Private Debt Market Research Articles

The Financial Intermediation and the Growth Nexus: Evidence from ASEAN Countries

The fundamental role of financial system is to inter relate the surplus holders (Savers) of the economy with the deficit holders (borrowers and investors or entrepreneurs) of the economy. This study is based in ASEAN context. By using annual macroeconomic data (1981–2014) from 9 ASEAN countries, and applying time series techniques of Granger causality and VECM, the study analysed the relationship between investment measured by gross capital formation (GCF) and different measures of financial development, such as; bank credit, stock market capitalisation, private debt market capitalisation, etc. This relationship is referred to as supply-leading hypothesis in finance growth literature. It is observed that the supply leading hypothesis is supported in case of stock market capitalisation only. In case of bank credit, credit by other institutions and private debt market, the hypothesis is supported in one country. It is observed that the credit system in the economy did not contributed significantly to the growth of these countries in the study period

Institutional Differences and International Private Debt Markets: A Test Using Mandatory IFRS Adoption

ABSTRACTInstitutional differences between countries result in additional information risks between borrowers and lenders in cross‐border private loans. This study examines the effect of these information risks on the structure of optimal debt contracts in international (cross‐border) versus domestic private debt markets. Using mandatory IFRS adoption as an indicator for institutional changes that reduced differences between countries, I compare attributes of international versus domestic loans before and after IFRS adoption. I find that, in the pre‐IFRS period, international loans are associated with a higher credit spread, a weaker relationship between the bank and the borrower, a more diffuse loan syndicate, and less reliance on accounting‐based covenants than domestic loans. These results are consistent with incremental information risks in international debt markets that make it more costly for lenders to screen and monitor borrower credit quality, resulting in a more arm's‐length relationship between borrowers and lenders. Many of these associations attenuate after IFRS adoption, suggesting that the pre‐IFRS differences in contract terms are driven by incremental information risks related to institutional differences between countries. My findings imply that incremental information risks result in a different optimal contract in international debt contracts compared to domestic debt contracts.

Loan-commitment borrowing and performance-sensitive debt

This paper examines a firm’s investment/financing decision when it uses loan-commitment-type debt with performance-sensitivity features. This analysis is of interest because most corporate borrowing today is by means of private debt, which tends to be of the loan-commitment type as well as contain performance-sensitivity provisions. We show that, except for the case of low leverage ratio, performance-sensitive debt makes shareholders better off relative to fixed-coupon debt. In particular, when the leverage ratio is chosen optimally, performance-sensitive debt dominates fixed-coupon debt and the resulting addition to shareholder wealth can be economically significant for reasonable parameter values. Therefore, it is not surprising that performance-sensitive debt has become so popular in the private debt market. The magnitude of shareholder wealth created by using performance-sensitive debt rather than fixed-coupon debt is an increasing function of earnings growth rate and tax rate, and a decreasing function of interest rate, earnings volatility and bankruptcy cost. Therefore, performance-sensitive debt financing is more likely to be used when earnings growth rate and tax rate are high, and interest rate, earnings volatility and bankruptcy cost are low.

Does mandatory IFRS adoption facilitate debt financing?

We examine whether the mandated introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is associated with the propensity to access the public rather than private debt market and the cost of debt. We use a global sample of public bonds and private loans and find that mandatory IFRS adopters are more likely, post-IFRS, to issue bonds than to borrow privately. We also find that mandatory IFRS adopters pay lower bond yield spreads, but not lower loan spreads, after the mandate. These findings are consistent with debt providers responding positively to financial reporting of higher quality and comparability, but only when there is a greater reliance on publicly available financial statements than private communication. Lastly, we document that the observed debt market benefits are concentrated in countries with larger differences between domestic GAAP and IFRS and are present even for EU countries that did not experience concurrent financial reporting enforcement or other institutional reforms. Overall, our study documents positive economic consequences around the mandated IFRS adoption for corporate debt financing and, in particular, for bond financing.

Political uncertainty and non-pricing terms of financial contract

The uncertainty embedded in the political environment has greatly impacts on the economy, firm level decision-making, and the cost of capital. This paper shifts the focus towards the financial contract, and specifically looks into the influence of political uncertainty on the non-pricing terms in the private debt contracts. I find, first, the political uncertainty affects the private debt market in general. Loan contracts are loaded with more stringent non-pricing terms during period of political turbulence. Second, with measurement that captures firm’s exposure to the political environment at the time of financial contract origination, I find that firms with larger political exposure have loan contract with higher possibility of collateral requirements, shorter maturities and other more stringent terms.

