Pragmatist View Research Articles

The idealist and pragmatist view of qi in tai chi and qigong: A narrative commentary and review

Qi, often translated as “vital energy,” is a central concept in tai chi and qigong that has puzzled physicians, scientists, and people in the West. To date, qi is not falsifiable by the scientific method and thus cannot be subject to scientific inquiry, leading many to criticize it as “pseudoscientific.” Even as medical research reveals the health benefits of tai chi and qigong, many wonder how to treat this seemingly outdated concept when promoting these meditative practices. While some tai chi and qigong practitioners insist on the existence of qi, more skeptical thinkers suggest that a scientific understanding should replace this “superstitious” idea. Integrative health professionals must be equipped to discuss this concept intelligently by considering a couple of subtle, clarifying points often missing from the discussion. First, science’s inability to verify qi’s existence does not affirm its nonexistence. In fact, under the philosophical system of idealism, qi might not be said to be less real than things that are verifiable by science. Similarly, under the instrumental and pragmatic view of science, health professionals should be cautious not to declare what is metaphysically real or unreal but instead what is useful and not useful. Second, even though qi may be pseudoscientific, it remains useful and indispensable to the correct practice of tai chi and qigong. Tai chi and qigong practitioners routinely visualize and perceive the flow of qi to guide their movements, breathing, and mental activity. As such, qi and related metaphysical concepts serve as a useful mental model during practice, and belief in them may be viewed as an “expedient means” to achieve one’s health goals.

A pragmatic path for strategic design: Influences from industrial design, cognitive studies and management sciences

Strategic design is a research field that was born in Italy, specifically at the Politecnico di Milano. Approaches with the same designation have been observed in other scientific communities, but they tend to be weakly in its theoretical perspectives. In this paper, an approach that derive from strategic design in its Italian roots is described, which is here broadly descried as pragmatic strategic design (PSD). The basis of the pragmatist view on this research field is explored, and the key characteristics of PSD are described. PSD is committed with real-life practical applications of Design in organizations. It privileges practice-based action, but extrapolates mere technical approaches, preferring to design product-service-systems. PSD is multidisciplinary. The variables that will be considered in the design are operationally described. It is concerned with user experience, since it represents a strategic issue for many organizations. It deals with intuition though metadesign. PSD is focused on for preferred outcomes, rather than for likely ones.Key-words: strategic design, pragmatic strategic design, pragmatic design, pragmatism.

Theoretical explanation, understanding and prediction in management studies

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to question whether the management studies is rigorous and/or relevant is a recurrent debate in the discipline. There is reason to believe that this dichotomy is simplistic as relevance is a consequence of rigor (defined in a variety of ways in the literature), whereas the epistemic value of rigor must per se be examined in more detail.Design/methodology/approachDrawing on the study of the analytical philosophy of Donald Davidson, rigor is here conceptualized as the capacity to examine how intersubjective meaning is constituted on the basis of the semantics of the everyday language.FindingsIn Davidson’s pragmatist view, individual beliefs are established through communication, and beliefs generate preferences and “pro-attitudes” that result in social action. Using Ian Hacking’s term undoing as a critique of a proposition or idea as being no contender for truth (or some other quality) at all, the paper questions the proposition that scientific rigor can be operationalized as the use of data collection and analysis methods developed in other and more authoritative disciplines, e.g. economics. On the contrary, to make accurate descriptions of beliefs, preferences and actions on the basis of the use of everyday language is the mark of scientific rigor in management studies.Originality/valueThe paper addresses the question of how rigorous research in management studies is essentially a matter of explanation, and that explanation, in turn, demands a more elaborate theory of action. The paper also introduces the work of Donald Davidson as an important figure when theorizing action.

Oyunu Kurallarına Göre Oynamak: Richard Rorty ve Ahlak

Richard Rorty'nin felsefesi, Wittgenstein'ın dil oyunları nosyonunu kendi düşüncesine adapte ettiği "söz dağarcıkları" kavramı çerçevesinde anlamını bulur. Pragmatizmin Darwinci evrim görüşü çerçevesinde dili insanın çevresiyle başa çıkmak için geliştirdiği bir alet olarak düşünmesi ve Wittgenstein'in dili kendi kuralları olan bir oyun olarak ele aldığı teorinin senteziyle ortaya çıkan görüş, Rorty'de insanın sadece kendi çevresiyle uyum iletişim kurduğu değil, kendisini, çevresini ve hatta Varlığı anlamlandırdığı düşünsel bir çerçeveye dönüşür. Tam bu noktada bir dilin içine doğan insan, çevresiyle olan bütün ilişkileriyle beraber ahlaka dair yargılarını ve değerlerini bu dili konuşmaya başlayarak elde eder. Bir dili öğrenmek, bir oyunu öğrenmektir. Bu çerçeve içinde ahlak, toplumsal dayanışma ve bir aradalığın gereği olarak ortaya konulan dil oyununun kurallarından ibarettir.

