Putin Research Articles

Development of russian-mongolian foreign trade relations in food industry

In the context of shifting trade emphasis to the East, Russia attaches great importance to the development of cooperation with the Asia-Pacific countries, where Mongolia is a key partner. The purpose of the article is to reveal global trade trends and identify key areas for the development of Russian-Mongolian foreign trade relations in the food industry. Having conducted a comprehensive analysis of the economic and political factors shaping bilateral trade, the article provides insights into the challenges and opportunities for expanding cooperation in the food sector. Global trend in the food market is that China a leader. China accounts for the largest share (35%) in Russia turnover also. Mongolian trade ties with Russia are becoming closer year by year. This was demonstrated by the official visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to Mongolia in September 2024. We can observe that Mongolia closely cooperates with such a region of Russia as Buryatia. Through a detailed examination of trade patterns, regulatory frameworks, and market trends, the study uncovers areas of untapped potential and identifies barriers to optimal trade flow. Drawing on industry best practices and case studies from other global food trade partnerships, the paper offers a series of practical recommendations for stakeholders. These recommendations cover infrastructure development, promotion of cultural exchange, harmonization of legal and regulatory frameworks, absorption and use of technology to create a more robust and sustainable trade ecosystem.

Russians’ Attitudes Towards the War in Ukraine

ABSTRACTThe Russian invasion of Ukraine has caused considerable military casualties on both sides and widespread harm to Ukrainian civilians. While polls suggest that a slim majority of Russians endorse the invasion, the factors underpinning this support remain uncertain. We investigated factors associated with support for the war among Russians. In three large, diverse, samples of Russian adults (total N = 2856), we extend the dual process motivational model to the context of international warfare, focusing on two key ideologies: right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO). Consistent with polling data, we find that approximately half of the participants support the war. Across studies, RWA, especially its submission facet, emerges as a strong and consistent predictor of increased support for the war in Ukraine. In contrast, the associations with SDO are weaker and more inconsistent, with anti‐egalitarianism playing only a minor role in opposing peace efforts. Additionally, factors such as Russian identification, nationalism, group efficacy, war‐related misperceptions and collective narcissism also contribute to war support. Our findings suggest that Russian support for the war may reflect broader support for the existing regime with backing for the military intervention serving as a demonstration of loyalty to Vladimir Putin and his government.

Taking Putin’s jokes seriously: what does gender-based humor tell us about Russia’s ontological insecurity, masculinity, and construction of gendered hierarchies?

ABSTRACT The article analyzes President Vladimir Putin’s gender-based humor as a way of exploring Russia’s ontological insecurity. Our research explores how Russia’s masculine ontological insecurities are trapped in the realities of patriarchy challenged in a contemporary globalized world. We integrate a constructivist ontology with poststructuralist attention to language to understand the role of gender-based humor in the (re)production of gendered hierarchies, and therefore in sustaining Russia’s ontological security. To achieve our goal, we examined 29 videos of Putin’s speeches broadcast between 2012 and 2022 through the lenses of “feminization” and “masculinization.” The study concludes that it is necessary to take political humor seriously. Its deployment helps Putin to maintain a consistent narrative of Russian self-identity based on associations with masculinity and the feminization of the Russian nation and its foes in the eyes of a conservative segment of the Russian populous. Ultimately, such humor aims to alleviate feelings of insecurity and anxiety, maintaining a heteronormative gendered order in Russian foreign affairs.

Главное о социальном банковском вкладе и социальном банковском счете

On July 22, 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed Federal Law № 202-FZ, which establishes the possibility of opening special banking products, namely a social bank deposit and a social bank account.

