Computer Security Problems Research Articles

Seeing-Is-Believing: using camera phones for human-verifiable authentication

Current mechanisms for authenticating communication between devices that share no prior context are inconvenient for ordinary users, without the assistance of a trusted authority. We present and analyse Seeing-Is-Believing (SiB), a system that utilises 2D barcodes and camera-phones to implement a visual channel for authentication and demonstrative identification of devices. We apply this visual channel to several problems in computer security, including authenticated key exchange between devices that share no prior context, establishment of the identity of a TCG-compliant computing platform, and secure device configuration in the context of a smart home.

Detecting Danger: The Dendritic Cell Algorithm

The Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA) is inspired by the function of the dendritic cells of the human immune system. In nature, dendritic cells are the intrusion detection agents of the human body, policing the tissue and organs for potential invaders in the form of pathogens. In this research, and abstract model of DC behaviour is developed and subsequently used to form an algorithm, the DCA. The abstraction process was facilitated through close collaboration with laboratory-based immunologists, who performed bespoke experiments, the results of which are used as an integral part of this algorithm. The DCA is a population based algorithm, with each agent in the system represented as an ‘artificial DC’. Each DC has the ability to combine multiple data streams and can add context to data suspected as anomalous. In this chapter the abstraction process and details of the resultant algorithm are given. The algorithm is applied to numerous intrusion detection problems in computer security including the detection of port scans and botnets, where it has produced impressive results with relatively low rates of false positives.

On the imbalance of the security problem space and its expected consequences

PurposeThis paper aims to report on the results of an analysis of the computer security problem space, to suggest the areas with highest potential for making progress in the attacker‐defender game, and to propose questions for future research.Design/methodology/approachThe decomposition of the attacker‐defender game into technological, human, and social factors enables one to analyze the concentration of public research efforts by defenders. First, representative activities are selected, then each activity is mapped into the technological, human and social (THS) basis. Afterwards, citation databases are used to estimate the relative volume of publications on each selected activity in the science and engineering communities. Finally, drawing on a number of relevant theories in organizational theory, sociology, and political science, avenues for exploring the social dimension by the defenders are discussed.FindingsThe analysis suggests that over 94 percent of the public research in computer security has been concentrated on technological advances. Yet attackers seem to employ more and more human and social factors in their attacks. The social organization of the attackers allows them to achieve the results not possible otherwise, shifting the balance in their favour. It is suggested that the scope of research should be broadened, to involve organizational behavior and structure as well as social capital aspects that are currently not high on computer security research agenda.Research limitations/implicationsThe queries limit the search to public content written in the English language only. Since the authors are concerned with the relative (rather than absolute) volume of each activity, it is an open question whether this limitation biases the results.Practical implicationsAs the arms race in computer security progresses, social factors may become or already are increasingly important. The side that capitalizes on them sooner may gain the competitive advantage.Originality/valueA simple method for gauging the focus of research efforts in the computer security community and for considering computer security problem space through the lens of social sciences is developed.

An ethics and security course for students in computer science and information technology

This paper describes an undergraduate course in computer security that has a strong ethical component. Ethical and related security topics are interwoven. The emphasis is on the kind of research that computer scientists and information technologists are conducting in order to address the fundamental problems in computer security. There is also a great emphasis on encouraging student creativity.

Experimenting with Innate Immunity

Libtissue is a software system for implementing and testing AIS algorithms on real-world computer security problems. AIS algorithms are implemented as a collection of cells, antigen and signals interacting within a tissue compartment. Input data to the tissue comes in the form of realtime events generated by sensors monitoring a system under surveillance, and cells are actively able to affect the monitored system through response mechanisms. libtissue is being used by researchers on a project at the University of Nottingham to explore the application of a range of immune-inspired algorithms to problems in intrusion detection. This talk describes the architecture and design of libtissue, along with the implementation of a simple algorithm and its application to a computer security problem.

Remote Job Submission Security.

