Presidential Transition Research Articles

2009 Public Policy Agenda Reflects Member Input

You have accessThe ASHA LeaderASHA News1 Dec 20082009 Public Policy Agenda Reflects Member InputResearch Funding, Autonomy for Audiologists, IDEA Funding Are High Priorities for ASHA James Potter James Potter Google Scholar More articles by this author https://doi.org/10.1044/leader.AN2.13172008.28 SectionsAbout ToolsAdd to favorites ShareFacebookTwitterLinked In More than 1,000 ASHA members—20% more than responded last year—provided comments to help shape the association’s public policy agenda for 2009. The comments were reviewed by ASHA’s Government Relations and Public Policy (GRPP) Board, which develops an annual list of priorities for advocacy. The Board of Directors accepted the 2009 agenda at its October meeting. Implementation of the agenda may be somewhat delayed by the upcoming presidential transition and the new 111th Congress, as government agencies await possible changes in the fiscal year 2009 federal budget and deliberations on an additional stimulus package for the banking and auto industries. However, DeAnne Wellman Owre, ASHA’s vice president for government relations and public policy, noted that “implementation of various successes in the 2008 public policy agenda is likely to keep our government relations teams and volunteer leaders very busy through at least the first half of 2009.” These successes include instituting the Medicare Part B private practice status (direct billing) for speech-language pathologists; participation in reporting of quality measures under the Medicare Physician Quality Reporting Initiative (PQRI); work on at least two ongoing studies on alternatives to the Medicare therapy caps; and work on expanded coverage for hearing aids and speech-generating devices under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program. Each objective was assigned to one of the following categories: Highest Priority—requires immediate federal or state legislative or regulatory attention and major ASHA resources. Priority—is important to ASHA members; activities to be determined as opportunity and resources permit. Monitoring—is relevant to the ASHA members, but will be acted upon only when specific opportunities arise or conditions change member needs and priorities. Planning—requires concerted planning to develop specific objectives. Within each category, the order of the objectives is not a reflection of their relative level of importance or resources expended. In addition, placement of these objectives may be adjusted as the course of Congress, state legislatures, or federal and state agencies change. Highest Priority Objectives Higher education and research funding. Promote state/federal financial aid policies and research funding opportunities, while collaborating with state agencies/communication sciences and disorders programs to support recruitment and retention of master’s and doctoral students and clinicians in education and health care settings. Autonomy for audiologists. Promote audiologists’ autonomy through direct patient access and comprehensive coverage of audiology services under Medicare. IDEA funding. Support increased funding of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and the following goals: establishment of effective service delivery and manageable workloads to maximize student outcomes; participation in early intervening activities using the Response-to-Intervention model (Part B) and increased access to appropriate early intervention services (Part C); increased professional development through dissemination of information about research-based practices in speech-language pathology and audiology. The GRPP Board members responsible for the agenda are Linda Tepperman (chair), Martin Audiffred, Craig Champlin, Linda Jacobs-Condit, Roberta Kreb, Joan Mele-McCarthy, Ninevah Murray, J. Timothy O’Neill (public member), Carolyn Wiles Higdon, DeAnne Wellman Owre (monitoring vice president), and James Potter (ex officio). ASHA’s complete 2009 public policy agenda is available on the ASHA Web site. Author Notes James Potter, director of government relations and public policy, can be reached at [email protected]. Advertising Disclaimer | Advertise With Us Advertising Disclaimer | Advertise With Us Additional Resources FiguresSourcesRelatedDetails Volume 13Issue 17December 2008 Get Permissions Add to your Mendeley library History Published in print: Dec 1, 2008 Metrics Current downloads: 54 Topicsasha-topicsleader_do_tagasha-article-typesleader-topicsCopyright & Permissions© 2008 American Speech-Language-Hearing AssociationLoading ...

The presidential transition in Russia, March 2008

We explore the possibilities of the Internet as a tool for supplying information necessary for the organization and mobilization of successful opposition movements, especially under non-democratic regimes. Examples of the roles the Internet plays in the political processes in Russia are discussed in detail. In particular, the recent cyberprotest cases of the Ingushetiya.ru website and the movement to release political prisoner Svetlana Bakhmina are investigated. Besides showing the Internet's significant role in organizing modern protests, these cases also demonstrate that in environments where practically all traditional mass-media are under the authorities' control, the Internet becomes the major source of alternative information. Our paper offers a look at how deploying technologies can bring about social change, even in some of the most difficult political environments.