THE EUROPEAN MIRROR OF HYBRID WAR: HOW RUSSIA TRIES TO DESTABILIZE THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

The unprovoked Russian aggression against Ukraine, which is the biggest war after the World War II, has caused a number of problems in Europe and in the whole democratic world, which is concerning regarding the functioning of the international institutions, the security of the countries that are part of international organizations, but aren't members of the EU and NATO, the protection of human rights mechanisms and the lack of mechanisms for the prevention of war and conflicts. It is clear that the Russian invasion of Ukraine is no accident. The Russian elites, led by President Vladimir Putin, have been preparing for this move for years. Not only have they acted openly, but they have also been waging a hybrid war. Moreover, the war in Ukraine has been going on since 2014, when Russia supported the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics for succession. And before that, Moscow unilaterally annexed Crimea. The European response to Russian aggression has been diplomatic expressions of concern and threats, and some sanctions, which Russia has successfully evaded. It seemed that Europe had consistently adapted to the new geopolitical environment. But only after 24th of February 2022, all civilization's words stand by Ukraine and the Ukrainians. The Western allies of Ukraine give money and weapons, humanitarian aid, training of military and deminers and take in Ukrainian refugees. The war in Ukraine is in its third year. This analysis elaborates the Russian influence on different levels and the European reactions to their attacks and provocations.

Actualization of Axiolemmas in Political Discourse of Russia and China (New Year Addresses of V. V. Putin and Xi Jinping)

This article presents the findings of a comparative study on the values articulated in the New Year addresses of the political leaders of Russia and China. The research addresses the challenge of identifying the determinants that influence their choices within epideictic texts. An analysis of the New Year addresses delivered by Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping from 2019 to 2023, approached from a linguo-axiological perspective, has highlighted the concepts of PEOPLE and GOVERNMENT, indicating the significance of themes related to the populace and representatives of authority in the political discourses of both countries. It is demonstrated that these congratulatory speeches actualize vital, political, national-cultural, moral-ethical, economic, and ecological concepts. Among these, the Russian President’s addresses place the greatest emphasis on the representation of moral-ethical concepts, while the Chinese leader’s addresses provide a more detailed presentation of political concepts. It has been revealed that in the speeches of the Chinese political leader, the concept of GOVERNMENT is verbalized through references to the country’s political party and through the expression of personal sentiments using the first-person singular pronoun. The results of this study have identified both objective and subjective factors that determine the selection of value dominants reflected in the New Year addresses of the political leaders of Russia and China.

The Perceptions of Nuclear War: The Imbalanced Co-Orientation Between Russian and American Youth

On February 24, 2022, Russia attacked its neighboring country of Ukraine. From the early days of what Russian President Putin called a special military operation, fears mounted that the conflict may grow into World War III, effectively ending the world in nuclear Armageddon. This study compares the current views of American and Russian youths on the issues of global nuclear war and nuclear weapons, as well as explores their inclinations toward supporting a first nuclear strike, nuclear retaliation, and their willingness to make personal sacrifices in the event of a nuclear conflict. Drawing upon the theoretical framework of co-orientation theory, the study methodically assesses the levels of agreement, congruency, and accuracy for the populations of both countries on the issues related to the nuclear conflict. The results show that American and Russian youths are currently in a state of imbalanced co-orientation—a newly defined state in the co-orientation theory—when it comes to their opinions on nuclear war and nuclear weapons. In conclusion, the study underscores the urgent need to address this lack of alignment between the two countries, given the potentially catastrophic consequences of nuclear warfare. Therefore, the study draws upon the co-orientation theory’s insights and formulates strategic public diplomacy recommendations, designed to cultivate mutual understanding, and promote constructive dialogue between the people of the United States of America and the Russian Federation.

The forgotten NATO enlargement dove in the Kremlin

Has Vladimir Putin always stood against NATO’s eastward enlargement? Detractors claim that Moscow has invariably objected to the transatlantic organisation moving towards its borders. This article challenges the prevailing orthodoxy by demonstrating that at the turn of the century, the Russian head of state was quite comfortable with NATO ‘setting up shop’ in Eastern Europe. Drawing upon declassified US diplomatic cables and other historical sources, the presented material speaks to selective forgetfulness on the part of the Russian leadership. The first years of ‘Putinism’ were not marked by assertions that NATO’s eastward expansion complicated relations with the West. On the contrary, his public remarks suggested that Russia was not opposed to this process. Simply put, Putin’s own words at that time refute his present-day arguments and display of grievances.

