Price Auction Research Articles

아파트 경매 낙찰가율 결정요인에 관한 연구: 수도권 지역을 중심으로

아파트 경매 낙찰가율 결정요인에 관한 연구: 수도권 지역을 중심으로

Equivalence of canonical matching models

This paper offers expected revenue and pricing equivalence results for canonical matching models. The equivalence of these models is centered on the assumption that there are large numbers of buyers and sellers, and the contact decisions of buyers to sellers are made independently. Therefore, the distribution of buyers to sellers is approximated by the Poisson distribution. The list of canonical matching models includes the models developed by Burdett and Judd (1983), Shimer (2005), and McAfee (1993). In the Burdett and Judd model, buyers post prices and the equilibrium features price dispersion because identical buyers play mixed strategies. In the Shimer model, sellers post a vector of prices corresponding to different buyer types. In equilibrium, all identical buyers pay the same price. In the McAfee model, equilibrium pricing is determined by simple second price auctions. McAfee's model also features price dispersion because the number of bidders at each auction is stochastic.

The Strength Of Legal Deed Auction Summary Of Burdened Of Confiscation Based On Regulation Of Finance Minister Number 27 / Pmk.06 / 2016 In The City Of Semarang

The purpose of this study was to: 1) To Know the Auction for Goods burdened Confiscation Based Finance Minister Regulation No. 27 / PMK.06 / 2016 in the city of Semarang. 2) To know the Power of Law Treatise Deed Auctions for Goods burdened Confiscation Based Finance Minister Regulation No. 27 / PMK.06 / 2016 in the city of Semarang. The data used in this study are primary data and secondary data and data that can support tertiary study, which was then analyzed by normative juridical method.Based on the results of data analysis concluded that: 1) How the Auction of Goods Seized Burdened By Finance Minister Regulation Number 27 / PMK.6 / 2016 in Semarang. In the official auction assisted by guides who guilty of employees DJKN, the auction progresses No offers the winning auction is bidders who bid the highest. Each implementation of the auction will be charged Customs Auction accordance with government regulations governing the types and rates of non-tax state revenue. Payment of the auction price and Customs Auction shall be made in cash or check or checking account, no later than five (5) working days. In the case of submission of official documents of the auction must submit the original document of title or goods are auctioned off to the buyer or winning bidder no later than 1 (one) working day. Buyers must show proof of payment of the form and submit proof of deposit Tax on Acquisition of Land and Building If items such as land and buildings. 2) How the Legal Power of The Minutes of the Auction the Seized Goods Burdened By Finance Minister Regulation Number 27 / PMK.6 / 2016 in Semarang. Deed Auctions treatise consists of body deed, deed and leg mid deed which contains about the day, date, type of goods, address of the seller, as well as goods sold. Minutes of Deed Auctions is an authentic deed made by officials of the auction and use the laws and legislation so this auction treatise deed has permanent legal force if there are problems in the future.Key Words: The Power of Law; the Deed of Auction; Goods Burdened Confiscation.

Price drivers in the carbon emissions trading scheme: Evidence from Chinese emissions trading scheme pilots

Carbon prices are low and fluctuate greatly since Chinese carbon emissions trading scheme pilots were operated. This paper discusses the price drivers in the pilots, using structural breaks test and autoregressive distributed lag model. The results indicate that oversupply of allowances, low auction prices and use of China certified emission reductions will cause remarkable decline on carbon prices; the expansion of carbon market and centralized trading will rise carbon prices. Oil prices are positively correlated with carbon prices, and coal prices are negatively related with carbon prices. Carbon-intensive product prices also affect carbon prices. Chemical prices are positively linked with carbon prices in Shenzhen, while negatively related with those in Beijing and Shanghai, for differences in sectoral coverage. Nonferrous prices have positive impacts on carbon prices in Beijing but negative impacts on those in Shenzhen, for differences in industrial structure. Financial markets and weather have limited impacts on carbon prices. Our results provide policy implications for the development of pilots and the national carbon market.

Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions

We investigate firms' incentives for cost reduction in the first price sealed bid auction, a format largely used for procurement. A central feature of the model is that we allow firms to be heterogeneous. Though private value first price auctions are not games with monotonic best responses, we find that for comparative statics purposes they behave like these games. In particular, firms will tend to underinvest in cost reduction because they anticpate fiercer ehad-on competition. Using the second price auction as a benchmark, we also find that the first price auction will elicit less investment from market participants. Moreover, both auction formats tend to favor investment by the current market leader and are therefore likely to reinforce asymmetries among market participants.