Presidential transitions during capital campaigns

In the past few decades, capital campaigns at institutions of higher education have increased in duration, while collegiate presidential tenures have been doing just the opposite. Turnover in the top post was frequent, even during major fundraising campaigns. Before this study, presidential transitions during campaigns had not been previously analyzed. Therefore, the objective of this exploratory study was to better understand presidential transitions during capital campaigns from the perspective of the chief development officer (CDO) who maintained continuity. Nine CDOs, who experienced presidential transitions during campaigns were interviewed to better understand their experience. The strategies for dealing with a presidential transition during a campaign included (a) providing input in the selection of the new president; (b) communication with constituency; (c) education of the incoming president; (d) involving the new president in the campaign right away; and (e) creating new funding priorities. Recommendations for a CDO dealing with a change in leadership during a campaign have been outlined in this paper.

Getting Ready for Day One: Taking Advantage of the Opportunities and Minimizing the Hazards of a Presidential Transition

Presidential transitions make a difference to the quality of the start a chief executive has coming into office. With formal presidential transitions a reality since 1952, we have sufficient experience to identify some of the elements of an effective transition. This article focuses on how a president‐elect can minimize the hazards and take advantage of the opportunities transitions offer. Opportunities and hazards can be found in the actions and commitments candidates take during their presidential campaigns, the information they gather on past transitions and on the actions of the incumbent president, the coordination they do with those in the Washington community, and their capacity to identify and take advantage of the early goodwill that exists when a new president comes into office.

Recommendations for an Effective 2008 Transition

In response to Martha Joynt Kumar’s essay on maximizing presidential transitions while minimizing hazards, this essay presents additional practical recommendations, framed within the context of the upcoming presidential transition.

Korea’s New Administration and Challenges for China’s Relations with the Korean Peninsula

ASIANPERSPECTIVE, Vol. 32, No. 2, 2008, pp. 173-183. Commentary KOREA S NEW ADMINISTRATION AND CHALLENGES FOR CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH THE KOREAN PENINSULA* Ren Xiao In a region as fluid and complex as Northeast Asia, Lee Myung-bak's election to the presidency of the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) will prove to be quite significant. The return of a conservative leader is an important change for Korean politics, and a new factor for regional relationships as well. Dur­ ing the previous two administrations of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, ROK relations with China kept growing rapidly. Both these presidents adopted a "sunshine" policy of reconcilia­ tion, cooperation, and peace toward the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea), especially against the backdrop of the reemerging Korean nuclear crisis. Chinese and South Korean policies largely converged on engaging with Pyongyang and inducing it to denuclearize and to open up. That approach to a great extent helped soften the Bush administra­ tion's hard-line stance and hostile policy toward the DPRK. Except for the (unnecessary) controversy over the Koguryo issue, a question of ancient history, that somehow disrupted the ChinaROK relationship during 2004-2005, other aspects of the relation­ * An earlier version of this commentary was presented at the international conference, "The New South Korean Administration's East Asia Policy and the Korean Peninsula," which was jointly organized by The NEAR Founda­ tion and the U.S.-Korea Institute at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, Seoul, February 13, 2008. 174 Ren Xiao ship mostly went very well. With a new Lee administration, will that trend continue? Will Seoul and Beijing continue to work together well to denuclearize the Korean peninsula? The Bilateral Tango China is, relatively speaking, unfamiliar with the entrepre­ neur-turned politician, Lee Myung-bak, who is a former CEO of Hyundai Construction and Engineering and a former mayor of Seoul. For China, what is at stake is a smooth transition of rela­ tions with the ROK under a new Korean administration, with the maintenance of continuity and stability. In mid-January 2008, Bei­ jing dispatched Wang Yi, the number-two person in its foreign ministry, to Seoul in the capacity of special envoy of the Chinese government to meet with President-elect Lee and his presidential transition team. The chief purpose of Wang's trip was to become familiar with Lee and his policy thinking as well as to make preparations for a good post-Roh bilateral relationship. Wang Yi passed on President Hu Jintao's congratulations and greetings to Lee. Likewise, President-elect Lee sent his spe­ cial envoy, former chairwoman of the Grand National Party Park Geun-hye, to Beijing. She carried a letter from Lee to Hu. The Chinese side received her well and President Hu met her in person. The visits were in hope of paving the way for an orderly transition of the China-ROK relationship. China and South Korea are two countries that are becoming increasingly interdependent. This complex interdependence has developed over the past sixteen years since the formal establish­ ment of diplomatic relations in 1992, years that witnessed con­ spicuous growth in every aspect of their relations. In 2004, China overtook the United States and Japan and became the ROK's largest trading partner, while the ROK became China's thirdbiggest trading partner. According to South Korean government statistics, in 2006 the two-way trade volume exceeded $134 bil­ lion, a tremendous growth from $6.3 billion in 1992. In contrast, ROK trade with Japan and the United States was $78.5 billion and $76.8 billion respectively in 2006. Meanwhile, there are approximately 30,000 Korean compa­ nies that have invested in China. Their total investment reached Korea's New Administration and Challenges for China's Relations 175 $35 billion in April 2007. The two governments have set an objec­ tive for bilateral trade to reach $200 billion by 2012T Presently, each week there are approximately 800 flights between six South Korean cities and thirty Chinese cities. All these developments show that the relationship has reached such a degree that nei­ ther side can afford...

