Principles Of Classical Liberalism Research Articles

Classical Liberal Criminal Law

This essay, written for a Festschrift for Richard Epstein, argues that the classical liberal principles he outlined provide a valuable frame for viewing government power in criminal matters that we would do well to use more often as a guide. Applying these principles in the criminal law context shows that they can produce outcomes that are more progressive than the output of many other constitutional theories more commonly associated with liberal thinking. The essay pays particular close attention to proportionality review under the Eighth Amendment.

Local Government and Self-government in the CIS and Kazakhstan

The theoretical, methodological and practical aspects of management and self-government at the local level in the post-Soviet states are reflected. The Introduction outlined the objectivity of the transition to models of governance at the local level based on the principles of classical liberalism and democracy. In Western countries, they were formed in a specific historical form, taking into account the peculiarities of social development and national specifics. In post-Soviet countries, the replacement of social structures of the former state system was not always confirmed by the adequacy of the principles of the rule of law and the experience of full-fledged statehood. The main part notes the differences in methods, models and content of civil society institutions. In theoretical terms, there is a lack of identity of the concepts that form the system of governance at the local level, including civil society institutions, as well as differences in their powers at the levels of hierarchy. The diversity of subjects of influence poorly takes into account the differences in approaches, methods, management technologies and tools for influencing the control object. In the course of the evolution of the liberal model, the centralized functions of public administration in the previous model were only monopolized within the national framework. In the course of this modernization, it is necessary to better take into account the challenges of a global nature; common previous experience; national traditions, as well as strategic goals for the development of new national entities. Positive processes of democratization of public administration do not exclude the need to develop all institutions of civil society. Kazakhstan needs to pay attention to the processes of democratization of civil society as a whole; assistance to structures for coordinating local self-government institutions at the national and regional levels; creating public councils representing the interests of the population, and provide them with material and financial resources; various forms of interregional cooperation, taking into account foreign experience. The Conclusion reflects measures to enhance the role of civil society institutions in modern conditions, taking into account their importance for the CIS countries, including future studies of this problem.

Life, Liberty, and M*A*S*H

The American television series M*A*S*H is one of the most popular and beloved series in TV history. One contributor to its success is its consistent promotion of the principles of classical liberalism, principles that were cherished across the American political spectrum in the late 20th century, from ACLU civil libertarians, to Jimmy Carter/Bill Clinton centrists, to Ronald Reagan’s small-government conservatives. This essay discusses M*A*S*H portrayal of several of these principles, from its opposition to war and compulsory service, to its skepticism of government power, to its support of market exchange, to its promotion of other civil liberties.

Karl Mittermaier and the hands of classical liberalism

AbstractKarl Mittermaier (1938–2016) completed a work in 1987 titled The Hand Behind the Invisible Hand: Dogmatic and Pragmatic Views on Free Markets and the State of Economic Theory, published for the first time in 2020. Here I treat Mittermaier's rich meditation, which I interpret as a pursuit of greater coherence in classical liberal thought. Mittermaier emphasises the moral, cultural, and institutional preconditions of a liberal market order, and argues that some of the preconditions depend on people feeling that they have reason to embrace such classical liberal principles. The preconditions, then, depend in part on the perception of coherence and appeal of the liberal order.

Karl Mittermaier’s Pursuit of Classical Liberal Coherence

Karl Mittermaier (1938-2016) was a classical liberal economist at the University of Witwatersrand in Johannesburg. He completed a work in 1986 titled The Hand Behind the Invisible Hand: Dogmatic and Pragmatic Views on Free Markets and the State of Economic Theory, being published in 2020 for the first time. Here I treat Mittermaier’s rich meditation, which I interpret as a pursuit of greater coherence in classical liberal thought. Mittermaier emphasizes the moral, cultural, and institutional preconditions of a liberal market order, and he says that some of the preconditions depend on people feeling that they have reason to embrace such classical liberal principles. The preconditions, then, depend in part on the perception of coherence and appeal of the liberal order. The present essay is written for the new volume presenting The Hand Behind the Invisible Hand.

