Presidential Appointments Research Articles

Career motives of presidential appointees and agency communication across American states

AbstractDo the career motives of presidential appointees affect program administration? To answer this question, I examine the phased development of policy communication of the U.S. Farm Service Agency (FSA) across states from 2002 to 2018 based on an original collection of historical official websites. This is a rare policy context for examining why peer appointees administer the same programs differently. Linking the state‐by‐state development of FSA newsletters to the career trajectories of state executive directors (SEDs), the presidential appointees who lead state FSAs, I show that SEDs interested in elective office post‐appointment are associated with faster institutionalization of newsletters. Examining these newsletters’ content, I then show that SEDs interested in elective office or a career in advocacy include more participation‐encouraging language in newsletters. These results suggest that appointees’ career goals outside the bureaucracy can potentially expedite innovation in program implementation and enhance the delivery of government benefits to the public, with implications for selecting appointees to enhance bureaucratic performance.

The gender factor in monetary policy: An event-study design

This article assesses whether central bankers’ monetary policy preferences differ by gender. Based on a monetary policy rule in which the inflation rate is a function of the output gap, we estimated differences in this rule between central banks with female presidents and those with male presidents. Using an original database of 159 countries observed from 1980 to 2018, we adopted an event-study design, which, compared with the related literature, offers a novel approach to evaluate gender differences in inflation changes in the years following a new presidential appointment. A difference-in-differences strategy with propensity score matching showed that men central bank presidents are strongly conservative (hawks) in their monetary policy, at least in the first years after taking office. On the contrary, women central bank presidents are progressive (doves). This implies that women let the inflation rate fluctuate more—in relation to the output gap—than do men.

The Contemporary Presidency: Which presidents win more or less than expected in Congress? A Biden update

AbstractThis article updates estimates of which presidents won more or fewer votes than should be expected through President Biden's first two years in office. Multiple regression models estimating the effects of contextual variables (party, public approval, and party polarization plus interactions) establish a common baseline. Errors reveal which presidents won more or less than should be expected. Party polarization conditions relationships between party control and presidential success, but effects differ across chambers. As polarization increases in the House, majority presidents win more votes and minority presidents win fewer. The effects are less obvious in the Senate. Majority presidents win more than do minority presidents regardless of polarization. But polarization has led to a de facto 60‐vote Senate, as the minority party uses the supermajority required to invoke cloture to block confirmation of presidential appointments. Conclusions discuss limitations of roll‐call vote measures of presidential success.

거점 국립대학교 선출직 총장의 특성 분석(1988~2023)

Objectives The purposes of this study is to analyze the characteristics of presidents appointed at major national universities in South Korea over a period of 35 years since the introduction of the direct presidential appointment system in 1988. The research questions are as follows: First, what are the demographic characteristics, academic backgrounds, and career experiences of presidents at major national universities? Second, are there any differ-ences in the demographic characteristics, academic backgrounds, and career experiences of presidents based on the universities they lead?
 Methods To achieve the study’s objectives, data on 78 presidents of nine major national universities appointed since 1988 were collected from various sources, including the university websites, the Korea Research Foundation's Korean Researcher Information, the Korea University Newspaper, Naver Person Information, and the Korea Press Promotion Foundation's BIG KINDS. The collected data were analyzed using the SPSS 27.0 program. Descriptive statistics were initially calculated to identify the overall trends, and ANOVA and chi-square tests were conducted to detect differences between groups.
 Results Most of the presidents of national universities were male and were appointed in their late 50s. They often had regional connections. All the elected presidents were professors, and most of them had prior experience in executive-level positions at the university. These characteristics were consistent across the nine major uni-versities studied. However, the ratio of presidents from their alma mater and the characteristics of the president's academic field exhibited slight variations depending on the university. Notably, the proportion of presidents from their alma mater sometimes exhibited significant differences between universities.
 Conclusions This study analyzes who became president by examining the characteristics of elected presidents rather than explaining why they became president. The study results simply illustrate the characteristics of elect-ed presidents over the past 35 years. To explain why someone became president, further research is needed to understand how these characteristics influence the presidential election process.

