Presidential Action Research Articles

Perspectives on the Presidency

With the inevitable procrustean effects, this paper attempts to summarize familiar and arcane writing on the presidency and its incumbents. I divide the literature into six categories, each of which, I suggest, represents a relatively distinctive perspective on the presidency. I portray these approaches by comparing and contrasting the beliefs and assertions of representative writers along four dimensions: first, presidential responsibilities; second, the powers of the office; third, the importance of the occupant's behavior; and fourth, prescriptions for institutional changes-which often but not invariably stem from the first three dimensions. These beliefs and assertions may be refurbished, revised, or modified in some way by the actions of Presidents, and by the horde of words which scholars, politicians, journalists, and other scribes compose and, with the encouragement and sometimes at the behest of publishers, purvey. I therefore attempt not only to distinguish the six different perspectives, but also to suggest why and how some of them have undergone change.l This paper is not an attempt to canvass the entire range of literature about the presidency or about particular Presidents. I concentrate on selected and representative works. Writings which treat particular facets of the office and its incumbent-subjects such as elections, advisory systems, presidential personality, and so on-are excluded from my purview.2 Nor do I include epiphenomena from the Saturday Review and New York Times Sunday Magazine. Moreover, by concentrating on the written word, I totally ignore television which, primarily because of its pervasiveness and its personalization of the presidency, has a far more important impact on the mass public's knowledge and myths than any of the works

Vietnamization: Can It Work?

THE uneasy public quiet on Vietnam which the President achieved with his speech last November 3 was shattered by the large-scale U.S. military intervention in eastern Cambodia. Once more U.S. policy in Southeast Asia became the subject of major controversy. In this situation there is some danger that we shall become so caught up in the immediate issues that we neglect more fundamental questions with respect to current American strategy. The new actions are product of basic fault in the structure of U.S. policy but do not, by them selves, define that fault. In his November 3 speech the President offered strategy based upon the twin approach of negotiations and Vietnamiza tion of the war, accompanied by withdrawals of American forces. He was pessimistic about the outlook for negotiations but told us that Vietnamization would permit the United States to disengage from the war even if negotiations failed. In the period since, the United States has further downgraded negotiations as an essential part of any solution. The only subsequent hint that the government might not consider the Vietnamization strategy sufficient by itself was provided by the President's speech on April 20 announcing future troop withdrawals, in which both the volume and tone of his discussion of negotiations implied recognition that they were important. He stated explicitly that negotiations at least provide a better, shorter path to peace. But there was no evidence following that speech of change in the U.S. position in the Paris negotiations, and the President's action in Cambodia 10 days later clearly gave priority to Vietnamiza tion. This priority was reflected in the renewed emphasis upon the use of military means to end the war and in the justification of the Cambodian intervention on the grounds that it was needed to protect American lives and to guarantee the continued suc cess of our withdrawal and Vietnamization program. The basic question therefore remains: Has the President been right in de-coupling Vietnamization and American troop with drawals from negotiations or are the two strategies essential com plements to each other? The search for an answer to this question must begin with an

3 EXPORTS AND IMPORTS

U.S. trade fortunes this year remind one of all of the great novels that have been made into movies. The picture never turns out to be as good as the book. When the book was written at the beginning of this year, the plot had an optimistic tone for the U.S. balance of trade. The first chapter told of the pending tariff cuts agreed upon at last year's hectic Kennedy round finale and of how these cuts would provide new opportunities for U.S. exporters. The second chapter described how the Administration's planned income tax surcharge would apply the brakes to a U.S. inflationary economy that was sucking in imports at a disturbingly high rate. By cooling down the economy, the surtax also would make U.S. exports more competitive in the world market. Chapter three outlined the President's Action Program to improve our chronic balance of payments deficit. The program contained suggestions to our European ...

America's Soft Sell

The American Pavilion at the World's Fair here is officially controversial. President Eisenhower, described as “very irritated” at the bad notices our exhibition has received, dispatched George V. Allen, Director of the United States Information Agency, to Brussels to give him a personal report. The President's action made the adverse opinions expressed by many writers and private citizens returning from the fair a subject of official inquiry.This controversy over our representation here has its ironic aspects. While everyone who visits the fair agrees there is much to criticize, little agreement exists on the basis for the criticism. Many vociferous attacks have been launched from assumptions that are questionable or even inconsistent.

Presidential Seizures in Labor Disputes

The steel seizure case of 1952 renewed interest in an issue which perturbed many persons during World War II, when some fifty-nine seizures of properties involved in labor disputes occurred. What is the real meaning, or function, of seizure? What does it actually accomplish? Are there alternatives available which will better attain thee same ends? In an examination of Presidential seizure actions since 1918, Mr. Kleilet endeavors to answer these questions. (Author's abstract courtesy EBSCO.)

