Predominant Party Research Articles

Towards a predominant party system: the May 2023 election in Greece

ABSTRACT The parliamentary election of May 2023 in Greece is historic because it was the first held with a proportional representation electoral system in decades. Notably, there was an unprecedented 20-point difference between the winner, New Democracy, and the second party, SYRIZA. Thus, the election marks a shift towards a predominant party system, which is accompanied by a decrease in all relevant institutionalisation indices, somewhat reversing a period of stabilisation and a return of two-partyism. Empirical evidence points towards economic voting as the main determinant for New Democracy’s second consecutive win, albeit in a media environment of waning pluralism.

Electoral engineering in autocracies: Effects of the 2021 electoral reform on Morocco’s parliamentary elections

ABSTRACT This article examines the effects of electoral engineering in the 2021 Moroccan parliamentary elections. It demonstrates that Morocco’s proportional system, introduced in 2002 and reformed in 2021, is designed to co-opt political parties, prevent a predominant party and promote party system fragmentation, in line with the monarchy’s interests. Nevertheless, the electoral system is not imposed on political parties. The analysis of the process of electoral reform yields evidence of the political parties’ involvement in electoral engineering, the changing political stances of the Moroccan parties, the role of administrative parties as intermediaries of the Minister of the Interior and, ultimately, the connivance between the political regime and the political parties, which acquiesce to the electoral rules in the expectation of being rewarded with seats and even office. In addition, the in-depth electoral analysis and the electoral simulation conducted in this paper reveal that the 2021 electoral reform led to an extreme multi-party system with balance between parties. The electoral amendments were particularly detrimental to the largest party, and to a lesser extent to the second and third parties. By contrast, the electoral reform benefitted small and medium-size parties in the new regional districts, where most of them are significantly overrepresented.

The Role of the Failure of Multi-Party Systems in Bringing About Dominant Party Systems in Democratizing Countries: The Cases of Bolivia and Turkey

Political parties are political societies that have a steady and stable organizational structure that seeks to seize control of the state mechanism with public support. Party systems refers to the arrangement within which political parties operate. Predominant party system is a condition where the opposition parties challenge the strongest party in competitive elections but fail to remove the incumbent from power. The most popular definition and classification for the concept of predominant party system remains Sartori’s conceptualization. According to Sartori, the predominance is established when a party wins three consecutive elections while keeping the majority of the seats in the parliament. How do predominant party systems emerge? This article explains the impact of the failure of multiparty systems in fostering predominant party systems in democratizing countries.

A Reassessment of the Turkish Party System

Modern political institutions have a long history in Turkey but because of limited competition until 1945 and military interventions in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997, the party system has not developed consistently. Moreover, the electoral system, particularly the 10% electoral threshold applied after 1980, directly affected the Turkish party system. Having been interrupted by non-democratic forces and attempted to be formed via political engineering, the development of Turkish political parties and party systems has not been linear. In recent years, there has been an increasing amount of literature on the Turkish party system. However, since most studies were based on inadequate empirical data and limited to the 1990s and the 2000s, they have generally focused on the predominant party system and failed to critically review discussions on party systems. This paper analyzes Turkish party systems from 1950 to the present using the quantitative method. Adopting the criteria of the number of relevant parties and their relative strengths, this study applies different indicators such as the effective number of parties and fragmentation. This paper argues that Turkey has experienced four main different forms of party systems since 1950: a two-party system (1950-1960 and 2002), a two and a half party system (1960-1980), a moderate multiparty system with a balance among parties (1991-1999), and a moderate multiparty system with one dominant party (1983-1987, and 2007-2018).

Patronage and Predominance: How the LDP Maintains Its Hold on Power

AbstractThe Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) held power from 1955 until 1993. How did it manage to do so? In 1994 a political reform resulted in competitive elections but, starting in 2012, the LDP regained its predominant position, winning three consecutive landslide victories. How did it manage to do this even after the reform? In this paper I argue that a system of ‘party-organization patronage’, in which the patron is the LDP and the client is an interest group organization, played a significant role in maintaining LDP predominance in both periods. I further argue that the key to explaining changes in the predominant party system is the LDP’s monopoly on access to the public policy making process. When this monopoly faltered, interest group organizations began to put a foot in both camps or even defected to an opposition party but once the LDP’s monopoly was re-established interest groups returned to the LDP fold. In both cases, predominance was established in two steps. First, fortuitous events gave the LDP an overwhelming parliamentary majority and a monopoly on access to policy making. Second, the LDP granted organizations access to policy making in exchange for their votes which helped it maintain its monopoly.

Novel Causal Relations between Neuronal Networks due to Synchronization.

