Yeltsin Research Articles

The Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation in the 1990s in the assessments of domestic social Democratic parties

The article is devoted to the consideration of assessments of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation in the 1990s by domestic social democratic parties. The subject of the study is the publications of representatives of Russian Social Democrats, which reflect their views on the foreign policy of the Russian Federation during the period of Boris Yeltsin. The Social Democratic parties in the world and in Russia at that time influenced both the domestic and foreign policies of their states. The assessments of the social democratic parties in their programs and press reflect a wide range of views on the foreign policy of our state in the 1990s. Depending on the directions of the Social Democrats - left and right, their contradictions in views are displayed, which shows the breadth of social democratic thought at that time. The study uses a historical and comparative method, a civilizational approach in analyzing the assessments of the positions of the right-wing social Democrats and a world-system analysis in analyzing the assessments of the positions of the left-wing social Democrats. The scientific novelty of the study consists in identifying the positions of the social democratic parties of the 1990s on the foreign policy course of the Russian Federation, and the different assessments of the country's foreign policy by left and right social Democrats. The study reveals differences in the assessments of social democratic parties and their priorities in the foreign policy of the Russian Federation, depending on their directions - the left social Democrats and the right social Democrats. The article evaluates the attitude of the parties to the official course of the authorities of the Russian Federation at that time, who advocated the country's close integration into the Western world. The conclusion is made about the role of social Democrats of different directions in constructing a new understanding of Russia's foreign policy, based on the ideological positions of the parties.

Высокопоставленные чиновники Администрации Президента РФ: историческая динамика занятости после ухода с должности

The article is devoted to a comparative analysis of the characteristics of the post-career of high-ranking PA officials who left their positions under President Yeltsin and in the post-Yeltsin period - and the factors that determine them. The empirical basis of the study is a database that includes biographical questionnaires on AP figures who at least once left a key position in this body. The study showed that the role of federal executive authorities (including the government of the Russian Federation and law enforcement agencies) as a channel of post-career has increased. Transitions to the federal parliament are rare in both eras, but the proportion of officials who ended up in the State Duma after their resignation (especially a year later) slightly decreased, while the proportion of those who moved to the Federation Council, on the contrary, slightly increased in the post-Yeltsin period as a whole. While transitions to regional administrations were rare in both periods, PA officials were noticeably more likely to become governors in the post-Yeltsin era, which was facilitated by a centralization of power. Finally, the share of transitions from government to business is similar in both periods, as are their other characteristics: the dominance of big business as a place of work and the distribution of firms that have adopted officials by form of ownership. The pantouflage was aided by high salaries in big business and the firms' interest in recruiting officials in the context of crony capitalism.

Application of the Modified Grunow-Finke Risk Assessment Tool to the Sverdlovsk Anthrax Outbreak of 1979.

The modified Grunow-Finke tool (mGFT) is an improved scoring system for distinguishing unnatural outbreaks from natural ones. The 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak was due to the inhalation of anthrax spores from a military laboratory, confirmed by Russian President Boris Yeltsin in 1992. At the time the Soviet Union insisted that the outbreak was caused by meat contaminated by diseased animals. At the time there was no available risk assessment tool capable of thoroughly examine the origin of the outbreak. This study aimed to retrospectively apply the mGFT to test its ability to correctly identify the origin of the Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak of 1979 as unnatural, using data available up to 1992, before the disclosure of a laboratory leak. Data spanning from 1979 to 1992 were collected through literature reviews. Evidence related to each mGFT criterion was scored on a scale of 0 to 3 and independently reviewed by 3 assessors. These scores were then multiplied with a weighting factor and summed to obtain a maximum score. A final score exceeding 30 was indicative of an unnatural origin. The mGFT results assigned a total of 47 points to the Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak, suggesting an unnatural origin with a 78% likelihood. These findings align with the confirmed unnatural origin of the outbreak, highlighting the value of tools such as the mGFT in identifying unnatural outbreaks. Such tools integrate both intelligence evidence and biological evidence in the identification of unnatural outbreaks. The use of such tools for identifying unnatural outbreaks is limited. Outbreak investigation can be improved if risk assessment tools become integral to routine public health practice and outbreak investigations.

RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN DISPUTES OVER SOVIET LEGACY AFTER 1991. BULGARIAN DIPLOMATIC PERSPECTIVE

The article explores the Russian-Ukrainian Cold War and Russian-Ukrainian disputes about the Soviet legacy after 1991 through the prism of Bulgarian diplomatic analysis. The main source material is unpublished documents from the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria, as well as published archives - the Boris Yeltsin Presidential Centre, and the American National Security Archive. Thematic circles focus on the Crimean Knot, Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet, and the fate of Soviet nuclear weapons. The analytical forecasts of Bulgarian diplomats are examined in two main vectors: geopolitical and ideological.

The Russian Empire and the Soviet Union: The Dialectics of Rupture and Continuity

Historians, politicians, and other mnemonic actors are actively debating the question about what characterises the relationship between the Romanov Empire and the Soviet Union, i. e. continuity or rupture. The Soviet regime of the interwar period emphasised discontinuity, both in domestic policy and in the international arena. Whenever references to the Romanov Empire appeared in international treaties of the Soviets of that time, it was only in the context of a renunciation of that legacy. However, on the eve of World War II, the Soviet authorities clearly outlined the Soviet state’s claims to its status as a successor state of the Russian Empire, declaring its right to the territories of the Baltic states, Bessarabia, and the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus that had once been part of the Romanov empire, or were claimed by Russia in WWI, such as Galicia and Bukovina. In the USSR, starting in the second half of the 1930s, the image of the Russian Empire as a “prison of peoples” faded into the background, replaced by the arguments about “objective progressiveness” in annexing certain territories and ethnic groups into the empire. However, the role of the October Revolution as the founding myth of the Soviet society persisted until the Soviet Union’s implosion and left no doubt that the rupture was crucially important for the Soviet authorities. During Boris Yeltsin’s presidency in the 1990s, Russia was trying to shape a new narrative of a young nation, which was starting its history from 1991, but the attempt quite predictably failed. After becoming president, Vladimir Putin almost immediately switched to the narrative of “a thousand-year-old state”, proclaiming the legacy of both the Romanov Empire and the Soviet Union part of national history. The article discusses various historiographic approaches to the issue of rupture and continuity between the Romanov empire and the USSR and concludes that one can speak of a radical rupture between the Russian Empire and Soviet Russia (and later, the Soviet Union), since the Soviet project rejected the key components of the late Russian imperial project. At the same time, we can also argue that the imperial nature of the polity itself survived albeit transformed, not just during the 1917–1922 revolutionary crisis but also during the crisis of the 1990s.

Стенограммы заседаний последних сессий райсоветов Москвы как важный исторический источник по изучению конституционного кризиса власти в России в 1993 году

The purpose of the article is to study archival documents that make it possible to understand the deep causes of the confrontation between President Boris Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR in 1993. Namely, to analyze the conflict not at the federal, but at the municipal level, where ordinary citizens worked. This paper reveals the main ways out of the constitutional crisis of 1993, which were expressed by deputies of the district councils of Moscow. The author identifies the main causes of the conflict between the deputies of the district councils and the executive authorities formed after the collapse of the USSR in Moscow. The conducted research has shown the importance of studying the transcripts of meetings of the sessions of the district councils of Moscow in connection with the disclosure of little-known facts about the formation of local self-government bodies.

