Private Bus Operators Research Articles

A Study on Bus Passengers Behaviour with Special Reference to Bangalore City

The transport system provides the basic infrastructure and it affects the economic activities of the country. The transport sector in India is divided into passenger and freight. The passenger services are available in both government private of bus category. At present private sector owns majority of the buses compared to government. In Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka also the private transport players dominating the passenger’s transportation market, especially if the travelling distance is more than 250 KM. Initially consumers (passengers) have been attracted with the facilities and service given by private bus operators. With the increasing competition and other policy issues, the private bus operators are implementing peak load pricing strategy. This pricing strategy is unexpected and unjustifiable to any passenger and even unbearable to them. And the facilities and service are same. Therefore a study has been made by the researcher to bring out the passengers behavior with peak load pricing by private operators with reference to Bangalore city in the state of Karnataka . By using judgment random sampling technique, 110 respondents were selected as sample size and information gathered through interview method. The outcome of the research has shown very interesting results such as customers’ dissatisfaction on Government failure to control the Private Bus operators and the price exploitation, in connection with their no alternative to avoid the services

Improving the route effectiveness of the intercity bus operators by co-optation: a data envelopment analysis

Indian private bus operators suffer from cyclical demand in weekly bookings. During the slack days, the entire passenger transport industry operates with loss or low margin. This research proposes a co-optation model to overcome the losses arising from the cyclical demand. This paper researches the comparative efficiency of pre and post co-optation scenarios among the Indian private bus operators. We assume reverse aggregation of less under booking schedules of operators of the same sector can be assigned to a single bus operator who has relatively higher booking than other operators. The co-optation model of reverse aggregation could enhance the efficiency of the industry. Though numerous studies have been done to measure the efficiency of operators, we focused our research on how the operator's co-optation could improve the efficiency of the industry. For this purpose, we analysed the daily trips data of Bangalore-Goa route of the Indian private public transport for a month. The comparative efficiency is measured using the DEA method.

Studying Operational Dynamics of Public Bus System: A Case of Lucknow City, India

In the era of rapid urbanization, the public bus system is struggling to become the main mode of transport in Indian cities. The co-existence of private city bus system and intermediate para-transit modes [shared auto-rickshaws, vikrams (6-8 seater shared 3-wheeler) and e-rickshaws] has created more competition for the public bus system instead of complementing it. This paper discusses the existing institutional arrangement of public bus systems in Lucknow city and identifies the challenges of organizations to operate an efficient public bus system. The study is based on primary survey and structured interviews of public bus service operators, representatives of private bus operators, representatives of employee unions, auto-rickshaw & vikram drivers, officials of public transport authority and Regional Transport Office (RTO). The study explores public bus governance system and administrative hierarchy of the city to understand its existing operational process. The role of travel cost and comfort in passenger’s choice of travel mode is discussed. The financial performance of the LCTSL shows the continuous losses. The paper contributes to identify the role of institutional framework to operate a successful public bus system. The analysis and findings will lead to the use of these modes in an integrated manner to complement and promote public bus system in a city.

Agency costs in public transport systems: Net-cost contracting between the transport authority and private operators - impact on passengers

Drawing on an agency theory approach, this paper examines conflict of interests and the resulting agency costs in the provision of urban public transport services in Istanbul's public transport system, particularly the private bus and minibus operators' relationship with local government. The agency problem in Istanbul's urban mobility system shows itself most explicitly in private bus and minibus operators because of the net-cost (NC) contract model in place. The private bus and minibus operators' relationship with local government is examined as a case study of agency relationships. Conceptually, government transport authorities and transport operators, together with the passengers, are the main actors of this urban public transport system. They all have distinct needs, interests and requirements and interact with each other, all embedded in a specific institutional environment. Service quality provided by public transport operators depends on the positive interactions between these actors. Whereas passengers demand reliable, affordable, safe and comfortable mobility services, private bus and minibus operators aim to increase their revenue and maximise their profits. In contrast to this, government bus operators provide in-house bus services without much concern for profitability. Regulators or local authorities, on the other hand, are expected to set up an institutional environment where passengers' and operators' expectations are met in a satisfactory manner. Empirical analyses and interviews with key agents demonstrate that agency costs are shown to be the result of misaligned interests between the government transport authority and private operators that lead to reduced service quality in terms of safety, comfort, reliability and affordability. We conclude that the agency costs of current NC contracting on passengers in Istanbul has deficiencies and propose instead a performance-based gross-cost (PrGC) contracting model. PrGC contracting can alleviate agency costs by changing the incentives of operators where regulatory and financing mechanisms are not enough to handle NC contracting. Istanbul represents some transferable lessons and implications, especially for developing cities around the world.