BOTSWANA: Presidential Transition

Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural SeriesVolume 44, Issue 11 p. 17298A-17298C BOTSWANA: Presidential Transition First published: 13 December 2007 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-825X.2007.01363.xRead the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume44, Issue11December 2007Pages 17298A-17298C RelatedInformation

The defining moment: FDR's hundred days and the triumph of hope

This is the story of a political miracle -- the perfect match of man and moment. Franklin Delano took office in March of 1933 as America touched bottom. Banks were closing everywhere. Millions of people lost everything. Great Depression had caused a national breakdown. With the craft of a master storyteller, Jonathan Alter brings us closer than ever before to the magic. Facing the gravest crisis since the Civil War, FDR used his cagey political instincts and ebullient temperament in the storied first Hundred Days of his presidency to pull off an astonishing conjuring act that lifted the country and saved both democracy and capitalism. Who was this man? To revive the nation when it felt so hopeless took an extraordinary display of optimism and self-confidence. Alter shows us how a snobbish and apparently lightweight young aristocrat was forged into an incandescent leader by his domineering mother; his independent wife; his eccentric top adviser, Louis Howe; and his ally-turned-bitter-rival, Al Smith, the Tammany Hall street fighter FDR had to vanquish to complete his preparation for the presidency. Old Doc Roosevelt had learned at Warm Springs, Georgia, how to lift others who suffered from polio, even if he could not cure their paralysis, or his own. He brought the same talents to a larger stage. Derided as weak and unprincipled by pundits, Governor was barely nominated for president in 1932. As president-elect, he escaped assassination in Miami by inches, then stiffed President Herbert Hoover's efforts to pull him into cooperating with him to deal with a terrifying crisis. In the most tumultuous and dramatic presidential transition in history, the entire banking structure came tumbling down just hours before FDR's legendary only thing we have to fear is fear itself Inaugural Address. In a major historical find, Alter unearths the draft of a radio speech in which considered enlisting a private army of American Legion veterans on his first day in office. He did not. Instead of circumventing Congress and becoming the dictator so many thought they needed, FDR used his stunning debut to experiment. He rescued banks, put men to work immediately, and revolutionized mass communications with pioneering press conferences and the first Fireside Chat. As he moved both right and left, Roosevelt's insistence on action now did little to cure the Depression, but he began to rewrite the nation's social contract and lay the groundwork for his most ambitious achievements, including Social Security. From one of America's most respected journalists, rich in insights and with fresh documentation and colorful detail, this thrilling story of presidential leadership -- of what government is for -- resonates through the events of today. It deepens our understanding of how Franklin Delano restored hope and transformed America. The Defining Moment will take its place among our most compelling works of political history.

Presidential Transition in Higher Education: Managing Leadership Change (review)