This paper presents the middleware needed to deploy jobs to non-geographically colocated clusters with decentralized look-up severs. We have named our framework the Initium Remote Job Submission (RJS) system. Initium generates a jar file that is signed by a trusted certificate authority CA [Lyon]. The jar is run by a Computation Server (CS), (a remote computer running the Initium Computer Server Software). A Web Server (WS) has a Java Network Launch Protocol (JNLP) file that makes reference to a signed jar file on a web server. The signed jar file contains a job for the computation server. This jar file is called the computation jar. The computation jar is executed on the CS and the answer is sent back to the server using RMI over SSL (RMI/SSL). A look-up server (LUS) is used to register computation servers as they come on line. When a computation server is started, it registers with a LUS. The LUS then updates its list of computation servers, in the cluster. Look-up servers can be started using Java Web Start. They can be contacted with multicast protocols. 1 THE DISTRIBUTED COMPUTING SECURITY PROBLEM We seek to create a framework that exploits idle CPU’s on the network. We are subject to the constraint that our code must be downloaded over the Internet (that is, a normally insecure channel). Further that the configuration should be automatic. In addition, the code should be verified as originating from a trusted source. Finally, computed answers should be returned over a secure link to a Web Server (WS). The web server is able to hold “jobs” for deployment, and hold computed answers. 1.1 Approach Our approach for authentication and encryption is to use Java Secure Socket Extension (JSSE) to implement a Java technology version of Secure Socked Layer (SSL) protocols. This is integrated into the Java 2 SDK, Standard Edition v 1.4 [Sun 2004]. Our goal is to securely download a list of jobs to the LUS, and securely upload the answer jar to the WS. All LUS – CS commutation is on the LAN behind the firewall. Most grid systems use SSL for authentication, but by default do not establish encrypted communication in a secure manner [Globus 2]. Our approach requires that we encrypt all WS-LUS communication via a session key. In order to establish the session key, WS and LUS must agree on shared key, without sending any secret data in the clear. To do this, REMOTE JOB SUBMISSION SECURITY 14 JOURNAL OF OBJECT TECHNOLOGY VOL. 5 NO. 1 we use the RSA key exchange algorithm as a standard method for SSL key exchange. In RSA key exchange, the WS encrypts a number of random bytes with the LUS's public RSA key and they both use this shared secret to create the session keys. In order to guarantee the integrity of the messages, we use the Message-Digest 5 (MD5) algorithm. The MD5 algorithm is intended for digital signature applications, where a large file must be compressed in a secure manner before being encrypted with a private (secret) key under a public-key cryptosystem such as RSA [Rivest]. The CS receives a URL to a jnlp file and downloads the Java Web Start “job” in order to compute it. The owner of the CS must accept the job owner certificate. Once the certificate is trusted, all jobs signed by it will be executed automatically. RSA algorithms ensure secure communication and MD5 message digest ensures that no one has altered the data in transit. An alternative approach to security might use the Kerberos network authentication protocol [Kerberos] or SSH protocol [OpenSSH]. However, such tools are vulnerable, as the attackers can gain access to user's password as it is being typed [Basney]. 1.2 Motivation Industrial computers are typically idle 14 or more hours per workday. If we assume that they are also idle on the weekend then they are idle 118 hours out of every 168 hours during the week (i.e., 70% of the time). We are motivated to address security issues in grid computing because an insecure network could be exploited by an advisory in order to gain access to data, destroy data, and steal logins or services (email, CPU cycles). Users will not agree to donate their CPU time without an assurance of security. A grid-based virus can spread faster than a normal virus, since it uses push technology to deploy itself and runs on-demand. Grids need to be protected not only because they are high-value assets representing lots of hardware and software, but also because they often serve a strategic function that's central to success [Myer].

US National Science Foundation: $19m security research programme

The US National Science Foundation (NSF) plans to set up a research programme for long-term solutions to computer security problems. The NSF – an independent federal agency that supports research and education in science and engineering – expects to provide almost $19 million in funding for the programme over a period of five years. The US National Science Foundation (NSF) plans to fund an IT security research programme worth almost $19 million over a five-year period. The NSF - an independent federal agency that supports research and education in science and engineering - describes the research initiative which will be led by the University of California, Berkeley - as “a major collaborative cybersecurity project”. A new Science and Technology Center will bring together researchers with a strong background in security research from eight academic institutions along with industrial and government partners. Other participants include Cornell University, Carnegie Mellon and Stanford. Industrial partners will include Bellsouth, Cisco Systems, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Intel and Microsoft. The consortium will be called ‘TRUST’ - Team for Research in Ubiquitous Secure Technology - and according to one of the participants, the aim of the research is to create new technologies “and perhaps even new social institutions, that will make it possible to build computer software and networks that are inherently secure”.

Does Trusted Computing Remedy Computer Security Problems?

The authors examine whether trusted computing is likely to remedy the relevant security problems in PCs. They argue that although trusted computing has some merits, it neither provides a complete remedy nor is it likely to prevail in the PC mass market.

Security in autonomic computing

Over the last fifteen years the world has experienced a wide variety of computer virus and general computer security problems, against which a wide variety of countermeasures have been deployed. The record tells us that what most strongly determines the size and nature of the worldwide virus and security problem is not any particular countermeasure or security technology, but rather the characteristics of the underlying platform (the operating system, macro execution environment, and so on). Autonomic computing is a new effort, intended to make IT systems more self-managing. Since it undertakes to change the nature of the underlying computing platform, it is likely to change the size and nature of the world's virus and security problem as well. This paper briefly describes both the relevant historical record and some current architectural approaches to autonomic computing, and offers a few thoughts on how autonomic computing relates to computer security and virus prevention.