Worse than Baumol's disease: The implications of labor productivity, contracting out, and unionization on transit operation costs

Unit costs measured as bus operating costs per vehicle mile have increased considerably above the inflation rate in recent decades in most transit agencies in the United States. This paper examines the impact of (lack of) productivity growth, union bargaining power, and contracting out on cost escalation. We draw from a 17-year (1997–2014) and a 415-bus transit agency panel with 5780 observations by type of operation (directly operated by the agency or contracted out). We have three main findings: first, the unit cost increase in the transit sector is far worse than what economic theory predicts for industries with low productivity growth. Second, contracting out tends to reduce unit costs, and the results suggest that the costs savings from private operations can be only partly explained by lower wages in the private sector. Interestingly, we find that the cost savings from contracting out are larger when the transit agency also directly operates part of the total transit service. However, while overall unit costs are lower in contracted services, cost growth in large private bus operators is no different than cost growth in large public transit operators. Third, unique transit labor laws that lead to union bargaining power are a likely driver of the unit cost growth above inflation. Overall, these factors reflect inherent characteristics of the bus transit sector, such as the nature of low productivity growth and union legislative power related to the need for public subsidy. They drive increases in both transit fares and public subsidy at rates higher than inflation, and play an important role in the deterioration of transit agencies’ financial sustainability.

Programación simultánea de buses y conductores: caso de estudio en Transantiago, Chile

En este artículo proponemos una formulación alternativa para resolver el problema de programación simultánea de buses y conductores. Este trabajo presenta una heurística constructiva y un modelo de programación lineal entera mixta para abordar este problema. Para disminuir sustancialmente los tiempos de solución, nuestra formulación construye de manera implícita el conjunto óptimo de itinerarios de buses. Adicionalmente, el modelo incorpora componentes de costo en la función objetivo, que permiten mejorar la calidad operacional de la solución entregada. Nosotros presentamos los resultados de la implementación de nuestra metodología para un caso de estudio que usa instancias reales de uno los principales operadores privados de buses en Transantiago, Chile. Los resultados del modelo evalúan el trade-off entre las dos soluciones extremas del problema abordado: priorizar la minimización de turnos versus priorizar la minimización de itinerarios.

Evaluating Private Bus Operators’ Willingness to Participate in Transit Improvements in Mexico

Inputs are provided for the decision-making process of transit improvements in developing countries. With an analysis of the willingness of private bus operators to participate in transit improvements, political feasibility can be assessed, and the likelihood of successful implementation can be increased. Data from 156 surveys conducted in cities in Mexico are used to develop probabilistic models that quantify the influence of private bus operators’ characteristics, perceptions about business and operating efficiencies, and their relationship with government on their willingness to participate. Evidence shows that several elements can increase the willingness of private operators to participate in government-led proposals. These elements include the level of trust and communication between private bus operators and government authorities, the economic power of private bus operators, and the attachment to the status quo. Several features are shown to limit operators’ willingness to participate, including the model of operation, likelihood of lost revenue through taxation, and concerns about the potential modifications of their legal rights to operate. An analysis of Mexico City, Mexico, and surrounding areas demonstrates the need to establish a well-defined strategy for engaging private bus operators in transit improvements; failure to do so has resulted in much less trust of government and led to more conflicts about future projects. The importance of analyzing private bus operators’ participative profiles in the assessment of transit improvements is revealed. Selected areas for improvements might present challenges for engaging private bus operators in proposed improvements.

