Preference Logic Research Articles

Preference logic grammars

Preference logic grammars (PLGs) are introduced in this paper as a concise, declarative, modular, and efficient means of resolving ambiguity in logic grammars. Preference logic grammars can be thought as extensions of definite clause grammars (DCGs) and definite-clause translation grammars (DCTGs). Just as DCGs and DCTGs can be directly translated into logic programs, PLGs can be translated into preference logic programs (PLPs), which we introduced in our earlier work. We discuss two applications of PLGs: optimal parsing, and ambiguity resolution in programming-language and natural-language grammars. Optimal parsing is an extension of parsing wherein costs are associated with the different (ambiguous) parses of a string and the preferred parse is the one with least cost. Many problems can be viewed as optimal parsing problems, e.g., code generation, document layout, etc. In the area of natural language parsing, we illustrate the use of preference clauses for resolution of prepositional phrase attachment ambiguities, and point out the growing consensus in the literature on the need to explicitly specify preference criteria for ambiguity resolution.

Monotonicity and Persistence in Preferential Logics

An important characteristic of many logics for Artificial Intelligence is their nonmonotonicity. This means that adding a formula to the premises can invalidate some of the consequences. There may, however, exist formulae that can always be safely added to the premises without destroying any of the consequences: we say they respect monotonicity. Also, there may be formulae that, when they are a consequence, can not be invalidated when adding any formula to the premises: we call them conservative. We study these two classes of formulae for preferential logics, and show that they are closely linked to the formulae whose truth-value is preserved along the (preferential) ordering. We will consider some preferential logics for illustration, and prove syntactic characterization results for them. The results in this paper may improve the efficiency of theorem provers for preferential logics.

Monotonicity and persistence in preferential logics

An important characteristic of many logics for Artificial Intelligence is their nonmonotonicity. This means that adding a formula to the premises can invalidate some of the consequences. There may,...

Decision theoretic foundations for axioms of rational preference

Rationality postulates for preferences are developed from two basic decision theoretic principles, namely: (1) the logic of preference is determined by paradigmatic cases in which preferences are choice-guiding, and (2) excessive comparison costs should be avoided. It is shown how the logical requirements on preferences depend on the structure of comparison costs. The preference postulates necessary for choice guidance in a single decision problem are much weaker than completeness and transitivity. Stronger postulates, such as completeness and transitivity, can be derived under the further assumption that the original preference relation should also be capable of guiding choice after any restriction of the original set of alternatives.

Multinational enterprise and economic analysis

The third edition of Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis surveys the contributions that economic analysis has made to our understanding of why multinational enterprises exist and what consequences they have for the workings of the national and international economies. It shows how economic analysis can explain multinationals' activity patterns and how economics can shed conceptual light on problems of business policies and managerial decisions arising in practice. It addresses the welfare problems arising from multinationals' activities and the logic of governments' preferences and choices in their dealings with multinationals. Suitable for researchers, graduates and upper-level undergraduates. The third edition of this highly accessible book incorporates the many additions to our knowledge of multinationals accumulated in research appearing in the past decade.

ALX, an action logic for agents with bounded rationality

We propose a modal action logic that combines ideas from H.A. Simon's bounded rationality, S. Kripke's possible world semantics, G.H. von Wright's preference logic, Pratt's dynamic logic, Stalnaker's minimal change and more recent approaches to update semantics. ALX (the xth action logic) is sound, complete and decidable, making it the first complete logic for two-place preference operators. ALX avoids important drawbacks of other action logics, especially the counterintuitive necessitation rule for goals (every theorem must be a goal) and the equally counterintuitive closure of goals under logical implication.

Preference logics: Towards a unified approach to nonmonotonicity in deductive reasoning

The notion ofpreference is central to most forms of nonmonotonic reasoning. Shoham, in his dissertation, used this notion to give a single semantical point of view from which most nonmonotonic reasoning systems could be studied. In this paper, we study the notion of preference closely and devise a class of logics of preference that extract the logicalcore of the notion of preference. Earlier attempts have been largely unsuccessful, because of adoption as matters of logic of certain theory-specific preference principles such asasymmetry andtransitivity. Soundness, completeness and decidability proofs for the logics are given. We define the notion of a preferential theory and reframe nonmonotonicity as a symbolic optimization problem where defaults are coded aspreference criteria which place preference orders on the models of a first-order theory. We study the relationship between normal default theories and show the correspondence between models of extensions and optimal worlds. We give a preferential account of some forms of circumscription. Thelocal nature of preference logic is contrasted with the global notion of normality and preference that is used by conditional logics of normality and cumulative inference operations. In related papers, we give a completely declarative semantics for the stable models of normal logic programs, a deontic logic based on preferences that is free of the anomalies of standard deontic logic, and extend Horn clause logic programming to impose partial orders on the bodies of clauses as declarative specification of the relaxation criteria for the truth-hood of the heads.

Exploiting the normative aspect of preference: A deontic logic without actions

This paper is an attempt to clear the following charge leveled against preference logics: preference logics rest upon the mistaken belief that concept construction can satisfactorily be carried out in isolation from theory construction (J. Mullen, Metaphilosophy 10(1979)247–255). We construct a logic of preference that is fundamental in the sense that it does notcommit itself to any allegedlyobvious or intuitive — and in actuality,theory specific — preference principles. A unique feature of our construction is that preference orderings are placed upon possible worlds. While this has been done before in the work of S.O. Hansson and N. Rescher, among others, we do not derive a binary preference relation — from these orders — that acts on individual propositions. Instead, we provide the syntactic means to impose the preference orderings among worlds. Thus, unlike Hansson, we do not need to assumea priori that our preference orderings be transitive. Such properties can be axiomatized. The close connections between preferences and obligations, in particular their normative nature, then allow us to derive a deontic logic that is free of the paradoxes of standard deontic logic. It is interesting to note here that this work arose in an attempt to provide a logical characterization of document description and layout Layout directives can be succinctly represented as preference criteria.

