Presidential Policy Directive Research Articles

Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Augmented Reality (AR): Disambiguated in the Telemedicine / Telehealth Sphere

Abstract The world is navigating through unfamiliar and incomprehensible times – COVID-19, international economic crisis, and crumbling healthcare systems. The United States (US) healthcare industry is grappling with an increased workload and advancing digitization technological concerns. The failure of organizations to offer suitable cybersecurity controls within the critical infrastructure leads to advanced persistent threat (APT) that could have incapacitating effects on organizations. A keen understanding of cybersecurity is vital for leaders and the need is referenced in US policy that advances a national unity of effort to strengthen and maintain secure, functioning, and resilient critical infrastructure. Akin to the Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 21 Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, leaders’ goals should be to reduce vulnerabilities, identify and disrupt threats, minimize consequences and hasten response and recovery efforts related to critical infrastructure. To address the concern, it is necessary to review how AI and AR serve as co-technologies to support security of patient care and monitoring, examine impacts on individuals’ and overall healthcare organizations, address how enhanced comprehension of AI and AR could guide medical professional leaders’ decisions and boost the overall patient experience. Therefore, this literature review examines AI and AR connections to cybersecurity for the healthcare environment.

Understanding the Challenge of Cybersecurity in Critical Infrastructure Sectors

Abstract The cybersecurity of critical infrastructures is an essential topic within national and international security as 16 critical infrastructure sectors touch various aspects of American society. Because the failure to provide adequate cybersecurity controls within the critical infrastructure sectors renders the country open to an attack that could have a debilitating effect on security, national public health, safety, and economic security, this matter is so vital that there is the Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 21 Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience advances a national policy to strengthen and maintain secure, functioning and resilient critical infrastructure. An organization identified as the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has the mission to be the risk advisor for the United States (US). Other organizations, such as the National Security Agency (NSA), have approved a specific Knowledge Unit (KU) to address cybersecurity for critical infrastructures associated with doctoral-level granting programs. To address this challenge, it is necessary to identify threats better and defend against them while mitigating risks to an acceptable level. Only then can a nation build a more secure and resilient infrastructure for the future while defending against present-day bad actors as cyberwarfare, cyber espionage, and cybersecurity attacks are the modern-day threats that need to be addressed in planning, designing, implementation, and maintenance. Therefore, the researchers developed a case study reviewing threats against different sectors defined in the PPD.

Systems Theory Principles and Complex Systems Engineering Concepts for Protection and Resilience in Critical Infrastructure: Lessons from the Nuclear Sector

ABSTRACTPart of the Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD‐21) (PPD 2013) mandate includes evaluating safety, security, and safeguards (or nonproliferation) mechanisms traditionally implemented within the nuclear reactors, materials, and waste sector of critical infrastructure—including a complex, dynamic set of risks and threats within an all‐hazards approach. In response, research out of Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) explores the ability of systems theory principles (hierarchy and emergence) and complex systems engineering concepts (multidomain interdependence) to better understand and address these risks and threats. This Sandia research explores the safety, safeguards, and security risks of three different nuclear sector‐related activities—spent nuclear fuel transportation, small modular reactors, and portable nuclear power reactors—to investigate the complex and dynamic risk related to the PPD‐21‐mandated all‐hazards approach. This research showed that a systems‐theoretic approach can better identify inter‐dependencies, conflicts, gaps, and leverage points across traditional safety, security, and safeguards hazard mitigation strategies in the nuclear reactors, materials, and waste sector. As a result, mitigation strategies from applying systems theoretic principles and complex systems engineering concepts can be (1) designed to better capture interdependencies, (2) implemented to better align with real‐world operational uncertainties, and (3) evaluated as a systems‐level whole to better identify, characterize, and manage PPD‐21's all hazards strategies.

Generalised resilience models for power systems and dependent infrastructure during extreme events

This study presents a generalised critical infrastructures resilience model for extreme events with a focus on power grids. Infrastructures are modelled as three domains – physical, cyber, and human. Each domain is described with respect to the services it provides. Each domain is represented by geometric graphs for each service it provides. The resilience models use geometric graphs with each graph's nodes and edges characterised based on relevant attributes. This study also discusses various applied aspects related to resilience models including the impact of changing operating environment, human-driven processes, such as logistics, and service buffers. Due to their stated particular importance in the U.S. Presidential Policy Directive 21, particular attention is placed on the power infrastructure and its impact on the public communication infrastructures as a main critical load. This study focuses on the multi-time scale power system operation to capture cascading outages within, and subsequently to its dependent infrastructure – the public communication system (e.g. wireless or ‘cellular’ communication networks) as a main critical load. This study illustrates the merits of the proposed models in calculating resilience in extreme events and derives physical domain representation for electric and communication systems using cell tower and substation data from the USA.