Analysis and Explanation in the Philosophical Investigations

In Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, one can find a number of remarks that could be seen as antithetical to classic philosophical analysis. There are passages seemingly rejecting the ideas of concept decomposition, regression to first principles, and semantic substitution. The criticism, I argue, is aimed not at analysis in particular, but rather at some idealizations that pervade a certain picture of philosophy. This picture can be contrasted with Wittgenstein’s pragmatist view of explanations of meaning which, I believe, can inform a different attitude towards philosophical method that aligns well with a vision of philosophy as conversation. If we think of philosophy as engaging in the development and exchange of explanations of meaning, we can see how various methods can coexist insofar as they are useful, and as long as the urge to sublimate them beyond our practices can be avoided.

Anthropomorphism in Human-Animal Interactions: A Pragmatist View.

This paper explores anthropomorphism in human–animal interactions from the theoretical perspectives of pragmatism and anthropology of human–animal communication. Its aim is to challenge the conception of anthropomorphism as the attribution/inference of human properties to a non-human animal – particularly as a special case of the theory of mind. The author’s goal is to articulate a plausible an alternative conception of anthropomorphism as a situated direct perception of human properties by someone who is engaged in a given situation and sensitive to what the animal is doing to them. Rooted in pragmatist theory as well as in contemporary anthropological studies, this paper offers an original perspective for in depth ethnographic and empirical studies of anthropomorphism-in-situation. Such studies could bring new insights in the study of how ordinary people make sense of animal behaviors in real-life situations.

Quantum Theory: Realism or Pragmatism?

Durante su larga y extraordinariamente productiva carrera, Hilary Putnam flirteó de
 vez en cuando con el pragmatism. Pero su realismo científico aportó un punto fijo
 para sus intentos de interpretar la teoría cuántica. Recientemente he defendido que
 los tratamientos pragmatistas de la representación, la explicación y la probabilidad
 son claves para comprender cómo usamos la teoría cuántica con tanto éxito y, así,
 como debería ser interpretada. Para Putnam, el realismo científico es en sí mismo una
 hipótesis científica que explica el éxito de la ciencia. Si estoy en lo correcto, el éxito
 de la teoría cuántica debilita esta clase de realismo científico mientras que apoya un
 pragmatismo rival. El realismo científico permanece inmune a la refutación empírica
 si se ve no como una hipótesis científica sino como un ideal regulativo. Pero una pers-
 pectiva pragmatista de la teoría cuántica plantea un desafío a una cierta clase de realismo
 metafísico.

A pragmatist view on two accounts of the nature of our ‘connection’ with the past: Hayden White and David Carr thirty years later

Hayden White’s and David Carr’s most recent works can be viewed as a weakening of their earlier, more provocative stances emphasizing the core practical and ethical concerns involved in any consideration of the past. White’s distinction between the practical past and the historical past and Carr’s search for historical experience appear now to limit the practical consequences of their previous arguments. In this article, I consider John Dewey’s illuminating reflections on the pragmatist notion of the ‘practical’ and of ‘practical meaning’ in relation to the knowledge of the past (for contemporary philosophy of history in general and for the narrativist philosophy of history in particular). The meaning of our beliefs or ideas is understood and evaluated in terms of their practical consequences, where practical consequences do not mean utility but future procedures of justification.

Perceptions of aquaculture ecolabels: A multi-stakeholder approach in Nova Scotia, Canada

Ecolabelling is a tool increasingly used to support sustainable aquaculture management across the world. Proponents argue that ecolabels can offer economic benefits, improve transparency of fish farms, and address some of the ecological and socio-economic concerns of intensive marine finfish aquaculture. Exploring how ecolabelling schemes are valued and perceived can help evaluate their potential acceptance, use, and benefits. However, most perception studies explore consumer opinions and demand; few investigate the perceptions of a range of stakeholders at various points in the supply-chain. In this study, Q-methodology was used to explore the perceptions of six aquaculture-related stakeholder groups (fish farming industry, food industry, scientists, management, wild capture fishing industry, and environmental groups) towards ecolabelling of finfish aquaculture in Nova Scotia, Canada. Twenty-five participants sorted and ranked how much they agreed or disagreed with 49 different statements about the potential uptake, benefits, challenges, and influence of ecolabelling within the aquaculture industry. The analysis revealed four defining factors, or shared ‘perspectives’ which included: the optimist view, the skeptic view, the pragmatist view, and the improver view. Stakeholders agreed on likely market benefits, but also saw confusion and credibility as biggest barriers to successful ecolabelling. Conflicting viewpoints and significant disagreement on the potential for ecolabels to address environmental and socio-economic concerns suggests that labels may not be an effective tool for improving social acceptance. This paper argues that studying perceptions can lead to a better understanding of how ecolabels communicate, identify areas of improvement, and provide insight for their use for sustainable resource management.

