Private Coins Research Articles

Studying and Collecting Coins of the Golden Horde in the Russian Empire in the Late 17th – Early 19th Centuries

Introduction. The purpose of the article is to find out the state of Jochi numismatics in the Russian Empire by the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries. The novelty of the research. For the first time in one work, the currently known information about the origin of the study of the coins of the Golden Horde in the 18th century is presented. The beginning of systematic coin collecting in Russia was laid by Peter I, who himself was one of the first Russian collectors and collected coins, including “Tatar” (i.e. Golden Horde) coins in his collection. Methods and materials. Numismatics is based on information from a number of human sciences: paleography, chronology, etc. Numismatics is characterized by a complex study of coins and attention to their role in historical processes. The materials for writing the article were mainly publications of the late 17th century – early 19th century, containing information about the coins of the Golden Horde. Analysis. In 1714, the Cabinet of Curiosities – the Kunstkamera – was founded in St. Petersburg. Before the emergence of the Hermitage, it was the Kunstkamera, which had its own Mintskabinet, that was the main numismatic treasury of Russia; coins from its collection later entered the Hermitage. There is evidence that Golden Horde coins were also stored in the Kunstkamera of the 18th century. The origin of private coin collecting in Russia, including Juchid coins (collections of Y.V. Bruce, A.P. Volynsky, P.I. Musin-Pushkin, etc.), belongs to the first half of the 18th century. Readings of inscriptions on coins (and, accordingly, definitions) were often erroneous. Rather, the exception is the activity of the orientalist Georg Jacob Kehr (1692–1740), who was in many ways ahead of the level of science of his time and who, judging by the surviving prints, made many correct definitions. Results. There was no systematic fixation of coin finds in the 18th century; only fragmentary information about the places of coin finds (Bolgar and Selitrennoe settlements, etc.) was preserved. At the same time, the base created in the 18th century (the development of private coin collecting, the Mintskabinet in the Kunstkamera, the activities of G.J. Kehr, etc.) contributed to bringing research to a qualitatively new level in the first half of the 19th century.

Colour-dependent dishonesty in a game of chance.

We report an odd result of a coin-flip experiment which incentivises dishonest behaviour. Participants of two treatments were asked to flip a coin in private, of which one side was WHITE and the other side BLACK, and report the colour shown by the coin. Payoff depended on the reported colour: in one treatment WHITE was the more profitable outcome whereas in the other treatment BLACK was more profitable. Surprisingly, the magnitude of cheating, as reflected by the difference between the frequency of reporting the more profitable colour and its statistical expectation (50%) was not, more or less, the same in both treatments. Rather, significantly more participants cheated when BLACK was the profitable outcome. This result reappeared in two variants of the coin-flip task. We suggest that a sense of entitlement triggered by a WHITE outcome may explain this behaviour.

An Exponential Separation Between MA and AM Proofs of Proximity

Interactive proofs of proximity allow a sublinear-time verifier to check that a given input is close to the language, using a small amount of communication with a powerful (but untrusted) prover. In this work, we consider two natural minimally interactive variants of such proofs systems, in which the prover only sends a single message, referred to as the proof.The first variant, known as MA-proofs of Proximity (MAP), is fully non-interactive, meaning that the proof is a function of the input only. The second variant, known as AM-proofs of Proximity (AMP), allows the proof to additionally depend on the verifier's (entire) random string. The complexity of both MAPs and AMPs is the total number of bits that the verifier observes—namely, the sum of the proof length and query complexity.Our main result is an exponential separation between the power of MAPs and AMPs. Specifically, we exhibit an explicit and natural property Pi that admits an AMP with complexity O(log n), whereas any MAP for Pi has complexity tilde{Omega}(n^{1/4}), where n denotes the length of the input in bits. Our MAP lower bound also yields an alternate proof, which is more general and arguably much simpler, for a recent result of Fischer et al. (ITCS, 2014). Also, Aaronson (Quantum Information & Computation 2012) has shown a Omega(n^{1/6})QMA lower bound for the same property Pi.Lastly, we also consider the notion of oblivious proofs of proximity, in which the verifier's queries are oblivious to the proof. In this setting, we show that AMPs can only be quadratically stronger than MAPs. As an application of this result, we show an exponential separation between the power of public and private coin for oblivious interactive proofs of proximity.