Private and Public Debt Markets in Disequilibrium Theory

In disequilibrium pricing of financial markets, excesses in either public debt or private debt can trigger a financial crisis, with attendant bank panics and recessions. For example, in the Euro crisis beginning in 2010, financial contagion in the sovereign bond market has spread among five nations: Greece, Ireland, Cyprus, Portugal, and Spain. But the reasons for the contagion was initially different for the countries, due to either disequilibrium pricing in public debt markets or disequilibrium pricing in private debt markets. In previous papers, we introduced a time-independent supply-demand model (three-dimensional model) for disequilibrium pricing in financial markets [1] and a steady-state disequilibrium systems model for the run-up of a financial crisis in a public debt market [2]. In this paper we construct a time-dependent disequilibrium systems model for the run-up of financial crises in a private debt market. We analyze the empirical case of the 2010-12 Euro crisis in Spain (private debt crisis) and then compare this to the empirical case of the 2010-2015 Euro crisis in Greece (public debt crisis).

Pecking order, access to public debt market, and information asymmetry

We suggest that the limited access to the public debt market is a reason for the violations of pecking order behavior documented in literature. We show that as information asymmetry increases, two effects take place. On the one hand, firms do desire to increase the debt issuance. On the other hand, firms start to lose their access to the public debt market. As a result, firms associated with high degrees of information asymmetry can only issue private debt and face the relatively low debt capacities provided in the private debt market.

Corporate Governance and Covenant Restrictiveness in Private Debt Contracts

Both corporate governance and covenants separately have been shown to play a role in mitigating agency problems associated with debt. Accordingly, we examine the association between corporate governance and the restrictiveness of covenants on a sample of newly syndicated loans in the U.S. private debt market. Cross-sectional results support the argument that, ceteris paribus, firms with stronger corporate governance are perceived by debtholders as less likely to engage in ex post opportunism, thereby reducing the need for particularly restrictive covenants. More specifically, the results indicate that both a corporate governance score and board independence are positively and significantly associated with covenant slack. While the results also show that independent directors’ financial expertise and covenant slack are positively related, there is no evidence to suggest that slack is associated with “busy” directors or CEO duality. Overall, the empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that debtholders perceive aspects of corporate governance to be beneficial and factor them into their contracting decisions.

Ownership Differences, Auditor Reputation, and Debt Financing: Evidence from China

This research examines whether “the paradox of auditor reputation” exists in China’s private debt market. Two types of hypotheses are developed to explain the “paradox” in terms of ownership differences. Our findings suggest: (1) by retaining big name auditors, non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) significantly reduce the cost of debt and lower financial constraints; (2) For the non-SOEs, the effect of auditor reputation on the cost of debt and financial constraints declines over time due to the accumulation of these firms’ own reputation; (3) SOEs are more sensitive to the interest rate of bank loans than their counterparts, implying their stronger bargaining power when negotiating with potential creditors than non-SOEs due to their government connections. However, SOEs’ government connections weaken the informational role of auditors and firm reputation on signaling debt market; and (4) Corporate governance is taken into consideration by creditors as an important indicator of solvency. Further investigation demonstrates that after controlling for firm size, operating cash flow, profitability and leverage ratio, the possibility of hiring big name auditors by the younger and median-aged group of non-SOEs is considerably higher than “elder” non-SOEs. Moreover, poor-performing SOEs have greater incentives to make use of their government connections in their bargaining for lower debt cost, as compared with their well-performing peers.

The Impact of Corporate Governance on the Restrictiveness of Covenants Used in Private Debt Contracts

We examine the association between corporate governance and the restrictiveness of covenants used in U.S. private debt contracts. Both corporate governance and covenants have been shown to play a role in mitigating agency problems associated with debt, hence a relationship is expected between these two monitoring mechanisms. Accordingly we argue that, ceteris paribus, firms with stronger corporate governance will be perceived by debtholders to be less likely to engage in ex-post opportunism thereby reducing the need to use particularly restrictive covenants. Our cross-sectional analysis on a sample of new syndicated loans in the U.S private debt market indicates that both a corporate governance score and board independence are positively and significantly associated with covenant slack. Similarly, we find that independent directors’ financial expertise and covenants slack are positively related, but we find no evidence that slack is associated with ‘busy’ directors or CEO duality. Overall, the empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that debtholders perceive aspects of corporate governance to be beneficial and factor them in to their contracting decisions.

Bank Reputation in the Private Debt Market

We examine the impact of lead arrangers’ reputation on the design of loan contracts such as spread and fees charged. Controlling for the non-randomness of the lender-borrower match (self-selection bias), we find that the reputation of top tier arrangers leads to higher spreads, and that top tier arrangers retain larger fractions of their loans in their syndicates. These larger spreads are especially pronounced for borrowers without credit rating that have the most to gain from the certification assumed by virtue of a loan contract with a top tier arranger. This certification channel differs from the one found in public markets, where certification leads to a reduced spread offered to the best clients. These differences between public and private markets can be explained by differences in the way they operate and are structured. Interestingly, the effect is strongest for transactions done after the changes in the banking regulations (including the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994) that led to significant consolidations in the banking industry, including among the largest commercial banks.

