Mobutu Research Articles

Rwanda Revisited

Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, UN document S/1999/1257, 16 December 1999, 82pp. Online at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/letters/1999/1257.The flood of books, commentaries, TV documentaries, theses, and commission reports on the Rwanda genocide seems to know no end. Some early superficial or partisan accounts have given way to better informed, if no less tragic, recitals of those terrible events. Nevertheless, such is the controversy and confusion generated by the genocide that blighted Rwanda and shamed the world that great expectations awaited the two 'official' reports under review, anticipating that they would clarify the outstanding issues. The secretary-general of the United Nations, Kofi Annan - a central figure in the drama - commissioned the first and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) initiated the second.(f.1) Neither disappoints. While not free of controversy or in total agreement on every point, the two assessments taken together are about as definitive as one can expect at this stage. Their judgments are bound to carry great weight. No one with an interest in the causes, course, complexities, and consequences of the genocide can afford to ignore them. Both reports were partly funded by Canada.The authors of the reports share two distinctions. First, they alone were 'accorded the opportunity to research the confidential records of the UN' (OAU 132; UN 4) and were able to interview a wide range of (largely the same) individuals who were actively involved. Secondly, they were given a genuinely free hand in reaching their own conclusions, and they took full advantage of that independence to write frankly, even brutally.The UN Inquiry comprised a three-man team: a former Swedish prime minister as chair, a former Korean foreign minister with experience as United Nations special representative in Cyprus, and a Nigerian general who had served as field commander of ECOMOG, the West African peacekeeping force, in Liberia and as head of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Jerusalem. The OAU panel consisted of seven 'Eminent Personalities,' two of whom were former heads of state (of Botswana and Mali) and two were illustrious women, one Liberian and the other Swedish. The remaining three were an Algerian ambassador, a retired Indian chief justice, and Stephen Lewis, UNICEF deputy executive secretary and, earlier, one of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's inspired appointments as Canadian ambassador to the United Nations. The senior writer on the project was another Canadian, the indomitable Gerry Caplan.(f.2)The mandates of the two bodies differed in significant respects. The Inquiry was enjoined to establish the facts related to the United Nations role and response in Rwanda and to 'draw relevant conclusions and identify the lessons to be learnt.' The actions of African organizations and governments, as well as outside powers, are, in the main, left to the OAU panel and others to explore (UN 1, 4). Moreover, the period under review covers only nine months - from the launching of UNAMIR, the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda, in October 1993 to the winding down of organized killing following the military conquest of the country by the (Tutsi) Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) in July 1994.The OAU report is considerably more comprehensive in terms of time frame, territorial scope, and range of actors. Its investigations extended to regional as well as Rwandan developments 'surrounding' the genocide over nearly four years, from the Arusha Peace Accords in August 1993 to the overthrow of the Mobutu Sese Seko regime in neighbouring Zaire in May 1997 (p 288). Five introductory chapters set the conflict in context by tracing the roots and evolution of the crisis from colonial times to Arusha, and seven concluding chapters carry the post-genocide story to the end of the decade.The OAU eminences, unlike their UN counterparts, were explicitly enjoined to examine the roles played by the OAU, internal and external forces, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as well as the UN, 'before, during and after the genocide. …

Anger and the Alchemy of Literary Method in V. S. Naipaul’s Political Fiction: The Case of The Mimic Men

. S. Naipaul's fiction and nonfiction since the 1960s have reflected an unenthusiastic view of postcolonial nationalism and nation building. He has had difficulty believing in the ability of new nations in Africa and the Caribbean to raise themselves to a condition of economic autonomy and cultural authenticity. He has also been against a political rhetoric and agenda that calls for breaking cultural ties with European nations.1 Instead, political skepticism, Western cultural conservatism, and realist and modernist aesthetics have determined the selection and treatment of subjects in Naipaul's writing. These approaches have caused postcolonial intellectuals to complain about his lack of interest in local culture2 and to grumble about his choice of material-such as Mobutu Sese Seko's reign in the Congo and the Michael de Freitas trial in Trinidad-that reflects pessimistically on politics, revolution, and the prospects of national renewal. Naipaul, however, is probably the most honored living author in the British literary world. Even those postcolonial intellectuals averse to his poli