The private mint in economics: evidence from the American gold rushes†

AbstractProminent economists have supposed that the private production of full‐bodied gold or silver coins is inefficient: due to information asymmetry, private coins will be chronically low‐quality or underweight. An examination of private mints during gold rushes in the US in the years 1830–63, drawing on contemporary accounts and numismatic literature, finds otherwise. While some private gold mints produced underweight coins, from incompetence or fraudulent intent, such mints did not last long. Informed by newspapers about the findings of assays, money‐users systematically abandoned substandard coins in favour of full‐weight coins. Only competent and honest mints survived.

The role of randomness in the broadcast congested clique model

We study the role of randomness in the broadcast congested clique model. This is a message-passing model of distributed computation where the nodes of a network know their local neighborhoods and they broadcast, in synchronous rounds, messages that are visible to every other node.This works aims to separate three different settings: deterministic protocols, randomized protocols with private coins, and randomized protocols with public coins. We obtain the following results:•If more than one round is allowed, public randomness is as powerful as private randomness.•One-round public-coin algorithms can be exponentially more powerful than deterministic algorithms running in several rounds.•One-round public-coin algorithms can be exponentially more powerful than one-round private-coin algorithms.•One-round private-coin algorithms can be exponentially more powerful than one-round deterministic algorithms.

Cheating, inequality aversion, and appealing to social norms

Abstract We conduct a field experiment involving 143, 9-years old children in their classrooms. Children are requested to flip a coin in private and receive a big or a small prize depending on the outcome they report. Comparing the actual and theoretical distribution of reported wins, we find evidence of cheating at the aggregate level. By using behavioral data gathered on previous and subsequent meetings with the same children, we are able to explore the relationship between cheating behavior, other regarding preferences, and the tendency to appeal to social norms in judging unfair behaviors. Children who are classified as concerned about inequality are less likely to cheat. Similarly, children who are more likely to appeal to social norms in judging unfair behaviors are also less likely to cheat. We find no significant relationship between inequality concern and social norms sensitivity, suggesting that these mechanisms work differently interacting with children moral behavior.

Cheating at the end to avoid regret.

How do people behave when they face a finite series of opportunities to cheat with little or no risk of detection? In 4 experiments and a small meta-analysis, we analyzed over 25,000 cheating opportunities faced by over 2,500 people. The results suggested that the odds of cheating are almost 3 times higher at the end of a series than earlier. Participants could cheat in 1 of 2 ways: They could lie about the outcome of a private coin flip to get a payoff that they would otherwise not receive (Studies 1-3) or they could overbill for their work (Study 4). We manipulated the number of cheating opportunities they expected but held the actual number of opportunities constant. The data showed that the likelihood of cheating and the extent of dishonesty were both greater when people believed that they were facing a last choice. Mediation analyses suggested that anticipatory regret about passing up a chance to enrich oneself drove this cheat-at-the-end effect. We found no support for alternative explanations based on the possibility that multiple cheating opportunities depleted people's self-control, eroded their moral standards, or made them feel that they had earned the right to cheat. The data also suggested that the cheat-at-the-end effect may be limited to relatively short series of cheating opportunities (i.e., n < 20). Our discussion addresses the psychological and behavioral dynamics of repeated ethical choices.

ANALYZING THE SILVER COINS FROM POTAISSA LEGIONARY FORT VS. ANCIENT TOWN

This paper is centered on the study of Roman silver coins from the archaeological site of Potaissa using as its main source M. Pislaru’s book “ The Roman coins from Potaissa: legionary fortress and ancient town ”. The book focuses on the presentation of analysis results of monetary finds coming from Potaissa area while the article presents a different approach to the subject, by integrating part of the results in graphs that show a close-up perspective for the monetary evidence in chronological periods. How this task was accomplished is explained bellow, in two chapters, one dedicated for the study of the two areas from Potaissa, legionary fortress and civilian town, and another dedicated for the study of private coin collections from all of Potaissa.

Children develop a veil of fairness.

