Pro-choice Advocates Research Articles

Linguistic encoding of women’s agency in the German political discourse on abortion: A diachronic Critical Discourse Analysis

This research, rooted in the Critical Discourse Analysis framework, employs a mixed-methods approach to examine debates on abortion legislation in the German Bundestag. Focusing on the attribution of agency to women through semantic role assignment in the context of abortion procedures, the study utilises both qualitative analysis and quantitative data analysis techniques. Five debates spanning the 1970s, 1990s and 2010s were examined using the qualitative analysis tool MAXQDA. Results consistently indicate that arguments referring to women are predominantly assigned semantic roles associated with passivity and relatively low agency. This pattern persists regardless of the ideological stance, transcending divides between pro-life and pro-choice advocates. This perpetuates and reinforces the societal perception of women as passive, upholding a traditional gender stereotype within the discourse. A larger number of arguments referring to women were found in the pro-choice data compared to the pro-life data, indicating a greater emphasis on women within the argumentation of pro-choice speakers. The study underscores the enduring impact of language on shaping perceptions of women’s agency in the context of abortion legislation debates.

“That is when I understood everything”: Ideological trajectories of pro-choice female doctors in Mexico

ObjectivesThere is little global evidence about how physicians become abortion clinicians or advocates. We describe the ideological trajectories of self-identified pro-choice female Mexican doctors and the factors that made them become pro-choice. Study DesignIn this qualitative study we conducted semi-structured interviews with members of the Mexican Network of Female Pro-choice Physicians (Red de Médicas por el Derecho a Decidir - México). Participants came from 8 diverse states in Mexico. We used a feminist epistemology approach and analyzed data using inductive coding as well as a priori categories (becoming pro-choice, trajectories, and training). ResultsWe included 24 female pro-choice physicians. We identified five intersecting factors that influenced becoming pro-choice: feminism, personal experiences, confrontation with the inequalities and violence that women experience, role models, and routine exposure to abortion care. Participants described three ideological trajectories: being pro-choice before studying medicine, not having a specific opinion, and changing from “pro-life” to “pro-choice”. Participants described an absence of abortion training in medical schools or stigmatizing training, and the use of alternative training sources. ConclusionIn the absence of training on abortion during the medical education, a combination of intersecting personal as well as work-related experience may turn doctors in to pro-choice abortion clinicians and/or advocates. Training on abortion care in medical education and stigma reduction in Mexican society is essential. The findings of this study may be used to develop comprehensive medical curricula as well as strategies directed at doctors in who have never received training on abortion care, such as promoting interactions between doctors and non-medical abortion providers, education on inequalities and violence against women, moving beyond a public health to a human rights and gender perspective, and exposure to routine safe abortion care. ImplicationsMexican female doctors become pro-choice clinicians who provide abortion care and/or advocates in spite of their medical education.

Schrödinger’s Fetus and Relational Ontology: Reconciling Three Contradictory Intuitions in Abortion Debates

Pro-life and pro-choice advocates battle for rational dominance in abortion debates. Yet, public polling (and general legal opinion) demonstrates the public’s preference for the middle ground: that abortions are acceptable in certain circumstances and during early pregnancy. Implicit in this, are two contradictory intuitions: (1) that we were all early fetuses, and (2) abortion kills no one. To hold these positions together, Harman and Räsänen have argued for the Actual Future Principle (AFP) which distinguishes between fetuses that will develop into persons and those that will never develop into persons. However intellectually ingenious their solutions are, they fail to account for a third intuition: that the death of a wanted fetus – e.g. through termination or miscarriage – is of moral significance. Not only is this practically important, but it is also supported by public opinion. The authors of this paper argue that relational ontology can modify the AFP to better account for all three intuitions. Furthermore, it further emphasizes the pivotal role of the pregnant person who relates to their own fetus in either personal or impersonal ways. Addressing the fundamental challenges of relational ontology, the authors defend the position that human personal identity is ultimately relational.

Relating to foetal persons: why women's Voices come first and last, but not alone in Abortion debates.