Presidential appointments of ministers in South Korea: beyond the dichotomy of loyalty and competence

ABSTRACT The present study provides an overview of the history of the civil service in South Korea, focusing on political appointments at the upper levels of the bureaucracy. We limit our investigation’s scope to presidential appointments of ministers and underscore the necessity for additional scholarly attention to this subject. To empirically assess these appointments, we introduce a novel dataset and conduct an analysis that examines the demographic characteristics and career paths of past ministers, alongside the types of political patronage employed in their appointments. This analysis utilizes the analytical framework of loyalty versus competence as proposed by (Ouyang, Y., Haglund, E. T., & Waterman, R. W. (2017). The missing element: Examining the loyalty-competence nexus in presidential appointments. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 47(1), 62–91.) and the typology of patronage outlined by (Panizza, F., Peters, B. G., & Ramos Larraburu, C. R. (2019). Roles, trust and skills: A typology of patronage appointments. Public Administration, 97(1), 147–161), which is further elaborated by (Peters, B. G. (2023). Patronage in Asian political systems: A framework for research. In B. G. Peters, C. Knox, & B. Kim (Eds.), Political patronage in Asian bureaucracies (pp. 1–21). Cambridge University Press). Our findings reveal that, irrespective of the regime or ministry, programmatic technocrats are the most prevalent type of presidential appointee in South Korea, with nearly half being former bureaucrats. Although most ministers in South Korea align with this category, we also discern significant variations across different regimes and ministries. These findings provide insights into the practices of political appointments in South Korea’s civil service and contribute to the literature on public administration and governance.

Legal Reforms in Indonesia Related to "Presidential Threshold" of Presidential Candidate in Law No. 7 Of 2017 Concerning General Elections

The election is the manifestation of freedom in choosing the president, vice-president and legislature parliament in a country, because the elections play a role as a mechanism for political change regarding the funds patterns for the direction of public policy/or regarding the circulation of the elite periodically and in an orderly manner. Indonesia itself holds the presidential and vice-presidential elections every five years that requires its citizens to vote the potential candidates for becoming the president and vice president for the next 5 years. This research aims to find out the legal reforms related to presidential nomination of Presidential Threshold based on Law number 7 of 2017 concerning the General Elections. This research examines the law concerning the presidential elections and presidential threshold based on 1945 Constitution in Indonesia to find out the president election and the obstacles in its implementation. This research showed that it is possible that public expect more candidate than just two candidates. And the public will only vote for the presidential candidate by dominant party, not the party in accordance with citizens’ need. From this research, it can be concluded that the unnecessary presidential appointments are incompatible with the dignity of Indonesia constitution.

LEGAL REFORMS IN INDONESIA RELATED TO "PRESIDENTIAL THRESHOLD" OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE IN LAW NO. 7/2017 CONCERNING GENERAL ELECTIONS

The election is the manifestation of freedom in choosing the president, vice-president and legislature parliament in a country because the elections has a role as a mechanism for political change regarding the funds patterns for the direction of public policy/or regarding the circulation of the elite periodically and in an orderly manner. Indonesia itself holds the presidential and vice-presidential elections every five years that requires its citizens to vote the potential candidates for becoming the president and vice president for the next 5 years. This research aims to find out the legal reforms related to presidential nomination of presidential threshold based on Law No. 7/2017 concerning the General Elections. This research examines the law concerning presidential elections and presidential threshold based on 1945 Constitution in Indonesia to find out the president election and the obstacles in its implementation. This research indicated that it is possible that public expect more candidate than just two candidates. Then, the public will only vote for presidential candidates from the dominant political party, not the party that suits the community's needs. The result of this research can be concluded that the unnecessary presidential appointments are incompatible with the dignity of Indonesia constitution.

The Impact of Presidential Appointment of Judges: Montesquieu or the Federalists?

A central question in development economics is whether there are adequate checks and balances on the executive. This paper provides causal evidence of how increasing constraints on the executive—via removal of presidential discretion in judicial appointments—promotes the rule of law. The age structure of judges at the time of the reform and the mandatory retirement age law provide us with an exogenous source of variation in the termination of presidential discretion in judicial appointments. Overall, the results indicate that presidential appointment of judges deteriorates the rule of law. Even one degree of separation between the judiciary and the president matters. (JEL D72, K40, O17)