Previous research suggests that children develop an increasing concern with fairness over the course of development. Research with adults suggests that the concern with fairness has at least 2 distinct components: a desire to be fair and a desire to signal to others that they are fair. We explore whether children's developing concern with behaving fairly toward others may in part reflect a developing concern with appearing fair to others. In Experiments 1 and 2, most 6- to 8-year-old children behaved fairly toward others when an experimenter was aware of their choices; fewer children opted to behave fairly, however, when they could be unfair to others yet appear fair to the experimenter. In Experiment 3, we explored the development of this concern with appearing fair by using a wider age range (6- to 11-year-olds) and a different method. In this experiment, children chose how to assign a good or bad prize to themselves and another participant by either unilaterally deciding who would get each prize or using a fair procedure--flipping a coin in private. Older children were much more likely to flip the coin than younger children, yet were just as likely as younger children to assign themselves the good prize by reporting winning the coin flip more than chance would dictate. Overall, the results of these experiments suggest that as children grow older they become increasingly concerned with appearing fair to others, which may explain some of their increased tendency to behave fairly.

Self-reported ethical risk taking tendencies predict actual dishonesty

AbstractAre people honest about the extent to which they engage in unethical behaviors? We report an experiment examining the relation between self-reported risky unethical tendencies and actual dishonest behavior. Participants’ self-reported risk taking tendencies were assessed using the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) questionnaire, while actual self-serving dishonesty was assessed using a private coin tossing task. In this task, participants predicted the outcome of coin tosses, held the predictions in mind, and reported whether their predictions were correct. Thus, the task allowed participants to lie about whether their predictions were correct. We manipulated whether reporting higher correct scores increased (vs. not) participants monetary payoff. Results revealed a positive relation between self-reported unethical risky tendencies and actual dishonesty. The effect was limited to the condition in which dishonesty was self-serving. Our results suggest liars are aware of their dishonest tendencies and are potentially not ashamed of them.

Separating Will from Grace: An experiment on conformity and awareness in cheating

In this paper we investigate if people cheat more when they observe their peers cheating because they conform or because they become aware that cheating is something to actively consider. In our experiment subjects toss a coin in private and report the outcome (white or black). We reward only those who report white and leave them the possibility to cheat without being discovered. In our 2×2 experimental design, we manipulated subjects’ report sheet to (i) suggest (or not) that cheating is an option; (ii) suggest that their peers were honest (or dishonest). We find that increasing awareness of cheating as an option significantly increases the probability that women cheat; whereas men – who are already aware that cheating is an option – are not affected. When we suggest that peers have cheated, men cheat significantly more, whereas women do not.

Fairness and cheating

We present evidence from a laboratory experiment showing that individuals who believe they were treated unfairly in an interaction with another person are more likely to cheat in a subsequent unrelated game. Specifically, subjects first participated in a dictator game. They then flipped a coin in private and reported the outcome. Subjects could increase their total payoff by cheating, i.e., lying about the outcome of the coin toss. We found that subjects were more likely to cheat in reporting the outcome of the coin flip when: (1) they received either nothing or a very small transfer from the dictator; and (2) they claimed to have been treated unfairly.

Fairness and Cheating

We present evidence from a laboratory experiment showing that individuals who believe they were treated unfairly in an interaction with another person are more likely to cheat in a subsequent unrelated game. Specifically, subjects first participated in a dictator game. They then flipped a coin in private and reported the outcome. Subjects could increase their total payoff by cheating, i.e., lying about the outcome of the coin toss. We found that subjects were more likely to cheat in reporting the outcome of the coin flip when: 1) they received either nothing or a very small transfer from the dictator; and 2) they claimed to have been treated unfairly.

Luck or cheating? A field experiment on honesty with children

We run an experiment to study the relationship between honesty, age and self-control. We focus on children aged between 5 and 15 as the literature suggests that self-control develops within such age range. We ask each child to toss a fair coin in private and to record the outcome (white or black) on a paper sheet. We only reward children who report white. Although we are unable to tell whether each child was honest or not, we speculate about the proportion of reported white outcomes. Children report the prize-winning outcome at rates statistically above 50% but below 100%. Moreover, the probability of cheating is uniform across groups based on child’s characteristics, in particular age. In a second treatment we explicitly tell children not to cheat. This request has a dampening effect on their tendency to over-report the prize-winning outcome, especially in girls. Furthermore, while this effect in boys is constant with age, in girls it tends to decrease with age.

