Pre-existing Distortionary Taxes Research Articles

A Second-Best Analysis of Alternative Instruments for the Preservation of Natural Resources

The literature on second-best environmental taxation provides us with a broad understanding of the welfare impacts of pollution regulation. However, most of the research undertaken to date has focused on environmental pollution, while other topics in environmental economics, such as the preservation of natural resources, have not warranted much attention in the optimal taxation literature. This paper uses a simple general-equilibrium model to analyze the welfare effects of taxes on final goods, taxes on natural resources, and extraction permits with a second-best approach based on the existence of initial distortionary taxes. This analysis not only takes into account the non-use utility of the mere existence of natural resources, but also captures the consequences of enjoying environmental goods on labor supply decisions, through the use-value attributed to natural resources. The comparison of the welfare impacts of a tax on final consumption and a tax on the use of natural resources is not conclusive. A consumption tax leads to a higher primary welfare effect than a resources tax, while taxing natural goods generates more revenue-recycling income than taxing consumption goods. In addition, as extraction permits do not generate new public revenues to reduce pre-existing distortionary taxes, this intervention entails the highest welfare costs.

How robust is the uniform emissions pricing rule to social equity concerns?

This paper examines pollution tax differentiation across industries in light of social equity concerns using theoretical and numerical general equilibrium analyses in an optimal tax framework. We characterize the drivers for non-uniform optimal taxes stemming from the interaction of household heterogeneity with social preferences. Quantitatively assessing the case of price-based CO2 emissions control in the U.S. economy, we find that uniform emissions pricing is approximately optimal when social concerns are defined over inequity induced by the environmental tax. The deviation from uniform emissions pricing, however, becomes non-negligible when pollution tax rebates deviate much from optimal transfer schemes or when social concerns are defined over both policy-induced impacts and inequity unrelated to environmental policy. Our results are robust to a number of model extensions including the stringency of the environmental target, downstream vs. upstream taxation, pre-existing distortionary taxes, and parametric uncertainty in firms’ and households’ equilibrium tax responses.

Green tax reform, endogenous innovation and the growth dividend

We study theoretically and numerically the effects of an environmental tax reform using endogenous growth theory. In the theoretical segment, mobile labor between manufacturing and R&D activities, and elasticity of substitution between labor and energy in manufacturing lower than unity allow for a growth dividend, even if we consider preexisting tax distortions. The scope for innovation is reduced when we consider direct financial investment in the lab, or elastic labor supply. We then apply the core theoretical model to a real growing economy and find that a boost in long-run economic growth following such a carbon policy is a possible outcome. Redistribution of additional carbon tax revenue by lowering capital taxation performs best in terms of effciency measured by aggregate welfare. In terms of equity among social segments the progressive character of lump-sum redistribution fails when we consider very high emissions reduction targets.

Introducing Carbon Taxes in Russia: The Relevance of Tax-Interaction Effects

Abstract The theoretical literature on the double-dividend concept is mainly focused on pre-existing distortionary taxes in the labour and capital markets; the relevance of interactions with other taxes is often neglected. Using an analytical model and a numerical general equilibrium model, we analyse the welfare effects of carbon taxes and their interaction with other taxes applied in Russia. We find that substituting carbon taxes for labour taxes in Russia can substantially reduce the cost of carbon taxation compared to returning carbon tax revenues to households in lump-sum form and can even result in welfare gains in Russia. In conclusion, introducing carbon taxes has an indirect corrective effect with respect to the distorting effect of export taxation on energy resources. Furthermore, welfare costs of carbon taxation can be significant under the assumption of perfect international mobility of capital. Nevertheless, the cost can be more than compensated in case of a high carbon trade price.

Real Effects of Money Growth and Optimal Rate of Inflation in a Cash‐in‐Advance Economy with Labor‐Market Frictions

This paper studies the consequences of labor‐market frictions for the real effects of steady inflation when cash is required for households' consumption purchases and firms' wage payments. Money growth may generate a positive real effect by encouraging vacancy creation and raising job matches. This may result in a positive optimal rate of inflation, particularly in an economy with moderate money injections to firms and with nonnegligible labor‐market frictions in which wage bargains are not efficient. This main finding holds for a wide range of money injection schemes, with alternative cash constraints, and in a second‐best world with preexisting distortionary taxes.

