Pricing Strategies Of Manufacturer Research Articles

Manufacturer's Pricing Strategy Choice and Third Party's Collection Rate Under Consumers' Social Interactions and Environmental Responsibility

Manufacturer's Pricing Strategy Choice and Third Party's Collection Rate Under Consumers' Social Interactions and Environmental Responsibility

Vehicles manufacturer's pricing strategies considering service level of car-sharing modes

Vehicles manufacturer's pricing strategies considering service level of car-sharing modes

Research on pricing strategy of manufacturer's dual-channel supply chain considering power structure and free-riding behaviour

Research on pricing strategy of manufacturer's dual-channel supply chain considering power structure and free-riding behaviour

Research on pricing strategy of manufacturer's dual-channel supply chain considering power structure and free-riding behaviour

Research on pricing strategy of manufacturer's dual-channel supply chain considering power structure and free-riding behaviour

Maximising manufacturer's profit in a dual-channel supply chain with disruption risk

With the rapid development of the e-commerce, more customer demands are generated through online sales channels. Together with traditional sales channels through retailers, the manufacturers need to implement the dual supply chain management to enhance their performance. However, both of the online and traditional sales channels might face various sources of disruption risks under the globalisation and the high complexity of the supply chain network. Using a theoretical modelling approach, three industrial cases, and sensitivity analysis, we discuss the optimal pricing strategy of manufacturer in the dual channel supply chain with disruption risks. We find that the influential factors of maximising profits of a manufacturer include its pricing strategy, product market share, disruption risk probabilities, and product distribution proportion between the online and offline channels.

The Effect of Supplier's Vertical Shareholding on Competitive Manufacturer's Pricing Strategy

The Effect of Supplier's Vertical Shareholding on Competitive Manufacturer's Pricing Strategy

Pricing and Inventory Strategy of Dual-channel Supply Chain under Random Demand and Retailer's Capital Constraint

A dual-channel supply chain system composed of one manufacturer and one retailer is considered in this paper, which existed uncertainty demands in both distribution channels and capital constraint on retailer. It set up the profit model of manufacturer dominated dual-channel supply chain system, studied to the optimal pricing and inventory strategies of decentralized and centralized supply chain, obtained the optimal pricing and inventory strategy of the two kinds of supply chain system. The analysis to the optimal solution indicated that the demand uncertainty of two distribution channels, deferred-payment rate etc, are all have certain influence relation on the pricing strategies of manufacturer and retailer. Numerical experiment has showed the effectiveness of the conclusions.

Manufacturer's Pricing Strategy for Supply Chain with Service Level-Dependent Demand

This article considers the pricing strategies of a manufacturer in a two-echelon supply chain with service leveldependent demand. This chain consists of one manufacturer and two retailers. The manufacturer decides the wholesale prices as a Stackelberg leader, and the retailers determine their service levels as the Stackelberg followers. We discuss the segmented and unified pricing strategies of the manufacturer. We also compute the optimal service levels and profits of the retailers, as well as the optimal wholesale prices and profits of the manufacturer associated with different pricing strategies. We conclude that the segmented pricing strategy benefits the manufacturer, whereas it cannot benefit the two retailers simultaneously. Furthermore, it is disadvantageous to the profit of the entire supply chain. Moreover, the increase in service cost coefficient adversely affects the earnings of the customers, the retailers, the manufacturer, and the entire supply chain. However, an increase in diffusion intensity benefits the customers, the manufacturer, and the supply chain.

Manufacturer's pricing strategy in a two-level supply chain with competing retailers and advertising cost dependent demand

The paper studies a two-echelon supply chain comprising one manufacturer and two competing retailers with advertising cost dependent demand. The manufacturer acts as the Stackelberg leader who specifies wholesale price for each retailer. The two retailers compete with each other in advertising and they have different sales costs. The manufacturer uses one of the following two pricing strategies: (i) setting the same wholesale price for both the retailers irrespective of the difference in their sales costs; (ii) setting different wholesale prices for the retailers depending on their sales costs. Two models are developed. In the first model, the manufacturer shares a fraction of each retailer's advertising cost while in the second model, the manufacturer does not share any retailer's advertising expenses. In both the models, we derive the retailers' and manufacturer's optimal strategies. A numerical example is given to illustrate the theoretical results developed in each model. Computational results show that it is always beneficial for the manufacturer to adopt different wholesale pricing strategy for the retailers.