Rumba on the River: A History of the Popular Music of the Two Congos

There was always music along the banks of the Congo River-lutes and drums, the myriad instruments handed down from ancestors. But when Joseph Kabsele and his African Jazz went chop for chop with O.K. Jazz and Bantous de la Capitale, music in Africa would never be the same. A sultry rumba washed in relentless waves across new nations springing up below the Sahara. The Western press would dub the sound Soukous or rumba rock; most of Africa called it Congo music. Born in Kinshasa and Brazzaville at the end of World War II, Congo music matured as Africans fought to consolidate their hard-won independence. In addition to great musicians - Franco, Essous, Abeti, Tabu Ley, and youth bands like Zaiko Langa Langa - the cast of characters includes the conniving King Leopold, the martyred Partrice Lumumba, corrupt dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, military strongman Denis Sassou Nguesso, heavyweight boxing champs George Foreman and Muhammad Ali, along with a Belgian baron and a clutch of enterprising Greek expatriates who pioneered the Congolese recording industry. Rumba on the River portrays an era when the currents of tradition and modernization collided along the banks of the Congo Rivers. It is the story of twin capitals engulfed in political struggle and the vibrant new music that flowered amidst the ferment.

Explaining the Rise and Fall of Military Regimes: Civil-Military Relations in the Congo

The primary argument of this article is that the disintegration of the military is a function of circumstances generated within civil-military relations. This argument seems to undermine Samuel Huntington's military subordination through either subjective or objective controls. In looking at the Congolese situation, this analysis relies on Morris Janowitz's idea of a politicized military corps to understand the rise and fall of General Mobutu Sese Seko. Janowitz's suggestion that the military is becoming more politicized, regardless of its level of professionalism, properly represents events in the Congo under General Mobutu. In fact, it was this high level of politicization that over time led to Mobutu's downfall. Using Janowitz's typology of the military in developing countries, this article focuses on several factors that explain why the military might fail to perform effectively in its mission of defending the state. Among these conditions are colonial legacy, economic survival, frequent military purges and reshuffling of top officers, regimental segmentation, poor recruiting and training programs, promotion of officers on the basis of subnational loyalty rather than combat experience, and the withdrawal of support from powerful patron states.

President Mobutu and the Prime Minister under the Transitional Constitutional Act: Duel or duo?

Since the beginning of the democratic process in Mobutu's Zaire, in April 1990, a judicial and political debate has continued to divide the opinion on the power sharing within the executive. The Transitional Constitutional Act, a result of the political negotiations of the Palais du Peuple, was aimed at resolving the competence conflicts between the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister. This constitutional framework, however, was unable to avoid neither the possibility of a "duel" nor the avatars of an alleged "duo" between the two main representatives of the executive function.In the meantime, the frequent violations of the constitution by the head of state have shown that power sharing within a parliamentary system could not come to a compromise with the power practice under Mobutu. KEY WORDS: President, politics, Prime Minister, constitution, Zaire

Good government, democratisation and traditional African political philosophy: the example of the Kanyok of the Congo

Over the last several decades, officials in both the public and private sectors have applied economic, military, cultural, academic and diplomatic tools to promote the spread of democratic pluralism in African and elsewhere. With the fall of Africa's most resilient tyrant, Mobutu Sese Seko, there is hope that even one of Africa's most troubled systems may be transformed into a state that reflects the will of the people and promotes the common good. Sober observers, however, remain pessimistic. Laurent Kabila's spotted record on human rights, his stubborn intolerance of political opposition, the challenging global economic and political environments, and the long history of bad government in Mobutu's Zaïre are obvious reasons for concern. Furthermore, the example of most other African states is not encouraging. With the exception of countries such as South Africa and Botswana, even the most tenuous democratic progress in Africa is often slowed, blocked or reversed.Generally, blame for this state of affairs has been levelled against the African political elite, the burden of colonialism, or international political and economic pressures. Specifically, for the Congo, Mobutu's kleptocracy, Belgium's paternalism, America's backing of a friendly dictator and the World Bank's support for ill-advised ‘development’ schemes all have been criticised. While such reproaches may be well deserved, this article argues that it is important to ask if the persistent failure of democracy in the Congo as well as in other African states is also related to African political culture.

Renewed danger in the Congo

Fourteen months after his forces deposed Zairean dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, Laurent Kabila's government in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DROC) is internationally isolated and facing formidable internal problems. Kabila has alienated the West with his 'anti-imperialist' rhetoric and his refusal to allow serious investigation of the massacres of Hutu refugees by his Tutsi supporters that took place during the struggle to overthrow Mobutu. Relations between the Tutsi and other ethnic groups in the DROC are, however, already tense, and Kabila is not in a position further to alienate Tutsi leaders by allowing them to be named as responsible for atrocities.

