M.S. Gorbachev and B.N. Yeltsin meetings with the top leadership of the Armed Forces of the USSR on December 10–11, 1991 as a turning point in the history of the Soviet Union

Abstract

The object of the study is the speeches of the President of the USSR M.S.Gorbachev and the President of the RSFSR B.N. Yeltsin to the supreme military leadership of the USSR after the signing of the Belovezhskaya Agreements on December 8, 1991 on the dissolution of the USSR and the creation of the CIS. The author analyzes articles of the periodical press of December 1991, memoirs of military and political figures of the RSFSR and the USSR, as well as documents of the office of the President of the RSFSR on the preparation of Boris Yeltsin's speech to the leadership of the Armed Forces of the USSR. The author pays special attention to the methods of the two Presidents in dealing with the highest military leadership, identifies the reasons for the defeat of Mikhail Gorbachev in this struggle for the support of the military and the victory of Boris Yeltsin in it. The author uses a comparative method when comparing the speeches of M.S. Gorbachev and B.N. Yeltsin, as well as the principles of historicism and objectivity. The author concludes that the President of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, had a much better chance of success in attracting the sympathy of the military as the constitutional head of state and Supreme Commander-in-Chief, however, due to ignoring the interests of the army and navy, poor preparation of the speech and an erroneous strategy of requests for rescue, he was perceived negatively by them. The President of the RSFSR B.N. Yeltsin and his staff conducted a deep and thorough preparation of the speech, answers to topical issues of the Armed Forces were prepared, in addition, B.N. Yeltsin found time to listen to the military and give concrete answers and promises, which allowed him to enlist the support of the leadership of the Armed Forces of the USSR in an unfavorable starting situation, which helped him upon ratification of the Belovezhskaya Agreements in the Supreme Council of the RSFSR on December 12, 1991. The novelty of the research lies in referring to such a little-studied event in the history of perestroika as the meetings of the Presidents of the USSR and the RSFSR with the military leadership of the USSR after the signing of the Belovezhsky Agreement in December 1991, as well as in the author's use of unpublished archival materials of the office of the President of the RSFSR B.N. Yeltsin.