Presidential Prerogatives Research Articles

Presidential prerogatives, exogenous situations, and Sisyphean IMF loan arrangements: examining fiscal crises in post-Arab Spring Tunisia and Egypt

Since the Arab Spring’s overthrow of leadership in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011, both states find themselves in severe fiscal crisis due to currency shortages, high external debt and inflation, despite loan arrangements from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Why has a decade of IMF loan programmes been unable to offset these economic imbalances? This article assesses the financial situations in both state cases, outlines the processes and provisions of IMF loan programmes, looks to specific examples of application in post-Arab Spring Tunisia and Egypt, and then articulates whether domestic leadership, exogenous crises, or IMF conditionality arrangements best explain the inability of the IMF to address these fiscal issues. It concludes by placing most of the blame on conditionality of IMF loan programmes, which encourage austerity and increased debt rates, creating a ‘Sisyphean arrangement’ where both states remain continuously inclined to accept further loan programmes, without alternative for economic reform to offset debt. However, effects of domestic leadership actions and exogenous crises remain highly influential on the performance of state economies, illustrating that the IMF’s position as being able to solve most fiscal problems is inhibited by these factors as well.

O nieprzydatności testu Ástráðsson wobec prezydenckiej prerogatywy – glosa do wyroku Naczelnego Sądu Administracyjnego z dnia 4 listopada 2021 r. (III FSK 3626/21)

On the Inappropriateness of the Ástráðsson Test against the Presidential Prerogative: A Gloss to the Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of November 4, 2021 (III FSK 3626/21) The Supreme Administrative Court in the commented judgment unfortunately made an unsuccessful attempt to carry out the Ástráðsson test with regard to a person appointed by the President at the request of a politically subordinate (in violation of the Constitution) National Council of the Judiciary. Failure to do so is a kind of paradox of the commented judgment. A significant part of it relates to supranational and international law. „Europeanness” is ubiquitous in the judgment and was additionally included in its thesis. According to its content, assessors and judges are European judges. However, this otherwise catchy statement is not confirmed by the application of the judgment of the ECtHR to the assessment of an judge. On the constitutional level, the judgment also deserves criticism. The court considered it justified to refer to the judicature of the Supreme Administrative Court, the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Tribunal, referring to some extent to the presidential prerogative of appointing judges at the request of the National Council of the Judiciary, in order to reach a conclusion about the almost „magically healing” effect of the presidential act of appointment to the office of judge. The NSA also did not comment on the total deprivation of any real influence of the judiciary on the nomination procedure. Therefore, one should ask what is the balancing of the legislative and executive powers with the judiciary power absent from the National Council of the Judiciary?

Prezydenckie prawo łaski w ukraińskim systemie prawa – zakres i wykonywanie

The aim of the article is to define the boundaries of the prerogative of pardon in the Ukrainian legal system in terms of the objective and subjective aspects from the constitutional point of view and the decree of the President of Ukraine on the application of the prerogative of pardon. This decree significantly restricts the decision-making freedom of the head of state in making decisions on the application of the prerogative of pardon, which raises doubts as to the compliance of the adopted solution with the fundamental law. The article compares the constitutional approach to the prerogative of pardon with the solutions adopted in the decree in order to answer the question whether they are consistent with the essence and nature of the presidential prerogative of pardon under the constitution.

Continuity and Change in Institutions: An Example and Implications and Implications

The nature and function of institutions in society have come under renewed debate in recent years. How institutions are related to historic events and to stresses in social groups, as well as how they gain legitimacy and in what contexts they change have come into focus. This article presents an example from the history of the United States of America in its formative years while engaging threats to its survival. The idea of Presidential prerogatives and “executive privilege” regarding Congress and oversight began during a crisis. This example became a central issue in recent American political discussions on presidential overreach.

The “Two Mr. Wilsons”: Party Government, Personal Leadership, and Woodrow Wilson’s Political Thought

Woodrow Wilson’s political thought on statesmanship and governance reveals a consistent tension between party and personal leadership. I trace three phases of Wilson’s political thought, analyzing this tension under a framework of Edmund Burke’s idea of party government and Henry Bolingbroke’s conception of the “Patriot King.” First, in his early scholarship, Wilson adopted the Burkean notion of unifying the legislative and executive branches to promote effective party government. Second, in his later scholarship and political career, Wilson embraced a view of the president as having the ability to bring about responsible party government through the power of personal leadership—implicitly using Bolingbroke’s means for Burke’s ends. Third, as his presidency came to focus more on foreign affairs, Wilson defended presidential prerogatives for personal leadership akin to a patriot king. This tension influenced Wilson’s presidency and subsequent American political development.