Classical Liberalism and the Problem of Technological Change

The relationship between classical liberalism and technology is surprisingly fraught. The common understanding is that technological advance is complementary to the principles of classical liberalism – especially in the case of contemporary, information-age technology. This is most clearly on display in Silicon Valley, with its oft-professed libertarian (classical liberalism’s kissing cousin) affinities. The analytical predicate for this complementarity is that classical liberalism values liberty-enhancing private ordering, and technological advance both is generally facially liberty-enhancing and facilitates private ordering. This analysis, however, is incomplete. Classical liberalism recognizes that certain rules are necessary in a well-functioning polity. The classical liberal, for instance, recognizes the centrality of enforceable property rights, and the concomitant ability to seek recourse from a third party (the state) when those rights are compromised. Thus, contemporary technological advances may facilitate private transactions – but such transactions may not support private ordering if they also weaken either the property rights necessary to that ordering or the enforceability of those rights. This chapter argues that technological advance can at times create (or, perhaps more accurately, highlight) a tension within principles of classical liberalism: It can simultaneously enhance liberty, while also undermining the legal rules and institutions necessary for the efficient and just private ordering of interactions in a liberal society. This is an important tension for classical liberals to understand – and one that needs to be, but too rarely is, acknowledged or struggled with. Related, the chapter also identifies and evaluates important fracture lines between prevalent branches of modern libertarianism: those that tend to embrace technological anarchism as maximally liberty-enhancing, on the one hand, and those that more cautiously protect the legal institutions (for example, property rights) upon which individual autonomy and private ordering are based, on the other. This chapter proceeds in four parts. Part I introduces our understanding of classical liberalism’s core principles: an emphasis on individual liberty; the recognition of a limit to the exercise of liberty when it conflicts with the autonomy of others; and support for a minimal set of rules necessary to coordinate individuals’ exercise of their liberty in autonomy-respecting ways through a system of private ordering. Part II then offers an initial discussion of the relationship between technology and legal institutions and argues that technology is important to classical liberalism insofar as it affects the legal institutions upon which private ordering is based. Part III explores how libertarian philosophies have embraced contemporary technology, focusing on “extreme” and “moderate” views – views that correspond roughly to liberty maximalism and autonomy protectionism. This discussion sets the stage for Part IV, which considers the tensions that technological change – especially the rapid change that characterizes much of recent history – creates within the classical liberal philosophy. The central insight is that classical liberalism posits a set of relatively stable legal institutions as the basis for liberty-enhancing private ordering – institutions that are generally developed through public, not private ordering – but that technology, including otherwise liberty-enhancing technology, can disrupt these institutions in ways that threaten both individual autonomy and the private ordering built upon extant institutions.

In Defense of Catholic Fusionism

Patrick Deneen’s criticisms of liberalism are both penetrating and persuasive. Yet, Deneen does not adequately address liberalism’s strongest arguments. Deneen’s concept of “liberalism” is problematic because it minimizes the significant distinctions between classical liberalism and progressivism. Certain principles of classical liberalism, such as the free market and an increased awareness of human beings as rights-bearing individuals, are compatible with the Catholic faith. Progressivism, on the other hand, is not. Progressivism’s moral failings are far worse than those associated with classical liberalism. Although classical liberalism is itself flawed, it remains viable to the extent that it may be integrated with core Christian teachings.

Retroliberalism and the new aid regime of the 2010s

This article coins the term ‘retroliberalism’ to describe the aid regime that has evolved out of the post-Global Financial Crisis (GFC) world order. This approach sees a partial return to the principles of classical liberalism with respect to the role of the state vis-à-vis the market, whilst also perpetuating a number of the principles of neoliberalism. At the same time, the rejuvenation of an active state harks back to modernization principles prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s. In describing this regulatory shift we suggest that a retroliberal ‘manual’ for aid practice can be discerned. Our analysis utilizes evidence from recent reforms in a range of Western aid donors that are members of the United Nation’s DAC, including the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the Netherlands. It also offers some comment on the increasing role and influence of non-traditional donors such as China in shaping the new regime. Ultimately, we argue that this state-led post-industrial modernization that serves to facilitate and sustain the accumulation of private capital harks back to the post-War development period.

