The U.S. proxy voting process is widely viewed as inefficient, opaque, and frequently inaccurate. The conventional wisdom is that voting inaccuracy has arisen largely as a result of decisions made in the 1960s to transition to a system of share immobilization pursuant to which most shares are held in “street name” by securities intermediaries as a fungible mass of shares that is not directly traceable to any individual. In particular, although the street name system facilitates securities trading, holding shares in fungible bulk makes it difficult, if not impossible, for street name investors to confirm that their shares are voted in accordance with their wishes since there is purportedly no way to provide end-to-end voting confirmations. Consequently, a number of academics and practitioners, including several SEC commissioners, have expressed an interest in exploring whether blockchain technology could provide end-to-end vote confirmations by enabling market participants to trace share ownership to the ultimate beneficial owner, and bypass the layers of intermediaries. But while blockchain technology may work in certain cases, it probably will not be the panacea that its proponents expect. Reliance on blockchain technology presumes that the aforementioned problems are primarily a function of existing technology. But several securities industry pilot projects have demonstrated that end-to-end vote confirmations are already possible under the existing proxy voting system, and in any event, the Depository Trust Corporation’s (“DTC”) Direct Registration System (“DRS”) Service has enabled investors to avoid holding their securities in street name since 1996. In addition, while blockchain technology could facilitate end-to-end voting, investors would have to hold custody of their own tokens and, for a number or reasons, many investors will not. More to the point, blockchains use public key cryptography, and the loss of private keys associated with a particular token would result in the loss of that token. Due to the complexities of safeguarding private keys, and the severe consequences for failing to do so, many token holders have relied on centralized exchanges or third-party custodians to hold their tokens and, absent a dramatic improvement in private key management technology, there is little reason to think that this trend will change. While this would seem to contradict one of the primary rationales for adopting blockchain technology – eliminating intermediaries – the logic is clear; after all, ask yourself if you have ever used the login reset function on a financial website because you have forgotten your username or password, and if the answer is “yes,” the rationale for delegating key management to third parties becomes completely understandable. There may be other problems with migrating the existing trading and clearance system to a blockchain. In particular, putting equity securities on a blockchain may increase the risk of a cyber attack on a holder of those securities. That’s because trades involving equity securities on a blockchain are cleared and settled nearly instantaneously, and the asset used in clearing and settling any such a trade is likely to be another blockchain token that is either a bearer instrument or easily converted into another token that is a bearer instrument. The proceeds of such an attack can, therefore, be easily laundered. Securities holders might avoid the problem by not disclosing that they own securities tokens, but most state laws require issuers to maintain records on the identity and holdings of their security holders and to give that information to security holders under certain circumstances. Federal securities laws also require security holders that meet certain ownership criteria to file beneficial ownership reports under Sections 13 and 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”). Finally, if equity securities are converted into tokens, there will presumably be an incentive to implement some form of blockchain voting. Yet a number of researchers have pointed out that using blockchains may exacerbate the problems inherent in internet voting. Moreover, unless the voting procedures are carefully thought out and implemented, migrating to a blockchain-based voting system could also facilitate vote buying.