Assessing Resilience Model Responsiveness in the Context of Stakeholder Preferences in Decision Support Systems

AbstractFrom Presidential Policy Directive 21, professional societies’ national meetings, to major United Nations initiatives, resilience has captured the attention of powerful stakeholders. Resili...

Effect of a power failure on rail transport

Abstract Electricity is one of the most significant discoveries that science has brought to the human race. Without it at present, a person cannot exist. Electricity has become an integral part of modern life. Everyday activities, whether in households or other areas, such as healthcare, industry, transport, are dependent on electricity. In 2013, the energy sector reached such a level of significance that it was declared to be uniquely critical by the Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-21). In the rail transport sector, more and more railway lines are electrified, and the electric motors are gradually replacing diesel engines. Such modernization of the railways leads to dependence on electricity and therefore their operation can significantly cause danger by the electricity outage. Almost all technological equipment on the rail is dependent on electricity. Therefore, it is important to pay attention to the resilience of the elements on which the operation of electricity production and supply depends on other sectors dependent on electricity.

Global Health Security at the Crossroads

Between 2000 and 2016, several new and emerging infections created significant global socioeconomic challenges to health security. Many infections, such as influenza, SARS, MERS, XDR-TB, and others, still threaten many people and communities globally. On November 18, 2016, based on advice from its Emergency Committee (EC), the WHO Director-General declared the end of the Zika virus as a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC). Thus Zika virus, or disease, is now joining the many other infections, including yellow fever and antimicrobial drug resistance, in the category of serious health threats. The United States has been, and continues to be, one of the major contributors to the world humanitarian effort in the fight for human health and security, partnering with other nations to reduce human suffering and interdicting the spread of infections. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the U.S. Army invested significant resources to develop vaccines against yellow fever and other infections and minimize the spread of vector-borne infections. The effective US Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003, and the “Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership Against HIV/ AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008” re-authorizing up to $48 billion over 5 years, provided much- needed resources to combat global HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. This Act is the cornerstone of the U.S. Global Health Initiative, which provides, on average, USD 10 billion annually to assist other countries in the fight against many invasive diseases. Additional funding to support the fight against antimicrobial drug resistance, Ebola, and Zika have been approved by the U.S. government. On November 4, 2016, an executive order was issued by President Barack Obama to further strengthen the fight against the spread of infections. Section 1 of this executive order notes that, “as articulated in the National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats and Implemented in Presidential Policy Directive 2 (PPD-2), promoting global health security is a core tenet of our national strategy for countering biological threats,” (White House, 2016) as is supporting the goals of the International Health Regulations (IHR). The Global Health Security Agenda (GSHA) action plan centers around three major actions: This is an ambitious plan, relying on partnership with many nations and private benevolent foundations for support, collaboration, and execution. Within the United States, the presidential directive assigns specific roles for each government department and agency to contribute and engage in this activity. Undoubtedly, the U.S. State Department medical officers will play a major role in ensuring coordination and implementation at the countries’ ministries of health level. WHO and World Medical Association leadership commitment to global health security is essential for the success of this GSHA plan. The United States has and will continue to support and engage in the global fight to prevent unnecessary deaths from infections. The new administration is encouraged to expand its engagement, political and economic, to ensure global health security. We encourage our readers to submit manuscripts in this area of research and policy addressing global health security, antimicrobial drug resistance, and pandemics. Finally, as we enter the new 2017 publication year, we would like to take this opportunity to thank all our peer reviewers, board of directors, and authors, for all their volunteered time to improve our journal. Special thanks goes to Professor Paul Rich, President of the Policy Studies Organization, and his staff for their support of this journal and their continued care and encouragement.

INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM CYBER SECURITY AND THE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES

ABSTRACTIndustrial control systems (ICSs) are critical to the operation of a modern society. ICS design is to be reliable and safe, rather than cyber secure. There is insufficient understanding of ICS cyber threats and what makes them different from traditional IT malware. ICSs throughout the world monitor and control electric grids, power plants, water and waste water systems, chemical plants, refineries, pipelines, manufacturing, transportation, and other physical processes. ICSs are systems of systems requiring cyber security to address the networks, the control centers, field devices, communication protocols, software, and firmware of each device.Cyber incidents, defined by US Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 41 (https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/26/presidential-policy-directive-united-states-cyber-incident), are electronic communications between systems that can impact confidentiality, integrity, and/or availability. As of November 2016, I have a database of more than 900 actual ICS cyber incidents. Most of the incidents were not malicious and most were not identified as being cyber‐related. Cyber attacks against ICSs have been rare. The most famous attack was Stuxnet (http://www.langner.com/en/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/To-kill-a-centrifuge.pdf). In December 2015, the Ukrainian electric grid was cyber attacked and more than 230,000 customers lost power (https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/alerts/IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01). The test at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in March 2007 (Swearingen et al. 2013) demonstrated the Aurora vulnerability. Aurora exploits a physical gap in protection of the electric grid affecting ALL substations. It uses the protective devices as the vehicle for the attack, which effectively removes any protection. It also uses the electric infrastructure against itself and its customers. The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) inadvertently made the true nature of the Aurora vulnerability public in July 2014 (https://www.muckrock.com/foi/united-states-of-america-10/operation-aurora-11765/?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter#1212530-14f00304-documents, May 22, 2014). Most publicly available information about Aurora has been misleading which resulted in most utilities not taking actions to prevent this real threat. The reason for the explanation about Aurora is the Ukrainian cyber attack used step 1 of the 2 steps of Aurora – remotely opening the breakers. The attackers chose not to go to Step 2 – reclosing the breakers out‐of‐phase with the grid.