Public transport pre-pay tickets: Understanding passenger choice for different products

Growing cashless services in the Sydney metropolitan region are motivated by the clear supply-side benefits associated with the prepayment of public transport fares. This paper examines the effect on prepay following the ‘MyZone’ fare and ticket reform in New South Wales introduced in April 2010. ‘MyZone’, introduced two new discounted and standardised prepay products, including a new, multimode ticket. Whilst these changes had implications for all public transport providers in the Sydney Metropolitan area, it had significant ramifications for the many private bus operators who, for the first time, could provide and accept tickets, which integrated their services with the state-run rail, ferry and bus network. With empirical data collected from two surveys of passengers of a private bus operator in northern Sydney this study analyses the ticket purchasing behaviour of passengers both before the fare reform, when passengers only had access to operator-specific prepay products, and post-MyZone, when the new standardised prepay products were available. The results clearly show there are significant differences in the characteristics of passengers using multi-modal versus pay-as-you-go tickets and that this difference is driven largely by age, income and whether or not the journey involved interchange. Prior to MyZone, prepay users were easily predicted and the fare and ticket reform was successful in transitioning some cash users to prepay but prepay users were no longer predictable unless separated into prepay product groups. This suggests that a policy designed to exploit the supply-side benefits associated with cashless services needs to consider that introducing only one prepay product will not address the market need of frequent users. Passengers who continued to pay cash after the fare and ticket reform showed high sensitivity to public transport cost and are those passengers with the lowest incomes. This raises policy questions of how to mitigate against the upfront costs often associated with prepay to transition less affluent, but frequent passengers, onto cashless ticketing.

Objectives of Private Bus Operators in Evaluating Transit Investments in Developing Countries

This paper discusses appropriate evaluation techniques for assessing transit proposals in developing countries. With the shift of ownership models in past decades from fully public to fully private and eventually to consolidated franchising models, successful transit projects require the analysis of several indirect costs associated with changing ownership. These indirect costs include (a) the potential loss of personal income for local bus operators if the new investment precludes their continued operation, (b) negative personal impacts on self-worth and changing business dynamics, and (c) long-term impacts on the ability of the government to implement future projects as a result of obstacles that may result from the first two costs. In the proposed methodology these costs are explicitly considered in the evaluation process. The way that various ownership models in current use influence—either positively or negatively—such indirect costs is assessed. The paper concludes that full involvement of local bus operators typically minimizes these indirect costs but may be difficult to achieve, depending on the number and characteristics of the operators in the corridor for which the development is proposed. The paper presents a detailed assessment of the conditions under which full involvement is possible and suggests alternative techniques to advance the idea of local operator involvement.

Model for Estimating Increased Ridership Caused by Integration of Two Urban Transit Modes

A simple, practical tool based on integration (basically, shortening) of competing bus and minibus transit services is provided for estimating increased ridership on metro lines. A simple model is developed to estimate the increased ridership in the metro line of Istanbul, Turkey (7.9 km long and being extended), caused by integration with bus and minibus transit lines, and the benefits related to the intermodal integration are presented. To estimate the effectiveness of the integration action, ridership information in all modes before and after the integration was gathered and analyzed. It was found that the ridership-over-capacity (RoC) ratio in the metro lines was quite low (0.28) before the integration. On December 24, 2001, a partial integration was deployed by the bus operator of the metropolitan city when 11 bus and three minibus routes were integrated to the metro, which yielded significant increase in RoC (56%). The study also considered possible options for the development of a full intermodal plan. In this regard, existing bus and minibus transit lines were examined, and 33 bus and three minibus routes were recommended for integration. It was found that such integration would increase RoC from 0.28 to 0.76 without any significant increase in operating cost. Also, the city and private bus and minibus operators would save an estimated of $4.8 million a year from cuts in operating these services along the metro route. It was also estimated that the integration would lower the amount of bus traffic in downtown Taksim and Mecidiyeköy by approximately 25% and 38%, respectively.