Relationships among carcass traits, auction price, and image analysis traits of marbling characteristics in Korean cattle beef

Marbling score (MS) is related to beef auction price (AP) in Korea, but how these relate to marbling texture (i.e. number and distribution of marbling particles [MPs]) is not known. We examined relationships among carcass traits, carcass AP, and image analysis marbling texture traits. In experiment 1, carcass data and longissimus thoracis (LT) were obtained from Korean cattle steers reared under similar feeding conditions. MS, quality grade (QG), and AP were related (P < 0.001) to numbers of coarse MPs and fine MPs and fineness index. In experiment 2, LT images photographed at a slaughterhouse were used in regression analysis within individual QG classes (QGs: 1 [middle], 1+, and 1++ [best]). AP was related (P < 0.001) to numbers of coarse MPs and fine MPs and fineness index in both QGs 1+ and 1++ but not in QG 1. Overall, several marbling texture traits were related to AP, but both MS and QG were more strongly related to AP.

Underwriting Government Debt Auctions: Auction Choice and Information Production

In this paper, we examine a novel two-stage mechanism for selling government securities, wherein the dealers underwrite in the first stage the sale of securities, which are auctioned in stage 2 via either a discriminatory auction (DA) or a uniform price auction (UPA). Using proprietary data on auctions during 2006–2013, we find that (a) the first stage underwriting auction generates significant information, including predicting the likelihood of devolvement, and bid shading, and (b) the outcome of the underwriting auction may generate enough asymmetry amongst bidders that may make DA dominate UPA in certain counterfactual situations. We document that the unique two-stage auction design provides a market-driven mechanism to simultaneously insure against auction failures and produce information about the quality of the underlying issue. This paper was accepted by Karl Diether, finance.

Analytical solution of kth price auction

We provide an exact analytical solution of the Nash equilibrium for the kth price auction by using inverse of distribution functions. As applications, we identify the unique symmetric equilibrium where the valuations have polynomial distribution, fat tail distribution and exponential distributions.

Simple combinatorial auctions with budget constraints

We study the efficiency of simple combinatorial auctions for the allocation of a set of items to a set of agents, with private subadditive valuation functions and budget constraints. The class we consider includes all auctions that allocate each item independently to the agent that submits the highest bid for it, and requests a payment that depends on the bids of all agents only for this item. Two well-known examples of this class are the simultaneous first and second price auctions. We focus on the pure equilibria of the induced strategic games, and using the liquid welfare as our efficiency benchmark, we show an upper bound of 2 on the price of anarchy for any auction in this class, as well as a tight corresponding lower bound on the price of stability for all auctions whose payment rules are convex combinations of the bids. This implies a tight bound of 2 on the price of stability of the well-known simultaneous first and second price auctions, which are members of the class. Additionally, we show lower bounds for the whole class, for more complex auctions (like VCG), and for settings where the budgets are assumed to be common knowledge rather than private information.

Book building and its application in offering shares of equitized State-owned enterprises in Viet Nam

Equitization and divestment continue to be one of the crucial pillars of the economic development strategy over the period 2020-2030. The Vietnamese Government has been completing the legal framework to speed up the process of privatization and divestment over the past 3 years. One of the highlights is the regulation on the application of Book Building (BB) Method to offer state shares in 2018. BB, an effective mechanism to determine the price on the primary market, is encouraged to apply on most markets. However, according to Hanoi Stock Exchange, for four months since Circular 21/2019/BTC-TT was released, 17 announcements of IPOs or divesture of state capital were whole lot sale auction or competitive offering. This implies the popularity of fixed price and discriminatory auction in Vietnam. Moreover, applying BB in Vietnam requires certain adjustments to theories. This paper presents the advantages and disadvantages of BB over fixed price and auction, reviews BB experiences of some economies, and make recommendations on the application of BB in offering state shares in Vietnam. Given that BB is expected to create a transparent and effective pricing mechanism and enhance the success of state share offering, this study indicates some points that need clarifying or adjusting to the current regulation, including (i) initial price and price range; (ii) time for disclosing information and opening order books; (iii) objectives of BB; (iv) cancel the results of BB; (v) selection of underwriters.

Renewable Energy Auction Prices: Near Subsidy-Free?

The latest trend of low record bid prices in renewable energy auctions has raised concerns on the effective deployment of the winning projects. A survey of recent auction data from several countries, technologies and remuneration designs is analysed and compared with the corresponding levelised costs of energy (LCOEs) to draw first insights on their viability. A critical assessment of the ability of the LCOE for determining the adequate bid level is then performed and the preliminary unviable results of selected mature technologies are further investigated using improved profitability metrics as the project and equity net present value (NPV) and internal rate of return (IRR). As representative examples, the analysed Danish 2019 onshore wind and photovoltaics (PV) auctions require very specific scenarios to become viable, which cast doubts on their effective implementation. Under the assumptions of a realistic base case, the sensitivity analysis revealed that either 59% of decrease in the weighted average cost of capital (WACC), or 37% of discount on the investment cost or a 3.6% annual increment in the mean market price is needed for achieving the NPV break-even in the onshore wind case. Likewise, the PV case is unprofitable whatever the WACC may be, and either a 60% discount on the investment cost or a 6.8% annual increment in the mean market price is needed for the NPV to break-even. Although some projects could be relying on indirect revenues or additional sources of incomes beyond the auction support, it remains to see if they are finally materialised.