Magic boxes and boots: security in hardware

Computer users tend to think of computation - even the globally distributed computation that constitutes the Internet - in terms of what we see: the browser user interface, the text editor, the Gnome or OS X or Windows desktop. Similarly, we tend to think of computer security problems solely in terms of what users see: the application software, perhaps the OS underneath it, or perhaps even the "end to end" environment from one application installation to another. We discuss how hardware can be used to change the security game. From a security perspective, the first idea that comes to mind is to add a "magic box" to the computer - one that can hide secrets and computation even from an adversary with direct physical access.

A Model for When Disclosure Helps Security: What Is Different About Computer and Network Security?

This Article asks the question: When does disclosure actually help security? The discussion begins with a paradox. Most experts in computer and network security are familiar with the slogan that there is no security through obscurity. The Open Source and encryption view is that revealing the details of a system will actually tend to improve security, notably due to peer review. In sharp contrast, a famous World War II slogan says loose lips sink ships. Most experts in the military and intelligence areas believe that secrecy is a critical tool for maintaining security. Both cannot be right - disclosure cannot both help and hurt security. Using a law and economics approach to resolve the paradox, Part I provides a model for deciding when either the Open Source or the military/intelligence viewpoints is likely to be correct. The model analyzes the costs and benefits of disclosure for both attackers and defenders. The model also sheds light on when disclosure is likely to provide net benefits in two other important cases: information sharing (such as between the FBI and the CIA) and the public domain. Part II explains why many computer and network security problems appear different from the traditional security problems of the physical world. The analysis focuses on the nature of the first-time attack or the degree of what the paper calls uniqueness in the defense. Many defensive tricks, including secrecy, are more effective the first time there is an attack on a physical base or computer system. Secrecy is far less effective, however, if the attackers can probe the defenses repeatedly and learn from those probes. It turns out that many of the key areas of computer security involve circumstances where there can be repeated, low-cost attacks. For instance, firewalls, mass-market software, and encryption algorithms all can be attacked repeatedly by hackers. Under such circumstances, a strategy of secrecy - of security through obscurity - is less likely to be effective than for the military case. Part III applies the analytic tools developed earlier in the paper to issues including the following: the enlargement of the public domain in a world of search engines; the relationship between disclosure and deterrence; the importance of not disclosing passwords or the combination to a safe; why secrecy in surveillance may improve security (while also threatening other important values); and variables that affect when Open Source or proprietary software may provide better security. Part III also explains how the academic literature on the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis can illuminate important issues in computer and network security. In short, this Article provides the first systematic explanation of how to decide when disclosure improves security, both for physical- and cyber-security settings.

Software security

Software security is the idea of engineering software so that it continues to function correctly under malicious attack. Most technologists acknowledge this undertaking's importance, but they need some help in understanding how to tackle it. The article aims to provide that help by exploring software security best practices. A central and critical aspect of the computer security problem is a software problem. Software defects with security ramifications, including implementation bugs such as buffer overflows and design flaws such as inconsistent error handling, promise to be with us for years. All too often, malicious intruders can hack into systems by exploiting software defects. Internet-enabled software applications present the most common security risk encountered today, with software's ever-expanding complexity and extensibility adding further fuel to the fire. By any measure, security holes in software are common, and the problem is growing.

Computer security and operating system updates

Application and operating system errors are a continuing source of problems in computer security. As businesses increase the number of servers through distributed computing and server farms, it becomes more difficult to keep the systems up to date. A survey of security professionals reveals that most find it difficult to keep up to date with security patches. Consequently, developing more automated management tools is an important step in improving enterprise security.

An artificial immune system architecture for computer security applications

With increased global interconnectivity and reliance on e-commerce, network services and Internet communication, computer security has become a necessity. Organizations must protect their systems from intrusion and computer virus attacks. Such protection must detect anomalous patterns by exploiting known signatures while monitoring normal computer programs and network usage for abnormalities. Current anti-virus and network intrusion detection (ID) solutions can become overwhelmed by the burden of capturing and classifying new viral strains and intrusion patterns. To overcome this problem, a self-adaptive distributed agent-based defense immune system based on biological strategies is developed within a hierarchical layered architecture. A prototype interactive system is designed, implemented in Java and tested. The results validate the use of a distributed-agent biological system approach toward the computer security problems of virus elimination and ID.

Programming language methods in computer security

This invited talk will give a personal view of the field of computer security and summarize some ways that methods from the study of programming language principles can be applied to problems in computer security. Some background information is provided here in this short document.