The Geopolitics of Peace in a Post-Western World – Special Invited Lecture

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS A PRESCRIPTION FOR PEACE We are in the midst of an extraordinarily dangerous and destructive hot war in Ukraine, and there is now daily talk about the prospects of a US-China war in Asia, perhaps over Taiwan. Such an expanded war is too horrific to contemplate, and yet it has become the casual discourse of US op-ed columns almost daily. The people who write these columns are not thinking straight, are not knowledgeable, and indeed are utterly irresponsible. We cannot afford a continuation of the current war, and we cannot afford a war between the US and China. That would be the end of civilisation. There is also the idea that the Ukraine war will not spiral into a nuclear war. The English-speaking media, especially in the UK and the US, tells us not to worry, and that it is unlikely that Putin will use nuclear weapons. The media tell us not to be afraid. Let me tell you: Be afraid. The world is not in safe hands right now. The governments in the United States, here in the UK, and around the world, are truly dangerous to our health and wellbeing. It is our responsibility to think clearly because our lives depend on it. I have been thinking a lot about the Ukraine war, and I am very concerned. This is a war that is extraordinarily dangerous and should never have happened (see the Addendum). This is not simply a war that Putin decided to launch, unprovoked, on February 24, 2022. That is nonsense for anyone who has been around. I was an adviser to President Mikhail Gorbachev; I was advisor to President Boris Yeltsin; I was advisor to President Leonid Kuchma, the first president of independent Ukraine; and to others. What you’re being told about this conflict and others is simply not true. I say that based on firsthand experience of more than 30 years.

Escape from Political Freedom. The Constitutional Crisis of 1993 and Russia’s Political Trajectory

Abstract The constitutional crisis of 1993 was one of the major turning points in the failed democratization of Russia and subsequent turn of the country towards personalist authoritarianism. The October 1993 conflict, as the crisis is commonly called in Russia, was driven by a strategic choice of priorities by Russia’s political leadership during the post-Communist “triple transition”. After the overthrow of the Communist regime in August 1991, Russian elites prioritized market reforms and sacrificed further democratization of the country for the sake of preserving the new political status quo. This choice, made at the expense of building new democratic institutions, greatly contributed to the clash between the plebiscitary legitimacy of President Boris Yeltsin and unconstrained legality of the parliament, which was resolved in a violent zero-sum game in October 1993. The new Russian constitution sought to drastically reduce institutional constraints to presidential power. Its approval paved the way to authoritarian regime building and served as a role model for other post-Soviet countries.

From “Living Constitutionalism” to “Zombie Apocalypse”. Valery Zorkin, the Constitutional Court and Russian Authoritarianism

Abstract The 2020 constitutional amendments marked a turning point for Russian constitutionalism. The Constitution finally lost its limiting function and the Constitutional Court lost significant power. The long-serving Chairman of the Russian Constitutional Court, Valery Zorkin, however, remained in power and continues to guarantee authoritarian legality and approval for Putin through favorable rulings, his theory of state and law, and support for the constitutional amendments in 2020. Over the years, Zorkin has adapted to the increasing authoritarianism of the Putin regime. This is all the more remarkable given that Zorkin was a strong defender of legalism and opposed Boris Yeltsin’s power grab in 1993. The figure of Zorkin can help us explain the development of Russian constitutionalism during the last 30 years and the poses questions for comparative constitutional law.

M.S. Gorbachev and B.N. Yeltsin meetings with the top leadership of the Armed Forces of the USSR on December 10–11, 1991 as a turning point in the history of the Soviet Union