베이지안 네트워크를 활용한 상가 경매 낙찰가율에 영향을 미치는 요인 분석

This study empirically analyzed the factors influencing the retail property aution price ratio in the metropolitan area using multiple regression analysis and Bayesian network approach. The dependent variable was set as the auction price ratio, and the independent variables were set as the auction ratio, corporate bond yield, industrial production index, commercial building construction, and economic sentiment index. The time range was from January 2003 to December 2019, and the spatial range was Seoul, Gyeonggi and Incheon. It was found that commercial building construction had the most influence in Seoul, corporate bond yield had the most influence in Gyeonggi-do, and the economic sentiment index also had a great influence. It was found that the Gyeonggi-do auction price ratio had the most influence on the Incheon auction price ratio, followed by the industrial production index. Although there are differences in factors affecting the auction price ratio for each region, it was found that overall, economic growth, supply and liquidity have a great influence, and the auction price ratio in the neighbor region also has an effect.

Auction based game theory in cognitive radio networks for dynamic spectrum allocation

Cognitive radio is an emerging technology that has a high potential to deal with the scarcity problem in the radio spectrum. Dynamic spectrum access in cognitive networks enhances the efficiency of spectral utilization by cognitive users (unlicensed users). Auction mechanism approach helps the cognitive users to get a part of the unused license band, for a lease, from the primary users (licensed users). Based on the interference constraints, auction methods share the leased band to many cognitive users with negligible mutual interference. Because of this unique feature, the multi-winner auction is a fresh challenge to the existing auction mechanisms like (Vickrey–Clarke-Groves) VCG and Second price auction. The proposed method uses interference-based constraints and satisfaction levels among the cognitive users to select the winner of the pricing based game. In this paper, a new framework plans to manipulate the multi-winner auction mechanism, based upon a pricing strategy to overcome the drawbacks of the traditional mechanisms. The proposed mechanism enhances the spectral efficiency of the cognitive users and also motivates the primary users to lease the bands to the cognitive users, with increased primary user revenue. Fairness among cognitive users ensures this mechanism. Simulation results show that our mechanism increases the spectral efficiency of cognitive users and the revenue of primary users.

Evaluating the Potential Contribution of Multi-Attribute Auctions to Achieve Agri-Environmental Targets and Efficient Payment Design

This paper analyses the performance of a multi-attribute auction for securing agri-environmental outcomes and cost-effective agri-environmental payments (AEPs). We set up a discriminatory price auction model in which farmers make an offer based on two attributes (i.e. the AEP and a proxy of environmental outcome). We provide a numerical simulation for a hypothetical agri-environmental scheme (AES) in Italy using FADN data 2011 for the Emilia-Romagna region (E-R). In three implementation scenarios, we compare the Budgetary cost-effectiveness (BCE), the Economic cost-effectiveness (ECE) and Information rent (IR) of the auction with that of two alternative policy instruments (i.e. uniform payment and marginal flat rate payment). Due to the heterogeneity in bidders' opportunity costs, the auction is more cost-effective than a uniform payment in delivering the target outcome. The performance indicators are sensitive to the farmers' expectations about the bid caps, revealing the opportunity of using both competition effect and information leverage associated with the implementation mechanism to increase the auction outcome when the budget is limited.

Price-quality trade-off in procurement auctions with an uncertain quality threshold

Procuring high-quality goods at reasonable prices is a critical public sector concern. Yet, procurers often do not advertise clear weighting rules for price and quality but set a flexible quality threshold upon participation. This paper studies endogenous entry and bidding behavior in such procurement auctions. Using unique data on pharmaceutical procurement in Guangdong, China, we find that a high-quality index acts as a signal of high production costs. We also observe that high-quality bidders are more likely to withdraw from bidding because of their prior commitment to quality. The procurers who use quality indicators in price auctions need a carefully considered quality threshold. Our results have important implications for price-quality trade-offs in procurements that have uncertain quality thresholds.