Abortion remains a controversial topic, with pro-life and pro-choice advocates clashing fiercely. However, public polling demonstrates that the vast majority of the Western public holds a middle position: being in favour of abortion but not in all circumstances nor at any time. The intuitions held by the majority seem to imply a contradiction: two early foetuses at the same point in development have different moral statuses. Providing coherent philosophical grounding for this intuition has proved challenging. Solutions given by philosophers such as Feinberg, Harman and Räsänen are complex and do not fully account for the lived experience of pregnancy loss. This article argues for a relational ontological construction of human personhood as the basis of foetal personhood. This approach takes seriously the literature of pregnancy loss and the lived experiences of pregnant persons. Focusing on the manner in which persons relate to early foetuses (especially pregnant persons), provides a coherent ground for distinct foetal value. Importantly, this approach is both simple and intuitive. Therefore, it can be more easily adopted by middle. To counter an implied equality of human relationality, the article argues for a clear hierarchy based on relational proximity that affirms pregnant persons? primary role in deciding the moral significance of foetal termination.

Respecting Fetal Life Within Pro-choice Advocacy: Conceding to Some Pro-life Concerns (and Asking the Same in Return)

This paper will explain three reasons why pro-choice advocates should move away from arguments in favor of abortion choice that is dependent upon the fetus’ non-personhood, and more towards generating arguments in favor of abortion choice that embraces a more respectful view of fetal life. First, the future of the legal right to an abortion in the United States may depend on generating an argument that does not rely on denying fetal personhood. Second, pro-choice advocates should be more respectful of fetal life because the hesitancy of doing so has not gone over well in the general public. Even individuals who are sympathetic to a pro-choice perspective are sometimes hesitant to align themselves with the pro-choice community because of the perception that it is antithetical to the value of fetal life. The third reason is that some women who choose abortion regard it as a morally significant act precisely because they regard the fetus as a morally significant being.

Abortion Is Healthcare: Lessons From a Public Hospital

Abortion Is Healthcare:Lessons From a Public Hospital Amy Zanoni (bio) Since the Supreme Court's Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization decision, many have invoked the coat hanger and the public hospital septic abortion ward as portents of life after the fall of Roe. Illinois Governor J. B. Pritzker was one of many pro-choice advocates who made direct reference to Ward 41 at Chicago's public hospital, Cook County Hospital. But by only paying attention to the horror stories of botched abortions in the pre-Roe era, we miss the other lessons that public hospitals like Cook County can teach us: even during Roe, access to abortion was limited, hard-fought, and dependent on local conditions. Public hospitals are key to understanding the brutal consequences of policies that limit people's access to healthcare, as well as the role that local governments often play in a country with no national healthcare system. In providing care to everyone who came through its doors, the public hospital approximated the right to healthcare. When county, state, and federal lawmakers undermined the right to reproductive care, Chicagoans demanded its reinstatement at Cook County Hospital. These struggles and the hospital's history shed light on the importance of tethering demands for reproductive rights to a more expansive welfare state and healthcare system. They also help us understand the crucial importance of federal action. Cook County Hospital Before Roe The State of Illinois passed its first anti-abortion law in 1827. But making abortion illegal never prevented women from having abortions. In the twentieth century, even before Roe, "abortion was not extraordinary, but ordinary," according to historian Leslie Reagan. Women with means were often able to access safe abortions in doctors' or midwives' offices. Low-income women were more likely to self-induce abortion and, as a result, more likely to suffer complications and end up in the hospital. [End Page 33] In Chicago, more often than not, that hospital was Cook County. Opened in 1866 to fulfill the county's legal obligation to finance medical care for the indigent, County (as it was called by many Chicagoans) provided a full spectrum of healthcare to the city's marginalized people. Communities of color, especially Black Chicagoans, relied disproportionately on County, the city's only public hospital until the 1990s. Historically barred from the industrial jobs most likely to provide insurance, Black Chicagoans were uninsured at higher rates. Private hospitals also routinely discriminated against Black Chicagoans. Medicaid, created in 1965, left out many people because the program was means-tested and because many private providers did not care for publicly insured patients. Before and after Roe, County provided care, reproductive and otherwise, to Chicagoans who needed it. Public hospitals all over the country played similar roles. In 1934, County admitted 1,159 patients suffering complications related to abortion; in 1949, the number reached 1,683 patients—about thirty-two per week in a city of approximately 3.6 million. By the early 1960s, hospital personnel cared for around 5,000 patients suffering complications from abortions annually. In 1965, one abortion patient was admitted to County for every 4.1 deliveries, compared to 1 in 10.8 at other Chicago hospitals. A twenty-one-year-old woman who underwent an illegal abortion in September 1970 was one such patient. An ambulance first brought her to a private hospital less than two miles from her South Side home. But hospital personnel sent her to County, about five miles to the northwest, claiming they had no obstetric beds available and that she had not previously seen a doctor on staff. (Private hospitals routinely sent uninsured or otherwise "undesirable" patients to County, a practice advocates decried as "patient dumping.") When she arrived at County, she was hemorrhaging and, according to the Chicago Daily Defender, "reacting adversely to poisoning from the dead fetus" left in her uterus. She died soon after. Cook County Hospital After Roe Roe v. Wade made abortion legal in 1973. But it did not guarantee the right to abortion: the absence of a comprehensive healthcare system put the onus on pregnant people to find providers and pay for abortions, as scholars including Dorothy Roberts and...