Need for Continuous Study of Law in Action

was the first step towards dictatorship. Others told us that they agreed with the President's action because a strike would stop the flow of weapons to Korea and increase the danger of our troops fighting there. On the same day that the Executive Order was signed a workman was badly hurt in an automobile accident in New York City. His case has not yet been tried. It will be several years before it is tried. During the intervening time there will be nothing about the case in the newspapers, on the air, or anywhere else. It will continue to be of not the

The Trade Agreement Act in Court and in Congress

“Practically every volume of the United States Statutes contains one or more acts or joint resolutions of Congress authorizing action by the President in respect of subjects affecting foreign relations, which either leave the exercise of the power to his unrestricted judgment, or provide a standard far more general than that which has always been considered requisite with regard to domestic affairs.” Thus did Mr. Justice Sutherland summarize the legal precedents for the President's actions in imposing an embargo on arms shipments to certain belligerent countries in South America, after Congress had delegated to him discretionary authority in such matters. This is more than a succinct historical summary. It is the first case in which the dicta of the Court has made clear that sharp line of distinction between the Chief Executive's discretionary powers in foreign affairs and those in internal matters.

“The Bearing of Myers v. United States upon the Independence of Federal Administrative Tribunals”—A Criticism

In a recent issue of the Review, Professor James Hart, of Johns Hopkins University, has advocated a limitation upon the doctrine announced in the Myers case so that Congress may prescribe the terms of office of the members of the various quasi-judicial administrative tribunals, and incidentally that of the Comptroller-General.The present writer's views on the status of the Comptroller-General are expressed elsewhere. He also dissents from Professor Hart's views on the expediency of granting to the various administrative tribunals any different terms of office from those which the Chief Justice indicated in the Myers case that they already have. This dissent is not a little supported by the practical suggestion of Dr. Hart. He indicates that “constitutional mores” are alone not enough to regulate the President's actions in exercising his power to remove, but that a definite term and formula should be prescribed and “constitutional mores” then depended upon to keep the President within the bounds of the formula. The limited experience of the present writer indicates that it is easier to satisfy a formula which is presumed to prescribe justice than to satisfy the dictates of justice on the facts of each case.Expediency, however, is a matter of opinion. One who attempts to criticize the logic and technique of another must accept the other's views of expediency.

“The Bearing of Myers v. United States upon the Independence of Federal Administrative Tribunals”—A Criticism

In a recent issue of the Review, Professor James Hart, of Johns Hopkins University, has advocated a limitation upon the doctrine announced in the Myers case so that Congress may prescribe the terms of office of the members of the various quasi-judicial administrative tribunals, and incidentally that of the Comptroller-General.The present writer's views on the status of the Comptroller-General are expressed elsewhere. He also dissents from Professor Hart's views on the expediency of granting to the various administrative tribunals any different terms of office from those which the Chief Justice indicated in the Myers case that they already have. This dissent is not a little supported by the practical suggestion of Dr. Hart. He indicates that “constitutional mores” are alone not enough to regulate the President's actions in exercising his power to remove, but that a definite term and formula should be prescribed and “constitutional mores” then depended upon to keep the President within the bounds of the formula. The limited experience of the present writer indicates that it is easier to satisfy a formula which is presumed to prescribe justice than to satisfy the dictates of justice on the facts of each case.Expediency, however, is a matter of opinion. One who attempts to criticize the logic and technique of another must accept the other's views of expediency.

The United States Chemical Foundation

EARLY in July last, President Harding instructed the Alien Property Custodian of the United States to demand the return of all patents, trade marks, etc., which had been sold to the Chemical Foundation, on the ground that “the sale was made at so nearly a nominal sum that there is reason to believe that this government has not faithfully observed the trust which was implied in the seizure of this property.” The birth of the Foundation was the subj ect of much abuse in Germany, and now a resolution of the third German-American National Conference, with Mr. G. S. Viereck as chairman of the resolutions committee, declares that “we greet with satisfaction the first steps of the administration to correct the iniquities committed by the custodian of alien enemy property.” Meanwhile, the consternation produced among chemists of the United States by the President's action will he readily understood.

SANITATION AT PANAMA.

Vindication of Dr. Reed's report is found in the fact that the President has accepted the resignation of the first Isthmian Canal Commission. To what extent this action is to be attributed to the Reed charges may never be known; but, according to the public press, they had much to do in justifying the President's action in the eyes of the people, to say nothing of its complete justification in the eyes of the medical profession. To any one who has read the report of Dr. Reed. the answer of the commission will appear to be very weak, in fact, divested of the verbiage of argument and explanation, it will be found to be a confirmation of nearly all the important charges. Thus it incidentally admits that "modifications of the suggestions submitted by the medical staff were made from day to day"; that in refuting the charge that "Colonel Gorgas