At beginning of his 1928 lecture course Metaphysical Foundations of Logic Heidegger addresses relation of of philosophy and of human. Here, one year after publication of Being and Time, his topic and focus appear driven by a need to respond to a misdirected-but, nevertheless, widely experienced-reaction to his magnum opus: If existential analytic of Dasein retained a place for ethics at all, then it withdrew ethical questions away from community of humans, privileging a kind of ego-centric ethics of authenticity.1 In answer to this reaction, Heidegger restructures problem, orienting it in of meaning of being, and insisting upon priority of of of over that of an ethics or any other compartmentalized science, an insistence he maintains with subtle variety through to his later work.2 The basic of philosophy, he writes, of being, is in itself, correctly understood, of man. Yet, important thing is to raise of man in view of problem of being. . . . This fundamental philosophical about man remains prior to every psychology, anthropology, and characterology, but also prior to all ethics and sociology. (My italics, MFL, 17)3 For Heidegger, because meaning of being of human being harbors and guides in advance questions of ethics, sociology, anthropology, and all such regional sciences, being (that is, of human understood in this fundamental sense) is prior, and thus, retains priority for philosophy. This is not, however, to say that more broadly construed, prior excludes ethical, but rather, ethical must be thought in light of this question about man; that is, ethical must be thought in terms of its priority over questions posed in science of ethics, insofar as decisions of this science have already decided upon of nature of human being. In appendix of Metaphysical Foundations of Logic lecture course, Heidegger precisely addresses necessity to attend to this prior/ontological questioning if questions about ethics are to be truly transformative: This investigation resides in essence of ontology itself and is result of its over-turning [changing over] (Umschlag), its metabole, I designate this set of questions ... (here of an ethics may properly be raised for first time). Positive sciences also have beings for their subject matter, but is not a summary ontic. (MFL, 157) While term metontology is sparsely employed by Heidegger, its usage here shows itself as one linguistic attempt in which he has tried to think ethical in its priority-that is, in its remaining prior to ontic manifestations of ethics. Heidegger has sought to think ontologically, such that of ethical becomes of how Da-sein is trans-formed in its being, or rather a of structures by which Da-sein is turned about... and disposed toward ... in its being. Given that Heidegger had already (in 1928) corrected this misunderstanding of his text ad nauseam5 one might think that he would leave concern with differentiation of ethics and proper about human behind. But, in fact, he returns time and again to differentiation. Yet, he comes back to this distinction not simply to refute careless readers of his text, but precisely because of human-in its articulation as prior-continues throughout his publishing career to call for reflection and to be newly recast. From lectures immediately after publication of Being and Time, through to Letter on Humanism, and on to Discourse on Thinking in 1959, Heidegger has explicitly engaged this prior notion of human, trying to allow priority to show itself in different phrases-zoon logon echon for instance, or the fundamental about man [Mensch] (MFL, 17), the nature of man [Mensch,]6 and even nature of humanitas (LH, 224). …