INTRODUCTION: NEOLIBERAL CULTURE / THE CULTURES OF NEOLIBERALISM

This introductory essay situates the contributors’ articles in relation to the over-arching questions for this special issue: how has neoliberalism impacted on culture, and how is neoliberalism thought from cultural perspectives; or, what happens to the idea of culture under neoliberalism? We acknowledge extensive disagreement among commentators as to what neoliberalism is, its coherence as a concept, and its duration. We trace the different values attributed to neoliberalism, from social democratic inflections that decry growing disparities in wealth distribution, to those perspectives that emphasise its promise of self-determination and the individual, social and ethical potentials of self-determination and consumer choice in market relations. Noting that neoliberalism is a term used to explain wide range of contemporary cultural phenomena, we argue that it maintains enough coherence as a project to act as an influential force on material life, even if it operates in some spheres more as a ‘structure of feeling’ than an explicit platform. We trace its reorientation of the key principles of classical liberalism, and its relationship to, and ascendancy over, postmodernity and globalisation as terms that have been used to designate the current cultural conjuncture. Neoliberalism emerges out of the same moment and conditions, but more directly names a particular mode of political economy and governance that is inextricable from cultural life, from intra-subjective through to collective levels. The remainder of this introduction groups the contributing articles under three headings, indicating the three spheres of cultural life that our contributors debate in particular. The complex interplay of neoliberal policies and Indigenous cultural rights, ranging from enthusiastic participation in the market economy to resistance, is discussed in the context of Aboriginal language policy by Sue Stanton, Chie Adachi and Henk Huijser. The articles by Juan Sanin and Eileen Oak are related by an interest in the contemporary ‘remoralisation’ of the market form, even though they address opposite ends of the consumption scale: Sanin analyses appeals to ethical consumption and patriotic values in Australian supermarket branding, while Oak’s study of neoliberal social policy in New Zealand observes the systematic demoralisation of those who are unable to participate in the formal economy. The issue concludes with two articles on the neoliberal university by Andrew Whelan and Edwin Ng. Although they draw on distinct intellectual traditions of (respectively) critical sociology and deconstruction, both authors raise concerns that the academic critique of the corporatised university threatens to further erode intellectual hospitality and community.

Die Politische Ökonomie des Entscheidungsdesigns: Kann Paternalismus liberal sein?

The concept of libertarian paternalism is already the subject of an increasingly intense academic debate. At the same time, it is gaining popularity among political practitioners. This paper argues that, contrary to its own claims, libertarian paternalism conflicts with basic principles of classical liberalism. The paper starts with a short summary of the development economics has taken from classical homo economicus to modern behavioral economics, and goes on to show why the search for efficient paternalist interventions is seemingly plausible from the perspective of behavioral economics. The argument continues with a discussion of some fundamental problems of libertarian paternalism, and it is shown that paternalism, also of the libertarian kind, is conflicting with two tenets of classical liberalism: autonomy of heterogeneous individuals and openness for long-term processes of economic and societal change.

Realistic Idealism and Classical Liberalism: Evaluating Free Market Fairness

ABSTRACTIn Free Market Fairness, John Tomasi defends classical-liberal principles not because of real-world considerations but on ideal-theoretic grounds. However, what constitutes a sufficiently “ideal” ideal theory is debatable since, as Tomasi shows, regimes that range from laissez faire to heavily interventionist can all be classified as legitimate from the perspective of ideal theory. Conversely, if ideal theory can allow for realistic constraints, as Rawls does, then we should recognize that even under ideal-theoretic conditions, political actors face logistical, epistemic, and motivational challenges that only intensify in the real world, where questions of feasibility become paramount.