Steps to a successful creation of a corporate threat management plan

One of the problems of computer security is deciding on how much security is necessary for proper control of system and network assets. This gets down to the concept of threat assessment or, more specifically, what do you have and who would want it? While it sounds relatively simple to state, it's not that easy to assess corporate network threats unless you approach things in a structured manner. In this article, the basics of threat assessment are discussed with some thought placed on how to identify who wants to take what you have or hurt you in some way.

Security in Distributed Computing

Glen Bruce and Rob Dempsey Prentice Hall PTR, Upper Saddle River, NJ, 1997, 456 pp. ISBN 0-13-182908-4, $56.00 This book is well written and organized to cover all aspects of computer security, especially in distributed computing environments. The overall computer security problems in computer systems, computer networks and database systems are explained throughout the book. Furthermore, the computer security problems are covered in balance based on the views and approaches of the business and technology sides. The book is organized with four parts. The introductory part 1 begins with a good overview of the security problems in distributed computing environments. In part 2, the foundations of computer security are discussed. Chapter 3 covers computing security basics by using the trust model which consists of identification, authentication, authorization, confidentiality, integrity, nonrepudiation, and so on. Chapter 4 explains the security architecture model which is based on foundation control and trust models. The following chapter 5 illustrates the foundation model that is based on security policy, security principles, security criteria and standards, and education. Chapter 6 discusses security policies based on corporate principles and business code of conduct. In part 3, all aspects of computer security technologies are covered. Chapter 7 begins with the illustration of what is a trusted network, which is followed by the discussions of System Network Architecture (SNA) and Transmission Control Protocol and Internet Protocol (TCP/IP). Chapter 8 explains network operating systems mostly based on Novell’s NetWare as well as other networking operating systems. Chapter 9 illustrates client/server system and Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) briefly. The security problems and possible corresponding solutions are explained well in chapters 10 through 12, which are followed by chapter 13 specifying Windows NT security. Chapter 14 explains the security problems and requirements connecting the network to the Internet by using a firewall machine as an example. Chapter 15 illustrates Data Encryption Standard (DES) private key encryption, and RSA public key encryption which are very well to understand. Chapter 16 covers the Distributed Computing Environment (DCE) from the Open Software Foundation (OSF) which provides the fundamental middleware services that allow clients and servers to work in a secure way. The following chapter 17 enhances the discussion of the fundamental aspects of DCE of chapter 16. Chapter 18 extends to the illustration of the security features in distributed database systems. The last chapter in part 2 explains the On-Line Transaction Processing (OLTP) by using available commercial products. In part 4, chapter 20 begins with how to design client-server applications satisfying security issues discussed in the previous chapters. Chapter 21 shows the examples of applying computer security in electronic mail and groupware. The following chapters 22 and 23 discuss how to manage security in the distributed system environments and how to develop a suitable security strategy for organizations. Chapter 24 explains well about all aspects related to auditing in computer systems. The final chapter of this book concludes with describing the security issues in the future. This book is an important reference book for anyone interested in computer security in distributed computing and especially for those beginners in the computer security field. The book is one of the better computer security books that is easy to follow. Haklin Kimm, University of Tennessee

Threat assessment: steps to successful creation of a corporate threat management plan

One of the problems of computer security is deciding on how much security is necessary for proper control of system and network assets. This gets down to the concept of threat assessment or, more specifically, what do you have and who would want it? While it sounds relatively simple to state, it's not that easy to assess corporate network threat unless you approach things in a structured manner. In this article, the basics of threat assessment are discussed with some thought placed on how to identify who wants to take what you have or hurt you in some way.

Cybernetic analysis of the 12th U.S. National Computer Security Conference

This report is an anlysis of the 1989 12th U.S. National Computer Security Conference using the SIIS project's cybernetic analysis methodology SBC. The papers presented at the conference are classified using the SBC static classification scheme. Once the papers are classified the SBC dynamic classification scheme is used to chart trends and tendencies in the computer security problems and solutions.

A proposal for an architectural approach which apparently solves all known software-based internal computer security problems

Computer security violations have become a serious threat to both corporate and national defense activities. By extending the work done by Myers et. el. in the development of the capability based addressing system for the SWARD at IBM, a Computer architectural approach has been developed which solves all known software based internal computer security problems. The problems solved include (but are not restricted to):(1) Violations of priority and access priveleges by highly skilled users,(2) The clasic "Trojan Horse" problem,(3) Access and alteration of sensitive data-bases by unauthorized users(4) The "Lost Key" problem of advanced capability based addressing systems.This solution proposes and develops an architectural approach which manages a sophisticated capability based addressing system entirely in hardware. As a result, the architectures developed by this approach tend to be somewhat hardware intensive in that they require unusual amounts of control and memory not available to any user (it is maintained soley for security purposes).