Rationality, transitivity, and contraposition

The purpose of this note is to compare the rule of Rational Monotonicity proposed in [3] and different rules expressing some weak forms of Transitivity and Contraposition. We present four weak forms of Transitivity that, in preferential logic, are equivalent to Rational Monotonicity and a weak form of Contraposition that is strictly weaker than Rational Monotonicity but equivalent to it in the presence of Disjunctive Rationality.

Preference-based deontic logic (PDL)

A new possible world semantics for deontic logic is proposed. Its intuitive basis is that prohibitive predicates (such as “wrong” and “prohibited”) have the property of negativity, i.e. that what is worse than something wrong is itself wrong. The logic of prohibitive predicates is built on this property and on preference logic. Prescriptive predicates are defined in terms of prohibitive predicates, according to the well-known formula “ought” = “wrong that not”. In this preference-based deontic logic (PDL), those theorems that give rise to the paradoxes of standard deontic logic (SDL) are not obtained. (E.g., O(p & q) → Op & Oq and Op → O(p v q)) are theorems of SDL but not of PDL. The more plausible theorems of SDL, however, can be derived in PDL.

The logic of nonmonotonicity

Shoham [14] presents a general semantic framework in which many nonmonotonic logics (the so-called “preference logics”) can be represented. We present another means of giving general semantics for preference logics using models of the conditional logic C. This has the advantage that we also provide an axiomatization for preference logics. Insofar as all nonmonotonic logics are preference logics, C is the logic of nonmonotonicity.

A new semantical approach to the logic of preference

A possible world semantics for preference is developed. The remainder operator (⊥) is used to give precision to the notion that two states of the world are as similar as possible, given a specified difference between them. A general structure is introduced for preference relations between states of affairs, and three types of such preference relations are defined. It is argued that one of them, “actual preference”, corresponds closely to the concept of preference in informal discourse. Its logical properties are studied and shown to be plausible.

Pluralistic evaluation of belief plausibility and its application to nonmonotonic reasoning

A pluralistic evaluation of belief plausibility is introduced by extending the notion of plausibility index introduced by Rescher. The properties of the extended plausibility are analyzed by comparing its properties with those of probability theoretic indexing and Rescher's indexing of beliefs. Also it is shown that the new indexing method can be effectively utilized in truth maintenance of beliefs in complex and dynamically changing situations. First, the reason we focus our attention on Rescher's plausibility index of beliefs and the necessity for its extension are clarified by referring to the method of knowledge organization and maintenance called ATMS (assumption-based truth maintenance system) introduced by De Kleer, which is an extension of Doyle's TMS. Second, Rescher's plausibility index is briefly reviewed. Third, the index is compared with the probability theoretic index of beliefs by referring to a system of logic called preference logic that reflects essential features of the indices. The comparison clarifies the monotonic, inflexible nature of Rescher's index and the need to extend it in order to cope with the nonmonotonic nature of truth maintenance in dynamically changing situations. An extension of Rescher's plausibility index is introduced, and its properties are examined. Finally, an application of the indexing method to ATMS and to default reasoning is presented, showing that the proposed indexing method can be effectively utilized in truth maintenance of beliefs in complex and dynamically changing situations.

Some results on dyadic deontic logic and the logic of preference

Some results on dyadic deontic logic and the logic of preference

Utility theory and preference logic

Utility theory and preference logic

Scaling and the logic of preference: A poser

Scaling and the logic of preference: A poser

THE GERMAN ROMANTIC BACKGROUND OF KIERKEGAARD'S PSYCHOLOGY*

The Southern Journal of PhilosophyVolume 16, Issue 1 p. 649-660 THE GERMAN ROMANTIC BACKGROUND OF KIERKEGAARD'S PSYCHOLOGY* John D. Mullen, John D. Mullen Dowling College John D. Mullen is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Coordinator of the Humanities Division at Dowling College in Oakdale, Long Island, New York. He received his Ph. D. from Boston University, and has written in the areas of Preference Logic, the Philosophy of Psychology, as well as Kierkegaard studies.Search for more papers by this author John D. Mullen, John D. Mullen Dowling College John D. Mullen is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Coordinator of the Humanities Division at Dowling College in Oakdale, Long Island, New York. He received his Ph. D. from Boston University, and has written in the areas of Preference Logic, the Philosophy of Psychology, as well as Kierkegaard studies.Search for more papers by this author First published: Spring 1978 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1978.tb00214.x * I am grateful for the assistance of my colleague Professor James O. Tate. Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Volume16, Issue1Spring 1978Pages 649-660 RelatedInformation

A note on Rescher's ‘Semantic Foundations for the Logic of Preference’

In ‘Semantic Foundations for the Logic of Preference’ (Rescher, ed.,The Logic of Decision and Action, University Press, Pittsburgh, 1967), Nicholas Rescher claims that, on the semantics developed in that paper, a certain principle - call it ‘Q’ turns out to be ‘unacceptable’. I argue, however, that, given certain assumptions that Rescher invokes in that same paper,Q can in fact be shown to be a ‘preference-tautology’, and henceQ should be classified as ‘acceptable’ on Rescher's theory.

Remark on a logic of preference.

Remark on a logic of preference.

Preference and choice

A theory of preference and choice based on that of von Wright is developed whereby the choice of a state of affairs is determined by preferences between pairs of them. The method used is letting preferences eliminate states of affairs from the choice set according to axiomatized rules. Formal properties of extensions of von Wright's preference logic are investigated.