Presence Of Market Power Research Articles

The role of demand response in mitigating market power: a quantitative analysis using a stochastic market equilibrium model

Market power is a dominant feature of many modern electricity markets with an oligopolistic structure, resulting in increased consumer cost. This work investigates how consumers, through demand response (DR), can mitigate against market power. Within DR, our analysis particularly focusses on the impacts of load shifting and self-generation. A stochastic mixed complementarity problem is presented to model an electricity market characterised by an oligopoly with a competitive fringe. It incorporates both energy and capacity markets, multiple generating firms and different consumer types. The model is applied to a case study based on data for the Irish power system. The results demonstrate how DR can help consumers mitigate against the negative effects of market power and that load shifting and self-generation are competing technologies, whose effectiveness against market power is similar for most consumers. We also find that DR does not necessarily reduce emissions in the presence of market power.

Taxation and market power in the legal marijuana industry

AbstractWe study tax and regulatory policy in the legal marijuana market using unique administrative data from Washington state. Washington's retail entry restrictions have resulted in firms with substantial market power who behave like local monopolists. We show how the presence of market power causes tax and regulatory policy recommendations to differ from standard models that assume perfect competition. Combining structural demand models with measured pass‐through, we show that marijuana is not overtaxed at 37% but is still on the upward sloping region of the Laffer curve and that these taxes have high social costs and are mainly borne by consumers.

Market Power, Intertemporal Permits Trading, and Economic Efficiency

The banking and borrowing (BB) system has been developed gradually in the tradable permits market to perform a role as an environmental management tool. One question naturally arises as to how it will impact the behaviors of firms and the efficiency in presence of market power in the permits market. This paper considers market power in two cases: with and without the BB system. The equilibrium behaviors of the firms are identified in two cases. The findings show that the producing and discharging behaviors of firms depend on the permits price elasticity of output price without BB system, while they only depend on the growth rate of the output price in the BB system. Although both cases fail to obtain efficient solutions, the market with a BB system is capable of alleviating the inefficiency arising from market power compared with that without a BB system. The path of permits price satisfies the Hotelling rule in the case of the BB system, while it is closely related to the path of output price and output price elasticity of permits price in the case without the BB system.

Deregulation, Market Power, and Prices: Evidence from the Electricity Sector

When deciding whether to introduce market competition into a regulated industry, a regulator faces an important tradeoff. Market-based prices can provide incentives to allocate resources more efficiently and reduce costs, but the presence of market power may lead to increased markups. We use a detailed dataset on electricity transactions to investigate the impact of market-based deregulation in the context of the U.S. electricity sector. We find that the increase in markups dominates despite modest efficiency gains, leading to higher consumer prices. Deregulation does not necessarily reduce prices and improve consumer welfare. Thus, regulated prices may be preferred to market-based prices when firms are capable of exerting market power.

Deficiencies in the Disclosures of Privacy Policies

Development of a comprehensive legal privacy framework in the United States should be based on identification of the common deficiencies of privacy policies. We attempt to delineate deficiencies by critically analyzing the privacy policies of mobile apps, application suites, social networks, Internet Service Providers, and Internet-of-Things devices. Whereas many studies have examined readability of privacy policies, few have specifically identified the information that should be provided in privacy policies but is not. Privacy legislation invariably starts a definition of personally identifiable information. We find that privacy policies’ definitions of personally identifiable information are far too restrictive, excluding information that does not itself identify a person but which can be used to reasonably identify a person, and excluding information paired with a device identifier which can be reasonably linked to a person. Legislation should define personally identifiable information to include such information, and should differentiate between information paired with a name versus information paired with a device identifier. Privacy legislation often excludes anonymous and de-identified information from notice and choice requirements. We find that privacy policies’ descriptions of anonymous and de-identified information are far too broad, including information paired with advertising identifiers. Computer science has repeatedly demonstrated that such information is reasonably linkable. Legislation should define these categories of information to align with technological abilities. Legislation should also not exempt de-identified information from notice requirements, to increase transparency. Privacy legislation relies heavily on notice requirements. We find that, because privacy policies’ disclosures of the uses of personal information are disconnected from their disclosures about the types of personal information collected, we are often unable to determine which types of information are used for which purposes. Often, we cannot determine whether location or web browsing history is used solely for functional purposes or also for advertising. Legislation should require the disclosure of the purposes for each type of personal information collected. We also find that, because privacy policies disclosures of sharing of personal information are disconnected from their disclosures about the types of personal information collected, we are often unable to determine which types of information are shared. Legislation should require the disclosure of the types of personal information shared. Finally, privacy legislation relies heavily on user choice. We find that free services often require the collection and sharing of personal information. As a result, users often have no choices. We find that whereas some paid services afford users a wide variety of choices, paid services in less competitive sectors often afford users few choices over use and sharing of personal information for purposes unrelated to the service. As a result, users are often unable to dictate which types of information they wish to allow to be shared, and which types they wish to allow to be used for advertising. Legislation should differentiate between take-it-or-leave it, opt-out, and opt-in approaches based on the type of use and on whether the information is shared. Congress should consider whether user choices should be affected by the presence of market power.