Reviewed by: Presidential transition in higher education: Managing leadership change George B. Vaughan Presidential transition in higher education: Managing leadership changeby James Martin, James E. Samels, et al.. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004. 288 pp. $45.00. ISBN 0-8018-7934-5 The editors of this book are James Martin, professor of English at Mount Ida College and academic vice president of The Education Alliance, and James E. Samels, president of The Education Alliance. The volume's 15 chapters are divided among three sections: context (chapters 1–4), action (5–8), and key issues (9–15). In chapter 1, Martin and Samels contend that the presidential transition process has achieved a critical mass and has become a focused subject of higher education research. Although the title of this introductory chapter is "A New Model of Transition Management," a more accurate title would have been " The Need fora New Model of Transition Management," for that is primarily Martin and Samels's concern in this chapter. Their model for presidential transitions is presented in the book's final chapter. The authors discuss and analyze the increasing complexity of the transitional process as well as the pressures that must be dealt with and skills needed to navigate the often unknown and treacherous waters of the modern-day college presidency, not the least being the transition into, as well out of, the office. Chapter one serves as a good introduction to the chapters that follow. Indeed, the final sentence in the chapter challenges the reader to continue: "Because while presidents, ultimately, come and go, howthey come and go has a profound effect on the institution and largely determines the difference between extended periods of failure and success" (p. 20). In chapter 2, Martin interviews Vartan Gregorian, former president of Brown University and current president of Carnegie Corporation of New York. The interview is an insightful look into the mind of Gregorian, someone who knows American higher education inside out and has the wisdom and experience to interpret the president's role in that scheme of things. Speaking to the theme of the book, Gregorian offers good advice to presidents-in-transition: know and understand the institution's history, values, and culture, and know and respect the faculty who in turn will give the president-in-transition time, support, and the freedom to act. The chapter is not only informative but also a pleasure to read. Chapter 3 suggests an often-neglected topic related to the presidency: when presidents should leave their position. Steven Muller, former president of Johns Hopkins University, offers his views on how long is too long for a president to stay in a given presidency. He suggests that there are a number of indicators that suggest when a president should leave a position. Age and exhaustion are two [End Page 539]such indicators. Muller offers plausible explanations of why presidents do not leave their positions, even when the signs suggest they should. For example, if a president does not own a home, it is hard to leave the one furnished by the institution. Muller is clear and, I believe, correct in stating that there is no magic formula that tells a president when it is time to move on. Chapter 4 is the last chapter in the context section. In it, Arthur Padilla, professor in the College of Management at North Carolina State University, "examines the environmental conditions and factors affecting leadership transitions in higher education and presents evidence on increased turnover at its institutions" (p. 37). Drawing on the literature of turnover at the top in business as well as in higher education, the author answers the perennial question: Does leadership matter? His answer is yes, and he concludes that too much turnover at the top, whether in the corporate world or the world of higher education, can have a negative impact on the organization or institution. Padilla uses empirical evidence to support his arguments and conclusions. This chapter places presidential transitions in a historical perspective and is especially useful for those interested in transitions at the nation's large research universities. Chapter 5 introduces the section on action. William Weary, president of Fieldstone...

Source Material: Out of Office and in the News: Early Projections of the Clinton Legacy

During the first year after a president has left office, the tone and topic of news media coverage can influence a legacy greatly. This study examines coverage of Bill Clinton during his first year out of office in the New York Times and on network news shows and compares this coverage to that of Ronald Reagan and George Bush during their first years out of office. We find that Clinton received substantially more news coverage during the first year out of office than did either Reagan or Bush, and that Clinton's coverage in the media was also more critical and negative than the coverage received by either of his predecessors.

The State of American politics

Part 1 Politics and Society Chapter 2 The Bush Nation and the Gore Nation Chapter 3 The Search for a New Center Part 4 Elite Strategies and Mass Publics Chapter 5 The Invisible Primary and the Hidden Campaign Chapter 6 Dynamics of the 2000 Campaign Part 7 Governmental Institutions Chapter 8 The Presidential Transition into a Fifty-Fifty Government, and Beyond Chapter 9 The U. S. Congress in 2001: Representation and Process Chapter 10 Judicial Activism, 1950 to 2000 Part 11 Afterword Chapter 12 How Divided is America?