In the process of information transmission, information is thought to be transmitted from the networks that are activated by the input to the networks that are silent or nonactivated. Here, via numerical simulation of a 3-network motif, we show that the silent neuronal network when interconnected with other 2 networks can exert much stronger causal influences on the other networks. Such an unexpected causal relationship results from high degree of synchronization in this network. The predominant party is consistently the network whose noise is smaller when the noise level in each network is considered. Our results can shed lights on how the internal network dynamics can affect the information flow of interconnected neuronal networks.

Conservatives, nationalists, and incumbent support in Turkey

ABSTRACT To consolidate a predominant party system, an incumbent party will attempt to anchor voting behavior to social cleavages, a strategy called cleavage enclosure. However, does this strategy actually work? In Turkey, the incumbent AKP government has focused its campaigning on conservatives and nationalists. The analysis of the 2018 post-election survey reveals that the cleavage enclosure worked for conservatives but not for nationalists. Of the incumbent supporters in the previous election, conservatives replicated their support, whereas nationalists were less likely to support the incumbent than other identity holders. Nationalists tend to punish but not reward the incumbent party for its economic performance.

Ideological Vote and Electoral Performance of the Bolivian MAS, 2002–2014

ABSTRACTSince 2005, the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) has become a predominant party in the Bolivian party system. Despite its origin as a small, indigenous, and peasant-based party, the MAS has achieved an electoral performance unprecedented in Bolivian political history. What accounts for its electoral rise? Unlike available explanations based on sociostructural, institutional, or contextual factors, this article argues that ideological location decisions served as a signaling device that allowed the MAS to differentiate itself from its competitors. In so doing, the party managed to transcend the border of ethnic and regional cleavages, appealing to a broader electorate, which contributed decisively to its electoral success. Using data from public opinion surveys and based on statistical models, this article shows that ideology was pivotal in Bolivians’ decisions to vote for the MAS, particularly during the early period of its electoral takeoff.

Does the Electoral System Foster a Predominant Party System? Evidence from Turkey

AbstractThis paper discusses the role of the electoral system in making the Justice and Development Party (AKP) dominant. Drawing on Sartori’s framework, we first clarify the concept of a predominant party system. Second, we examine the impact of the electoral system on the emergence of a predominant party system in Turkey. Analysing election results, we argue that the electoral system fosters dominance in three ways. First, a combination of electoral formula, national threshold and district threshold leads to over‐representation of large parties and under‐representation of small ones. Second, the fear of a wasted vote due to the high threshold prompts voters to support their second‐best option, which concentrates the votes among large parties. Finally, the electoral system increases electoral turnout rates by extending polarization.

Vicisitudes del sistema de partidos del Estado español (1977-2011): ¿bipartidismo imperfecto, sistema de partido dominante o pluripartidismo limitado?

This paper analyzes the vicissitudes and changes experienced by the Spanish state party system from the 1977 general elections to 2011. Thus, after a brief terminological approach to the issue, it shows some generic features of the state party system and undertakes a critical examination of some of its most prominent typifications (“imperfect bipartidism,” “predominant party system” or “limited pluralism”). On the basis of such critical examination, it finally provides its own and more adequate characterization of itself

Плинність партійних систему посткомуністичних країнах (1992−2019)

The paper offers a thorough analysis of the main types of party systems and their changes in the post-Soviet countries between 1992 and 2019. The evolution of the main criteria concerning the party systems classification has been analyzed. We use a database of all parliamentary elections which took place in the post-communist countries since 1992. This article concludes that the majority of party systems of the post-Soviet countries are not stable and suffering permanent changes. On this basis, 16 party systems that continue to exist in the post-communist countries from 1992 to 2019 are almost half-assigned to the predominant party types. Our findings indicate that Kyrgyzstan and Moldova have moved from a predominant party type to a multiparty type. Russia, Armenia, and Ukraine have changed their party systems from a multiparty type to a predominant party type. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan remain in the predominant party system since the first elections. Slovakia, the Czech Republic and the Baltic countries have remained in the multiparty types since the first elections.

Author's response

Moving beyond the analytical characteristics of apportionment methods or election systems, this article focuses on their outcomes in practice. We illustrate how apportionment and partisan biases working with a high threshold created an electoral environment conducive to the establishment of a predominant party system. We use the historical example of the Turkish experience. We trace the historical development of disproportionality for the entire multi-party elections for the 1950–2015 period. Focusing on the five most recent elections of this period since 2002, we demonstrate how the biases introduced by the apportionment method in use and the 10% threshold have advantaged the leading Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP). Our study suggests that a partisan bias favoring AKP still continues to exist at a lower level even after correcting the apportionment and the threshold biases. We underline how these biases form the foundation for a conservative over-representation and emphasize the path-dependent dynamics that keep challengers to the AKP away from the electoral scene, effectively helping to continue its hegemonic position in the system.