Impact of Permit Allocation on Cap-and-trade System Performance under Market Power

The presence of market power usually has negative impacts on the cost-effectiveness of the carbon market. As market power-induced efficiency loss depends on permit allocation, the choice of permit allocation methods is likely to affect the cost-effectiveness of the carbon market. This paper examines theoretically how the choice of emission permit allocation method affects the cost-effectiveness of an emissions trading system when market power exists. We find that, under grandfathering and benchmarking, the carbon market would be more efficient if the permits initially allocated to the dominant firm were closer to its CO2 emissions. Under auctioning, the dominant firm tends to lower the CO2 price, which may result in efficiency loss. By combining the modelling results of efficiency loss due to market power and the fairness in terms of CO2 cost pass-through, we finally provide some policy recommendations on how to choose a CO2 emission permit allocation method for different industries.

Market Power in Output and Emissions Trading

This article focuses on the strategic behavior of firms in the output and the emissions markets in the presence of market power. We consider the existence of a dominant firm in the permit market and different structures in the output market, including Cournot and two versions of the Stackelberg model, depending on whether the permit dominant firm is a leader or a follower in the output market. In all three models, the firm that dominates the permit market is more sensitive to its initial allocation than its competitor in terms of abatement and less sensitive in terms of output. In all three models, output is decreasing and the permit price is increasing in the permit dominant firm’s initial allocation. In the Cournot model, permit dominance is fruitless in terms of output and profit if the initial allocation is symmetric. Output leadership is more relevant than permit dominance since an output leader always tends to, ceteris paribus, produce more and make more profit whether it also dominates the permit market or not. This leadership can only be overcompensated for by distributing a larger share of permits to the output follower, and only if the total number of permits is large enough. In terms of welfare, Stackelberg is always superior to Cournot. If the initial permit allocation is symmetric, welfare is higher when the same firm dominates the output and the permit market at the same time.

Is there a market power in the Philippine Rice Industry?

Rice, as a staple food for the Filipinos, is widely studied from production to consumption. However, observations of the National Food Authority domestic procurement and price stabilization policy, as well as results of the marketing and market-related studies, still reveal some gaps which call forth for an in-depth investigation and analysis. One ofthese is the possible presence ofmarket power, a market inefficiency in rice. Hence, this study aimed to ascertain the presence of market power in the Philippine rice industry. Secondary data published by the Philippine Statistics Authority from 1990 to 2015 were utilized. A structural econometric model using a time series approach was used in estimating the presence of market power. Results revealed the presence of market power in non-major rice-producing regions for well-milled and regular-milled rice in major rice-producing areas. The more the demand curve becomes inelastic the more the market power becomes apparent. The price elasticity of demand in the non-major rice-producing regions is -0.63 for both well-milled and regular-milled rice and -0.83 and -0.59, respectively, in the major rice producing areas. To minimize, if not solve market power, a substitute staple for rice may be introduced, programs/policies that will encourage more palay traders may be implemented, and farmers may be trained to operate like industry clusters.

Assessing Ten Years of Intervention in UK Pay TV

Ofcom identified significant competition concerns in the UK pay TV market and proposed regulatory remedies to address them. For about ten years it tried to get these measure implemented. However, its proposed measures have been repeatedly rejected by appeal bodies and courts. This article critically assesses these interlinked competition decisions disguised as regulatory interventions. It highlights significant issues with the proposed interventions, which have been framed as refusal to supply. It emphasises a failure to properly frame and assess its concerns under a coherent theory of harm, distinguishing and differentiating between premium movies and sport content in terms of what drives consumers’ preferences, and whether the chosen remedies would address any potential consumer harm. The latter concern is particularly relevant as in pay TV, even in the presence of market power and consumer harm, it is at best unclear whether access remedies may substantially benefit consumers.