The right to choose to abort an abortion: should pro-choice advocates support abortion pill reversal?

Abortion pill reversal (APR) treatment aims to halt an initiated medical abortion, wherein a pregnant woman takes progesterone after having taken the first of the two consecutive abortion pills, typically because she has changed her mind and no longer wants to abort the pregnancy. It is a controversial intervention, generally supported by those identifying as pro-life and opposed by those identifying as pro-choice. This paper examines whether, in principle, those identifying with the pro-choice view should support APR. We firstly examine the commitments of the pro-choice stance. We then briefly outline the evidence supporting the APR. Following this, we discuss potential consequences of APR on women’s mental health and its safety. We conclude that those espousing the pro-choice standpoint should be, in principle, committed to supporting the availability of APR, while recognising that data on its efficacy may be difficult to obtain.

Is Pregnancy Really a Good Samaritan Act?

AbstractOne of the most influential philosophical arguments in favor of the permissibility of abortion is Judith Jarvis Thomson’s violinist analogy, presented in “A Defense of Abortion.” Its appeal for prochoice advocates lies in Thomson’s granting that the fetus is a person with equivalent moral status to any other human being, and yet demonstrating—to those who accept her reasoning—that abortion is still permissible. In her argument, Thomson draws heavily on the parable of the Good Samaritan, arguing that gestating a fetus in some circumstances is what she calls a Good Samaritan act, and claiming that we are not morally required to be Good Samaritans. Here, I argue that Thomson has subverted the parable to justify an action that is the antithesis of its meaning. I contend that Christians are required to be Good Samaritans, and explain that for Christians, this entails that abortion is impermissible in all circumstances. Furthermore, I argue that the parable shows that the fetus is our neighbor in need of our mercy and assistance, and consequently, Christians should be actively involved in helping to ensure the unborn are protected, whether they are fetuses in danger of induced abortion or miscarriage, or surplus frozen embryos.

If fetuses are persons, abortion is a public health crisis.

Pro-life advocates commonly argue that fetuses have the moral status of persons, and an accompanying right to life, a view most pro-choice advocates deny. A difficulty for this pro-life position has been Judith Jarvis Thomson's violinist analogy, in which she argues that even if the fetus is a person, abortion is often permissible because a pregnant woman is not obliged to continue to offer her body as life support. Here, we outline the moral theories underlying public health ethics, and examine the COVID-19 pandemic as an example of public health considerations overriding individual rights. We argue that if fetuses are regarded as persons, then abortion is of such prevalence in society that it also constitutes a significant public health crisis. We show that on public health considerations, we are justified in overriding individual rights to bodily autonomy by prohibiting abortion. We conclude that in a society that values public health, abortion can only be tolerated if fetuses are not regarded as persons.