Presidential Strategy amidst the “Broken” Appointments Process

AbstractOne of the notable features of the most recent presidential administrations has been the increasing prevalence of vacancies in presidentially appointed and Senate‐confirmed positions. This article explains when and how presidents actively take control of those positions once they become vacant. It evaluates its claims with original data on the most important Senate‐confirmed positions during the first year of the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations, with a total of nearly 5,000 quarterly observations of 1,009 administration‐position cases. Estimates from Markov multistate models reveal that presidents use non‐default acting officials more frequently in ideologically opposed agencies, agencies connected to their campaign priorities, and the highest tier of leadership positions. Further, presidents pursue confirmation sparingly, often opting instead to use non‐default acting officials for extended periods of time. These results suggest that presidents have significant discretion over the leadership of the executive establishment that is at odds with our separation of powers system of government and the Senate's constitutional role to provide advice and consent on presidential appointees.

President Trump and the Shallow State: Disloyalty at the Highest Levels

President Donald Trump often complained about the “deep state” of career civil servants who, he asserted, were determined to undermine his presidency. But it was his own presidential appointees who most visibly resisted his directives. Political appointees are expected to be the most loyal advocates of a president's policy agenda, riding herd on the many bureaucracies of the executive branch. This article analyzes resistance to Trump's policy directives by his own appointees in the White House, cabinet, military, and intelligence community. It concludes that this level of resistance is unprecedented in the modern presidency.

The Fix is in? Parliamentary Scrutiny of Appointments of the Heads of Brazilian Regulatory Agencies

Abstract This manuscript analyses the parliamentary scrutiny of the presidential appointments to the direction of independent Brazilian Regulatory Agencies from an in-depth case study of the heads of the Brazilian Health Regulatory Agency—ANVISA, between 1999 and 2021. In Brazil, the Senate has the final decision on these appointments, exercising a dual function: parliamentary control over presidential patronage and selecting future heads of agencies. The objective of this article was to explain how the parliament exercises these functions and interferes in the appointment process. The results indicate that, although the formal process of parliamentary scrutiny seems like a game of marked cards, where it is already known in advance that the result will be approval, the Parliament plays an anticipatory role of presidential decisions, interfering in the timing of appointments and the possibility of influence over the choice of nominees.

The Pivotal and Distributive Politics of Senate‐Confirmed Appointee Vacancies

AbstractWe examine the influence of discretionary agency outlays on the relative length of Senate‐confirmed presidential appointee vacancies over time. We argue that key Senate pivots in the appointment process are more (or less) likely to extend a vacancy based on an agency's discretionary spending outlays to the Senator's state. We combine a uniquely thorough dataset on PAS vacancies with federal budget data by state and agency and show that co‐partisan Senate pivots in the confirmation process seem to reward presidents with shorter vacancies when a given agency is more generous in discretionary outlays. However, under divided government, vacancies lengthen in presidentially aligned agencies as status quo agency outlays increase to key pivots. Our work speaks to both the pivotal politics of the Senate and the extent to which presidents and Senators might value filled (vacant) PAS positions.

Going for Goals: Presidential Appointments and Agency Goal Change

AbstractWith dozens of mandates, federal agencies have considerable discretion in how they focus their time and resources. In this article, I explain how presidents influence agency goals, focusing on how appointee teams are essential to prioritizing and resetting agency goals. Using original data on federal agency goals from the Obama administration to the Trump administration, my analysis of strategic and priority goals across 56 agencies reveals that agencies in which the president has a higher percentage of key appointed positions filled experienced higher levels of long‐term goal change. This finding highlights the president's immediate need to get their appointee teams in place to alter the course of agency policymaking for their whole first term.

Serving the Law or Playing Politics? The Strategic Use of U.S. Attorney Appointments

AbstractThe strategic nature of presidential appointments and politicization of federal prosecution have flourished as separate strains of research. This article opens a dialogue between them by theoretically developing expectations for the three distinct origins of interim U.S. Attorneys. The expectations are tested using an original, continuous data set of all 93 U.S. Attorney positions for 1987 to 2016, which, unlike any other study, includes details of appointment and service for Senate‐confirmed and interim appointees. We find that the opportunity to realize his agenda and divergence from his predecessors motivates the president's revealed preference for interim United States Attorneys of his own choosing.