Near-Optimal Scheduling in Day-Ahead Markets: Pricing Models and Payment Redistribution Bounds

Near-optimal unit commitment (UC) scheduling is a practical reality in wholesale electricity markets. This paper revisits previous work that has found that minor differences in cost among near-optimal schedules can result in a large redistribution of market payments (i.e., changes in generator profits and consumer surplus). It has been believed that this instability is unavoidable, but previous studies have only calculated prices using what we call the Restricted pricing model. This paper compares previous results to three additional models that are based on integer relaxation, and which we call the Partial, Tight, and Loose Dispatchable pricing models. Results are presented for a suite of test cases, including four ISO-scale cases. Similar to previous findings, the Restricted and Partial Dispatchable models both result in large payment redistributions among alternative solutions. In contrast, theoretical and experimental results for the Tight and Loose Dispatchable models show that pricing models with unconditional integer relaxation will have bounded payment redistributions, and, further, this bound can become quite small by tightening the UC problem's convex relaxation. In the presence of market power, stable financial outcomes may improve market efficiency by reducing incentives to bid strategically.

Market Power and Technology Diffusion in an Energy-Intensive Sector Covered by an Emissions Trading Scheme

The emissions trading scheme (ETS) has been long advocated to address climate change not only because it is cost effective but also because it can provide economic incentives for the adoption of new technologies. The emissions abatement of the energy-intensive sector covered by ETS is of great significance for the whole nation to attain sustainable and low-carbon development, especially for developing countries. This paper investigates the effect of market power in the emissions trading market on the diffusion of a new emissions abatement technology when firms in the energy-intensive sector interact in an imperfectly competitive output market. In the model, each firm needs to determine the optimal time to adopt the new emissions abatement technology, taking into account its benefits and costs, as well as its rival’s strategic behavior. With this framework, the results suggest that firms will delay adoption of the new emissions abatement technology in the presence of market power. Moreover, when the output demand is larger and more elastic, emissions abatement technology diffusion will occur earlier. It implies that the technology diffusion in the weak elastic sector, such as the Chinese iron and steel sector, may have more barriers than that in the strong elastic sector, such as the Chinese nonferrous metals sector.

Advance Selling in the Presence of Market Power and Risk‐Averse Consumers

ABSTRACTWe consider a manufacturer who procures raw material through a long‐term contract as well as in a spot market to produce goods for selling to consumers, a fraction of whom are risk averse. We assume that the manufacturer has the market power to influence the spot market price of raw material. To increase consumer demand and obtain demand information, the manufacturer may implement an advance selling program that depends on his market power and consumer risk aversion. We investigate whether the manufacturer should offer the advance selling program and how his decision and performance are influenced by the program. We find that the advance selling program should be offered when consumer risk aversion is low, or when it is high, and the manufacturer has high and low market power. By contrast, the advance selling program should not be offered when consumer risk aversion is high and the market power is medium. Our results also reveal that even with no promotion cost of the advance selling program, the manufacturer may not always offer it. Finally, the manufacturer benefits more from advance selling when consumers are myopic and/or risk neutral.

Examining the benefits of load shedding strategies using a rolling-horizon stochastic mixed complementarity equilibrium model

As a result of government policies increasing the amount of electricity generated from fluctuating renewable sources in many countries, the requirement for flexibility in the corresponding electricity systems increases. On the demand side, load shedding is one demand response mechanism contributing to an increased flexibility. Traditionally, load shedding was based on rather static or rotational strategies, whereby the system operator chooses the consumers for load shedding. However, ongoing technological developments provide the basis for smarter and more efficient load shedding strategies. We therefore examine the costs and strategies associated with such mechanisms by modelling an electricity market with different types of generators and consumers. Some consumers provide flexibility through load shedding only while others additionally have the ability to generate their own electricity. Focussing on the impacts of how and to whom consumers with own generation ability can supply electricity, the presence of market power and generator uncertainty, we propose a rolling horizon stochastic mixed complementarity equilibrium model, where the individual optimisation problems of each player are solved simultaneously and in equilibrium. We find that a non-static strategy reduces consumer costs while allowing consumers to provide own generation to the whole market results in minimal benefits. The presence of market power was found to increase costs to consumers.

The Welfare Economics of “Buy Local”

AbstractThis paper provides a theoretical model of how various aspects of the “buy local” movement influence social welfare and output across two regions. Market power considerations are also addressed where one region has a competitive advantage in production. While consumers buy local for a variety of reasons, our model categorizes some of the motivations and analyzes the impacts on output under various market structures. Welfare is calculated when demand is changed due to subsidies or taxes. We also allow for the presence of externalities. We find that, in the absence of market power or externalities, deadweight losses occur when the region without a competitive advantage buys more locally. However, in the presence of significant externalities and in the presence of market power, it is possible that profits to producers from consumers buying local could increase more than consumer utility is harmed, thus increasing aggregate social welfare. This could arise if consumers genuinely feel there are sufficient positive externalities from local production or negative externalities from non‐local production to warrant the loss of efficiency. We point out that understanding the motivation behind the movement is critical when analyzing welfare effects since some motivations are counter‐productive to each other.