The object of the study is the speeches of the President of the USSR M.S.Gorbachev and the President of the RSFSR B.N. Yeltsin to the supreme military leadership of the USSR after the signing of the Belovezhskaya Agreements on December 8, 1991 on the dissolution of the USSR and the creation of the CIS. The author analyzes articles of the periodical press of December 1991, memoirs of military and political figures of the RSFSR and the USSR, as well as documents of the office of the President of the RSFSR on the preparation of Boris Yeltsin's speech to the leadership of the Armed Forces of the USSR. The author pays special attention to the methods of the two Presidents in dealing with the highest military leadership, identifies the reasons for the defeat of Mikhail Gorbachev in this struggle for the support of the military and the victory of Boris Yeltsin in it. The author uses a comparative method when comparing the speeches of M.S. Gorbachev and B.N. Yeltsin, as well as the principles of historicism and objectivity. The author concludes that the President of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, had a much better chance of success in attracting the sympathy of the military as the constitutional head of state and Supreme Commander-in-Chief, however, due to ignoring the interests of the army and navy, poor preparation of the speech and an erroneous strategy of requests for rescue, he was perceived negatively by them. The President of the RSFSR B.N. Yeltsin and his staff conducted a deep and thorough preparation of the speech, answers to topical issues of the Armed Forces were prepared, in addition, B.N. Yeltsin found time to listen to the military and give concrete answers and promises, which allowed him to enlist the support of the leadership of the Armed Forces of the USSR in an unfavorable starting situation, which helped him upon ratification of the Belovezhskaya Agreements in the Supreme Council of the RSFSR on December 12, 1991. The novelty of the research lies in referring to such a little-studied event in the history of perestroika as the meetings of the Presidents of the USSR and the RSFSR with the military leadership of the USSR after the signing of the Belovezhsky Agreement in December 1991, as well as in the author's use of unpublished archival materials of the office of the President of the RSFSR B.N. Yeltsin.

Book Monuments of the Boris Yeltsin Presidential Library and their Integration into the Electronic Collection

Preservation and accessibility of cultural heritage, the most important part of which are book monuments, is the main task of libraries and other cultural institutions.An important achievement in the implementation of the state policy was the consolidation in the Russian legislation of the norms governing the work with book monuments, the formation of the Register of Book Monuments, the creation of the site “Book Monuments” within the framework of the national project “Culture”, being the part of the National Electronic Library.The article presents the first results of work on the identification, study and digitization of book monuments from the collection of rare books stored in the non-digital collection of the Presidential Library.The purpose of this article is to introduce researchers to book monuments from the collection of rare books of the Presidential Library, the peculiarities of presenting their digital copies in the library's electronic collection.A brief description of the documents identified in the collection of rare books with signs of book monuments is given. Among them, there are early printed books; books with autographs, records of scientific, historical, cultural interest; books from personal collections of prominent people, etc. Considerable attention is paid to the description of the rarest and most interesting copies. The basic principles and approaches to digitization and presentation of book monuments in the central collection of electronic documents are considered. Special attention is paid to the experience of the Presidential Library in forming the digital collection “Book Monuments of the Presidential Library”, which includes selected domestic and foreign editions published before 1830.

Формирование политических эвфемизмов: этапы, способы, динамика

The paper is devoted to the study of political euphemisms. The aim of the research is to identify and substantiate the dynamic characteristics of political euphemisms used in Russian-language newspaper texts. The use of political euphemisms depends on the political reality and on the intention of communication: what appears to be a relevant political euphemism in this historical era, may be regarded as an obsolete euphemism in another era that requires a new euphemistic replacement. As the denotations of euphemisation change, a variety of linguistic means emerge. The paper describes the productive ways of formation of political euphemisms used in mass media texts of different historical periods (namely, under President Boris Yeltsin and President Vladimir Putin). The research is novel in that it is the first to present the tendencies of changes in the composition of political euphemisms from a diachronic perspective. As a result, it has been shown that as the language develops, semantic calquing occurs, the change of connotation strongly influences the ways of formation of new groups of euphemistic substitutes. Active processes at the lexical level of the language system contribute to the fact that some of the lexemes acquire the status of euphemisms. The main strategies for forming political euphemisms are prefixation, borrowing and metaphorisation.