Initiating Bus Rapid Transit in Jakarta, Indonesia

On February 1, 2004, a 12.9-km (8-mi) bus rapid transit (BRT) line began revenue operation in Jakarta, Indonesia. The BRT line has incorporated most of the characteristics of BRT systems. The line was implemented in only 9 months at a cost of less than US$1 million/km ($1.6 million/mi). Two additional lines are scheduled to begin operation in 2005 and triple the size of the BRT. While design shortcomings for the road surface and terminals have impaired performance of the system, public reaction has been positive. Travel time over the whole corridor has been reduced by 59 min at peak hour. Average ridership is about 49,000/day at a flat fare of 30 cents. Furthermore, 20% of BRT riders have switched from private motorized modes, and private bus operators have been supportive of expanding Jakarta's BRT. Immediate improvements are needed in the areas of fiscal handling of revenues and reconfiguring of other bus routes. The TransJakarta BRT is reducing transport emissions for Jakarta and providing an alternative to congested streets. The BRT provides a tangible vision for an effective, viable, and sustainable public transportation system in Jakarta and elsewhere.

Initiating Bus Rapid Transit in Jakarta, Indonesia

On February 1, 2004, a 12.9-km (8-mi) bus rapid transit (BRT) line began revenue operation in Jakarta, Indonesia. The BRT line has incorporated most of the characteristics of BRT systems. The line was implemented in only 9 months at a cost of less than US$1 million/km ($1.6 million/mi). Two additional lines are scheduled to begin operation in 2005 and triple the size of the BRT. While design shortcomings for the road surface and terminals have impaired performance of the system, public reaction has been positive. Travel time over the whole corridor has been reduced by 59 min at peak hour. Average ridership is about 49,000/day at a flat fare of 30 cents. Furthermore, 20% of BRT riders have switched from private motorized modes, and private bus operators have been supportive of expanding Jakarta's BRT. Immediate improvements are needed in the areas of fiscal handling of revenues and reconfiguring of other bus routes. The TransJakarta BRT is reducing transport emissions for Jakarta and providing an alternati...

A PRIVATE-PUBLIC COMPARISON OF BUS SERVICE OPERATORS

The aim of this study was to determine the key factors causing differences in efficiency between private and public bus operators, especially with regard to efficiency in service provision, wages, and costs. Econometric methods were used to estimate the cost function of bus services and the wage function. Analytical results suggest that the total operating cost of public bus operators is 20.2% higher than that of private bus operators, and that the wages of public bus operator employees are 14.5% higher than those of private bus operator employees.

Ownership and control in the bus industry: the case of Hungary

In Hungary, the impending expiry of existing operating licences for both urban and interurban bus services is leading to considerable pressure for change in the current system of ownership and control. Furthermore, the transport sector in Hungary faces several endemic problems. Consequently, this paper analyses the experience of the public transport sector in Hungary with respect to the current situation noting changes after 1990. At the national level, reference is made to both road-based transport (including car ownership and use) and (briefly) to railways. The situation in Budapest is then considered in detail. Next, the structure of the public transport sector in Hungary is discussed both before and after 1990 when the move towards a free market economy received new impetus. The paper examines, as a case-study, the recent experience of private bus operators in Hungary. Finally, drawing on experience elsewhere with possible models for privatization and deregulation in the case of bus operations, suggestions are offered on lessons to be learned by the governments of countries in Central and Eastern Europe as they assess the possibilities for alternative methods of ownership and control.

Productivity measurement in the urban bus sector

This paper investigates the relative performance of urban bus operators in Australia. An index of gross total factor productivity (GTFP) for each operator is developed and decomposed to identify the sources of variation across operators, such as the role of different institutional and regulatory ‘constraints’ on relative performance. Data has been compiled from a sample of private bus operations in Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne and all of the public operators in Australia for the financial year 1991/92. The emphasis is on the cost efficiency and cost effectiveness of private and public urban bus operators in Australia.

Iterative methods for solving an equilibrium problem arising in transit deregulation

We consider the context of a deregulated transit system involving private cars, bus passengers, and bus operators where the latter freely decide which line they operate. We assume that car drivers and transit users strive to minimize individual travel times whereas bus operators maximize individual profits. Within each system under consideration—cars, passengers, buses— a state of equilibrium can be characterized as the solution of a variational inequality. In this paper we assume that the combined model is solved by the Gauss-Seidel approach scribed in Fernández and Marcotte. Special attention is paid to the solution of the bus operators equilibrium for which several solution algorithms—Jacobi-Newton, Newton-Jacobi, fixed point iterations— are proposed. Numerical results are presented for a small network and for the Santiago (Chile) transit network.