Disability and Reproductive Justice

Since at least the 1960s, public debate over abortion rights has frequently turned to issues of disability. Those who argue for liberalization of abortion laws have often been successful by raising the specter of fetal disability — whether caused by Thalidomide, or rubella, or otherwise. Those who agitate for restricting or banning abortion, by contrast, have often argued that pro-choice advocates devalue the lives of people with disabilities. In the spring of 2019, disability and abortion rights collided at the Supreme Court. Indiana had adopted a law “barring the knowing provision of sex-, race-, or disability-selective abortions by abortion providers.” The Seventh Circuit invalidated that law. In Box v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana & Kentucky, the Supreme Court denied certiorari (though it summarily reversed the Seventh Circuit’s invalidation of a separate Indiana law regulating the disposal of fetal remains). Justice Thomas concurred in the denial of certiorari, but he filed a lengthy separate opinion arguing that the ban on selective abortions was constitutional. He argued that “this law and other laws like it promote a State’s compelling interest in preventing abortion from becoming a tool of modern-day eugenics.” Just a few months earlier, disability and reproductive rights issues had intersected in a very different way in the debate over the nomination of Brett Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court. Disability rights advocates drew attention to an opinion then-Judge Kavanaugh had written in a case in which individuals with developmental disabilities challenged a District of Columbia policy that denied them the right to make decisions about their medical care. The case was Doe ex rel. Tarlow v. District of Columbia. The D.C. Circuit reversed a district court decision enjoining that policy. Judge Kavanaugh’s opinion did not say anything specifically about reproductive rights. He treated the case entirely as one about the (lack of a) right of incompetent persons to consent to medical treatment. But the case itself was very much a reproductive rights case. Two of the three plaintiffs had been forced to have abortions without their consent; they sued precisely to challenge the policy that had taken away their power to choose. Although Kavanaugh had a reputation as a strong “pro-life” judge, here he voted to uphold government decisions to require individuals with intellectual disabilities to have abortions. Debate over disability and reproductive rights has typically focused on the issues raised by Justice Thomas’s opinion in Box — whether fetal disability is an acceptable reason for terminating a pregnancy, and what the law should do about it. Those are important questions. But any full assessment of the intersection between disability and reproductive rights must also address the issues raised by then-Judge Kavanaugh’s opinion in Doe. Disabled people are frequently denied their own rights to conceive, bear, and parent children, whether through forced sterilization or abortion, the denial of assisted reproduction, or the denial of parental rights once their children are born. Some of these practices — notably forced sterilization — are emblematic of the Eugenics Era. But they are not at all confined to the past. Indeed, the practices that prevent people with disabilities from having and raising children — practices like the law Kavanaugh upheld in Doe — are in many ways the disability analogues of the race-based eugenic practices that Justice Thomas himself decried in his Box opinion. This essay offers a fuller consideration of the intersection of disability and reproductive rights. It does so by considering the legal and societal treatment of fetuses and children with disabilities alongside the legal and societal treatment of parents with disabilities. And it does so by bringing to bear insights drawn from two distinct social movements: the disability rights movement, and the reproductive justice movement. The piece argues that, taken together, the disability rights and reproductive justice perspectives offer substantial purchase on the questions raised by Justice Thomas in his Box concurrence. Those perspectives suggest that the questions are serious indeed but that Thomas gave the wrong answer to them. They also suggest that any effort to address the intersection of disability and reproductive rights needs to address the questions raised by then-Judge Kavanaugh’s Doe opinion — and that Kavanaugh, too, gave the wrong answer.

An Unnatural Reading of History: The Revisionist History of Abortion in Hodes v. Schmidt

Recently, in Hodes v. Schmidt, the Kansas Supreme Court concluded that women have a natural right to procure an abortion and that this right is subject to broader protection than afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment. Hodes relied on some of the most influential jurists and philosophers in legal history to support its reasoning, including John Locke, Edward Coke, and William Blackstone. Hodes explained that these jurists and philosophers acknowledged a natural right to bodily autonomy, and we agree with that proposition. However, in this Article, we demonstrate that Hodes failed to acknowledge specific statements from these jurists and philosophers condemning abortion. They did not believe that the natural right to bodily autonomy encompassed the right to procure an abortion. Hodes further erred by referencing specific statements on matters unrelated to abortion to support its conclusion. The court's errors created a precedent with far-reaching implications. For example, under a fair reading of Hodes, Kansans have a natural right to assisted suicide. We conclude that Hodes illustrates the danger of courts acknowledging natural rights. If courts are going to do so, they must exercise caution and restraint. Hodes has broad significance because it relied on Section 1 of the Kansas Bill of Rights. Identical or substantially similar language exists in thirty-three other state constitutions. Pro-choice advocates may reference Hodes in other jurisdictions with the hope of achieving broader protection for abortion rights than afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment. Furthermore, arguably, federal courts are becoming less favorable forums for pro-choice advocates. Moreover, there are other consequences to acknowledging a natural right. We hope to call into question the legitimacy of Hodes so as to limit its reach.

