174 SAISREVIEW continuous American support for German unification and German insistence on remaining a member of NATO indicate the continued validity of this observation. Despite its underlying strength, this relationship is experiencing increasing difficulties. Smyser attributes these difficulties to "the growth of German power, the relative decline ofAmerican power, and the emergence ofthe new Europe and the new world." The present and future of German-American relations are best understood by "an appreciation of the exploding breadth of the relationship." From global economics to reconstructing the East, to non-regional issues, a constantly widening agenda offers the possibility both for greater cooperation and for greater conflict. During the Cold War, the commitments and dependencies arising out of the nuclear relationship between the two countries exacerbated the potential for conflict. An "extraordinary degree of mutual trust" was required, which prompted "ceaseless mutual scrutiny" in the search for reassurance. Smyser does not reflect on whether Europe's impending demilitarization will relax this strain. Concluding his study, Smyser recommends that balanced communication and understanding between the United States and Germany be facilitated through the institutionalization of increased high-level contact. Further, he asserts that principles necessary to guide the relationship should be the focus of such contact. Directing high-level attention towards the relationship is logical given the added weight that a newly-unified Germany will cany in world affairs. Yet the potential threat that such a policy will eclipse other European powers poses a dilemma. As the Germans increasingly infuse their foreign and domestic policies with a European component, it will be appropriate for the United States to structure its relations with Germany in the context of other European institutions as well. American National Interest: Virtue and Power in Foreign Policy. By Karl Von Vorys. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990. 276pp. $39.95/Hardback. Reviewed by Mark S. Mahaney (SAIS M.A., 1990), Presidential Management Intern with the Department of State. What to make of a book that casually roams from the conceptual underpinnings of strategic deterrence, to the trials and tribulations of historical European security structures, to the social, economic, and political obstacles facing development planners in the Third World? And what to make of an author who can concisely outline the reasons why U.S. military intervention is unlikely to succeed in Latin America, explain how U.S. policy lost contact with domestic political reality during the Vietnam War, and then conclude that the nation needs a small, highly trained, and highly mobile Rapid Deployment Force? Von Vorys declares at the outset that the purpose of his book is "to develop national interest as a pre-policy standard, a standard that by consensus sets the parameters for official policy...[a standard] by which foreign policy can be evaluated." Sound familiar? It should. American foreign policy thinkers from Charles Beard to Walter Lippmann to Hans Morgenthau (to name only a few) BOOK REVIEWS 175 established their reputations through their efforts to wed U.S. foreign policy to a "correct" interpretation of American national interests. How does Von Vorys fare in such exalted company? Answer: the odds were against Von Vorys from the start, but his attempt is interesting and quirkily provocative. What might help explain the quirks of this book—its drift into and out of topics as diverse as SDI, the fundamental tenets of Islam, and foreign aid—is the rather unusual perspective the author brings to the main subject. Von Vorys' previous books focused on communalism in Malaysia and political development in Pakistan. All the more impressive, therefore, is his sharp analysis of the foreign policy challenges confronting U.S. national interests. According to Von Vorys, those challenges come in the following order of importance: those to our vital interests (our national existence); those to our special interests (our friends and allies); and those to our general interests (international order). By carefully setting up this hierarchy, Von Vorys has half the battle behind him. After all, one of the greatest challenges facing our country has always been our unwillingness or our inability to discriminate between those national interests that are truly vital and those that are not. The former sometimes obligate the expenditure of our most precious resources—our...
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Sep 1, 1994
Shirley Anne Warshaw + 1
