Competition or Collusion? How Presidents and the Senate Evade or Enforce Statutory Requirements for Ambassadorial Nominees

Abstract

With each presidential transition and subsequent rush of presidential appointments, the long-running debate about presidential preferences and senatorial advice and consent becomes front-page news. The political science literature has long examined the nomination and confirmation process, especially for cabinet and judicial appointments, and a growing quantitative literature evaluates political and personal factors shaping that process. Yet we lack a systematic understanding of how ex ante statutory requirements, in addition to the ex post confirmation process, affect presidential choices and how senators might seek to enforce compliance with those requirements. Using a new dataset that combines ambassadorial nominee qualifications provided by the State Department to the Senate with nomination and confirmation data, this article provides an initial glimpse of the competing perspectives of presidents and senators on the bounds Congress can set for ambassadorial appointees’ characteristics. The evidence suggests that, instead of the interbranch competition set up by Article II’s checks on presidential appointments, collusion to maintain the status quo on ambassadorial appointments is less costly and more beneficial for both presidents and senators.