Domestic Private Credit Research Articles

Causality between Credit Depth and Economic Growth: Evidence from 24 OECD Countries

Causality between the ratio of domestic private credit to GDP and growth in real GDP per capita is investigated in a country-by-country time-series framework for 24 OECD economies over the period 1980–2013. The proposed threefold methodology to test for causal linkages integrates (i) lag-augmented VAR Granger causality tests, (ii) Breitung-Candelon causality tests in the frequency domain, and (iii) testing for causal inference based on a fully modified OLS (FMOLS) approach. For 12 of 24 countries in the sample, the three tests yield uniform results in terms of causality presence (absence) and direction. Causality running from credit depth to economic growth is found for the UK, Australia, Switzerland, and Greece. The findings lend no support to the view that financial development shifts from a supply-leading to demand-following pattern as economic development proceeds. The aggregate results mesh well with the current discussion on “too much finance” and disintermediation effects. However, idiosyncratic country determinants also appear significant.

Banking, debt, and currency crises in developed countries: Stylized facts and early warning indicators

We construct and explore a new quarterly dataset covering crisis episodes in 40 developed countries over 1970–2010. First, we present stylized facts on banking, debt, and currency crises. Using panel vector autoregression we find that banking and debt crises are interrelated and both typically precede currency crises, but not vice versa. Banking crises are the most costly in terms of the overall output loss, and output takes about six years to recover. Second, on a reduced sample we try to identify early warning indicators of crises specific to developed economies, accounting for model uncertainty by means of Bayesian model averaging. The most consistent result across the various specifications and time horizons is that significant growth of domestic private credit precedes banking crises, while rising money market rates and global corporate spreads are also leading indicators worth monitoring. For currency crises, we also corroborate the role of rising domestic private credit and money market rates and detect the relevance of domestic currency overvaluation. The role of other indicators differs according to the type of crisis and the warning horizon selected, but it mostly seems easier to find reliable predictors at a horizon shorter than two years. Early warning indicators of debt crises are difficult to uncover due to the low occurrence of such episodes in our dataset. We also employ a signaling approach to derive the threshold value for the best single indicator (domestic private credit), and finally we provide a composite early warning index that further increases the usefulness of the model.

Financial Globalization or Great Financial Expansion? The Impact of Capital Flows on Credit and Banking Crises

This paper empirically examines the impact of capital flows on credit growth, credit excesses and banking crises using quarterly panel data from 43 advanced (AEs) and emerging market economies (EMEs). Regressions show that gross capital inflows precede credit growth and credit excesses. Both gross inflows and high private domestic credit precede banking crises. Formalized hypotheses allow us to study whether domestic or international drivers more frequently precede banking crises, and thus to evaluate "financial globalization" and the "great financial expansion" as explanations for country vulnerability to banking crises. Our evidence provides support for both narratives as drivers of country vulnerability; financial globalization seems to matter particularly for EMEs. We also provide some ground for caution on the effectiveness of capital controls and the desirability of very high levels of private credit to GDP.

Banking, Debt and Currency Crises: Early Warning Indicators for Developed Countries

We construct and explore a new quarterly dataset covering crisis episodes in 40 developed countries over 1970–2010. First, we examine stylized facts of banking, debt, and currency crises. Using panel vector autoregression, we confirm that currency and debt crises are typically preceded by banking crises, but not vice versa. Banking crises are also the most costly in terms of the overall output loss, and output takes about six years to recover. Second, we try to identify early warning indicators of crises specific to developed economies, accounting for model uncertainty by means of Bayesian model averaging. Our results suggest that onsets of banking and currency crises tend to be preceded by booms in economic activity. In particular, we find that growth of domestic private credit, increasing FDI inflows, rising money market rates as well as increasing world GDP and inflation were common leading indicators of banking crises. Currency crisis onsets were typically preceded by rising money market rates, but also by worsening government balances and falling central bank reserves. Early warning indicators of debt crises are difficult to uncover due to the low occurrence of such episodes in our dataset. Finally, employing a signaling approach we show that using a composite early warning index significantly increases the usefulness of the model when compared to using the best single indicator (domestic private credit).

Financial Development, Financial Fragility, and Growth

This paper studies the apparent contradiction between two strands of the literature on the effects of financial intermediation on economic activity. On the one hand, the empirical growth literature finds a positive effect of financial depth as measured by, for instance, private domestic credit and liquid liabilities (e.g.,Levine, Loayza, and Beck 2000). On the other hand, the banking and currency crisis literature finds that monetary aggregates, such as domestic credit, are among the best predictors of crises and their related economic downturns (e.g., Kaminski and Reinhart 1999). The paper accounts for these contrasting effects based on the distinction between the short- and long-run impacts of financial intermediation. Working with a panel of cross-country and time-series observations, the paper estimates an encompassing model of short- and long-run effects using the Pooled Mean Group estimator developed by Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999). The conclusion from this analysis is that a positive long-run relationship between financial intermediation and output growth co-exists with a, mostly, negative short-run relationship. The paper further develops an explanation for these contrasting effects by relating them to recent theoretical models, by linking the estimated short-run effects to measures of financial fragility (namely, banking crises and financial volatility), and by jointly analyzing the effects of financial depth and fragility in classic panel growth regressions.

Financial Development, Financial Fragility, and Growth

This paper studies the apparent contradiction between two strands of the literature on the effects of financial intermediation on economic activity. On the one hand, the empirical growth literature finds a positive effect of financial depth as measured by, for instance, private domestic credit and liquid liabilities (e.g., Levine, Loayza, and Beck 2000). On the other hand, the banking and currency crisis literature finds that monetary aggregates, such as domestic credit, are among the best predictors of crises and their related economic downturns (e.g., Kaminski and Reinhart 1999). The paper accounts for these contrasting effects based on the distinction between the short- and long-run impacts of financial intermediation. Working with a panel of cross-country and time-series observations, the paper estimates an encompassing model of short- and long-run effects using the Pooled Mean Group estimator developed by Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999). The conclusion from this analysis is that a positive long-run relationship between financial intermediation and output growth co-exists with a, mostly, negative short-run relationship. The paper further develops an explanation for these contrasting effects by relating them to recent theoretical models, by linking the estimated short-run effects to measures of financial fragility (namely, banking crises and financial volatility), and by jointly analyzing the effects of financial depth and fragility in classic panel growth regressions.

Financial intermediation and growth: Some robustness results

We examine the relationship between financial intermediary development and economic growth using different instruments. We find a strong positive effect when financial intermediation is measured as private domestic credit or liquid liabilities, supporting earlier findings based on only one instrument.

Financial Development, Financial Fragility, and Growth

This paper studies the apparent contradictions between two strands of the literature on the effects of financial intermediation on economic activity. On the one hand, the empirical growth literature finds a positive effect of financial depth as measured by, for instance, private domestic credit and liquid liabilities. On the other hand, the banking and currency crisis literature finds that monetary aggregates, such as domestic credit, are among the best predictors of crises and their related economic downturns. This paper accounts for these contrasting effects based on the distinction between the short- and long-run effects of financial intermediation.

Growth-Financial Intermediation Nexus in China

This paper studies the relationship between economic growth and financial development in China during the post-1978 reform period. Recent studies, based on cross-country data, have found a positive association between these two variables. We find that while a positive correlation between growth and financial intermediation exists in China, the association is more apparent than real. The nonstate sector, which contributed most to China's remarkable growth during this period, did not use the domestic financial system in any substantial way for financing. The same appears to be true for the faster-growing provinces. Compared to foreign investment, domestic private credit played a relatively small, although statistically significant, role in financing the nonstate sector and fast-growing provinces.