The Gorbachev Moment – and Why It Was So Brief

Abstract The essay describes the anti-Stalinist tradition as a source of reformist thinking in the USSR and the policies of Nikita Khrushchev as precedents for Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms. It identifies promoters of reform within the Communist Party, among dissidents, and among their foreign supporters. It claims that those who supported Gorbachev were fewer and less influential than it appeared at the time, and that their ideas for economic reform were less developed and coherent than those for democratization and foreign policy. The essay describes the New Economic Policy of the early 1920s advocated by Nikolai Bukharin as an example of what at the time seemed to serve as a precedent for Gorbachev’s reforms, but had little actual impact. The essay discusses how opponents of Gorbachev’s reforms at home and abroad sought to undermine his initiatives. It considers the role of the United States in bringing the Gorbachev Moment to an end, by highlighting US rejection of Gorbachev’s vision of a nuclear-free, demilitarized world; insistence on promoting “shock therapy” for the Russian economy and support for Boris Yeltsin’s antidemocratic means of doing so; and policies that undermined democratic opposition to Yeltsin, even as his brutal war against Chechnya helped set a precedent for Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.

The End of the Soviet Union Revisited. Evidence from Ministerial de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba (MINREX)

ABSTRACT This article uses a qualitative historical analysis to scrutinise previously underutilised documents housed in the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba (MINREX) archive in Havana to examine Cuban-Soviet relations during 1991, the final tumultuous year of close Havana-Moscow relations. Specific focus will be given to the MINREX reaction to the August 1991 coup in Moscow and its aftermath. This article will offer several new findings. Principally that throughout 1991 MINREX officials firstly attempted to affect the bilateral relationship by both lobbying Soviet officials while in Cuba, and they proposed utilising glasnost for their own purposes. This proposal was despite a conceptual aversion to the Soviet process. Secondly, MINREX officials endeavoured to lobby Russian officials, including trying to facilitate a meeting with Andrei Kozyrev the Russian Foreign Minister. These endeavours were notwithstanding the adverse reporting of Boris Yeltsin, the Russian President, and his actions during 1991 in both the MINREX documents and Cuban state media.

Through the Eyes of a Strategist and a Diplomat: Polish-American Relations post-1918

Through the Eyes of a Strategist and a Diplomat: Polish-American Relations post-1918

Information Support of the Cultural Sector: Achievements, Problems, Prospects

The 2nd International Scientific and Practical Online Conference “Information Context of Culture: Resources, Technologies, Service” was held on October 11—12, 2022. Conference organizers are the Russian State Library (RSL), the Russian State Library of Arts (RSLA) and St. Petersburg State Institute of Culture (SPSIC). The purpose of the event is to summarize scientific research and practical experience on the issues of information support in the cultural sector, demonstrate the best achievements, identify problems and ways to overcome them. The leitmotif of the forum was the topic of cooperation between libraries, archives and museums of the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States. During two days of the forum, more than 80 representatives of the cultural sector from the RSL, the RSLA, the Boris Yeltsin Presidential Library, the national libraries of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, public libraries of almost two dozen regions of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, as well as from the universities of culture in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Chelyabinsk, Tashkent, as well as from the South Ural State University, worked in video communication mode. During the event, more than 900 viewings of the broadcasts of the meetings were recorded on the RSL YouTube channel. Within the framework of the conference, there were held the plenary session, two sessions of the Section “Information potential of libraries for the development of the cultural sector” and two special events: The 12th Conference/Meeting of the heads and specialists of information services on culture and art “Libraries — in the Year of Cultural heritage of the peoples of Russia” and the Round table “Development of library and information space on the basis of border libraries of the CIS member states: conceptual approaches and advanced directions”. In order to improve the work on information support for representatives of the cultural and art sector, the conference participants recommended to promote digital transformation aimed at the formation of common access resources on culture and art and improvement of information services; as well as to strengthen cooperation on the formation and mutual use of information resources created by the libraries of the CIS member states.