Presidents and Cabinet Payoffs in Coalition Governments

As a key consequence of government formation negotiations among executive and legislative actors, portfolio allocation offers a window to understand the impact of constitutional design and presidential prerogatives on cabinet dynamics across democratic regime types. This article uses Shugart and Carey’s emphasis on the implications of regime distinctions and institutional variation in presidential powers for executive-legislative relations as a starting point for an examination of the extent to which presidents influence government formation outcomes in parliamentary and semi-presidential systems. Many presidents in these political systems have some influence on government formation, which enables them to shape cabinet composition. Yet, whether these powers advantage presidential parties in reaping more cabinet spoils than their proportional share has yet to be investigated. Using data on 442 government formation situations in 23 European parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies during 1945–2015, this study finds that parties of strong presidents generally, or presidents formally empowered to choose a formateur, are more likely to be advantaged in the allocation of cabinet seats than their peers who are not allied with the head of state.

Domestic Contestation and Presidential Prerogative in Colombian Foreign Policy

The study of Colombian foreign policy emphasises external constraints and presidential prerogative in foreign policymaking. Drawing on insights from recent foreign policy analysis literature and evidence from several cases (Plan Colombia, US military bases, free trade talks with China, and ICJ arbitration of a maritime border with Nicaragua), this article challenges commonplace presidentialist assumptions. A novel model of ‘contested presidentialism’ better captures how Colombian domestic actors mobilise to raise political costs to block or modify presidential preferences. When the opposition fails to raise costs, presidentialist assumptions apply. Otherwise, presidents respond strategically by abandoning policies or substituting second‐best alternatives.

Zwolnienie z konstytucyjnego wymogu kontrasygnaty – rozważania na tle niekontrasygnowanych obwieszczeń Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej o wolnych stanowiskach sędziego w Sądzie Najwyższym i Naczelnym Sądzie Administracyjnym

On June 29, 2018 in Dziennik Urzędowy “Monitor Polski” (the Official Gazette of the Republic of Poland) were published two announcements by the President of the Republic of Poland – from May 24, 2018, on the vacant positions of the judges in the Supreme Court and from May 28, 2018 on the vacant positions of the judge in the Supreme Administrative Court. The obligation to announce the number of vacant judges’ positions is a result of changes in the structure of the Supreme Court introduced by the new law of 8 December 2017 and the obligation to apply these provisions to the judges of the Supreme Administrative Court. The controversy is aroused by the fact that the published announcements were not countersigned – although this competence is not included in the catalog of presidential prerogatives, exempted from the obligation of co-signing by the Prime Minister. The analysis of the constitutional shape of the countersignature and the practice of using by the President of his competences will allow to answer the question whether the President’s announcements require for their validity the signature of the Prime Minister’s or are they exempt from this requirement. In the light of the doctrinal reflections, the recognition of the announcement of the President of the Republic of Poland on vacant judicial positions in the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court may be considered as a derivative or analogous competence to the presidential prerogative of appointing judges. However, this stands in contradiction with the Constitutional Tribunal jurisprudence, which excludes the possibility of a broad interpretation of the constitutional catalog of prerogatives. Nevertheless, due to the informative, non-normative character of the announcements of the President, the issue of qualifying them to the catalog of official acts, for which the countersignature is required, raises reasonable doubts.

Truman's Rhetoric Entrenches Unilateral Authority and Fashions a Trend for Future Executive Use

In the 1936 case of United States v. Curtiss‐Wright Export Corp., the U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that the president is the sole organ of foreign affairs given implicitly through the commander‐in‐chief clause. With over 10,000 citations (Code of Federal Regulations) and 145 Curtiss‐Wright references by attorney generals and the Department of Justice justifying presidential prerogatives, the imperial president is enshrined in law. Even with recent challenges, the Court remains steadfast to unilateral executive decision making. However, few studies identify when the executive branch first adopts the Court's newly constituted constitutional order, and few provide a systematic analysis of how presidents advance the sole‐organ doctrine. Building on this scholarship I show that President Truman's cohesive narrative of asserted unilateral powers redirects development for future executives to claim unfettered discretion.

Starting the Emergency Process: Some Reflections on Presidential Prerogatives in South Africa and Cameroon in Time of Turmoil

Starting the Emergency Process: Some Reflections on Presidential Prerogatives in South Africa and Cameroon in Time of Turmoil

Presidential Pardon and Prerogative of Mercy: A Necessary National Soothing Balm for Social Justice.