Private security forces and African stability: the case of Executive Outcomes

The end of the Cold War has had contradictory effects on African security. Southern Africa and Ethiopia clearly benefitted from the end of superpower rivalry, whereas central and western Africa have seen an upswing of violence during the 1990s. The withdrawal of foreign patronage, the post-Somalia reluctance of the West and the UN to intervene militarily, heightened external demands for economic and political reform, and the changing nature of African insurgencies, have placed additional pressure on already weak governments. Many African states have only weak militaries to defend their security, the collapse of Mobutu Sese Seko's Armed Forces of Zaïre providing the most recent example.As recently as 1990, the idea of African states relying upon mercenaries from the former South African Defence Force (SADF) would have seemed both preposterous and insulting. Yet since 1993, Executive Outcomes (EO), the world's largest and best known ‘mercenary’ group, has marketed itself as a defender of African state security in this post-Cold War era. A private army with access to some 2,000 ex-South African Defence Force (SADF) combat veterans, EO has helped to defeat discredited insurgencies in Angola and Sierra Leone. Large sections of Africa need effective militaries and EO, which claims to fight only for sovereign governments, presents itself as a stabilising force for African development. To some observers, EO is ‘with the possible exception of the South African army, the most deadly and efficient army operating in sub-Saharan Africa today’.This article examines the controversial Executive Outcomes military as a security option for African governments. It sketches EO's history, its military effectiveness, and its political loyalty, to assess whether EO threatens or assists African state stability. The article concludes by looking at EO's possible future, and the lessons which it offers about African security.

Congo's Odious Debt: External Borrowing and Capital Flight in Zaire

During the dictatorship of Mobutu Sese Seko, Congo (or Zaire, as Mobutu renamed the country) accumulated a public external debt of roughly $14 billion. At the same time, Mobutu and his associates extracted wealth from the country. By 1990, real capital flight from Zaire amounted to $12 billion. With imputed interest earnings, the accumulated stock of Zairian flight capital was nearly $18 billion. Congo's successor governments may be able to repudiate liability for the Mobutu regime's debts on the basis of the doctrine of odious debt. Creditors could then seek to recover their losses by identifying and impounding flight capital which was extracted from the country.

Le President Mobutu et le Premier Ministre Sous L’acte Constitutionnel de la Transition: Duel ou Duo?

President Mobutu and the Prime Minister Under the Transitional Constitutional Act: Duel or Duo? Since the beginning of the democratic process in Mobutu’s Zaire, in April 1990, a judicial and political debate has continued to divide the opinion on the power sharing within the executive. The Transitional Constitutional Act, a result of the political negotiations of the Palais du Peuple, was aimed at resolving the competence conflicts between the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister. This constitutional framework, however, was unable to avoid neither the possibility of a “duel” nor the avatars of an alleged “duo” between the two main representatives of the executive function. In the meantime, the frequent violations of the constitution by the head of state have shown that power sharing within a parliamentary system could not come to a compromise with the power practice under Mobutu.

Mines, Money, and the Problem of State-Building in Congo

“They call it a country. In fact it is just a Zaire-shaped hole in the middle of Africa,” wrote The Economist in 1995. Well before then, Erwin Blumenthal, who visited Zaire on behalf of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to assess prospects for reform, warned that, despite promises from President Mobutu (1965-97) that loans would be repaid, “there is no—I repeat no—chance on the horizon that Zaire’s many creditors will recover their money.’ Meanwhile, Mobutu did not use loans to build state bureaucracies or provide services; he actively discouraged them. Even by official accounts, the modest spending of 10 percent of Zaire’s budget on education and health services in 1982 fell to zero a decade later.

Africa's New Bloc

Sub-Saharan Africa is undergoing its most profound changes since the early years of independence. Forces that have long held sway over the region are now either waning or gone. For decades the United States, the Soviet Union, and France propped up dictators who served their interests?men like Ethiopia's Mengistu Haile Mariam, Somalia's Mohamed Siad Barre, Rwanda's Juvenal Habyarimana, and the former Zaire's Mobutu Sese Seko. The scaled-down presence of foreign powers has helped topple the regimes these men built. Other despots like Kenya's Daniel arap Moi and Cameroon's Paul Biya are also feeling unprecedented pressure for democratic change. Many were military officers who took advantage of the general disorder left by departing colonial forces to seize power. Once entrenched, each preached some form of nationalism, only to evolve cynical regimes which, in addition to being brutal, did little for their own people while shamelessly enrich ing their leaders' inner circles. Now, with the clear exception of Nigeria, Africa's postcolonial despotic order is finally breaking down. But several new trends are evident. Since the departure of foreign powers, precolonial ethnic conflicts?exploited by local political forces? have reemerged with a vengeance. Although the divide between the Hutus and Tutsis dates back to at least the sixteenth century, Rwanda's 1994 genocide, in which up to 800,000 people were slaughtered, was unprecedented. Ethnic and clan-based political identities are resurfacing

