China's ethnic autonomous regions, inhabited by diverse ethnic groups and located near national borders or at provincial intersections, confront complex natural, relatively underdeveloped economic, and ethnic harmony challenges. Governments balance central government-assigned tasks and ethnic harmony, showing varied responses: some prioritize stability, others focus on management, and some are indifferent to local emergencies. Given this phenomenon, why do governments in these regions vary in their responses to emergencies? This research, based on government role theory, examines how role preferences influence government behavior in emergency management, identifying two key roles: economic man and social man, and establishes a four-quadrant role analysis framework: : local guardian, political competitor, moral paragon, and indifferent bystander. Grounded theory explains these roles and evaluation indicators, with evaluations from 44 scholars gathered via questionnaire, and the indicator weights determined using the Analytic Hierarchy Process. The weight matrix then calculates economic man (X) and social man (Y) values for 272 cases based on expert scores. The research results reveal that (1) these governments exhibit an overall role preference of “local guardian > political competitor > indifferent bystander > moral paragon” in emergency management. (2) This ranking also reflects their preference for the economic man role. (3) Factors contributing to this ranking include cultural differences, administrative contracting, and performance tournaments within the Chinese system and administrative ethics. These findings provide theoretical insights into emergency management role preferences in multi-ethnic, multi-racial, and even multicultural regions, ultimately aiming to enhance local government emergency management efficiency, optimize policy formulation, and ensure community resilience.
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