Principle Of Sovereign Equality Research Articles

Kiobel V. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: Corporate Liability Under the Alien Torts Statute

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., (2d. Cir.) overruled numerous 2d circuit decisions and contradicts sister federal appellate courts in other circuits, finding that corporate liability in international law is not a sufficiently specific norm to support a finding of liability under the Alien Tort Statute. That decision is clearly erroneous. Kiobel violates the general principle of legality, immunizing corporate conduct from liability even in cases where States would be liable for violating jus cogens norms and thus also violates the principle of sovereign equality of States due to principles of comity and res judicata. Kiobel also is an abnegation by the U.S. of U.S. obligations under international law. While no state is obliged to remedy jus cogens violations, each state is obliged to respect them. Because Kiobel reflects a deep and significant split at the circuit courts, because it concerns U.S. international legal obligations, because the stakes, in human and financial terms are high, because it was so obviously wrongly decided, the split that Kiobel represents will surely eventually reach the U.S. Supreme Court. This article explains precisely why the court's decision in Kiobel misapprehends the structure and sources of international law and consequently reaches the wrong result for the wrong reasons. The U.S. Supreme Court will likely conclude that the ATS governs jus cogens claims against natural and artificial persons without a showing of state action, but requires state action or complicity with state action otherwise.

The effectiveness of the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to analyse the performance of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of World Trade Organization (WTO) performance, between 1995 and 2007, as well as to discuss the main proposals for its improvement.Design/methodology/approachFirst, the paper presents the legal predictability of the system; compliance with its procedural stipulations in regard to its proposed timeframes; and the participation of different groups of States within this system. The timeframes are compared with those that really happened. Thus, there is an analysis of the effectiveness of its decisions and the necessity to induce compliance and retaliation. Finally, the main proposals to change the system are discussed.FindingsIt is concluded that most of legal procedures are accomplished as previewed by DSB, but the system itself is highly dependent of the action of States, who need time to negotiate. It is also possible to conclude that there is a high level of effectiveness and States prefer to respect the decisions of DSB and maintain the legitimacy of the system as a whole than keep advantages in specific matters.Originality/valueWhen the WTO was founded, there was an effort to generate a system guided by legal rules. The DSB has made efforts to maintain a high level of legal preciosity. However, it is clear that this system is still very limited by the traditional method of negotiation among States. The implementation of a rule‐oriented system contributes to greater democratization of access to justice and, of course, in a limited way, the principle of sovereign equality of States. Finally, the majority of proposed changes attempt to apply the logic of domestic courts to an international body, assuming a level of organization of the international community as a whole that still does not exist. Others proposals suggest increasing the politicization of the system, which is also not appropriate.

International Environmental Law and Principle of Sovereign Equality

International Environmental Law and Principle of Sovereign Equality

Cosmopolitism, Global Justice, and International Law

Along with the exploding attention to globalization, issues of global justice have become central elements in political philosophy. After decades in which debates were dominated by a state-centric paradigm, current debates in political philosophy also address issues of global inequality, global poverty, and the moral foundations of international law. As recent events have demonstrated, these issues also play an important role in the practice of international law. In fields such as peace and security, economic integration, environmental law, and human rights, international lawyers are constantly confronted with questions of global justice and international legitimacy. This special issue contains four papers which address an important element of this emerging debate on cosmopolitan global justice, with much relevance for international law: the principle of sovereign equality, global economic inequality, and environmental law.

Reforming the Governance of the International Monetary Fund

Democratising the governance of the IMF will significantly improve the institution's capacity to manage crises. The implementation of a democratic framework requires a reform of the Fund's ‘quota regime,’ which mediates the distribution of voting power. An optimal reform of the quota regime that reflects the increased weight of emerging economies requires matching the number of policy objectives with the number of policy instruments. Presently, there is a classic ‘assignment problem’ whereby one policy instrument (i.e., the quota regime) is aimed at achieving three objectives (i.e., member contribution obligations, access rights, and voting rights). Three different instruments need to be adopted. Member contributions should be based on member's capacity to pay; access to resources should be based on need; and voting rights should balance the rights of creditors with the principle of sovereign equality. These reforms will enhance the Fund's legitimacy and accountability as a forum for global economic policy‐making.

Population Weights in the International Order

Relative population sizes play little part in the international system. A state's economic and military power is influenced by population size, but as one factor among many. Formal relations among states exclude population from consideration by the principle of sovereign equality. Three sources of possible change in this situation are explored, in which states would be “population‐weighted” to a greater degree than before. Convergence of productivity levels around the world, expected by many, would bring the economic and population rankings of states more into line. Some convergence is occurring, but selectively and for the most part quite slowly. Anticipation of its effect, however, influences the international order well in advance. A second source of change is the necessity to allocate among states the use of global commons, particularly the atmosphere as a sink for greenhouse gases. Acceptable remedies for this problem and perhaps for other global‐level threats are likely to involve at least in part a per capita allocation principle. And third, population weights will tend to be more prominent in futures in which states are less important—as envisaged, for example, in the more benign scenarios of global society.