One of the purposes of my article' was to stimulate debate on the events that occurred in the aftermath of World War I, since the literature on interwar unemployment concentrates heavily on the period from the mid I920S. Thus in one sense I welcome the comment by Glynn and Booth,2 although this must be tempered by the fact that they misrepresent my views, adding a touch of irony to their title. In fact, rather than making one or two precise, substantial points, they provide a rather rambling commentary, and some of the arguments are hopelessly confused. Thus my reply will necessarily have to take the form of a series of rebuttals. Their comment gets off to a bad start with a series of confusions concerning consumption and the real wage. I was very careful to distinguish between the real consumption wage and the real product wage3 and provided plots of both the retail price index and the NNP deflator in figure 4. Furthermore the earnings index, which Glynn and Booth say they prefer, strengthens my case, since earnings rose faster than wage rates in the latter years of the war, implying a larger build up of unspent purchasing power. On the issue of working-class assets, it is true that some of the rise in small savings came from middle-class savers, but recent estimates emphasize the contribution of the working class.4 Furthermore, the costs of three of the four major contingencies that working-class savings aimed to cover (sickness, unemployment, old age, and death) were lessened by state provision at this time.' I object to the claim that my approach is bereft of any theory of the consumption function. On the contrary, it assumes that consumption is a function of wealth as well as income and is discussed in detail elsewhere.6 On the issue of whether unions pushed more strongly for a shorter working week than for higher wages, I was content to rely on a straightforward revealed preference argument. Unions negotiated a deal with a large fall in hours and a constant wage. This can hardly have been forced upon them by employers, who have traditionally been fiercely opposed to reductions in hours which leave capital idle for longer. It is always useful to have more detailed historical evidence on issues such as this. As Dowie pointed out, however, labour historians have almost completely ignored the issue of the fall in hours during I9I9-20.7 If Glynn and Booth's comment stimulates