Partisan and apportionment bias in creating a predominant party system

Moving beyond the analytical characteristics of apportionment methods or election systems, this article focuses on their outcomes in practice. We illustrate how apportionment and partisan biases working with a high threshold created an electoral environment conducive to the establishment of a predominant party system. We use the historical example of the Turkish experience. We trace the historical development of disproportionality for the entire multi-party elections for the 1950–2015 period. Focusing on the five most recent elections of this period since 2002, we demonstrate how the biases introduced by the apportionment method in use and the 10% threshold have advantaged the leading Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP). Our study suggests that a partisan bias favoring AKP still continues to exist at a lower level even after correcting the apportionment and the threshold biases. We underline how these biases form the foundation for a conservative over-representation and emphasize the path-dependent dynamics that keep challengers to the AKP away from the electoral scene, effectively helping to continue its hegemonic position in the system.

The Politics of “Antagonism and Recognition” in Post-communist Central Europe: The Case of Hungary

이 연구는 악셀 호네트의 ‘인정투쟁’이론으로부터 발전시킨 ‘적대와 인정의 정치’라는 틀로 공산체제 붕괴 이후 중유럽의 정치변화를 헝가리를 사례로 하여 분석하는 것을 목적으로 하였다. 헝가리는 1989~2010년 사이의 체제전환 기간 동안에 온건다당체제와 양당체제가 유지되면서 여야간 정권교체를 이룸으로써 비교적 안정된 민주주의와 함께 ‘인정의 정치’를 보여 주었다. 정당 간 경쟁은 존재하였지만 경쟁세력을 타도하고자 하는 홀로주체적 정치의 모습은 찾기 어려웠다. 하지만 2010년 이후 헝가리 정치는 크게 변모한 것으로 평가된다. 2010년 집권한 오르반 정권은 포퓰리즘적 정치로 특징지워지며, 현재까지 3연임에 성공하였다. 오르반 포퓰리즘은 비자유주의적 민주주의로 정당화되었으며, 민주세력과 반대세력에 대한 탄압, 언론자유 억압, 그리고 민족주의의 동원과 반 난민 및 반 유럽연합 정책을 전개하고 있다. 오르반의 포퓰리즘으로 인하여 헝가리에서 서로주체적 ‘인정의 정치’는 홀로주체적 ‘적대의 정치’로 변화되었다. 2010년 이후 헝가리 민주주의는 후퇴하거나 퇴행하였고, 민주주의와 권위주의의 사이에 위치하고 있다. 사르토리의 정당체제론을 적용할 경우 오르반의 포퓰리즘은 일당우위정당체제와 패권정당체제의 경계에 서 있는 것으로 보인다.The purpose of this thesis is to analyze political changes in post-communist Central Europe―focusing on Hungary―with the framework of the “politics of antagonism and recognition” that has been developed from Axel Honneth’s theory of “recognition struggle.” In Hungary during the system transformation period of 1989-2010, a relatively consolidated democracy that operated with moderately limited pluralism or the two-party system was maintained, and the politics of recognition was sustained. Though competition and conflicts among the political forces were present, it was difficult to discern antagonism in politics aimed at getting rid of opposing forces. Since 2010, however, Hungary’s politics are considered widely as having changed enormously. Vitor Orbán’s second administration, which took power in 2010, is characterized as a populist regime and has succeeded in winning three consecutive elections. Orbán’s populism has been justified as illiberal democracy. His regime has suppressed democratic and opposing forces, severely infringing on freedoms of the press and speech. The regime has also mobilized nationalistic sentiments in Hungary and has implemented anti-EU and anti-refugee policies. Because of Orbán’s populism, the politics of recognition has been transformed into the politics of antagonism in Hungary. Since 2010, Hungary’s democracy has receded and deteriorated. The political environment seems to float between democracy and authoritarianism. When we apply Sartori’s theory of party systems to Hungary, it seems that the country is situated on the border between a predominant party system and a hegemonic party system.