Is There a Right to the Death of the Foetus?

At some point in the future - perhaps within the next few decades - it will be possible for foetuses to develop completely outside the womb. Ectogenesis, as this technology is called, raises substantial issues for the abortion debate. One such issue is that it will become possible for a woman to have an abortion, in the sense of having the foetus removed from her body, but for the foetus to be kept alive. We argue that while there is a right to an abortion, there are reasons to doubt that there is a right to the death of the foetus. Our strategy in this essay is to consider and reject three arguments in favour of this latter right. The first claims that women have a right not to be biological mothers, the second that women have a right to genetic privacy, and the third that a foetus is one's property. Furthermore, we argue that it follows from rejecting the third claim that genetic parents also lack a right to the destruction of cryopreserved embryos used for in vitro fertilization. The conclusion that a woman possesses no right to the death of the foetus builds upon the claims that other pro-choice advocates, such as Judith Jarvis Thomson, have made.

Lobbying for the Unborn: The American Catholic Church and the Abortion Issue

Following the landmark 1973 Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade (410 US 113), there are around a million abortions performed each year in the United States. Originally a mere medical procedure which aims at delivering a woman from an unwanted pregnancy, abortion has become one of the most controversial issues of American life today. Actually, two opposing forces are constantly fighting to win legitimacy and impose their own views: on the one hand, the pro-abortion proponents who defend the right of women to control their own bodies and who believe that abortion is a fundamental right which should be protected by the Constitution; on the other, the pro-life advocates who, supported by the American Catholic Church, claim the sacredness of prenatal life from the moment of conception and urge legal and constitutional protection for unborn children. Although it may give way to unresolved questions about the beginning of human life or the status of the fetus in general, the present study is not meant to deal with the religious or theological aspect of abortion. Nor is it intended to fully assess the moral or ideological debate between pro-life and pro-choice advocates. One of its primary concerns, however, is to stress the special status of abortion as social and public policy issue. Interestingly, the American Catholic hierarchy has always been a deciding force in articulating opposition to abortion. It gave the right-to-life movement more than institutional support and legitimacy. It offered people, money, and brought focus and intensity of commitment against abortion. Its reaction to Roe v. Wade was immediate and condemnatory. In the immediate aftermath of the Supreme Court decision, it formed an ad hoc committee on pro-life activities to mount a campaign against legal access to abortion. Then, to press for the passage of Human Life Amendment, but also to protect its tax exempt status (legally preventing religious institutions from engaging in political activity), the Church established a lobby group: The National Committee for a Human Life Amendment. But amending the Constitution for the purpose of preserving prenatal life requires focused and coordinated political action. Besides the crucial necessity for local and grassroots mobilization, the Catholic prelates need first to broaden the base of support for their program and reach out beyond their Church, if they want to deflect charges that abortion is a mere “catholic-issue.” Their full involvement into the recent debate over Obama’s health care reform and the unrelenting pressure they exert on individual Congressmen to make sure that no federal funds could be used to pay for abortion on demand are a case in point.

Eggs and Abortion: "Women-Protective" Language Used by Opponents in Legislative Debates over Reproductive Health.

In this paper we undertake an examination of the presence of similar "women-protective" discourses in policy debates occurring over two bills on reproductive-related topics considered during the 2013 California legislature session. The first bill (AB154), now signed into law, allows nurse practitioners, certified nurse midwives, and physician assistants to perform first-trimester aspiration abortions. The second bill (AB926), had it passed, would remove the prohibition on paying women for providing eggs to be used for research purposes. Using frame analysis we find evidence of similar protective arguments by opponents of both bills, although these advocates do not share ideological positions on abortion rights or women's autonomy. In the case of AB154, anti-abortion advocates use language and frames that call for protecting the health of women against the imputed interests of the "abortion industry." In the case of AB926, feminists and pro-choice advocates evoke similar frameworks for the protection of women against the interests of the "medical research industry." Both sides argue for the "protection of women," from opposing positions on the rights and autonomy of women in relationship to reproductive freedom.