Defending Scientific Realism Without Relying on Inference to the Best Explanation

Explanationist strategies for defending epistemological scientific realism (ESR) make heavy use of a particular version of inference to the best explanation known as the no-miracle argument. I consider ESR to be a genuinely philosophical—non-naturalistic—thesis which contends that there are strong arguments to believe in some non-observational claims made by scientific theories that are partially observationally correct. In this paper, I examine the grounds of the strength of these arguments from what I call a contemplative perspective which focuses on the end products, i.e. theories, of the scientific activity as opposed to the pragmatist view which considers science to be primarily an activity. I briefly rehearse the main difficulties of the no-miracle argument and of inference to the best explanation in general. I argue that a convincing defence of ESR should be based on the empirically ascertained reality of causal connections between theoretical entities which possess properties that are in principle observable (OP properties) and the results of measurements or observations. The knowledge of those causal connections may well deliver an—even the best—explanation of the appearances. But belief in the existence of some unobservable entities is mainly justified by their empirically attested causal role, not on their possible explanatory function.

Emerging Intentionality in Routine Dynamics: A Pragmatist View

This paper responds to recent interest in the role of intentionality in the internal dynamics of routines. Previous research has focused on how routine participants bring particular intentions to the performance of a routine and choose the means for accomplishing the pre-defined ends accordingly. Drawing on the pragmatist theory of action and a yearlong ethnographic study of a pharmaceutical company, we uncover “emerging intentionality” in routine performances. We show how the foregrounding of means within the concrete situation at hand might lead to the emergence of new ends to pursue. Moreover, we find that the emergence of new ends in routine performances might result in updating the goals for the routine and its associated patterns. With these findings, we contribute to a better understanding of the full spectrum of intentional action in routine dynamics, ranging from purposeful action (foregrounding ends) to purposive action (foregrounding means). This expanded perspective on intentionality in routin...

Probabilidad y contratos. Sobre el pragmatismo de Roberto Torretti

I want to expand the pragmatist view of probability advocated by Roberto Torretti, drawing on the propensity approach. In the first part, I will show how the concept of mathematical expectation originally formalized an Aristotelian principle of justice. In the second half, I will present the game-theoretic approach to probability developed by Shafer and Vovk, showing how it allows us to interpret the original normativity of mathematical expectations. I will finally discuss how this latter view contributes to a pragmatist understanding of probability, as Torretti advocates, although with broader foundations than the physical symmetries of standard propensities.

Probabilidad y contratos. Sobre el pragmatismo de Roberto Torretti

I want to expand the pragmatist view of probability advocated by Roberto Torretti, drawing on the propensity approach. In the first part, I will show how the concept of mathematical expectation originally formalized an Aristotelian principle of justice. In the second half, I will present the game-theoretic approach to probability developed by Shafer and Vovk, showing how it allows us to interpret the original normativity of mathematical expectations. I will finally discuss how this latter view contributes to a pragmatist understanding of probability, as Torretti advocates, although with broader foundations than the physical symmetries of standard propensities.

A pragmatist view of the metaphysics of entanglement

Quantum entanglement is widely believed to be a feature of physical reality with undoubted (though debated) metaphysical implications. But Schrodinger introduced entanglement as a theoretical relation between representatives of the quantum states of two systems. Entanglement represents a physical relation only if quantum states are elements of physical reality. So arguments for metaphysical holism or nonseparability from entanglement rest on a questionable view of quantum theory. Assignment of entangled quantum states predicts experimentally confirmed violation of Bell inequalities. Can one use these experimental results to argue directly for metaphysical conclusions? No. Quantum theory itself gives us our best explanation of violations of Bell inequalities, with no superluminal causal influences and no metaphysical holism or nonseparability—but only if quantum states are understood as objective and relational, though prescriptive rather than ontic. Correct quantum state assignments are backed by true physical magnitude claims: but backing is not grounding. Quantum theory supports no general metaphysical holism or nonseparability; though a claim about a compound physical system may be significant and true while similar claims about its components are neither. Entanglement may well have have few, if any, first-order metaphysical implications. But the quantum theory of entanglement has much to teach the metaphysician about the roles of chance, causation, modality and explanation in the epistemic and practical concerns of a physically situated agent.

¿Puede realmente una mayoría estar equivocada?

