Private Insurance Providers Research Articles

Empfehlungen zur Begutachtung von Sehnenschäden

Expert assessment of tendon injuries depends on differences between private and public insurance providers in the way preexisting conditions have to be taken into account. In most cases degenerative and injury-dependent factors have to be balanced. Common tendon injuries such as Achilles and biceps tendon ruptures as well as rotator cuff tears are discussed.

1990s: Decade of Change

As market principles took firmer hold in New Zealand public policy in the 1990s, ACC received close scrutiny and passed through three legislative revisions. The idea of opening ACC to competition from private insurance providers was moving up the policy agenda—and was briefly enacted in 1999, prior to a change in government. New management practices within ACC focused attention on cost containment, benefit levels, and experience-rated premiums for employers. This paper, by the current Chair of ACC, summarises the history of formal reviews, administrative changes, and legislative reforms across the decade, including the increasing emphasis on administrative efficiency.

Risk segmentation and equity in the Chilean mandatory health insurance system

For decades, the Chilean health system has included a requirement for dependent workers to spend a certain percentage of their wages on health insurance. Since 1981, workers have been able to choose between public insurance and several private insurance providers. The reforms introduced more choice, moving away from reliance on an exclusive public provider. By 1999, about half of the country's active dependent workers had opted out of the public and into the private insurance system. The development of the private insurance system has been accompanied by controversy, however, regarding possible inequities in the utilization of medical services, the degree of risk segmentation, inefficiencies in the system's operation, and other factors. This paper discusses the issues of risk segmentation and equity. It starts by reviewing the system's design on a theoretical level, then deriving hypothesis and finally providing empirical evidence regarding these hypothesis. Particular attention is given to the issues of how individuals choose between the public and private system (to determine the reasons behind risk segmentation) and the differences in utilization among the various income groups (to clarify the issue of possible inequities).

Self-selection and moral hazard in Chilean health insurance

We study the existence of self-selection and moral hazard in the Chilean health insurance industry. Dependent workers must purchase health insurance either from one public or several private insurance providers. For them, we analyze the relationship between health care services utilization and the choice of either private or public insurance. In the case of independent workers, where there is no mandate, we analyze the relationship between utilization and the decision to voluntarily purchase health insurance. The results show self-selection against insurance companies for independent workers, and against public insurance for dependent workers. Moral hazard is negligible in the case of hospitalization, but for medical visits, it is quantitatively important.

Assessing the Efficiency of an Insurance Provider - a Measurement Error Approach

The purpose of this paper is to compare the cost efficiency of private and public property insurance providers in Switzerland. The most commonly used measure for this kind of exercise is the Claims/Premium ratio. We argue that this measure may give strongly biased results. We develop a simple model to test whether the elasticity of premiums with respect to claims is less than unity. We address the fact that premium income is relatively stable across time, while claims are not, using estimation techniques that correct for measurement error. We develop tools to cope with heteroskedasticity in such measurement errors and apply the model to a data set on 19 firms in housing insurance markets in Switzerland. We show that the public insurance providers are about 20 per cent more cost efficient than their private counterparts.

Political Risk Investment Insurance

The crises that have occurred in Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe in the past eighteen months reminds investors that political and economic events do not merely have a potential to cause losses, but actually do cause losses. As the prospect of further aspects looms, investors are paying more careful attention to political risk assessment and management. This article discusses current developments affecting the political risk insurance market, particularly the various demand factors driving the market, some recent innovations, the increasing capacity, and the greater collaboration among private, national, and multilateral political risk insurance providers.