Manufacturer's pricing strategies in cooperative and non-cooperative advertising supply chain under retail competition

A B S T R A C T This article studies the manufacturer's pricing strategy in a supply chain with a single manufacturer and two competing retailers. The manufacturer, as a Stackelberg leader specifies wholesale prices to two retailers who face advertisement dependent demand. Based on this gaming structure, two mathematical models are developed - the cooperative advertising model where manufacturer shares a fraction of retailers' advertising costs and the non-cooperative advertising model where manufacturer does not share any retailer's advertising expenses. The optimal strategies of the manufacturer and retailers are determined and a numerical example is taken to illustrate the theoretical results derived. We show that cooperative advertising policy is beneficial not only for the participating entities but also for the entire supply chain.

Wholesale price discrimination with interdependent retailers

This paper examines the relationship between one manufacturer and two retailers who sell a product on their downstream markets. If a retailer invests in activities that enhance demand and, for example, improve the perceived image of the product, he or she might attract more customers, as well as increase the sales volumes of other retailers. In such a situation, free rider problems arise between the retailers, which finally lead to reduced sales efforts. We show that for linear wholesale prices, the manufacturer's pricing strategy depends on the retailers' investment costs and derive conditions for the optimality of wholesale price discrimination. We find that for low and high costs the manufacturer charges the retailers identical wholesale prices and thus does not have to bear any agency costs due to free riding. In all other cases, the manufacturer mitigates this problem by engaging in wholesale price discrimination. Our results indicate why it might make sense for a manufacturer to charge different wholesale prices even when the retailers have equal cost structures, market conditions, and investment options.

Manufacturer's pricing strategy for supply chain with warranty period-dependent demand

This article presents a review of the issues associated with a manufacturer's pricing strategies in a two-echelon supply chain that comprises one manufacturer and two competing retailers, with warranty period-dependent demands. The manufacturer, as a Stackelberg leader, specifies wholesale prices to two competing retailers who face warranty period-dependent demand and have different sales costs. The manufacturer considers three pricing options: (1) setting the same price for both retailers, while disregarding their difference with regard to sales cost; (2) setting a different price to each retailer on the basis of their sales cost; and (3) setting the same price to both retailers according to the average sales cost of the industry. In this article, the retailers' optimal warranty periods and their optimal profit, manufacturer's optimal wholesale price, and his/her optimal profit associated with different pricing strategies have been derived using the game theory. Our analysis shows that the results for retailers are the same with Strategy 1 or Strategy 3. In addition, we compared the effects of different pricing strategies of the manufacturer on supply chain decisions and profit. We conclude from the results that the manufacturer should either adopt Strategy 2 with symmetrical sales cost information or Strategy 3 if retailers' sales costs are asymmetrical.

Implementing coordination contracts in a manufacturer Stackelberg dual-channel supply chain

We examine a manufacturer's pricing strategies in a dual-channel supply chain, in which the manufacturer is a Stackelberg leader and the retailer is a follower. We show the conditions under which the manufacturer and the retailer both prefer a dual-channel supply chain. We examine the coordination schemes for a dual-channel supply chain and find that a manufacturer's contract with a wholesale price and a price for the direct channel can coordinate the dual-channel supply channel, benefiting the retailer but not the manufacturer. We illustrate how such a contract with a complementary agreement, such as a two-part tariff or a profit-sharing agreement, can coordinate the dual-channel supply chain and enable both the manufacturer and the retailer to be a win–win.

Manufacturer's pricing strategy and return policy for a single-period commodity

This paper presents a model for designing the pricing and return-credit strategy for a monopolistic manufacturer of single-period commodities. That is, given the unit manufacturing cost and the unit retail sale price, the manufacturer determines: (i) the unit price C to be charged against the retailer; and (ii) the unit credit V to be given to the retailer for units returned. While the manufacturer is allowed to set C and V, the order quantity Q is set by the retailer in response to the manufacturer's C and V. Among the unexpected findings derived from our model are: (i) unless an external force supports the retailer, otherwise the manufacturer can usually design a ( C, V)-scheme that gives himself the lion's share of the profit; (ii) depending on the risk attitudes of the manufacturer and the retailer, the optimal return policy can range from “no returns allowed” to “unlimited returns with full credit”; (iii) instead of losing his profit share to the retailer, a return-credits agreement can often be manipulated by a shrewd manufacturer to increase his profit.