The Poverty of Agency in Conrad’s The Secret Agent

The Poverty of Agency in Conrad’s The Secret Agent Benjamin Lewis Robinson (bio) The “secret” in The Secret Agent (1907) lies in the ambiguity of the word “agent.” The story reflects on its historical moment by playing on the slippage between “agency” expressive of a capacity for individual action and “agency” in the functional or institutional sense. London, characterized by a proliferation of competing and overlapping agencies, agents and agendas, emerges as the site of this slippage. At a time when the imperial metropolis was the hub of diverse political and economic developments and as such emerged as a distinctive political space in its own right, The Secret Agent conveys an impression of the city as one of poverty and incapacity, of destitution and dependence, devoid of the sort of concerted, concentrated and committed action associated then as now with social engagement and political life. A PERIOD OF REACTION The Secret Agent was written in 1906 on the eve of a series of social reforms by the newly elected Liberal government, most notably the introduction of national health insurance and social security, but also changes to the educational system, measures supplementary to the outdated Poor Laws, and changes in the administration of mental deficiency, which in certain crucial respects anticipated, and in the long term facilitated, the establishment of the welfare state in Britain.1 Although these policies were only the most dramatic in a long-running process of piecemeal reform and increasing government (as well as civic) intervention, they reflect a significant transformation in the self-understanding of British liberalism, which had, as a party as well as an ideology, suffered major setbacks since the loss of power in 1886. While classic liberalism had promoted a policy of minimal government, individualism, private property, and a laissez-faire economy, the “new liberalism” was forced to come to terms with the emergence of a new and amorphous political entity, “the social,” that could not be reduced to the sum of its parts and operated—this being the subject of the emergent field of sociology—according to a logic of its own. [End Page 195] Specifically, liberalism was obliged to confront those aspects of the social—issues relating to poverty, public health, un- and underemployment, housing and sanitation, child care, old age and disability—that together constituted the so-called “social problem” (also the title of J. A. Hobson’s 1901 book). In the light of accelerating urbanization, the economic depression of the 1880s, and the rising specter of socialism across Europe, these issues could no longer credibly be said to resolve themselves progressively according to classical liberal principles. Most unsettling of all, perhaps, was the fact that the “period of reaction,” from 1886, as one of the more significant “new liberals,” L. T. Hobhouse, would describe it, was owed in some degree at least to the liberalization of the franchise beyond determinations of property brought about by Gladstone’s legislation, most notably the “Representation of the People Act” of 1884. Apart from demanding further social protections, the “people,” it turned out, were susceptible, especially at the hands of the emergent mass media, to the worst kinds of demagoguery and jingoism, proving proponents of such illiberal policies as imperialism and the Boer War. Of course, such developments were by no means simply a liberal problem in the party-political sense but were rather indicative of broader tendencies and transformations in the nature of “the political” in the late nineteenth century. As the social emerged over the course of the century as a distinct albeit difficult to define agency that was widely perceived to harbor a potentially decisive political force, European politics in general became a matter of addressing, conforming to, or representing the social. As the liberal politician, William Harcourt, who is caricatured as the Home Secretary in The Secret Agent, famously declared in 1888, “we are all socialists now.”2 What this meant for the new liberalism, as espoused by the likes of Hobhouse and Hobson, was an acknowledgement that the individual subject that classic liberalism had presupposed was in fact a social construct and that the social had accordingly to be intensively managed by state and private initiatives in...

“Our People in General Have a High Degree of Freedom”

This article considers the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in National Federation of Independent Business et al v Sebelius, which questioned the constitutionality of President Obama’s signature healthcare reforms of 2009, which have become colloquially known as ‘Obamacare’. Although the Supreme Court upheld the Act as constitutional, this article contends that the Supreme Court’s reasoning can be read as another battle in the long-standing debate in American politics over the correct size and limits of the Federal Government. In upholding the healthcare reforms as a tax, rather than under the Constitution’s Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court has endorsed a view of limited government in line with the principles of classical liberalism. This has the potential to greatly restrict the scope of the Federal Government to pursue large scale expansive social welfare programmes in the future.

Indywidualizm amerykańskiej Starej Prawicy

Individualism of so called „Old Right Wing” in America The article is dedicated to the philosophy and history of the Old Right movement in United States of America. At the beginning, author discusses the historical roots, ideological structure, and principles of the Old Right with important figures behind it. The next part of the article is devoted to the presence of the movement in the American political arena: it’s alliances, enemies, and political representation. A substantial part of the article is based on the Old Right’s arguments against President Roosevelt’s New Deal in all it’s aspects. The consequent anti-interventionist position of the Old Right pushed them to opposition to the US military presence in World War I and World War II. That unique but ideologically coherent standpoint is discussed in the later part of the article. It shows the popular perception of the anti-interventionist arguments, revealing not widely known facts about it. The question of the American military interventions reflected by the classical liberal principles, dominates the last part of the article. Author discusses the theory of the cold war and emerge of the New Right as a cause of the Old Right’s defeat. Finally, he summarizes the Old Right’s political positions, and predicts possible developments of that ideas in future.

