The following are not so much replies as remarks about the direction in which I would undertake to reply to Professor B. C. Heyl's careful examination of some of my views in his article on "'Relativism' and 'Objectivity' in Stephen C. Pepper's Theory of Criticism.' I keep these views malleable so that they may benefit from just such criticism. First, there are some matters of verbal definition. I myself have generally avoided the term "subjectivism," because it spreads over so large an area of ambiguity. But a writer may define it for his own purposes, as Heyl does, identifying it with the theory that "evaluations become a matter solely of individual personal preferences" (New Bearings, p. 120). This is perhaps the same as the view Beardsley has lately dubbed "particularism." It takes in the practice of the older impressionistic school, and also that of the more recent "emotive judgment" school. This theory does not appear on the evidence to be a tenable view. For I would ask with Heyl "Why is it that certain works of art continue throughout the centuries to be highly praised?" (NB., p. 123). Such continuity is to be sure fluctuating and often periodic, but it is evidence of a stability of aesthetic criteria and judgment inconsistent with "subjectivism" as Heyl defines it. "Objectivity," however, is a term I do employ, meaning by it primarily verifiability or confirmability. Theories of criticism have different degrees of objectivity depending on the extent of their confirmable references. The narrower the range of these references, the more "relativistic" the theory of criticism. The most relativistic type of theory would then be one which limited critical judgment to the preference of the moment, and holds that one momentary preference gives no grounds for judgment about any other momentary preference. This is, as I suggested, one species of Beardsley's extreme particularism. The statement of such a judgment of preference is, it should be observed, open to confirmation, and may be false. It has, consequently, a minimum of objectivity in my use of the term. That this view has a minimum range of objectivity can be seen in contrasting it with the current emotive judgment and prescriptive theories which hold that value judgments are not declarative and so are neither true nor false. Basically these theories are devoid of any objectivity, though in practice their more recent exponents slip in a good deal of objective material by various back doors. Particularism seems clearly untenable in view of evidences of regularities of preferences in individuals and species. Even Beardsley cannot point to an unquestionable example. The next stage of relativism, however, which I call "individual relativism" has a good many apparent exponents, especially among hedonists. It does not stress the preferences of the moment but those of the individual, who may be described as having a fairly reliable set of personal preferences, but these, it is said, have no bearing on any other person's preferences. I say "apparent exponents," because there is so much obvious evidence for confirmable statements about techniques of producing pleasurable objects, about preparing oneself to enjoy such objects, and the cultivation of one's taste to extend one's range of enjoyments, that an empirically justifiable hedonism is driven beyond the individual to accept a degree of objectivity applicable to the psychological capacities of man as a biological species. This I have called biological relativism. There are, within my reading and acquaintance, very few, if any, individual hedonists who do not under pressure of the evidence admit to a wide range of biological relativism. Then, of course, there is cultural relativism. As a restricted theory, this has as wide a range of objectivity as the historical duration of a culture. I believe Heyl and I agree on the force and also the limitations of this theory. His first formal objection to my view, however, has to do with the objectivity of a judgment about feeling. A statement that I am experiencing pleasure now is a statement true or false or probable and in my use of the term clearly objective. It is also narrowly relative.