Weakening the Influence of General Political Bureau and Building the Predominant Party System in the Kim Jong-un Regime

Weakening the Influence of General Political Bureau and Building the Predominant Party System in the Kim Jong-un Regime

A real electoral duel between the P.J.D. and the P.A.M.? Analysing constituency-level competitiveness in the 2016 Moroccan elections

ABSTRACTThis article examines electoral competitiveness between the two main contenders in Morocco’s 2016 legislative elections, i.e. the Islamist Party of Justice and Development (P.J.D.) and the pro-monarchy Party of Authenticity and Modernity (P.A.M.). In contrast with electoral results at the national level, which reflect a high parliamentary competitiveness between these two parties, the analysis of competitiveness at the local constituency level (92 electoral districts) leads to quite different conclusions. The degree of local standard competitiveness between the P.J.D. and the P.A.M. was generally very low and, in most of the districts, the Islamists held a large advantage over the P.A.M. Other third parties also played a significant role and became the voters’ first or second choice in some districts, with the effect of increasing parliamentary fragmentation and decreasing competitiveness between the P.J.D. and the P.A.M. Thus, the proportional system used in a large number of districts contributed to achieving the monarchy’s aim of avoiding a predominant party. Also, the central role played by the loyalist National Rally of Independents (R.N.I.) in blocking the coalition government talks after the elections questions the idea that the Moroccan party system is becoming polarized between the P.J.D. and the P.A.M.

The analysis of multiparty dynamic systems in the modern world on the example of the post-soviet countries (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova)

The modern world of policy is characterized by existence of the most various political systems. In this regard, it is appropriate to remind of classification of party systems of Dzhiovanio Sartori. In this classification first of all, a multi-party system with a dominant party draws attention. This system attracted our attention due to the fact that it is characteristic to many countries. Sartori distinguishes 3 modification of a multiparty system with a dominant party. He writes about a predominant party system, a dominant party system and an authoritarian dominant system [1, p. 260-261]. It should be noted that, in Dzh. Sartori opinion, these systems significantly different from each other. However, Sartori was able to reveal similarities. A convincing illustration of this fact is the process of formation of multi-party system in the former Soviet space. This will be illustrated below later. Number of researchers believe that the «one-party system derives its strength from the struggle with imperial, conservative and traditional forms of power. In modernizing societies multiparty systems are weak» [2, p. 419]. It should be noted that, regardless the form of domination, all the dominant party systems have similarities. This is because, these party systems decide essence common challenges. One of the such feature is the spread of patronage and orientations of cash bonds. The second feature is that the dominant parties often act as a center party. This creates more opportunities for ideological maneuvering. However, the dominant parties of different systems also have differences. The most important difference is the methods of dealing with political opponents. The predominant and dominant party systems prevail legitimate democratic mechanisms, like competition of authoritarian ideologies of dominant systems, which leads to a very tough fight. The second difference is, being the ruling party, the dominant party determines the structure of the executive branch. In the dominant authoritarian systems, as a rule, parties serve to enhance the influence of a small group. The third difference is that, in predominant party and dominant systems parties are usually used for the modernization political relationships. In authoritarian systems the dominant ruling party often use non-democratic practices and procedures to maintain the dominance of the ruling group. As stated above, we have paid so much attention to the multi-party dominant party because the party system functioning in the post-Soviet space are mostly the dominant party systems of various modifications. This conclusion is strongly supported by concrete analysis of the formation of parties and party systems in some countries of the former Soviet Union.

The Regionalism of Busan and the Nomination of the Predominant Party - From the Perspective of the Public Choice Theory

The Regionalism of Busan and the Nomination of the Predominant Party - From the Perspective of the Public Choice Theory

Economic and corruption voting in a predominant party system: The case of Turkey

Voting behavior studies have paid scarce attention to the predominant party system (PPS), in which one party has won three consecutive legislative majorities, despite the fact that nearly half of the world democracies have had a PPS. It is often unclear why a large portion of voters prefer the same party over a long period of time. We propose two hypotheses to address the question. First, since PPSs often thrive when economic performance is strong, the long-term economic success of the incumbent party produces a “halo effect” that renders voters insensitive to short-term economic changes. Second, voters blame the incumbent party for the corruption of politicians only, and not for bureaucratic corruption. The current Turkish government initially established its wide electoral support on the basis of its economic performance, which gave rise to a PPS in 2011. However, the Turkish government has been tarnished in recent years by corruption allegations, especially since 2013. This paper applies a three-choice multinomial logit model to 2014 survey data to examine voter preference between the incumbent party, opposition parties, and neither in Turkey under its PPS. The results supported both hypotheses.

Does Corruption End the Dominant Party System? A Comparative Analysis of the Italian and Turkish Cases

This article argues that the effects of high-level corruption scandals on the future of a dominant party depend on the existence of a rule of law system based on the separation of powers. The article will study two examples from a comparative perspective to concretise its theoretical claims: the Christian Democracy Party in Italy, which was the dominant party from 1948 to 1992, and the Justice and Development Party in Turkey. The comparison will be based on an institutionalist perspective. The first part tries to provide a theoretical clarification of the concepts of predominant party systems and corruption. The second part discusses whether the Turkish and Italian party systems can be classified as predominant and the characteristics of these systems. The final section seeks to draw out similarities and differences between these two systems and the effects corruption has on them.