Planes, ships and taxes: charging for international aviation and maritime emissions

International aviation and maritime transport account for a significant and growing share of global carbon emissions. Yet they are not only excluded from the Kyoto agreement and all current carbon pricing schemes, but do not even pay fuel excises of the type standard for other transport activities. Moreover, each sector benefits from preferential tax treatment – failure to charge VAT on international aviation, and the application of tonnage tax regimes rather than the normal corporate tax in maritime. This paper considers the design of fuel charges in these sectors to address these distortions, and quantifies their impact on emissions, revenue and welfare – showing, amongst other things, that the gain from offsetting the pre-existing tax distortions may be as significant as those from reducing emissions. It shows, too, how compensation schemes can be designed to protect the poorest countries – a key ingredient in the politics of the issue, given the practical need for wide applicability of such charges. The real challenge is to amass the degree of international cooperation required (especially strong for maritime), failure of which to some degree explains their current under-taxation – and, unsurprisingly, to decide who gets the money. Technically, these charges should, if anything, be rather easy to implement. — Michael Keen, Ian Parry and Jon Strand

Options for Returning the Value of CO2 Emissions Allowances to Households

This paper examines alternative ways that the value of CO2 emissions allowances created under cap-and-trade policy could be returned to households. One approach (based on principles of economic efficiency) is effectively a that would use revenues from an auction of CO2 emissions allowances to reduce preexisting distortionary taxes. A second approach (based on principles of property rights for common-pool resources), known as cap-and-dividend, would refund allowance value as equal lump-sum cash transfers to households. Economic theory suggests (with some caveats) that a tax shift would be considerably less costly to the overall economy. In contrast, cap-and-dividend provides ample compensation for low-income households, though it appears to be more costly than other approaches, including perhaps well-designed regulatory policies. A dividend approach might be combined with other policies to provide incentives for households to invest in energy-efficient technologies and thereby lower the costs of the carbon policy.

The hedge value of international emissions trading under uncertainty

This paper estimates the value of international emissions trading, focusing on a here-to-fore neglected component; its value as a hedge against uncertainty. Much analysis has been done of the Kyoto Protocol and other potential international greenhouse gas mitigation policies comparing the costs of achieving emission targets with and without trading. These studies often show large cost reductions for all Parties under trading compared to a no trading case. We investigate the welfare gains of including emissions trading in the presence of uncertainty in economic growth rates, using both a partial equilibrium model based on marginal abatement cost curves and a computable general equilibrium model. We find that the hedge value of international trading is small relative to its value in reallocating emissions reductions when the burden sharing scheme does not resemble a least cost allocation. We also find that the effects of pre-existing tax distortions and terms of trade dominate the hedge value of trading. We conclude that the primary value of emissions trading in international agreements is as a burden sharing or wealth transfer mechanism and should be judged accordingly.

The double dividend from carbon regulations in Japan

Using a multisector dynamic CGE model, this paper examines the double dividend from carbon regulations in Japan. The model has 27 sectors and goods (eight goods generate carbon emissions) and covers 100 years (from 1995 to 2095). When carbon regulations are introduced, pre-existing taxes are reduced, keeping government's revenue constant. Our main findings are summarized as follows. First, the weak double dividend arises in all scenarios. This means that by using revenues from carbon tax to finance reductions in pre-existing distortionary taxes, one can achieve cost savings relative to the case where the tax revenues are returned to households in lump-sum fashion. Second, the strong double dividend does not arise from reductions in labor and consumption taxes, but it does from reductions in capital tax. The second result is attributable to the nature of the pre-existing tax system in Japan where capital taxes are more distortionary than labor and consumption taxes. J. Japanese Int. Economies 21 (3) (2007) 336–364.

Modeling Economy-wide vs Sectoral Climate Policies Using Combined Aggregate-Sectoral Models

Economic analyses of climate change policies frequently focus on reductions of energy-related carbon dioxide emissions via market-based, economy-wide policies. The current course of environment and energy policy debate in the United States, however, suggests an alternative outcome: sector-based and/or inefficiently designed policies. This paper uses a collection of specialized, sector-based models in conjunction with a computable general equilibrium model of the economy to examine and compare these policies at an aggregate level. We examine the relative cost of different policies designed to achieve the same quantity of emission reductions. We find that excluding a limited number of sectors from an economy-wide policy does not significantly raise costs. Focusing policy solely on the electricity and transportation sectors doubles costs, however, and using non-market policies can raise cost by a factor of ten. These results are driven in part by, and are sensitive to, our modeling of pre-existing tax distortions.