The Value of Choice and the Choice to Value: Expanding the Discussion about Fetal Life within Prochoice Advocacy

In this essay, I provide evidence that a new generation of prochoice advocates wishes to move away from defending abortion rights via the view that fetal life has little or no value (for example, as Mary Anne Warren does in her “On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion”) and toward a more complex view of abortion rights. This newer view simultaneously grants that fetuses are more than simply “clumps of cells,” that they are, to some extent, entities that possess some degree of value, and also that women still have the right to decide whether they wish to continue a pregnancy (for example, as can be found in the writings of Rosalind Hursthouse, Judith Jarvis Thomson, and Margaret Olivia Little). Prima facie, this may sound like an impossible task—an instance of “having your cake and eating it too”—but I will show throughout my paper that, and how, such a task can indeed be accomplished.

Death with “dignity”: The wedge that divides the disability rights movement from the right to die movement

Much of the American debate over physician assisted death (PAD) is framed as an ideological split between conservatives and liberals, pro life and pro choice advocates, and those who emphasize morality versus personal autonomy. Less examined, but no less relevant, is a split within the ranks of progressives—one that divides those supporting a right to die in the name of human rights from disability rights activists who invoke human rights to vehemently oppose euthanasia. This paper reviews how “dignity” serves both as a divisive wedge in this debate but also as a value that can span the divide between groups and open the way to productive discourse. Supporters of legalized euthanasia use “dignity” to express their position that some deaths might indeed be accelerated. At the same time, opponents adopt the concept to argue that physician assisted suicide stigmatizes life with a disability. To bridge this divide, the worldviews of two groups, Compassion & Choices and Not Dead Yet, are studied. The analysis concludes that the two organizations are more parallel than contrary—a finding that offers opportunities for dialogue and perhaps even advances in public policy.

Death with “dignity”:The wedge that divides the disability rights movement from the right to die movement

Much of the American debate over physician assisted death (PAD) is framed as an ideological split between conservatives and liberals, pro life and pro choice advocates, and those who emphasize morality versus personal autonomy. Less examined, but no less relevant, is a split within the ranks of progressives--one that divides those supporting a right to die in the name of human rights from disability rights activists who invoke human rights to vehemently oppose euthanasia. This paper reviews how "dignity" serves both as a divisive wedge in this debate but also as a value that can span the divide between groups and open the way to productive discourse. Supporters of legalized euthanasia use "dignity" to express their position that some deaths might indeed be accelerated. At the same time, opponents adopt the concept to argue that physician assisted suicide stigmatizes life with a disability. To bridge this divide, the worldviews of two groups, Compassion & Choices and Not Dead Yet, are studied. The analysis concludes that the two organizations are more parallel than contrary--a finding that offers opportunities for dialogue and perhaps even advances in public policy.

Dynamic Debates: An Analysis of Group Polarization Over Time on Twitter

The principle of homophily says that people associate with other groups of people who are mostly like themselves. Many online communities are structured around groups of socially similar individuals. On Twitter, however, people are exposed to multiple, diverse points of view through the public timeline. The authors captured 30,000 tweets about the shooting of George Tiller, a late-term abortion doctor, and the subsequent conversations among pro-life and pro-choice advocates. They found that replies between like-minded individuals strengthen group identity, whereas replies between different-minded individuals reinforce in-group and out-group affiliation. Their results show that people are exposed to broader viewpoints than they were before but are limited in their ability to engage in meaningful discussion. They conclude with implications for different kinds of social participation on Twitter more generally.

Visible hand or invisible fist?: the new market and choice in the English NHS

As England (unlike the rest of the UK) retreads the market route in health policy, it is worth asking two questions. Firstly, is the government right that the 'new market' (as it refuses to call it, except in private seminars) is fundamentally different from the 1990 s' internal market which New Labour allegedly abolished in 1997? Secondly, given that the new market is clearly not characterized by the invisible hand, should we characterize it as steered 'economically' by a visible (facilitating) hand, on the one hand, or managed 'politically' by a fist which would like to remain invisible in order to maintain its power? This article goes on to examine choice in the new NHS with reference to Hirschman (1970), arguing that genuflections to the latter by pro-choice advocates such as Le Grand (2003) are just that - genuflections. Hirschman is used as a taxi by which to reach a desired destination rather than a stimulus to critical reflection, Hirschman-style, upon how 'exit', 'voice', and particular combinations of 'exit' and 'voice' may produce perverse outcomes.

中國傳統身體觀與當代墮胎難題

中國傳統身體觀與當代墮胎難題