Abstract
AbstractThis paper discusses the role of the electoral system in making the Justice and Development Party (AKP) dominant. Drawing on Sartori’s framework, we first clarify the concept of a predominant party system. Second, we examine the impact of the electoral system on the emergence of a predominant party system in Turkey. Analysing election results, we argue that the electoral system fosters dominance in three ways. First, a combination of electoral formula, national threshold and district threshold leads to over‐representation of large parties and under‐representation of small ones. Second, the fear of a wasted vote due to the high threshold prompts voters to support their second‐best option, which concentrates the votes among large parties. Finally, the electoral system increases electoral turnout rates by extending polarization.
Highlights
Under its AKP governments, Turkey’s party system has transformed into a predominant party system (Ayan-Musil 2015; Cß arkoglu 2011; Esen and Ciddi 2011; Gu€mu€ßsßcu€ 2013; Keyman 2012 and Mu€ftu€ler-Baßc).1 In accounting for this phenomenon, scholars have mostly emphasized the role of religion (e.g., Eligu€r 2010; Hale and O€ zbudun 2009; Tugal 2009; Yeßsilada and Rubin 2011) or neoliberal transformation (e.g., Bozkurt 2013; Gambetti 2009; Gu€mu€ßsßcu€ 2010; O€ nißs and Sßenses 2009)
Drawing on Sartori, we suggest that a dominant party is one that wins at least three consecutive elections in a competitive political environment with more than a 10 per cent margin and plays a major role in government formation
Using a conceptual framework adopted from Sartori, we argued that to transform any party system into a predominant one, a predominant party must win at least three consecutive elections with more than a 10 per cent margin, and set up a one-party government in a competitive political environment
Summary
Under its AKP governments, Turkey’s party system has transformed into a predominant party system (Ayan-Musil 2015; Cß arkoglu 2011; Esen and Ciddi 2011; Gu€mu€ßsßcu€ 2013; Keyman 2012 and Mu€ftu€ler-Baßc).1 In accounting for this phenomenon, scholars have mostly emphasized the role of religion (e.g., Eligu€r 2010; Hale and O€ zbudun 2009; Tugal 2009; Yeßsilada and Rubin 2011) or neoliberal transformation (e.g., Bozkurt 2013; Gambetti 2009; Gu€mu€ßsßcu€ 2010; O€ nißs and Sßenses 2009). Performance legitimacy theory,10 which posits that predominant party systems emerge because of dominant government parties’ remarkable economic performance, fails to account for the rising vote share of the AKP in the November 2015 elections despite deteriorating economic indicators since 2008 (Acemoglu and Ußcer 2015; Co€mert and Cß olak 2014).11 the decision-centric model,12 which assumes that dominant parties conquer the centre and represent the median voter (Arian and Barnes 1974; Cox 1997; Greene 2007; Riker 1976), does not fit the Turkish case, since the AKP is a right-wing party that incorporates neoliberalism, conservatism and selective nationalism in its political appeal.13
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