Члены правительств постсоветской России: историческая ди- намика занятости после отставки (от Б. Н. Ельцина к В. В. Путину)

Introduction: the dynamics of a post-government career is a significant subject of research, since its analysis allows us to clarify the nature of the relationship between the government and other power institutions, to better understand the behavior of its members, to assess the stability of elite membership and the degree of elite integration in different periods. Objectives: to identify similarities and differences in the post-career of the Russian governments’ members retired under President Yeltsin and in the post-Yeltsin period, and the factors that determine such similarities and differences. Methods: a database (collected data being further statistically processed) that includes biographical questionnaires on members of post-Soviet cabinets who had resigned at least once. Results: a comparative analysis of the post-government career has showed that in post-Yeltsin period the role of federal administrative bodies, primarily the Presidential Executive Office, as a place of work has increased. On the contrary, transitions to the federal parliament have decreased, due to the its weakening role, which reduced the attractiveness of legislative positions and manifested itself, in particular, in a decrease in its significance as a channel of ministerial recruitment. Transitions to regional administrations are rare in both periods, but in the post-Yeltsin era, government members more often became governors, due to centralization of power. Finally, the share of transitions from government to business is similar in both periods, as well as some other characteristics of pantouflage. However, while under Yeltsin the officials moving into business most often ended up in the private sector, later they mostly fit into to the public sector. In both periods, pantouflage was fueled by high incomes in business and the companies’ interest to hiring officials, reinforced by the crony capitalism. Conclusions: the post-government career in the Yeltsin and post-Yeltsin periods demonstrates significant differences associated with changes in the political and economic structure of Russia affecting the attractiveness and availability of positions in various power institutions.

Russian Reformers of the 1990s. (Biographical Research Experience)

In recent history, the triumph of the philosophical law on the increase of the subjective factor in social development is becoming particularly evident. In these conditions, psychology is becoming more and more in demand. The article examines the psychological mechanisms of appointment by the first President of Russia Boris Yeltsin of the head of the economic department of the newspaper “Pravda” E. Gaidar to lead the implementation of economic reforms in Russia. A psychological portrait of Gaidar and his associates is presented on the basis of the biographical method with the involvement of a wide source and factual materials. It is shown that the results of the Russian economic reforms carried out in the 1990s are a consequence of the human qualities of reformers — professional competence, value orientations and attitudes.

Politički sistem Rusije - između demokratije i autoritarnosti

The main research objective of this article was to assess the nature of the democratization of Russia's political system in the period 1985-2000. The authors analyze the selected period of the transformation in Russia based on the concept of S. Huntington, considered the most adequate theory of democratization. The authors attempted to answer following questions: what changes occurred during the "Perestroika" process initiated by M. Gorbachev - unsuccessful liberalization for Soviet Russia and "started" the Third wave of democratization of the Russian Federation; secondly, what was the specificity of the democratization of the political system during the presidency of Boris Yeltsin; and lastly, when the retreat from democratization began in Russia. This analysis seems quite sensible due to the fact that it can explain the reasons for the retreat from democracy during the presidency of V. Putin and the construction of an authoritarian state in Russia in the 21st century. In order to verify the hypotheses and answer the research questions, the classic method for the social sciences was chosen (the decision-making, systemic, and case study methods).

Сравнительный анализ образа Б. Н. Ельцина в американской прессе

The article discusses the results of a study on the image of Boris Yeltsin as it was presented in the American weekly magazine Time in the period 1986 – 1991. Applying the methods of content analysis, quantitative analysis, and imagological analysis, the author focuses on the specific formation features of the image of the USSR and its leader in the foreign (American) culture. The author determines the peaks of interest in the personality of Yeltsin in the American press, draws historical parallels explaining this phenomenon, proposes thematic groups that reflect the focus of American journalists’ interest. These groups are presented by the categories ‘appearance’, ‘personality’, ‘politics’, and ‘relationships with Mikhail Gorbachev’. A frequency analysis of lexemes reveals that the image of Boris Yeltsin was mainly positive. American journalists emphasize his special strength, ‘monumentality’, and outstanding oratorical skills. The most frequent characteristics of Yeltsin in the Time magazine are ‘oppositionist’, ‘maverick’, ‘reformist’, ‘populist’. The press also emphasizes such his qualities as ‘energetic’, ‘impulsive’. An analysis of the empirical material in the diachronic perspective revealed the dynamics of the representation of Boris Yeltsin and Mikhail Gorbachev from ‘close allies’ to ‘irreconcilable enemies’.