Mines, Money, and the Problem of State-Building in Congo

“They call it a country. In fact it is just a Zaire-shaped hole in the middle of Africa,” wroteThe Economistin 1995. Well before then, Erwin Blumenthal, who visited Zaire on behalf of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to assess prospects for reform, warned that, despite promises from President Mobutu (1965-97) that loans would be repaid, “there is no—I repeat no—chance on the horizon that Zaire’s many creditors will recover their money.’ Meanwhile, Mobutu did not use loans to build state bureaucracies or provide services; he actively discouraged them. Even by official accounts, the modest spending of 10 percent of Zaire’s budget on education and health services in 1982 fell to zero a decade later.

Mines, Money, and the Problem of State-Building in Congo

“They call it a country. In fact it is just a Zaire-shaped hole in the middle of Africa,” wrote The Economist in 1995. Well before then, Erwin Blumenthal, who visited Zaire on behalf of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to assess prospects for reform, warned that, despite promises from President Mobutu (1965-97) that loans would be repaid, “there is no—I repeat no—chance on the horizon that Zaire’s many creditors will recover their money.’ Meanwhile, Mobutu did not use loans to build state bureaucracies or provide services; he actively discouraged them. Even by official accounts, the modest spending of 10 percent of Zaire’s budget on education and health services in 1982 fell to zero a decade later.

'Is It Witchcraft? Is It Satan? It Is a Miracle.' Mai-Mai Soldiers and Christian Concepts of Evil in North-East Congo

'Bang-Bang' shout a group of small children brandishing make-believe guns. Their playmates, semi-naked, with leaves protruding from behind their ears, refuse to play dead. Instead they shout 'mai' and advance on their make-believe enemies, fearlessly wresting their 'guns' from them and 'shooting' them down. These children are re-enacting the defeat of the Zairean' government forces in north-east Zaire from November 1996 to January 1997 by a faction of Laurent Kabila's Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation (AFDL),2 the Mai-Mai. While the children play, their parents regale one another with stories of the invincible soldiers, who rely on traditional belief and magic potions rather than conventional warfare to defeat the demoralized forces of Mobutu. The triumph of the Mai-Mai gripped the imagination of those who had observed their victory. They were willing to pay tribute to the conventional soldiers whose skill and discipline had helped to rout the Zairean forces, but they were convinced that their success could not have been so swift and definitive had the Mai-Mai not used their supernatural powers. The population of north-east Congo attribute their liberation from the oppressive regime of Mobutu Sese Seko in large part to the Mai-Mai. This article is a snap-shot of oral theology in north-east Congo which displays the vivacity of local Christianity as it responds to contemporary circumstances. It aims to study the response of the Christian community to the actions of Mai-Mai during the war. This response provides a window onto a host of conceptions surrounding the nature of evil as

Neither peace nor war in Angola

Angola appears to be once again on the brink of renewed conflict. The hand of President José Eduardo dos Santos’ ruling Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) party has recently been powerfully strengthened by a number of factors. These include: the imposition of UN sanctions against Jonas Savimbi’s National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) – due to come into effect on 30 October 1997; stronger political and military support from the US; and the ousting in May 1997 of UNITA’s main regional backer, former Zairean President Mobutu Sese Seko. With the implementation of the November 1994 Lusaka Peace Accords at a standstill, some members of the Angolan government may see a military offensive as an increasingly attractive option.