Political Suitability in an Authoritarian Regime: A Comparison of the Personality Profiles of Vladimir Putin and Opposition Leader Alexei Navalny

Political Suitability in an Authoritarian Regime: A Comparison of the Personality Profiles of Vladimir Putin and Opposition Leader Alexei Navalny

Why will China and Russia not form an alliance? The balance of beliefs in peacetime

Abstract The ongoing war in Ukraine has thrust China–Russia relations into the global spotlight, with both nations asserting their stance against forming a military alliance. This article introduces a novel ‘balance-of-beliefs’ framework, positing that the foundation of peacetime alliances lies in leaders' shared beliefs. Using operational code analysis, this study quantifies the philosophical and instrumental beliefs of leaders from the United States (Barack Obama), Australia (Tony Abbott), China (Xi Jinping) and Russia (Vladimir Putin) between 2013 and 2015, and includes additional comparison between Putin and Xi between 2016 and 2022. This research examines the essential role of aligned world-views on ‘the nature of the political universe’ (which we label a P-1 belief) and ‘the strategic approach to achieving political objectives’ (an I-1 belief). The findings reveal that such congruence is crucial for fostering like-minded alliances in peacetime, as evidenced by the US–Australia alliance. In contrast, the divergent P-1 beliefs of Xi and Putin hinder a Sino-Russian military alliance; yet, their aligned I-1 beliefs facilitate pragmatic cooperation on specific issues. This analysis underscores the need for US and European policy-makers to devise nuanced strategies in response to the evolving dynamics of a rising China and a resurgent Russia.

Putin’s Ideological State

Russian President Vladimir Putin is often seen and characterised merely as a venal thug. To deal with him effectively, however, it is important to understand that he has a genuine, if misguided, ideology. The Kremlin has not merely composed, disseminated and imposed an official ideology on Russian society as a means of controlling the masses and concealing the Putin regime’s corruption. Ideology founded on grand ideas about Russia is central to Putin’s ruling philosophy. From the outset, his project was authoritarian with totalitarian intentions that have been realised through progressive political radicalisation. For Putin, Russia’s greatness is an end in itself and the highest attainment of the state and the Russian people. It is prudent to assume that Russia is preparing for major war with the West.

The Significance of the Prisoner Exchange with Russia

The 1 August 2024 prisoner exchange between Russia and the West shows that, for all his ruthlessness, Russian President Vladimir Putin can act rationally. The negative view is that Putin successfully held hostages for ransom, will have concluded that ‘prisoner diplomacy’ works and will simply instrumentalise it again. But the analogy with mere hostage-taking is flawed insofar as Russia got nothing immediately or directly useful out of the deal. For Putin, it turned on fulfilling what he considers a moral commitment to secure the return of Russian intelligence officers. He was willing to make concessions to achieve a goal that he valued highly. Conversely, through firmness, patience and unity, Western negotiators were able to induce Putin to compromise. An implicit lesson is that the West can support Ukraine more consistently, without undue fear of escalation, and take a firmer, more proactive approach to defining the terms of mutual restraint.

The New Satanic Panic

Abstract A moral panic animated by conspiracy theories alleging ritual sex abuse swept through the United States in the 1980s. During that “Satanic Panic,” as it came to be known, people expressed fears of social change regarding gender and sexuality. Beginning in 2022, conservative politicians, pundits, and pastors in the United States levied similar accusations of child grooming, sex trafficking, and satanic sex abuse at the LGBTQ + community, teachers, liberals, and entertainment companies; these accusations were accompanied by repressive legislation and violence. Despite their political salience, little is known about the people who believe these accusations. Using a 2022 U.S. national survey (N = 2,001), we find that up to one-third of Americans believe accusations of satanic cult abuse, government sex trafficking, and an “agenda” to “groom” children into gay or trans lifestyles. These beliefs are correlated with a range of political attitudes (e.g., positive views of Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin, and white nationalists) and policy preferences (e.g., overturning Roe v. Wade), as well as with normative (e.g., a desire to run for political office) and nonnormative (e.g., the acceptance of political violence) political intentions and behaviors. Regression analysis further reveals that these conspiracy theory beliefs are positively associated with dark psychological traits, antiestablishment orientations, and repressive views toward sex and gender. Our findings suggest that these accusations can spark dehumanization and deadly violence by mobilizing into politics people who possess strong feelings of political efficacy, but also antisocial traits, nonnormative tendencies, and a desire to undermine established political institutions.

