Preferences For Public Goods Research Articles

Private Preferences for Public Goods: Towards a Model for the Interaction of Pressure Group and Electoral Politics

This essay explores two contrasting paradigms of collective action in the context of some observed anomalies in the development of the welfare states, focussing on private interest mod& of public expenditure growth versus models emphasising social choice and the degree of congruence between the political responsiveness of interest groups to the public expenditure crisis since the early 1970s, and the assumptions underpinning these models on political behaviour in the mixed economies. A bifurcation of the political system, resulting from the development of systems of functional interests representation alongside parliamentary and representative government, gives rise to a potential for strong governments to maintain regime support because of, rather than despite, the political fragmentation of majorities.

Revelation of preferences for public goods: Aggregation by Abelian operations

When the utility functions for the public and private goods are additively separable, in the two-public-alternative situation, a new class of incentive compatible mechanisms is presented, and some of its properties are explored. If there are more than two public alternatives and if the utility functions remain separable according to a generalized addition (called an abelian operation), it is also possible to construct incentive compatible mechanisms. Such mechanisms are similar to those of Groves but they do not involve maximizing a sum of utilities.

Voluntary purchase of public goods

This paper examines the application of Buchanan's ‘independent adjustment’ model of public good provision to individual donations to voluntary or non-profit organizations. An individual's donation function is a simple transformation of the Marshallian demand function; consequently donation functions ‘reveal,’ in principle, preferences for public goods. The existence of a tax-subsidy system sustaining a Pareto optimal level of provision is demonstrated, and the relationship to the existing subsidy scheme in the U.S. is examined. Finally, two implications of the model suggest that it is not appropriate as a representation of actual donor behavior.

Voting with one's feet: A critique of the evidence

This study offers an interpretation of the literature on voting with one's feet, that is, moving to that area which best satisfies one's preferences for public goods. The implications of the literature to date are examined. The study also offers ways in which to improve future research efforts. Regional labor market distortions are examined in depth.

Voting by veto

This paper describes a voting procedure for revealing preferences for public goods. The procedure consists of two steps: a proposal by each committee member to be added along with the status quo to form the issue set, and then, subsequent to a random determination of voting order, the elimination of one proposal from the issue set by each committee member. For any set of proposals and a given order of voting the procedure determines a unique, winning proposal. Under the procedure's incentives, the winning proposal tends to contain an equal sharing of the potential gains from collective action among the committee members.

On the revelation of preferences for public goods

On the revelation of preferences for public goods

Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods

Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods

A New and Superior Process for Making Social Choices

This paper describes and elaborates a process first discovered by Edward H. Clarke that motivates individuals to reveal their true preferences for public goods. The essence of the process is that each individual is offered a chance to change the outcome that would occur without his vote by paying a special charge equal to the net cost to others that results from including his vote in the decision. Because the special charge on any one person is not paid to any other person, a very small budget surplus results. Applications to both discrete and continuous decisions are illustrated.

Partial equilibrium approach to the free-rider problem

Groves and others have shown that truthful answers concerning preferences for public goods can be elicited as dominant strategies if appropriate tax-subsidies rules are applied. This paper studies the statistical properties of the total revenues generated by one of the mechanisms with this desirable dominant strategy property. For particular specifications, it is shown that the expected total revenues increase like √ N. Further, if these revenues are rebated equally to the individuals in the model, then, although the dominant strategy property no longer obtains, the optimal responses converge to the truth in large economies. As a result, it can be shown that the mechanism with rebates will make the Pareto optimal decision with arbitrarily high probability, provided that the willingness to pay distribution is assumed to be symmetric.

Interstate Migration and the Tiebout Hypothesis: An Analysis According to Race, Sex and Age

Abstract This article examines the impact on interstate net migration of differential state and local property tax and transfer policies in the United States by race, age and sex for 1965–70. The results offer considerable support to the Tiebout hypothesis that the consumer-voter moves to that area which best satisfies his preferences for public goods.

Interstate Migration and the Tiebout Hypothesis: An Analysis According to Race, Sex and Age

Abstract This article examines the impact on interstate net migration of differential state and local property tax and transfer policies in the United States by race, age and sex for 1965–70. The results offer considerable support to the Tiebout hypothesis that the consumer-voter moves to that area which best satisfies his preferences for public goods.

Decentralization and Citizen Participation in Social Services

Decentralization and Citizen Participation in Social Services

A Note on Demand for Public Goods

In a stimulating recent article' Professor Albert Breton refers to a dominant feature of the world of uncertainty and competition-the situation where there are externalities in output consumption. The exclusion principle is inapplicable and individuals have no reason to reveal their true preferences for public goods.2 Breton suggests (as have other major contributors) that, in this situation, a benefit taxation system is impossible and reliance on a non-benefit (ergo non-optimal) system results in the disequilibrium of some individuals in the community.3 The purpose of this note is to suggest a model of the world of competition, uncertainty, and externalities in output consumption, in which in(lividuals maximize their own self-interest while revealing their preference for public goods. First, it is useful to substitute the term conflict in place of Breton's competition. I do this for two reasons. One is that competition is usually associated with a price-taker's model. However, a consumer is a price-taker in a meaningful sense only if the exclusion principle applies, in which case this