The NBS pursues a policy of exchange rate targeting, contrary to its official Memorandum on monetary policy. The NBS informally modified the Memorandum in two ways: it restricted the supply of securities under reverse open market operations and targeted informal exchange rate levels by frequent foreign exchange interventions. In this paper, we have provided empirical and econometric evidence for the second statement based on daily data for 11 years and Vector Error Correction models, while we did not address the first statement because it is evident if one compares market and repo interest rates. Targeting the level of the exchange rate is not a problem in itself, but rather a non-transparent process that leads to an unrealistic level of the exchange rate. If monetary policy is to support a new development strategy in the context of the fourth technological revolution, it is not enough just to maintain a stable price level but also to support the realistic dinar exchange rate. The real appreciation of the dinar, which has been going on for some time, is not conducive to economic development. The first step in formulating a synchronised macroeconomic and development policy is to acknowledge these facts and then find appropriate solutions.