A wrongful acquittal can sometimes involve injustice as grievous as wrongful conviction. The conviction as a matter of record, survives the pardon. Pardon expresses forgiveness not innocence. An innocent man cannot be pardoned but to apply for rescindment which is a total cancellation, not a pardon that leaves the record intact. Because the President as an Executive does not deal with law, he concerns himself with mistake of facts while the courts concern itself with mistake of law. There are usually wrongful convictions that are suitable for presidential pardon or prerogative of mercy. Some Presidents and Governors use this constitutional provision to add luster to their names or party patronage or to score political points. The danger of convicting the innocent calls for greater and greater care. This article examines the necessity of the prerogative of mercy as a means of correcting mistakes in the process of justice delivery and its use as a tool for calming political tides and uniting the nation. It is expected that this will kick start scholarly and legislative action for acceptable guidelines for the exercise of Presidential pardon and prerogative of mercy in the interest of our justice system.

The classical liberal constitution: the uncertain quest for limited government

American liberals and conservatives alike take for granted a progressive view of the Constitution that took root in the early twentieth century. Richard Epstein laments this complacency which, he believes, explains America's current economic malaise and political gridlock. Steering clear of well-worn debates between defenders of originalism and proponents of a living Constitution, Epstein employs close textual reading, historical analysis, and political and economic theory to urge a return to the classical liberal theory of governance that animated the framers' original text, and to the limited government this theory supports.Grounded in the thought of Locke, Hume, Madison, and other Enlightenment figures, the classical liberal tradition emphasized federalism, restricted government, separation of powers, property rights, and economic liberties. The most serious challenge to this tradition, Epstein contends, has come from New Deal progressives and their intellectual defenders. Unlike Thomas Paine, who saw government as a necessary evil at best, the progressives embraced government as a force for administering social good. The Supreme Court has unwisely ratified the progressive program by sustaining an ever-lengthening list of legislative programs at odds with the classical liberal Constitution.Epstein's carefully considered analysis addresses both halves of the constitutional enterprise: its structural safeguards against excessive government power and its protection of individual rights. He illuminates contemporary disputes ranging from presidential prerogatives to health care legislation, while reexamining such enduring topics as the institution of judicial review, the federal government's role in regulating economic activity, freedom of speech and religion, and equal protection.

The Law: Prerogative Power and Executive Branch Czars: President Obama's Signing Statement

On April 15, 2011, Barack Obama issued a controversial signing statement that effectively nullified a provision of a bill he had signed into law. Specifically, president abrogated section 2262 of budget compromise law, which prohibited using for salaries and expenses of czars of energy, health reform, auto recovery, and urban affairs (Obama 2011). defunding provision was part of a larger effort by Congress to prevent increased centralization and control of public policy by White House aides who are not confirmed by Senate. moniker czar is shorthand term used by media, politicians, and scholars to describe certain officials who are appointed by president to provide advice, coordinate policies among multiple departments and agencies, and even to make important personnel and spending decisions. Lacking senatorial confirmation and even prohibited many times from testifying, czars are a controversial feature of executive branch. Given substantial number of czars in Obama White House, Republican members of House had been trying to pass similar anti-czar measures for nearly two years before successfully adding anti-czar provision to budget bill (Fabian 2009; O'Brien 2011; Zimmermann 2009). Senate Republicans had also sought information about 18 positions in Obama administration that they considered czars and asked that president refrain from creating any new czar-type posts (Lerer 2009). Obama justified his plan to set aside anti-czar provision by stating that President has well-established authority to supervise and oversee executive branch, and to obtain in furtherance of this supervisory Continuing, Obama noted that he has the prerogative to obtain advice in fulfilling his from any official or employee within executive branch or White House. Legislative efforts that significantly impede President's ability to exercise his supervisory and coordinating authorities or to obtain views of appropriate senior advisers, he claimed, violate separation of powers by undermining President's ability to exercise his constitutional responsibilities and take care that laws be faithfully executed. result being that Obama would construe section 2262 not to abrogate these Presidential prerogatives (Obama 2011). Obama's signing statement set off a variety of criticisms, most notably from Representative Steve Scalise (R-LA), author of anti-czars provision of budget bill: The does not have option of choosing which laws he will follow and which he will ignore. He continued: The United States is not a kingdom run by a political dictator, and Obama needs to quickly reverse course and abide by law eliminating czars that were part of budget resolution agreed to be Speaker Boehner, Senator Reid, and Obama himself (Scalise 2011). Some Democratic lawmakers, however, countered by saying that section 2262 was intrusive micromanagement of president's White House staff via appropriations (Bravender 2011). controversy over president's signing statement raises a significant constitutional question: is there a constitutional or any legal basis for presidents to claim that they have authority to shield themselves and their aides from statutory direction and controls? Obama believes so, and he went so far as to invoke concept of prerogative power as a defense of his action to void a provision of a bill he had signed into law. To answer constitutional question raised by Obama's action, this article describes concept of prerogative power and provides an assessment of whether presidents possess such authority. It poses question of whether presidents have ability to set aside laws after they have signed them. …