Separating Deterministic from Randomized Multiparty Communication Complexity

We solve some fundamental problems in the number-on-forehead (NOF) $k$-player communication model. We show that there exists a function which has at most logarithmic communication complexity for randomized protocols with one-sided false-positives error probability of 1/3, but which has linear communication complexity for deterministic protocols, and in fact, even for the more powerful nondeterministic protocols. The result holds for every $\epsilon > 0$ and every $k \le 2^{(1-\epsilon)n}$ players, where $n$ is the number of bits on each player's forehead. As a consequence, we obtain the NOF communication class separation $\mathsf{coRP} \not\subset \mathsf{NP}$. This in particular implies that $\mathsf{P} \neq \mathsf{RP}$ and $\mathsf{NP} \neq \mathsf{coNP}$. We also show that for every $\epsilon > 0$ and every $k \le n^{1-\epsilon}$, there exists a function which has constant randomized complexity for public coin protocols but at least logarithmic complexity for private coin protocols. No larger gap between private and public coin protocols is possible. Our lower bounds are existential; no explicit function is known to satisfy nontrivial lower bounds for $k \ge \log n$ players. However, for every $\epsilon > 0$ and every $k \le (1-\epsilon) \cdot \log n$ players, the $\mathsf{NP} \ne \mathsf{coNP}$ separation (and even the $\mathsf{coNP} \not\subset \mathsf{MA}$ separation) was obtained independently by Gavinsky and Sherstov (2010) using an explicit construction. In this work, for $k \le (1/9) \cdot \log n$ players, we exhibit an explicit function which has communication complexity $O(1)$ for public coin protocols and $\Omega(\log n)$ for deterministic protocols. This improves the best previously known deterministic lower bound for a function with efficient randomized protocols, which was $\Omega(\log \log n)$, given by Beigel, Gasarch, and Glenn (2006). It follows from our existential result that any function that is complete for the class of functions with polylogarithmic nondeterministic $k$-player communication complexity does not have polylogarithmic deterministic complexity. We show that the set intersection function, which is complete in the number-in-hand model, is not complete in the NOF model under cylindrical reductions.

Luck or Cheating? A Field Experiment on Honesty with Children

We ran an experiment with children to study the development of honesty with age. We asked each child to toss a fair coin in private and to record the outcome (white or black) in a paper sheet. We rewarded only those who reported white. We found a fraction of reported whites significantly larger than 50%, uniformly across age groups. This suggests that some children cheat when cheating is profitable and they are not observed. In a second treatment we told children not to cheat. This reminder reduced the probability of reporting white by 18% on average, and significantly more in girls.

Worst Case Nonzero-Error Interactive Communication

In the interactive communication model, two parties and possess respective private but correlated inputs and , and wants to learn from while minimizing the communication required for the worst possible input pair . Our contribution is the analysis of four nonzero-error models in this correlated data setting. In the private coin randomized model, both players are allowed to toss coins, and must learn with high probability for every input pair. The second and third models are similar to the first one, but the players are allowed to use a common source of randomness and to solve several independent instances of the same problem simultaneously, respectively. In the fourth model, is allowed to answer incorrectly for a small fraction of the inputs. We show that one round of communication is nearly optimal for the private coin randomized model. We also prove that the last three models are equivalent and can be arbitrarily better than the original worst case deterministic model when interaction is not allowed. Finally, we show that the deterministic model and all the nonzero-error models are equivalent for a class of symmetric problems arising from several practical applications, although nonzero-error and randomization allow efficient one-way protocols.

A note on randomized mutual search

In Mutual Search, recently introduced by Buhrman et al. (1998), static agents are searching for each other: each agent is assigned one of n locations, and the computations proceed by agents sending queries from their location to other locations, until one of the queries arrives at the other agent. The cost of a search is the number of queries made. The best known bounds for randomized protocols using private coins are (1) a protocol with worst-case expected cost of ⌈(n+1)/2⌉, and (2) a lower bound of (n−1)/8 queries for randomized protocols which make only a bounded number of coin-tosses. In this paper we strictly improve the lower bound, and present a new upper bound for shared random coins. Specifically, we first prove that the worst-case expected cost of any randomized protocol for two-agent mutual search is at least (n+1)/3. This is an improvement both in terms of number of queries and in terms of applicability. We also give a randomized algorithm for mutual search with worst-case expected cost of (n+1)/3. This algorithm works under the assumption that the agents share a random bit string. This bound shows that no better lower bound can be obtained using our technique.