Failure of the market, state and economics from the perspective of the financial crisis

The debate between the advocates of market and interventionist solutions, primarily based on pitting the market against regulation, has escalated as a result of the financial crisis. The objective of the paper is not only to analyze the advantages and drawbacks of alternative regulatory mechanisms in the light of the global economic downturn, but also to evaluate the modern economy from this perspective. The paper focuses on three hypotheses. 1. It is illegitimate to pit the market against regulation. 2. The crisis resulted from the violation of the principles of classical liberalism, which was precipitated both by inadequate policies and by modern economic methodology. 3. Critical analysis of the methodology and logic of the development of 20th century economic thought reveals the existence of a systemic failure of the dominant doctrines in mainstream economics.

Progressivism and Philanthropy

Progressivism and Philanthropy Lenore T. Ealy (bio) and Steven D. Ealy (bio) Toward the end of the nineteenth century America faced unfamiliar circumstances that seemed to make its traditional social institutions obsolete and threatened the hope for social stability. Steady immigration swelled the ranks and diversity of the urban poor, and headlong industrialization radically changed the ways in which people worked and lived. The growing complexity of social and economic affairs contributed to a widespread belief that a new social and political order must be created. The response of many social critics and scholars, today known broadly as "Progressives," was to forge an approach to social and institutional change rooted in evolutionary philosophy, enamored with scientific objectivism, and often infused with German ideological statism. Traditional Anglo-American common sense and the rule of common law were increasingly suspect as the new "social sciences" emerged with hopes of rationalizing social control. In the decades that followed, most American institutions were organized or re-organized according to the Progressive prescription. The flow of social responsibility was away from more primary, local, and voluntary institutions to those more centralized, professionalized, and tax-supported. This transformation was financed in part by the fledgling philanthropic foundations of Carnegie, Rockefeller, Sage and others who subscribed to some version of the new corporate liberalism. The hierarchical, corporate organization of business entities created a work force with middle-class means and proletarian status, and many of the society's major responsibilities were newly assumed by remote national organizations or assigned to some level of government. By mid-century, in the wake of the New Deal, America's institutions and practices of mutual aid were widely displaced by specialized professionals. Those in need of assistance became clients or "cases." Today, at the turn of another century, new circumstances are rendering the Progressive prescriptions largely obsolete. American society is outgrowing the institutions the Progressives designed for it. The practical virtue and utility of classical liberal principles have triumphed over the ideologies of socialism and statism. Government administration has been shown to suffer from and to reinforce significant knowledge problems. The electronic revolution has suggested and enabled a more horizontal corporate organization in which more and more working people are self-managed. In short, the centralizing thrust of the 20th century seems to be giving way to a decentralizing tendency in the 21st. The purpose of this paper is to foster better understanding of the origins and rationale of the Progressive "old order" and of its continuing impact on American philanthropy. Drawing upon dozens of readings from Progressive-era journals and popular magazines, we seek to uncover the intellectual foundations of Progressivism and to identify its strengths and vulnerabilities. Part of our exploration is also intended to understand how we might best articulate a new rationale for philanthropic enterprises that are today working to return social responsibility to local communities and to support the emergence of new forms of mutual aid and voluntary action. A more robust understanding of the promise of decentralized voluntary action is needed to facilitate the reclamation of responsibility from the outdated, bureaucratic institutions born in the Progressive era. Philanthropists who are today glimpsing the opening of new paths for human action and who wish to encourage the present transformations must understand the challenges in proceeding. A better understanding of the "old order" as well as the entrenchment of contemporary institutions in Progressive assumptions can help promote more effective action in the present. Only when we understand the old assumptions and their compelling hold on the present can we begin fruitfully to challenge these assumptions with a new vision for the future. I. What's Wrong With Charity? A hallmark of the Progressive movement was its effort to reform politics and government administration, to reclaim them from the corrupt patronage system of the party bosses and to apply new, more professional means to accomplishing the ends of government. In the name of reform the Progressives viewed the legitimate ends of the national government as more expansive and substantive than in previous eras. Ever present in the minds of many reformers was the fear of popular revolution, and "the labor question" was of central importance. In the years...

Retrospectives: Classical Family Values: Ending the Poor Laws as They Knew Them

Poor law reform in the early 1830s provides a key example of the deep conflicts between classical liberal principles of self-reliance and the realities of dependency. Eminent economists, such as Nassau Senior and Thomas Malthus, argued that the dependency of women and children calls forth and motivates its own support from the altruism of husbands and fathers. Like modern welfare reformers, the classical economists asserted the natural necessity and sufficiency of such dependency and ignored its powerful implications for the intergenerational perpetuation of a highly illiberal inequality of opportunity.