Towards an Optimal IPO Mechanism

Concerns about the negative consequences of the excessive underpricing of the current arrangement in the initial public offering (IPO) market for the provision of entrepreneurial finance—book building—have led to research into the viability of auctions for IPO pricing and allocation. IPO firms face a trade-off between the benefit of accurate and reliable IPO price discovery and the cost of underpricing. The main aim of this paper was to gain new scientific knowledge about this trade-off by measuring the impact of two key variables on this trade-off: capacity restraint and discount on the auction clearing price. Using controlled experiment methodology in multi-unit uniform price auctions we found that the most capacity-restricted auctions that also offer investors a discount are likely to produce the most accurate and reliable price discovery and consequently, the most predictable auction outcome. There are indications that a discount of 8% may suffice to incentivize investors to reliably contribute to price discovery. The resulting underpricing (and its variability) of these auctions is likely to be significantly lower than if book building would be used to price and allocate IPOs. Technological innovation in the IPO market through the application of recent advances in data science, experimental economics and artificial intelligence allows for the optimization of IPO mechanisms and crowdfunding platforms which in turn improves the access to equity required for entrepreneurial finance.

Optimal reserve prices in sealed-bid auctions with reference effects

The reference effect and loss aversion are incorporated into the buyer’s utility in the symmetric independent private value models of sealed-bid auctions. The buyer’s equilibrium bidding strategy and the seller’s optimal reserve price are derived for the first-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions. In both auction mechanisms, the seller’s optimal reserve price and expected revenue are increasing in the reference point. We compare the seller’s expected revenues as well as the optimal reserve prices in the two auctions. The results show that the seller will set a higher optimal reserve price but obtain lower optimal expected revenue in the second-price auction compared to the first-price auction. Further, we extend the model to the gain-seeking case, and endogenize the reference point as the ex-ante expected price of the item in equilibrium. In contrast to the loss-averse case, the seller will set a lower optimal reserve price but obtain higher optimal expected revenue in the second-price auction compared to the first-price auction if the buyers are gain-seeking. With an endogenous reference point, similar results are obtained in terms of revenue comparison between the two auctions.

A Novel GSP Auction Mechanism for Dynamic Confirmation Games on Bitcoin Transactions

Bitcoin is gaining ground in recent years. In the Bitcoin system, miners provide computing power to confirm transactions in pursuit of transaction fees, while users compete by bidding transaction fees for faster confirmation. This process is in essence analogous to online ad auctions, where advertisers bid for more prominent ad slots. Therefore, inspired by ad auction research, we propose to apply the Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction mechanism in the dynamic confirmation game on Bitcoin transactions. Our model is targeted to deal with the problems caused by instability and low efficiency in the currently-adopted Generalized First Price (GFP) auction model in Bitcoin confirmation games. Besides, we use the &#x201C;rank-by-cost&#x201D; rule to replace the &#x201C;rank-by-fee&#x201D; rule, where each transaction&#x2019;s cost is calculated by the user-submitted fee and the waiting time. Aiming to probe users&#x2019; equilibrium strategy, we first discuss the GSP game with complete information under synchronous submissions, and show that it has the Locally Envy-Free equilibrium. Then, we study the GSP game with incomplete information under asynchronous submissions, and define two types of strategies, i.e., the Farsighted Balanced (FB) strategy and the Instant Balanced (IB) strategy. The FB strategy is in line with users&#x2019; practical needs of determining fees so as to maximize the long-term payoffs; however it cannot generate a stable equilibrium. Alternatively, the IB strategy focuses on the instant payoff maximization, and if all users follow the IB strategy, their equilibrium fees can finally converge to a stable profile. Finally, we design computational experiments to validate our theoretical models and analysis. Our research findings indicate that this novel GSP mechanism is superior to the currently adopted GFP mechanism. Besides, the convergence of the GSP game under the IB strategy has also been illustrated by the computational experiments.

Robust bidding and revenue in descending price auctions

We study the properties of Dutch auctions in an independent private value setting, where bidders face uncertainty over the type distribution of their opponents and evaluate their payoffs by the worst case from a set of probabilistic scenarios. In contrast to static auction formats, participants in the Dutch auction gradually learn about the valuations of other bidders. We show that the transmitted information can lead to changes in the worst-case distribution and thereby shift a bidder's payoff maximizing exit price over time. We characterise the equilibrium bidding function in this environment and show that the arriving information leads bidders to exit earlier at higher prices. As a result, the Dutch auction systematically generates more revenue than the first-price auction.

Effects of European emission unit allowance auctions on corporate profitability

During Phase 3 of the EU Emission Trading System (ETS), to remedy the so-called windfall profits obtained by companies that benefited from the free allocation of emission permits, the EU introduced an auction-based method for the allocation of carbon emission allowances. We estimate the effect on firms' profits from participating in auctions during Phase 3 of the EU ETS using a propensity score matching approach. The work shows that the introduction of the new market mechanism for allocating carbon emission allowances has no significant effect on corporate profits, whatever the measure of profitability used. From a policy standpoint, this result seems to suggest that this new allocation mechanism might fail to improve the incentives for companies to increase their production cost efficiency or to invest in breakthrough technologies that reduce CO2. The rather flat auction price trend seems to support this conclusion.