The Contemporary Presidency: The Bush White House: First Appraisals

When disputed election of 2000 ended with Supreme Court's decision on December 12, it effectively shortened presidential transition to less than fifty days and complicated incoming administration's personnel problems. Chief among George W. Bush's immediate hiring decisions was choice of senior White House staff, those advisers with whom he would have most day-to-day contact. Selecting an ideal White House staff is confounded by a host of factors: satisfying president-elect's personal preferences, honoring political obligations, finding experts with appropriate ideological hue, and achieving diversity goals. While these were Bush's initial goals, terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, required instant adjustments that resulted in structural, procedural, and staff changes. This article examines Bush's first crack at assembling his White House and assesses its early performance as well as staff and structural changes made in wake of terrorist attacks. In an effort to gain perspective on Bush record, we compare his staff to initial staffs of his three immediate predecessors--Bill Clinton, George H.W. Bush, and Ronald Reagan. More specifically, we examine appointments to Executive Office of President (EOP), including such senior staff members as national security adviser and director of Office of Management and Budget. The conventional wisdom was that President Bush hired an older, wiser set of advisers than President Clinton, who had rewarded the kids--hard-working, youthful campaign staffers (Stephanopoulos 1999, 148; Houston 1993, 22). Furthermore, while Clinton worked hard to assemble a team that looked like America, Bush hired establishment Republicans, particularly those with a conservative bent. However, staff biographies published in National Journal reveal remarkable similarity between two administrations. (1) Adding Presidents George H.W. Bush and Ronald Reagan into comparison provides a long-term look at presidents' initial staffing, revealing additional similarities as well as important differences. This article identifies unique features of President Bush's staffing organization as well as recent additions. Part two will discuss presidents' first attempts to staff White House from 1981 through 2001 and demonstrates key demographic characteristics and concludes with an evaluative discussion of Bush operation. Inaugural Innovations Although President Bush's staff possessed qualities similar to those of his predecessors, he imposed his own ideas about running a White House by making structural changes within EOP, reflecting his administration's priorities, goals, and general approach to governing. He began his term by adding two new units: Office of Strategic Initiatives (OSI) and Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (OFBCI). He bolstered Office of Vice President, and his cabinet was given both standard and untraditional functions (Nakashima and Milbank 2001, A1). The events of September 11, 2001, additionally imposed various structural and procedural changes that affected cabinet and White House staff Each innovation represented a break with Clinton presidency, although in some cases, there were roots in prior administrations. The OSI, led by Bush confidant Karl Rove, was designed to think ahead and devise long-term political strategy. is an effort to solve problem that consistently dogs White House staffs: pressure to respond to unexpected events and to react to daily news cycles, which causes presidential advisers to lose sight of big picture (Milbank 2001a, A1). The equivalent during Reagan administration could have been Office of Planning and Evaluation, led by Richard Beal, a colleague of pollster Richard Wirthlin. It is hardly unusual for presidents to create offices designed to ensure their political longevity. …

The 2000–01 Presidential Transition: Planning, Goals and Reality

The circumstances of the 2000–2001 presidential transition will never be repeated, or at least I hope not for the sake of all concerned. Nevertheless, what we planned and what actually happened are highly relevant to future transition efforts. Most observers agree that the Bush-Cheney Administration got off to a strong start in large part because it made good use of the time available to it during the abbreviated transition period. Understanding this may help future presidents-elect plan their own transitions.

The Presidential Transition of 2001: Scholars Offer Expertise and Analysis

The Presidential Transition of 2001: Scholars Offer Expertise and Analysis

Relations with Congress

Even before the 36-day fandango following the election, George W. Bush and his team focused both on the presidential transition and the initial days of the presidency. Bush and chief political adviser Karl Rove had read history, examining how previous presidents had handled their initial phases in transition and in office; early on, Rove cautioned reporters and analysts to watch not the first 100 days but the first 180 days for an early measure of the president's capacity and success.

Already Buried and Sinking Fast: Presidential Nominees and Inquiry

Nothing challenges a new President's team more than its need to fill out the executive. The White House 2001 Project played a significant role in this aspect of the presidential transition. Its White House Interview Program provided useful information gleaned from the rarified ranks of White House personnel, and its Nomination Forms Online Program detailed for the first time the exact particulars of the inquiry process. Already well under way by the time the Bush team began planning in 1999, the White House 2001 Project provided the Bush staff with details about two of the five great transition challenges affecting personnel: scale and complexity.

The Law of Presidential Transitions and the 2000 Election

The Presidential election of 2000 raised a number of unprecedented legal and political issues. Among those were issues raised by the Presidential Transition Act of 1963, which provides for office space and funding to be made available to the President-elect to effectuate his transition to power. The statute vests in the Administrator of the General Services Administration the power to determine the President-elect under the statute and thereby to release the transition offices and funds. Following the certification of Florida's electoral votes in November 2000, George W. Bush could claim a majority of certified and pledged electoral votes and thus requested the release of the transition resources. The Administrator refused this request and refused to release the transition resources until after the Supreme Court's ruling in Bush v. Gore and Al Gore's subsequent concession. This essay examines the language, legislative history, political history, and policies of the Act and concludes that the Administrator acted improperly in refusing to recognize Bush as the President-elect following the certification of Florida's electoral votes for him. The essay examines the arguments advanced by the Administrator and concludes that they do not justify the vast power and discretion claimed by him under the Act. The essay then briefly considers possible amendments to the statute to prevent similar problems in the future. Most of the legal issues raised by the 2000 election are likely to be unique to that election and are unlikely to arise again in future elections. By contrast, the issues raised by the Presidential Transition Act are likely to occur again in the future, making necessary an understanding of the inaccuracies of the Administrator's acts in the 2000 election as well as the proper interpretation of the Act.