Presidential Prerogative: Imperial Power in the Age of Terrorism - By Michael A. Genovese

Presidential Prerogative: Imperial Power in the Age of Terrorism - By Michael A. Genovese

What Sort of Semi-presidentialism do Finns Want? An Intra-systemic Comparative Analysis

Against the backdrop of moves by the political establishment, endorsed by political scientists, to shift towards a purely ceremonial presidency, this paper uses recent survey data to assess levels of popular support – and the socio-demographic structure of support – for two different types of semi-presidentialism in Finland. It represents an exercise in intra-country comparison – comparing public support for a return to the significant powers the head of state possessed under the 1919 constitution (Duverger-style semi-presidentialism) with backing for the more limited presidential prerogatives enshrined in the 2000 constitution (status quo semi-presidentialism). Correlation and multiple regression analysis of complementary data-sets led to two main findings. The vast majority of Finns seem content with the current limited powers of the president – status quo presidentialism – whilst among the minority that would apparently prefer a return to Duverger-style semi-presidentialism, there is a disproportionate number of persons with relatively low levels of formal education, low social status and predominantly left-wing party political persuasion.

Institutions and the Legislative Success of ‘Strong’ Presidents: An Analysis of Government Bills in Chile

This paper examines the approval of government bills in Chile, evaluating the effect of presidential prerogatives and policy substance, and considering both bill-specific and contextual effects. The results show that presidential prerogatives over financial policy, as well as the ability to affect the congressional agenda through urgent bill scheduling, significantly influence government bill approval. As expected, government success is enhanced during the honeymoon period. However, changes in public approval of the president do not appear to exert a significant effect on the passage of presidential bills.

The Last Word: Presidential Power and the Role of Signing Statements

Signing statements have become an important device that both protects and enhances presidential power by signaling how legislation is to be implemented, offering a mechanism of electoral reward, and protecting presidential prerogatives. We offer a first cut at explaining signing statements by applying William Howell's theory of unilateral action. The evidence shows that presidents use signing statements under conditions of gridlock, such as divided government, which erode their influence in Congress. The findings also suggest a strategic element to signing statement behavior. Presidents issue significantly more signing statements on major legislation when the policy and political stakes are greatest. The results provide insight into the theory of unilateral action and demonstrate how signing statements complement rather than contradict the Richard Neustadt view of power.

Cohabitation: the Parliamentary Aspect of the French Semi–Presidential System

The political system of the French Fi€fth Republic is referred to as “semi-presidentialism”. This is is to indicate its mixed nature – of a system presidential and parliamentary at a time. The Constitution grants broad prerogatives – and assigns serious tasks to both the head of state – le Président de la République – and the chief of government – le Premier ministre. When the prime minister represented the pro-presidential political camp, the head of state gained very serious in! uence on governing the state and political strategy (first, when the French political scene was dominated by the right – 1958–1981; then by the le€ – 1981–1986 and 1988–1993; and finally by the right again 1995–1997 and since 2002). As early as during Charles de Gaulle presidency (1958–1969) the idea called domaine reservée came into existence. According to this political concept, the widelyinterpreted external policies – including foreign affairs and defence were recognised as presidential prerogatives, regardless the of literal construction of legal provisions. Relations within the executive changed radically with the end of political unity. During the so-called cohabitation French political practices were different and they ultimately led to an amendment of the Constitution.

L'institutionnalisation des compétences implicites du Président russe et leur rôle dans le fonctionnement du pouvoir présidentiel

Institutionalizing the Russian president's "implicit" powers: The exercise of presidential power The "implicit" powers of the president of Russia are not described in the constitution or are mentioned in very general, ambiguous terms. Alongside classical presidential prerogatives, the president has the power, for instance, to create advisory organs, head certain ministries and administrations, make appointments to major positions and give instructions to various authorities. This scope of action has considerably expanded the presidency. The contents of these "implicit" powers, their institutionalization since 1990 and the effect of administrative practices from the Soviet era in exercising them are analyzed. The effects of these powers on the Russian political system are examined.

Inherent War and Executive Powers and Prerogative Politics

Executive power in the Constitution was left ambiguous and underdefined. Commentators have questioned presidential claims of inherent executive and war powers. Have the president and his subordinates obeyed the Constitution and adhered to the letter and spirit of the law? Have legal commentators and courts properly construed constitutional clauses, especially those dealing with war powers? I start with the idea that the Constitution is a power base for government officials and that construing the Constitution is a political act. As political scientists, we can observe presidents and their counsel substitute novel interpretations of presidential prerogatives when they claim the president has inherent war powers and related diplomatic and national security powers that override statute law or bypass the constitutional prerogatives of Congress, and we can analyze the conditions under which their substitution of executive prerogative power will succeed or fail.