Environmental Policy and Public Revenue with International Capital Mobility

In the presence of preexisting distortionary taxes, it is often argued that auctioned emission permits are preferable to non-auctioned permits, because the former generate revenues that may be used to reduce other taxes. This paper shows that when capital is internationally mobile, it may be optimal to use a combination of non-auctioned and auctioned emission permits, for both environmental and fiscal reasons. By letting the number of non-auctioned permits be a positive function of the amount of capital used domestically, they will attract capital to the home country. This may create environmental benefits in terms of reduced transboundary pollution and may lead to increased public revenue because the price of emission permits may increase and because the tax base may be enhanced. It is also shown that the optimal number of non-auctioned permits may increase as the marginal costs of public funds increase.

Environmental quality, the macroeconomy, and intergenerational distribution

The paper studies the dynamic allocation effects and intergenerational welfare consequences of environmental taxes. To this end, environmental externalities are introduced in a Blanchard–Yaari overlapping generations model of a small open economy. A rise in environmental taxes – taking into account pre-existing distortionary taxes and endogenous labor supply – is shown to yield an efficiency gain if agents care enough for the environment. The benefits are unevenly distributed across generations because agents are heterogeneous in their capital ownership. An accompanying debt policy can be designed – prescribing debt accumulation at impact and debt redemption in the new steady state – to ensure everybody gains to the same extent. With lump-sum recycling of environmental tax revenue, aggregate employment is unaffected in the short run, but falls in the long run. Furthermore, it raises environmental quality more in the long run than in the short run. Recycling revenue through a cut in labor taxes, however, is shown to yield a rise in employment in the short run, which disappears during transition. In the new steady state, environmental quality is higher at the expense of a lower level of employment.

The Cost of Reducing Gasoline Consumption

High nominal gas prices, new awareness of threats to national security, and growing concern about global warming have reignited discussion of ways to reduce gasoline consumption in the United States. Debate centers on changing two policies already in place: the federal gas tax and Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards. Two influential recent reports find that increasing the gas tax would attain a given reduction in gas consumption at lower cost than would tightening CAFE standards (National Research Council, 2002; Congressional Budget Office, 2003). The gas tax has this advantage because it encourages not just increases in fuel efficiency, but also reductions in miles driven. In contrast, CAFE standards actually encourage more driving, because increases in fuel efficiency reduce the cost of gas per mile driven. We also compare the costs of the gas tax and CAFE standard but take into account interactions with preexisting tax distortions. Many papers examine the effects of these tax interactions in other contexts, but to our knowledge none of them considers the CAFE standard (see e.g., Lars Bovenberg and Ruud de Mooij, 1994; Ian Parry, 1995; Lawrence Goulder, 1995; Bovenberg and Goulder, 1996; Parry et al., 1999; Don Fullerton and Gilbert Metcalf, 2001). These interactions reduce the cost of the gas tax but increase the cost of CAFE, thus expanding the cost advantage enjoyed by the gas tax. This difference does not arise because the gas tax raises revenue, while the CAFE standard does not. Rather, this result is similar to that in West and Williams (2004a), which showed that, since gasoline and leisure are relative complements, raising the gas tax will increase labor supply, generating additional efficiency gains. In this paper, we estimate a consumer demand system using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey and the California Air Resources Board and find that miles driven and leisure are relative complements. Thus, the gas tax encourages labor supply by raising the cost per mile driven, producing an additional efficiency gain. Conversely, because CAFE reduces the cost per mile, it discourages labor supply and yields an additional efficiency loss. While the induced changes in labor supply are tiny relative to the labor market, they are still substantial relative to the gas market and thus have a dramatic effect on the relative costs of the two policies. Our point estimates imply that they reduce the social marginal cost of the gas tax (starting from the status quo gas tax rate and ignoring the benefits of reduced gas consumption) by almost 30 percent, while increasing the marginal cost of CAFE by nearly 60 percent. This result implies that the case for raising the gas tax rather than tightening the CAFE standard is far stronger than previous studies suggest. Indeed, it strongly suggests that any tightening at all of the CAFE standard would lower welfare unless the benefits of reduced gas consumption have been seriously underestimated.

Prices versus Quantities in a Second-Best Setting

The choice between taxes and tradable permits has been independently analysed by two distinct research traditions. The first proceeds from Weitzman's partial equilibrium sto- chastic model and concludes that a tax should be preferred if the marginal abatement cost curve is steeper than the marginal environmental benefit curve. The second utilises deter- ministic general equilibrium models with pre-existing distortionary taxes. It concludes that non-revenue-raising instruments (e.g., grandfathered tradable permits) are costlier than rev- enue-raising ones (e.g., a tax on every unit of pollution or auctioned permits). To build a bridge between these two traditions, we introduce in Weitzman's model a positive cost of public funds due to pre-existing distortionary taxes. The tax admits a greater comparative advantage over the permits, as compared to Weitzman's classical result. Then, we assume that the regulated industry blocks any proposal that poses it too high an expected burden. This may require a transfer to firms, in the form of freely-allocated permits or lump-sum tax rebate. It turns out that if this acceptability constraint is binding, then the comparative advantage of taxes over permits is still reinforced. Quantitatively, even if the marginal benefit function is 50% more steeply sloped than the marginal cost function, the price instrument should be preferred. We also compare the expected net benefit of these two instruments to a contingent instrument which leads to the ex post optimum. The superiority of the contingent instrument over the quantity one is higher than in first-best.