Bank reputation in the private debt market

We examine the impact of lead arrangers' reputation on the design of loan contracts such as spread and fees charged. Controlling for the non-randomness of the lender–borrower match (self-selection bias), we find that the reputation of top tier arrangers leads to higher spreads, and that top tier arrangers retain larger fractions of their loans in their syndicates. These larger spreads are especially pronounced for borrowers without credit rating that have the most to gain from the certification assumed by virtue of a loan contract with a top tier arranger. This certification channel differs from the one found in public markets, where certification leads to a reduced spread offered to the best clients. These differences between public and private markets can be explained by differences in the way they operate and are structured. Interestingly, the effect is strongest for transactions done after the changes in the banking regulations (including the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994) that led to significant consolidations in the banking industry, including among the largest commercial banks.

Bank Reputation in the Private Debt Market

We examine the impact of lead arrangers' reputation on the design of loan contracts such as spread, fees and the inclusion of restrictive covenants. Controlling for the non-randomness of the lender-borrower match (self-selection bias), we find that the reputation of top tier arrangers leads to higher spreads, and that top tier arrangers retain larger fractions of their loans in their syndicates. These larger spreads are especially pronounced for borrowers without credit rating that have the most to gain from the certification assumed by virtue of a loan contract with a top tier arranger. Top tier arrangers are able to select the best deals and thereby sell larger portions of their loans to syndicate banks. This certification channel differs from the one found in public markets (Fang, 2005), where certification leads to a reduced spread offered to the best clients. In the private syndicated loan market, certification seems to be through the higher retention of loans by the lead arranger-however, only for borrowers without credit rating. We find no evidence of certification for rated borrowers. These differences between public and private markets can be explained by differences in the way they operate and are structured. Interestingly, the effect is strongest for transactions done after the changes in the banking regulations (including the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994) that led to significant consolidations in the banking industry, including among the largest commercial banks. Consistent with the overall results on spreads, top tier arrangers charge lower arranger fees only to borrowers with credit ratings that have little need for additional certification by lenders.

The Economic Consequences of Mandatory IFRS Adoption for Debt Financing

We examine whether the mandated introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is associated with the propensity to access the public rather than private debt market and the cost of debt. We use a global sample of public bonds and private loans and find that mandatory IFRS adopters are more likely, post-IFRS, to issue bonds than to borrow privately. We also find that mandatory IFRS adopters pay lower bond yield spreads, but not lower loan spreads, after the mandate. These findings are consistent with debt providers responding positively to financial reporting of higher quality and comparability, but only when there is a greater reliance on publicly available financial statements than private communication. Lastly, we document that the observed debt market benefits are concentrated in countries with larger differences between domestic GAAP and IFRS and are present even for EU countries that did not experience concurrent financial reporting enforcement or other institutional reforms. Overall, our study documents positive economic consequences around the mandated IFRS adoption for corporate debt financing and, in particular, for bond financing.

The Determinants of Private Debt Holdings: Evidence From the Life Insurance Industry

AbstractLife insurers hold the majority of private debt. Lenders in the private debt market must have the ability to evaluate the credit quality of borrowers and to perform ongoing risk monitoring. The purpose of this study is to examine the determinants of private debt holdings in the life insurance industry. The results suggest that larger insurers, insurers with higher financial quality, mutual insurers, publicly traded insurers, insurers facing stringent regulation, and insurers with greater cash holdings are more prevalent lenders in the private debt market.

Bank Reputation in the Private Debt Market

We examine the impact of lead arrangers’ reputation on the design of loan contracts such as spread and fees charged. Controlling for the non-randomness of the lender-borrower match (self-selection bias), we find that the reputation of top tier arrangers leads to higher spreads, and that top tier arrangers retain larger fractions of their loans in their syndicates. These larger spreads are especially pronounced for borrowers without credit rating that have the most to gain from the certification assumed by virtue of a loan contract with a top tier arranger. This certification channel differs from the one found in public markets, where certification leads to a reduced spread offered to the best clients. These differences between public and private markets can be explained by differences in the way they operate and are structured. Interestingly, the effect is strongest for transactions done after the changes in the banking regulations (including the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994) that led to significant consolidations in the banking industry, including among the largest commercial banks.

Financial covenants and related contracting processes in the Australian private debt market: an experimental study

Private debt markets are characterised by covenant-restrictive but renegotiation-flexible debt contracts as financial intermediaries lending in private debt markets have a comparative advantage over investors in public debt markets in offering such contracts. The two research questions investigated in this paper are ‘Whether several borrower and contract-specific variables determine the restrictiveness of financial covenants in private debt contracts?’ and ‘Whether several borrower- and contract-specific variables are associated with loan officers' decisions to waive technical default on financial covenants?’ Two behavioural experiments involving loan officers examined these contracting processes in the Australian private debt market. The first experiment examined whether certain variables determine the restrictiveness of financial covenants in private debt contracts. Management reputation and security were found to be associated with the number and tightness of financial covenants, while high financial risk was associated with increased tightness, but not the number, of such covenants. The effect of the interaction management reputation x security, was also significant. The second experiment examined the association between certain variables and the likelihood of loan officers waiving technical default on financial covenants. Low financial risk, security and defaults caused solely by a change in accounting standards were found to be associated with the likelihood of the default being waived.