“THE DAY WHEN HE WAS TAKEN UP…”—A MEDITATION FROM ACTS 2:1–9

ASCENSION DAY 1997, MORGES, SWITZERLAND The Day The on which Jesus ascended is a tucked neatly in between commissioning Jesus presented his disciples and baptizing with Holy Spirit's power that he promised would accompany them on way. In details of Luke's account, it is carefully marked as a that came giving instructions through Holy Spirit to apostles whom he had chosen. It followed days when he had been appearing to speaking to them, staying with them. On other side of this there would be waiting. What is promised is not yet here. A strict order compels them not to leave Jerusalem. At Holy Spirit's fiery coming, he told them, you will be baptized, you will receive power, you will be my witnesses. In traditions of church's worshipping life, resurrection and Pentecost have played large. The relation of both to mission of God into which church is implicated has been crucial for church's self-understanding. But this day in between, of ascension, has been treated more as a passing comment, an almost irrelevant footnote. Perhaps it is now, in light of swirling dynamics in our contemporary world of globalization and fragmentation, dominance and liberation, healing and violence, that we can see in Ascension Day a paradigm for church's presence and missional identity. Perhaps we can recognize in the when Jesus was taken up (as also ten days following) a liminal moment very much like our own, and one which therefore orients us to our vocation. Luke makes it apparent that of ascension was poised - suspended, as it were - between heaven and earth, between beginning and end. This was not culmination - too much was yet awaiting fulfillment of God's intentions. Nor was it beginning - so thoroughly had Jesus' incarnation and suffering and death and resurrection begun triumph of God's reign. Ascension Day stood wonderfully between, as we ourselves stand continuously between beginnings and endings of God's designs. We stand after garden of Genesis where something went dreadfully wrong. We stand after flowering of nations and diversity of peoples (Gen. 10) and powerful human instinct to construct a resolution, to fix earth and achieve by effort knowledge and grandeur of God (Gen. 11). We stand after modern project of mastery by autonomous rationality and rational choice market forces in a technologized world. We inherit it all. We stand also before coming world of God's reign, captured so vividly by vision in revelation to John of a sparkling city, with a garden in midst of it and tree of life rooted on banks of river that runs through it. We live with memories of dreams Jesus painted in those forty days before he was taken up, dreams that echoed visions of prophets, fueling a hope grounded in reality of Jesus' resurrection. And ten more days of waiting were like our own, imagining what yet comes in fulfillment of words of Amos and Isaiah: Let justice roll down like waters, and righteousness like an everflowing stream (5:24). They will not hurt or destroy on all my holy mountain, for earth will be full of knowledge of Lord as waters cover sea (11:9). We know ourselves to be implicated in liminality of of ascension, even now in our own time. We can feel it in this world of globalization and fragmentation. The big news of this week has been falling from power of President Mobutu of Zaire. But many more clues spill from pages of this week's newspapers and magazines. Nike is in pursuit of dominance in world's sportswear market. Swissair defends (in its own in-flight magazine) why they hired non-Swiss to be top executives charged with success of company, and why they declared some flights non-smoking - in answer to challenge by one reader who said smoking infringed on personal freedoms and rights. …

Contemporary Warfare in Africa:Changing Context, Changing Strategies

Summaries This article attempts to synthesize a coherent analysis of the ways in which warfare in Africa has changed since the end of the Cold War. Strategies used by governments to combat insurgencies and counter the threat of military coups d'etat are assessed, contrasting the centralized military machine of the former Ethiopian government with the policy of fragmenting military authority pursued by President Mobutu of Zaire. The economic decline of African governments and the decline of external patronage of both governments and rebel movements has led to important structural changes that compel military structures to seek to extract resources from local populations, humanitarian aid programmes, and control of commerce. This leads to much more decentralized, locally‐specific forms of military organization. The article finally deals with innovations in military doctrine in Africa, specifically the way in which counter‐insurgency and destabilization strategies have been adapted and developed, and the use of children as combat troops.

Truth or Credibility: Castro, Carter, and the Invasions of Shaba

an attempt to oust President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, one of the West's principal allies in Africa, in 1977 and 1978, guerrillas based in Angola invaded the Zairean province of Shaba. In so doing, they exposed Mobutu's weakness, triggered the intervention of foreign troops to bolster up his regime, and showed the limits of the US president, Jimmy Carter's, human-rights policy in Africa. What added spice to the story was the claim that Cuba had helped them.1 In December 1993, the former Cuban ambassador to Zaire, Lazaro Mora, assured me that there was no truth to the claim.2 1 was sceptical and remained so when he was echoed a few weeks later by Jorge Risquet, a senior member of the Cuban Communist Party's central committee who had been the head of the Cuban mission in Angola between December 1975 and May 1979. After Risquet took me to the archives, however, and read to me the contents of an entire folder of documents about the

Contemporary African politics and development: a comprehensive bibliography, 1981-1990

This research tool is based on a systematic, comprehensive analysis of books, monographs, journals and edited volumes dealing with African political affairs and socioeconomic development. The bibliography contains more than 16,000 citations (both English and French sources are included) covering material published from 1981 through 1990. Chapters in edited volumes are treated as individual citations. In addition to the standard bibliographic data, each citation is annotated with the relevant subject terms and keywords; and all citations for 1986 through 1990 also include an abstract summarising the material's theoretical and substantive focus. A distinctive feature of the bibliography, the extensive indexes assure easy access to the entries. These include a country/region index, an index of general subjects (agricultural technology, women's economic role, structural adjustment, ethnic politics) and a keyword index (OAU, Mobutu, Sese Seko, Addis Ababa, Lagos Plan of Action, Fulani people). The entries themselves are arranged alphabetically by author. This work was compiled by Vijitha Mahadevan working with the staff of UCLA's African Bibliography Project.