Environmental Quality, the Macroeconomy, and Intergenerational Distribution

The paper studies the dynamic allocation effects and intergenerational welfare consequences of environmental taxes. To this end, environmental externalities are introduced in a Blanchard-Yaari overlapping generations model of a small open economy. A rise in environmental taxes-taking into account pre-existing distortionary taxes and endogenous labor supply - is shown to yield an effciency gain if agents care enough for the environment. The benefts are unevenly distributed across generations because agents are heterogeneous in their capital ownership. An accompanying debt policy can be designed prescribing debt accumulation at impact and debt redemption in the new steady state - to ensure everybody gains to the same extent. With lump-sum recycling of environmental tax revenue, aggregate employment is unaffected in the short run, but falls in the long run. It raises environmental quality more in the long run than in the short run. Recycling revenue through a cut in labor taxes, however, is shown to yield a rise in employment in the short run, which disappears during transition. In the new steady state, environmental quality is higher at the expense of a lower level of employment.

Taxes and Transport Externalites

The paper reviews the role of taxation in controlling transport externalities. It argues that the design of transport taxes should take into account pre-existing tax distortions in the economy and looks at the implications of restrictions on the transport instruments at the disposal of the policy maker. The relevance of equity considerations for transport pricing is also explored.

Fiscal Interactions and the Case for Carbon Taxes Over Grandfathered Carbon Permits

This paper provides simple formulas for adjusting the costs of carbon taxes and tradable carbon permits to account for interactions with pre-existing tax distortions in the labour market. Both policies reduce labour supply as they increase product prices and reduce real household wages; the resulting efficiency losses in the labour market can be substantial relative to partial equilibrium abatement costs. However, much of this added cost can be offset, and perhaps more than offset when additional distortions from the tax system are considered, if revenues from carbon taxes or auctioned permits are used to reduce distortionary taxes. Consequently, there can be a strong case on efficiency grounds for using carbon taxes or auctioned permits over grandfathered carbon permits. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

Taxes and Transport Externalities

The paper reviews the role of taxation in controlling transport externalities. It argues that the design of transport taxes should take into account pre-existing tax distortions in the economy and looks at the implications of restrictions on the transport instruments at the disposal of the policy maker. the relevance of equity considerations for transport pricing is also explored.

Tax distortions and global climate policy

We consider the efficiency implications of policies to reduce global carbon emissions in a world with pre-existing tax distortions. We first note that the weak double dividend, the proposition that the welfare improvement from a tax reform where environmental taxes are used to lower distorting taxes must be greater than the welfare improvement from a reform where the environmental taxes are returned in a lump sum fashion, need not hold in a world with multiple distortions. We then present a large-scale computable general equilibrium model of the world economy with distortionary taxation. We use this model to evaluate a number of policies to reduce carbon emissions. We find that the weak double dividend is not obtained in a number of European countries. Results also demonstrate the point that the interplay between carbon policies and pre-existing taxes can differ markedly across countries. Thus, one must be cautious in extrapolating the results from a country specific analysis to other countries.

Assessing the impact of carbon tax differentiation in the European Union

To what extent do the welfare costs associated with the implementation of the Burden Sharing Agreement in the European Union depend on sectoral allocation of emissions rights? What are the prospects for strategic climate policy to favor domestic production? This paper attempts to answer those questions using a CGE model featuring a detailed representation of the European economies. First, numerical simulations show that equalizing marginal abatement costs across domestic sectors greatly reduces the burden of the emissions constraint but also that other allocations may be preferable for some countries because of pre-existing tax distortions. Second, we show that the effect of a single country's attempt to undertake a strategic policy to limit impacts on its domestic energy-intensive industries has mixed effects. Exempting energy-intensive industries from the reduction program is a costly solution to maintain the international competitiveness of these industries; a tax-cum-subsidy approach is shown to be better than exemption policy to sustain exports. The welfare impact either policy – exemption or subsidy – on other European countries is likely to be small because of general equilibrium effects.