Coordinated Energy Management in Resilient Microgrids for Wireless Communication Networks

This paper proposes a novel approach to power wireless communication network base stations (BSs) in order to achieve higher resilience. In the proposed dc microgrid, resilience is improved with the coordinated operation of renewable energy sources, energy storage devices, and BS traffic using an integrated controller that adjusts BS traffic and distributes stored energy among cell sites based on weather forecast and other operational conditions. The essential role played by power electronics active power distribution nodes in this resilient microgrid is also explained. Resilience improvements are evaluated quantitatively with metrics analogous to that of availability, which considers energy storage levels, power generation, and load. The analysis shows that the proposed system allows reducing service restoration times by a factor of 3 or improve resilience by double-digit percentage points, while the battery life is extended by about 10%. Additionally, battery bank size needs and PV array footprints can be reduced without compromising resilience. The proposed microgrid is implemented for wireless communication networks because both energy and communications are identified in the U.S. Presidential Policy Directive 21 as the two infrastructures that are especially critical for community resilience. Nevertheless, this same technology can also be used in other applications, such as residential neighborhoods or industrial campuses.

Influences of Preparedness Knowledge and Beliefs on Household Disaster Preparedness.

In response to concern about strengthening the nation's ability to protect its population and way of life (i.e., security) and ability to adapt and recover from emergencies (i.e., resilience), the President of the United States issued Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness (PPD-8) (1). Signed on March 30, 2011, PPD-8 is a directive for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to coordinate a comprehensive campaign across government, private and nonprofit sectors, and individuals to build and sustain national preparedness. Despite efforts by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and other organizations to educate U.S. residents on becoming prepared, growth in specific preparedness behaviors, including actions taken in advance of a disaster to be better prepared to respond to and recover, has been limited (2). In 2012, only 52% of U.S. residents surveyed by FEMA reported having supplies for a disaster (2), a decline from 57% who reported having such supplies in 2009 (3). It is believed that knowledge influences behavior, and that attitudes and beliefs, which are correlated with knowledge, might also influence behavior (4). To determine the association between knowledge and beliefs and household preparedness, CDC analyzed baseline data from Ready CDC, a personal disaster preparedness intervention piloted among Atlanta- and Morgantown-based CDC staff members during 2013–2015. Compared with persons with basic preparedness knowledge, persons with advanced knowledge were more likely to have assembled an emergency kit (44% versus 17%), developed a written household disaster plan (9% versus 4%), and received county emergency alert notifications (63% versus 41%). Similarly, differences in household preparedness behaviors were correlated with beliefs about preparedness. Persons identified as having strong beliefs in the effectiveness of disaster preparedness engaged in preparedness behaviors at levels 7%–30% higher than those with weaker preparedness beliefs. Understanding the influences of knowledge and beliefs on household disaster preparedness might provide an opportunity to inform messages promoting household preparedness.

Business Continuity and Disaster Management: Mitigating the Socioeconomic Impacts of Facility Downtime After a Disaster

Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8) was signed by U.S. President Barack Obama on 30 March 2011. This directive deals with the subject of developing a national preparedness system for security and resiliency for businesses to endure a disaster or catastrophe, which can be caused by anything from natural disasters to terrorism. The overall purpose of the directive is for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to help administer a program within the United States to analyze, mitigate, and recover from a disaster. Any downtime at a major petrochemical plant or refinery can have an enormous impact on the national economy. This article provides recommendations on how to perform risk assessments in general, how to perform a risk assessment of a petrochemical industry power system, how to develop an effective preventative program, and how to recover quickly from a disaster. The benefits of being well prepared are also addressed.

U.S. Trade Representative Champions New Presidential Policy Directive for Trade with Sub-Saharan Africa

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War. Military Law. Reference to Presidential Policy Directive Held Prejudicial and Future Use of Manual for Courts-Martial Restricted. United States v. Rinehart (U. S. C. M. A. 1957)

War. Military Law. Reference to Presidential Policy Directive Held Prejudicial and Future Use of Manual for Courts-Martial Restricted. United States v. Rinehart (U. S. C. M. A. 1957)