Glosa do wyroku Naczelnego Sądu Administracyjnego z 6 maja 2021 r., sygn. akt II GOK 3/18

The judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 6 May 2021, the subject of which was the assessment of the legality of the resolution of the National Council of the Judiciary on the submission (failure to present) of applications for appointment to the position of a Supreme Court judge in the Civil Chamber, created the possibility of challenging the composition of the adjudicating panels with the participation of judges selected in this procedure. However, the administrative court did not assess the validity of the appointments of judges, finding that the effects of the ruling issued in this case do not relate to the systemic validity and effectiveness of presidential appointments to the office of judge. Therefore, the judgment does not resolve the key issue determining the effectiveness of the appointment of the judiciary

Competition or Collusion? How Presidents and the Senate Evade or Enforce Statutory Requirements for Ambassadorial Nominees

With each presidential transition and subsequent rush of presidential appointments, the long-running debate about presidential preferences and senatorial advice and consent becomes front-page news. The political science literature has long examined the nomination and confirmation process, especially for cabinet and judicial appointments, and a growing quantitative literature evaluates political and personal factors shaping that process. Yet we lack a systematic understanding of how ex ante statutory requirements, in addition to the ex post confirmation process, affect presidential choices and how senators might seek to enforce compliance with those requirements. Using a new dataset that combines ambassadorial nominee qualifications provided by the State Department to the Senate with nomination and confirmation data, this article provides an initial glimpse of the competing perspectives of presidents and senators on the bounds Congress can set for ambassadorial appointees’ characteristics. The evidence suggests that, instead of the interbranch competition set up by Article II’s checks on presidential appointments, collusion to maintain the status quo on ambassadorial appointments is less costly and more beneficial for both presidents and senators.

All the President's Justices? The Impact of Presidential Copartisanship on Supreme Court Job Approval

AbstractSupreme Court job approval is sensibly connected to its decisions, particularly salient ones. We fill a gap in the literature by theorizing—via a presidential appointment mechanism—how partisan alignment with the incumbent president (presidential copartisanship) influences Supreme Court job approval. Analysis of data from 1986 to 2019 (supplemented by longer‐term confidence data) shows that a president's copartisans are significantly more approving of the Court than outpartisans. Analysis of the American Panel Survey surrounding high‐salience events during the transition from Obama to Trump shows that Republicans, who significantly increase in Court approval following Trump's election victory, are anticipatory of Trump's prospects of changing the Court. Democrats, whose approval significantly declines only after Justice Gorsuch's confirmation, are not anticipatory but reactive to the president's confirmed appointee. Our findings generate new evidence of how the president structures public opinion toward the Court, which has important implications for judicial independence and legitimacy.

Is the Failed Pandemic Response a Symptom of a Diseased Administrative State?

Abstract David E. Lewis is the Rebecca Webb Wilson University Distinguished Professor and Professor of Law (by courtesy) at Vanderbilt University. He is the author of Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design (2003) and The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance (2008).

Control without Confirmation: The Politics of Vacancies in Presidential Appointments

Scholarship on separation of powers assumes executives are constrained by legislative approval when placing agents in top policy-making positions. But presidents frequently fill vacancies in agency leadership with unconfirmed, temporary officials or leave them empty entirely. I develop a novel dataset of vacancies across 15 executive departments from 1977 to 2016 and reevaluate the conventional perspective that appointment power operates only through formal channels. I argue that presidents’ nomination strategies include leaving positions empty and making interim appointments, and this choice reflects presidents’ priorities and the character of vacant positions. The evidence indicates that interim appointees are more likely when positions have a substantial capacity to act on presidential expansion priorities and suggest that presidents can capitalize on their first-mover advantage to evade Senate confirmation. The results further suggest that separation of powers models may need to consider how deliberate inaction and sidestepping of formal powers influence political control and policy-making strategies.

The Longer You Wait, the Longer It Takes: Presidential Transition Planning and Appointment Politics

Contemporary research on presidential appointments tends to focus on the Senate’s political climate as a primary cause of its “broken politics.” In contrast, we focus on the role the president plays in setting the stage for Senate confirmation of federal appointees. Our empirical approach suggests that an active president who demonstrates initiative in the transition planning phase of an administration can better control the agenda of the Presidentially Appointed and Confirmed by the Senate (PAS) appointment process by jump-starting it before the Senate’s policy workload accumulates and legislative politicking takes over. This approach suggests that better transition planning can hasten the overall appointments process.