We consider the problem of finding the best time to stop a diffusion process for an agent with a preference model that is a mixture of expected utility theory (EUT) and cumulative prospect theory (CPT). In view of time-inconsistency, we consider two types of agents: a naive agent, who is not aware of the time-inconsistency and thus re-plans at every instant, and a sophisticated agent, who is aware of the time-inconsistency and takes a so-called intra-personal equilibrium strategy by correctly anticipating her actions in the future. We show that under a wide range of the CPT preference parameter values, the naive agent will never stop. For a sophisticated agent, we use a different notion of intra-personal equilibrium from the one employed by Ebert and Strack (2018). We show that any two-threshold strategy, which is to stop when the diffusion process reaches either an upper threshold or a lower threshold, cannot be an intra-personal equilibrium if the agent overweights worst, unlikely outcomes disproportionally. We derive a sufficient and necessary condition for the strategy of stopping everywhere to be an intra-personal equilibrium and show that this condition does not hold and thus the sophisticated agent may choose to start the diffusion process for some commonly used probability weighting functions.
Read full abstract