PUTIN AND BIDEN’S SPEECHES ON THE RUSSIAN INVOLVEMENT IN UKRAINE: DIALOGUE AND POLEMICS

Throughout the world’s long tradition with war, it has often been raised as a question whether any war was worth waging, and if so, when and how? The reply to this philosophical maze of extreme convictions differs depending on whom you ask. In this present article, we tackled the ideological differences that lead to the discrepancies between answers given by Russia and the United States of America. For this, we took as primary sources the speeches of 24 February 2022 that Vladimir Putin and Joe Biden made on Russia’s immediate involvement in Ukraine. We tried to look for dialogic clash over the choice of diction as a major ideological stance, relying on Michael Bakhtin’s theory of dialogism and his notions of hidden polemics and parody to illustrate the condemnation of the war on one end and its justification on the other. The aim was to extrapolate the themes tackled and their sequence by referring to the just war theory in its three divisions jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum which together structure the ancient practice of the art of war in its distinct phases. Biden and Putin heavily bid on these notions to give their viewpoints legal and ethical legitimacy and convince the international community of their just causes. Through this study, we found that the presidents stylized their speeches to follow each other’s, giving responses in an implicit and tacit manner, which we uncovered as hidden polemics in their styles of diction. We have also discovered that both presidents evoked their nemesis’ violation of the just war theory and defended their own just cause and respect for international regulation. This study falls within the field of discourse analysis that is a key element in understanding politics on the levels of presidential speeches.

Новые правовые меры в интересах ограничения рисков для заемщиков

n June 2024, President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin signed Federal Law No. 151-FZ «On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation», which provides for a significant limitation of risks for borrowers — individuals and borrowers — small and medium-sized businesses with a possible increase in interest rates.

To Whom Much is Given: The Russian Orthodox Church’s Role in the Russo-Ukrainian War

Abstract The essence of a war is in its justification. In Vladimir Putin’s Russia, the state has turned to Patriarch Kirill and the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) to assemble a tranche of religio-legal justifications for the war in Ukraine. Russia’s full-scale invasion of its neighbor was instantaneously colored by theological proclamations from the Kremlin and the Patriarchate. While powerful as mere propaganda, much more is at stake. In March 2024, the ROC officially declared Russia’s “special military operation” to be a “holy war,” the first time the ROC has made such a statement since the Russo-Japanese War under Tsar Nicholas II. This article argues that the decree is the logical reverberation of a broader urge to revivify Russian imperial mores, particularly in the legitimation of warfare against Ukraine. Vladimir Putin and Patriarch Kirill have instrumentalized one another. Patriarch Kirill gives religious substance to the Russian president’s claims of geopolitical slight, while the latter buttresses the ROC’s relevance amidst modernization. It is a partnership as nostalgic as it is pragmatic, rooted in the symphonic heyday of tsars and primates. An examination of the historical relationship between the Russian state and its church (as the ROC has come to be known) offers a multitude of lessons in the maintenance of the Kremlin’s power, the stateward trend of ROC theology, and the lengths to which states go to legitimate revanchist acts.

Vladimir Putin on Channel One, 2000–2022

ABSTRACT Drawing on transcripts from the television network Channel One, a popular news source in Russia, this article addresses the question: “How was Vladimir Putin covered by state-controlled media while the regime became increasingly centralized?” The literature on the subject is scarce and inconclusive. Dictators create different images of themselves, and the portrayals of present-day spin dictators — those who primarily rely on the power of propaganda to persuade rather than dominate — are understudied. While some analysts point to Putin’s omnipresence in mass media, others uncover the lack of media personalization and relatively neutral coverage. Using 385,981 news transcripts from 2000–2022 and relying on techniques from natural language processing, I examine how a present-day autocrat attempts to optimize the intensity of state-controlled propaganda. I uncover three main tendencies. First, during all the years in power, the ruler has been more frequently referred to through positive stories. Second, there is only partial evidence that the relative references to Putin on Channel One have significantly increased over time. Third, during all his years in power, Putin has been more frequently mentioned in domestic news rather than in stories about foreign affairs. However, I also demonstrate that the share of news about foreign affairs and events abroad that mentions the ruler has been increasing every year since 2013. By focusing on the supply side of propaganda, this article contributes to the literature on autocratic resilience and spin dictators.

