The EU is presently in a transition phase from environmental policy-making by law towards other governance approaches based upon networking, voluntary commitments, benchmarking and other forms of “soft law”. Those new governance approaches often claim to lead to “better regulation”, while adopting a more consensus-oriented and participatory style, taking economic aspects more seriously into account, allowing for more flexibility and autonomy for the private sector and Member States alike, mobilising a broader knowledge base or adopting more integrated and holistic approaches than previous sectoralised and compartmentalised policies. While the limitations of traditional regulatory approaches are widely accepted and cited, it is far from evident, that “new modes of governance” have greater capacity to solve problems than the old ones. There is an argument, that “better regulation” might by synonymous to a withdrawal and weakening of the regulatory state and hence effectively of the aspirations and objectives of environmental policies. An interesting case for an approach, combining the strengths of the old and the new approaches is the ongoing reform of chemicals policies. While some observers claim, that the proposed directive, “REACH” might belong to the outdated category of overcomplex and bureaucratic regulation, a closer look shows that there are many new forms of governance in REACH. This mixture or old and new may open a more realistic and promising perspective on the reform of European policy-making. In our paper we assess the effects and the interplay of the combination of different modes of governance using the example of REACH. We are particularly concerned with the question in how far the representation of interests may change when new modes of governance are introduced.