The Presidential Transition Heightens Uncertainty

Funding for the Superconducting Super Collider remains uncertain with the election of Bill Clinton. As a result, the Japanese are delaying their decision on whether or not to supply approximately $1 billion. The costs of delay or termination are discussed.

The Argentine Paradox

The Argentine Paradox Carlos H. Waisman (bio) In July 1989 the new Argentine democracy passed a crucial test: Carlos Menem of the Peronist party succeeded to the office of president, replacing Raúl Alfonsín of the Radical party. This presidential transition, the first since the restoration of democracy in 1983, marked the first transfer of power since 1916 between elected presidents of different political parties. Moreover, it was the first time in Argentine history that both the incoming and outgoing president were elected on the basis of universal suffrage. But even as Argentina's fledgling democracy was recording this notable achievement, its economy was undergoing a deep crisis. Argentina is a land of paradoxes, not the least of which is this: even as its polity becomes more like that of an advanced capitalist nation, its economy and society increasingly resemble those of a typical underdeveloped country. The question is whether this new democracy, in a society where democratic traditions are weak, can be sustained amidst economic stagnation (or outright retrogression), triple-digit inflation (even higher for part of 1989), and massive foreign debt. I will argue that the effects of the economic crisis on democratic stability are complex: negative in the short term, for democracy will be strained by the discontent of those whose lot has worsened; but perhaps positive in the long term, for the crisis may break the stalemate that produced stagnation in Argentine society. Thus economic impoverishment may paradoxically end up facilitating the consolidation of democracy. [End Page 91] The wave of democratization sweeping most of Latin America and much of Eastern Europe provides students of democratic legitimation with a unique laboratory. High levels of both popular participation and competitive politics are being instituted in countries with widely different economic systems, social structures, ethnic compositions, and political cultures. Thus we can observe the conditions under which a new political regime becomes accepted "naturally, without questioning" (to use Jean Blondel's words) by the large majority of the population. Social scientists have been particularly concerned with the economic conditions of democratic legitimation. The proposition that capitalism has an elective affinity with liberal democracy—a proposition shared by liberal theorists and Marx alike—is based in part on the notion that a dynamic, capitalist economy can satisfy the demands of ail social groups, the lower classes included. And contemporary social scientists have argued that a regime's "efficacy" (an aspect of which is economic growth) is one of the determinants in its legitimation. Economic growth may not be a necessary condition for the legitimation of a new democracy, but it is clearly a powerful contributing factor in both the short and long terms. The explosion of group demands is characteristic of new democracies that succeed authoritarian regimes. This is usually a consequence of two factors: the forcible suppression of these demands (particularly those of labor and the lower classes) by the old regime, and the strong incentives and lowered costs for group organization and mobilization under democratic conditions. Economic growth allows for the satisfaction of at least some of these demands and thus prevents the development of zero-sum conflicts. In the long run, economic growth fuels legitimacy by permitting individual and collective upward mobility and by providing a safety net to contain downward mobility. Economic stagnation—or even retrogression—does not necessarily block legitimation, at least in the short run. It can be offset by favorable noneconomic factors such as strong democratic traditions, the formation of a democratic political culture, the commitment to democracy of economic or political elites, and strong political leadership. In the long run, however, the survival of democracy is doubtful under such conditions. Stagnation or retrogression is likely to lead to high levels of political polarization, especially in societies having large and mobilized working and middle classes. In the case of Argentina, democracy has been restored in a period of outright economic retrogression. For most of the past three decades, the economy has experienced sharp fluctuations but little or no net long-term growth. From 1970 to 1979, the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita grew by an average of 0.3 percent a year. From 1980 to 1988, however, the GDP declined...

The Presidential Election and Transition 1980-1981.Paul T. David , David H. EversonThe Reagan Presidency: An Early Assessment.Fred I. GreensteinProblems and Prospects of Presidential Leadership in the Nineteen-Eighties.James Sterling YoungThe Public Presidency: The Pursuit of Popular Support.George C. Edwards III

<i>The Presidential Election and Transition 1980-1981.</i>Paul T. David , David H. Everson<i>The Reagan Presidency: An Early Assessment.</i>Fred I. Greenstein<i>Problems and Prospects of Presidential Leadership in the Nineteen-Eighties.</i>James Sterling Young<i>The Public Presidency: The Pursuit of Popular Support.</i>George C. Edwards III