Value-based Russian language teaching as a priority of the modern era (to mark the anniversary of the <i>Axiological linguistic methodology</i> school of thought)

The article aims to comprehend the fundamental role of value-based Russian language teaching in modern education. The key points of the speeches delivered by Russian President Vladimir Putin, His Holiness Patriarch Kirill, and Minister of Education of the Russian Federation S. S. Kravtsov are related to the preservation and strengthening of traditional spiritual and moral values. Therefore, the thirty-year activity of the scientific school Axiological linguistic methodology: the worldview and value aspects in school and university teaching of the Russian language, the leader of which is Doctor of Pedagogical Sciences, Professor of the Department of Methods of Teaching the Russian Language at the Institute of Philology of MPSU, is A. D. Deikina, winner of the Russian state award - the A. S. Pushkin medal, the K. D. Ushinsky medal, is becoming more relevant than ever. We used analysis of scientific research in the field of axiological linguistic methodology and scientific generalisation to characterise the activities of the scientific school whose origins relate to M. T. Baranov’s concept of schoolchildren’s linguistic worldview formation. Moreover, we outlined the key positions of axiological linguistic methodology substantiated in the concept of A. D. Deikina and thirteen postdoctoral studies of her students as scientific areas developing the idea of value-based Russian language teaching at school and university. The postdoctoral research conducted within the framework of the scientific school of axiological linguistic methodology with A. D. Deikina as the scientific advisor developed the leading linguistic methodological approaches to Russian language teaching. Drawing on the Russian canonical methodologists’ ideas, the members of the Moscow Methodological Scientific School create and predict promising ways of developing higher and school education in the Russian Federation, expand the research space in different regions of this country, increase the scientific status of methodological science, and contribute to the success of interpersonal and intercultural communication in Russian. The works of those who represent the axiological linguistic methodological scientific school, as well as other like-minded researchers have a beneficial effect on the creation of a holistic value picture of the world using the Russian language in modern education.

Do Autocrats Need a Foreign Enemy? Evidence from Fortress Russia

Abstract Conventional thinking suggests that autocrats need enemies and thus have incentives to create them. Russia's Vladimir Putin is often thought to reap domestic legitimacy from belligerence. We examine multiple public opinion datasets collected in Russia that span Putin's presidency to confirm that he gains popularity from a sense of Western threat. But findings indicate that until 2021, these gains came primarily from a carefully cultivated domestic reputation for responding to threats with moderation instead of bellicosity. Our survey experiment further suggests that Putin wins as much support when he is prudent and cooperative as when he is hostile and aggressive. These findings add to evidence that Russia's full-scale 2022 invasion of Ukraine was not a war of domestic political necessity. They also help explain why Putin felt that he had to promote the invasion at home as a careful, limited, defensive act rather than something glorious for which the Russian population should fully mobilize. Even the most aggressive autocrats may still cater to public preferences for moderate foreign policy.

Counterfactual coercion: Could harsher sanctions against Russia have prevented the worst?

Numerous studies show that properly designed economic sanctions can force the target to refrain from violating international norms. However, policymakers cannot integrate this finding into their ex ante assessments of whether more forceful coercive measures could prevent military coups, human rights violations, or a war of aggression such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In this article, we address this shortcoming and introduce counterfactual predictions to answer the what-if question of whether adequate sanctions by the European Union and the United States could have provoked targets to abandon severe norm violations. To this end, a training data set from 1989 to 2008 is used to predict the success of sanctions from 2009 to 2015. Our policy counterfactuals for key sanction cases suggest that stricter EU coercion against Russia after the annexation of Crimea could have triggered policy concessions from the regime of President Putin.