Optimal completeness of property rights on renewable resources in the presence of market power

There are many instances where property rights are imperfectly defined, incomplete, or imperfectly enforced. The purpose of this normative paper is to address the following question: are there conditions under which partial property rights are economically efficient in a renewable resource economy? To address this question, we treat the level of completeness of property rights as a continuous variable in a renewable resource economy. By design, property rights restrict access to the resource, so they may allow a limited number of firms to exercise market power. We show that there exists a level of property rights completeness that leads to first-best resource exploitation; this level is different from either absent or complete property rights. Complete rights are neither necessary nor sufficient for efficiency in the presence of market power. We derive an analytic expression for the optimal level of property rights completeness and discuss its policy relevance and information requirements. The optimal level depends on (i) the number of firms, (ii) the elasticity of input productivity, and (iii) the price elasticity of market demand. We also find that a greater difference between the respective values of input and output requires stronger property rights. In fact, high profits imply both a severe potential commons problem and may be the expression of market power; strong property rights limit the commons problem; and their incompleteness offsets market power. Biology also impacts the optimal quality of property rights: when the stock of a resource is more sensitive to harvesting efforts, optimal property rights need to be more complete.

Modelling upstream and downstream market power in bilateral oligopoly

ABSTRACTThis article develops a general model that estimates market power exertion in a bilateral market relationship for processors and retailers where each may also have market power in their primary input market and output markets, respectively. Monte Carlo experiments are used to generate industry data for market structures such as perfect competition, monopoly, monopsony, bilateral imperfect competition with an integrated processor/retailer, bilateral imperfect competition with separate processor and retailer, and bilateral imperfect competition with four adjacent upstream and downstream markets. Then, new empirical industrial organization models are estimated using the data with models that match the market structure under which the data were generated (true) and with models that reflect alternative market structures (alternative). The general model is derived using the production function approach without imposing the fixed proportion assumption. Monte Carlo simulation results indicate that the general model is preferred to alternative models that presume competitive behaviour by processors in primary input procurement and by retailers in the output market. Results indicate that less flexible models lead to biased market power estimates in the presence of market power in the corresponding input and output markets.

Sequential Markets, Market Power, and Arbitrage

We develop a framework to characterize strategic behavior in sequential markets under imperfect competition and restricted entry in arbitrage. Our theory predicts that these two elements can generate a systematic price premium. We test the model predictions using microdata from the Iberian electricity market. We show that the observed price differences and firm behavior are consistent with the model. Finally, we quantify the welfare effects of arbitrage using a structural model. In the presence of market power, we show that full arbitrage is not necessarily welfare-enhancing, reducing consumer costs but increasing deadweight loss. (JEL D42, D43, L12, L13, L94, Q41)

Can Decentralized Markets Be More Efficient?

Decentralized markets are opaque and prone to trade delays, leading to the perception that they are less efficient than centralized limit order markets. Our model shows, however, that in presence of market power and asymmetric information problems decentralization can promote higher trade efficiency. First, screening behavior may be less aggressive and inefficient in decentralized markets as sellers reach fewer buyers. Second, in asset classes where information is needed to improve allocative efficiency, decentralized markets may dominate as predictable trading interactions and exclusive trading terms encourage information acquisition. Centralized markets, however, dominate when private information merely induces adverse selection.

CHANGES TO THE NATURAL GAS, CORN, AND FERTILIZER PRICE RELATIONSHIPS FROM THE BIOFUELS ERA

AbstractThe biofuels era brought about changes to the energy and agricultural sectors. For example, the decrease in natural gas prices has led to a weakening of the relationship between fertilizer and gas prices. The other change has been an increase in the demand for fertilizers, which has strengthened the price relationship between these two products. Econometric evidence from this work indicates that after 2008 the relationship between fertilizers and corn prices increased. In addition, results from our work indicate the presence of market power in the ammonia fertilizer sector.

How does market power affect the impact of large scale wind investment in 'energy only' wholesale electricity markets?

In the short run, it is well known that increasing wind penetration is likely to reduce spot market electricity prices due to the merit order effect. The long run effect is less clear because there will be a change in new capacity investment in response to the wind penetration. In this paper we examine the interaction between capacity investment, wind penetration and market power by first using a least-cost generation expansion model to simulate capacity investment with increasing amounts of wind generation, and then using a computer agent-based model to predict electricity prices in the presence of market power. We find the degree to which firms are able to exercise market power depends critically on the ratio of capacity to peak demand. For our preferred long run generation scenario we show market power increases for some periods as wind penetration increases however the merit order counteracts this with the results that prices overall remain flat. Returns to peakers increase significantly as wind penetration increases. The market power in turn leads to inefficient dispatch which is exacerbated with large amounts of wind generation.