<p class='p1'>Este trabajo se centra en la concepción rortiana de la justificación epistémica como el consenso asertivo comunitario y pretende ofrecer un argumento en contra de la identificación de ambas nociones. La crítica explota la perspectiva pragmatista que Rorty defiende: se propone entender que los estándares de justificación son históricocontextuales y se trata de mostrar que la reducción de la justificación al consenso entra en conflicto con esta idea. Para ello primero se exponen y evalúan los argumentos de Putnam contra la concepción rortiana que giran en torno del problema del relativismo, así como las réplicas de Rorty. En segundo lugar se arguye que nuestra noción de sentido común de la justificación impide la identificación entre justificación y consenso, y abre la posibilidad de que una comunidad pueda estar mayoritariamente equivocada respecto de cuáles creencias están justificadas.</p>

Pragmatism and new directions in social and environmental accountability research

Purpose– The purpose of this paper is threefold. To clarify what is meant by “pragmatism” as a philosophy for social and environmental accountability (SEA) research, to survey its use within this research field and to explore how a further pursuit of pragmatism may extend this research field.Design/methodology/approach– An extensive review of the SEA literature was conducted in order to determine what aspects of the philosophy of pragmatism have been used within the research. The authors organised the discussion of the literature around the pragmatist ideas of “truth” and “sensemaking”.Findings– SEA research is a heterogeneous space in which various ideas are commonly attributed to the philosophical notion of pragmatism. However, there is a tension in the literature between seeing accounting as a medium for representing social and environmental organisational activities and a pragmatist view of accountings as a way of allowing managers and stakeholder to make sense of these same activities.Research limitations/implications– A clearer development of the ideas of pragmatism may be used to redirect the focus of SEA research in a number of useful ways. Seeing accounting as a medium of sensemaking between organisations and their stakeholders allows the authors to widen the exploration of accounting not only to the production of reports but also their interpretation by users. The ideas of pragmatism also allow the authors to explore the ways stakeholders might affect change within organisations and how accounting may support this process rather than capture or limit it.Practical implications– This paper concludes by providing a set of methodological prescriptions for conducting future SEA research in a way that is inspired by pragmatism. It outlines an approach to research that focuses on users and their sensemaking and encourages an exploration of the possible ways accounting may create positive change in organisations.Originality/value– Overall, this paper refines what it means to follow pragmatism within SEA research. It will promote a clearer understanding of how we, as a research community, may engage with practice in more positive ways in order to facilitate corporate social responsibility.

Agire razionale e abiti: una visione non gerarchica

According to William James, on the one side, habits are humble mechanisms; on the other side, in the most important cases they have a very noble genesis. We reject both these ideas insofar as they depend on an old conception of the mind — one that appears to us to be totally inadequate. This is the “pyramidal” conception the mind, which was historically associated with the hierarchical conception of the cerebral functions dating back to the 19th Century. In our view, in order to make the most of James’s conception of habits, one has to uncouple the pragmatist elements of that view from the pyramidal picture of the mind. We conclude that the pragmatist view of habits does not need the pyramidal conception of the mind; neither does it need the connected ideas that habits are, at the same time, humble and noble.

Methodological Considerations in Studying Transformational Leadership and its Outcomes

The current paper aims to discuss the methodology of developing a social-structure explanation of employee work performance, emphasizing the importance of transformational leadership behaviours and the three components of organizational commitment in an Arab context. As this research paper adopted the pragmatist view in exploring the phenomenon, choices of lower-level methodological considerations are influenced by such philosophical perspective. The cross-section ‘snapshot’ descriptive questionnaire survey was considered as the most appropriate research approach to gather information. Statistical techniques were proposed as the means to analyse the data.

Pragmatism as ventriloquism: Creating a dialogue among seven traditions in the study of communication

In this article, I propose to respond to Craig’s (1999) call for a dialogue between what he identified as the seven traditions in the study of communication, as well as Russill’s (2005) positioning of pragmatism as a meta-perspective on the seven others. I show that a way to respond to Craig and Russill consists of considering communication as an activity of ventriloquism, a thesis that is, as I demonstrate, congruent with the pragmatist meta-tradition. Communicating and experiencing the world, according to the pragmatist view, indeed amounts to responding or reacting to what one considers a situation requires, demands or requests, which is precisely what a ventriloqual view tries to analyze and unveil. I then introduce a dialogue between this ventriloqual view of pragmatism and the seven traditions that Craig identified.

PRAGMATIC INTERVENTIONS INTO ENACTIVE AND EXTENDED CONCEPTIONS OF COGNITION

AbstractClear statements of both extended and enactive conceptions of cognition can be found in John Dewey and other pragmatists. In this paper I'll argue that we can find resources in the pragmatists to address two ongoing debates: (1) in contrast to recent disagreements between proponents of extended vs enactive cognition, pragmatism supports a more integrative view—an enactive conception of extended cognition, and (2) pragmatist views suggest ways to answer the main objections raised against extended and enactive conceptions—specifically objections focused on constitution versus causal factors, and the mark of the mental.