Pragmatic Critique Research Articles

A Procedural, Pragmatist Account of Ethical Objectivity

This article offers a procedural, pragmatist account of objectivity in the domain of the good that is inspired by pragmatic and feminist critiques of objectivity in philosophy of science and epistemology. I begin by asking first what we want to capture--or ought to want to capture--with a notion of ethical objectivity and in answer to this question I identify four "points" to ethical objectivity: undergirding the possibility of mistakenness, making genuine disagreement possible, making sense of our appreciation of the ethical perspectives of others, and making possible a sense of ethical improvement or learning. I then lay out a process-based account of objectivity in ethics that makes good on the four points I have identified. Finally, I consider worries related to convergence, bias, and ontology and defend the procedural, pragmatist account in light of those potential objections.

The Logic of Relevance in Independent School Education: A Pragmatic Critique

I offer a pragmatic critique of the use of relevance in independent school education. I examine three meanings of relevance. I analyze the possible components of education which need to become relevant. And I give a critique of the call to make schools relevant through technology. I conclude that advice to make teaching relevant is ambiguous and stands on a shaky philosophical foundation. In place of the current calls for relevance in independent schools, the ideal of free inquiry should become the hallmark of relevance.1. IntroductionThe recent economic downturn has placed tuition driven-schools under increased pressure to retain students. Institutions of higher learning and independent secondary schools have both felt this strain. Unique to independent school marketing and pedagogy, however, is the increased impetus to make education relevant to the consumer, the families paying tuition at independent secondary schools.Several factors help insulate institutions of higher education from this immanent call for relevance. Since colleges and universities hire professors with doctoral degrees, and the training of these professors in doctoral programs takes place with highly professionalized disciplinarity, colleges and universities rarely make sweeping claims to their applicant pools about the way professors teach in order to attract applicants or to enroll those applicants admitted (Menand 2010, 87). Furthermore, professors with tenure have an increased amount of freedom in choosing to teach in a traditional or non-traditional manner or to teach what they consider canonical or to teach outside what the discipline deems canonical.1 Therefore, colleges and universities often make use of extra-pedagogical ways of attracting students. Attractive dorm rooms, recreational facilities, and other enhanced student services play significant roles in the marketing strategies of admissions departments.Independent secondary schools operate in a different environment than institutions of higher education, and many factors contribute to the increased drive for relevance and its distinctiveness to independent schools. In independent secondary schools, which pride themselves on teaching to the needs of individual students, and with faculty less protected by tenure from the demands of administrators, teachers are often asked to make their teaching relevant to the students. Such appeals to the need to make education relevant appear throughout a recent publication of Independent School, an issue dedicated to Teaching in a 2.0 World (2009). However, the authors employing this term do not give us a rigorous account of what relevance means. Therefore, this piece of advice has an odd ring to it, suggesting many things at once. The call for relevance implies that something in the traditional manner of teaching or of the traditional canon of each discipline is of itself not relevant. The advice proposes that we must transform the irrelevant into the relevant. Last, the suggestion insinuates that there is a present relevance to which we must conform our irrelevance.There is a lot to sort our here if we want to understand the logic of the use of the concept of relevance in education. We must determine the various meanings of the term relevance and gauge which meaning is proffered when it is used in educational literature. Only then can we give a critique of the logic and the philosophy of education supporting its use. Of particular interest is the relationship among method, content, skill, medium, and purpose in teaching. We must determine if the merely potentially relevant, which must be transformed into the actually relevant, is the material content we teach, the methods we use, the skills we teach, the medium through which we teach, or the goals of our teaching. That is, by compelling us to make what we teach relevant, which of the following is the teaching expert asking us to transform: ancient history and calculus, the choice of metaphor in explanation, essay writing and problem solving, outlining and working problems on the chalk, dry-erase, or smart board, or the functional consequences which ensue from the successful teaching of any of these? …

A Pragmatic Critique of Corporate Criminal Theory: Atrocity, Commerce and Accountability

Corporate criminal liability is a controversial beast. To a large extent, the controversies surround three core questions: first, whether there is a basic conceptual justification for using a system of criminal justice constructed for individuals against inanimate entities like corporations; second, what value corporate criminal liability could have given co-existent possibilities of civil redress against them; and third, whether corporate criminal liability has any added value over and above individual criminal responsibility of corporate officers. In this paper, I use examples from the frontiers of international criminal justice to criticize all sides of these debates. In particular, I harness the latent possibility of prosecuting corporate actors for the pillage of natural resources and for complicity through the supply of weapons, to highlight the shortcomings of corporate criminal theory to date. Throughout, I draw on principles derived from philosophical and legal pragmatism to reveal a set of recurring analytical flaws in this literature. These include: a tendency to presuppose a perfect single jurisdiction that overlooks globalization, the blind projection of local theories of corporate criminal responsibility onto global corporate practices; and a perspective that sometimes seems insensitive to the plight of the many who have fallen victim to corporate crime in the developing world. To begin anew, we need to embrace a pragmatic theory of corporate criminal liability that is forced upon us in a world as complex, unequal, and dysfunctional as that we presently inhabit.

Distributing Epistemic Authority: Refining Norton’s Pragmatist Approach to Environmental Decision-Making

Environmental pragmatists are committed to analyzing questions of environmental policy. Bryan Norton's pragmatic critique of environmental decision-making shows how an implicit commitment to the fact/value distinction has hindered productive environmental action. Nonetheless, Norton, as well as the majority of environmental ethicists, have devoted more attention to theorizing value disagreements as a primary cause of controversy than to examining epistemic structures. A case study demonstrates why and how Norton's procedural account may be supplemented with sensitive attention to the construction of epistemic authority in environmental disputes. I recommend supporting the development of local knowledges and just distributions of epistemic authority.1. Pragmatism and Environmental Policy-MakingPragmatist environmental philosophers have made noteworthy contributions to persistent philosophical problems in environmental ethics, such as the source of value in nature, the nature of our moral obligations to the environment and to living creatures, and the objectivity of environmental value. But pragmatists have an additional interest beyond these ethical and ontological questions - they believe that philosophers can help make ideas clear in order to improve policy and action. To this end, pragmatists have contributed to debates in agricultural biotechnology (Thompson 2003), ecological restoration (Light 2000), water policy (Thompson 1996), and livestock production (McKenna 2004).In doing so, pragmatist environmental philosophers are following the lead of earlier pragmatists such as John Dewey who recognized that pragmatism can and ought to have real-life practical consequences and should not be limited to debates of a merely academic or scholastic nature. From this standpoint, contemporary pragmatists can contribute to the resolution of environmental problems by examining the process of inquiry and by evaluating procedures for political participation. Thus, pragmatists are well positioned to expand environmental philosophy beyond its current focus on ethics. A broader scope for environmental philosophy ought to include both an epistemological examination of what is known about natural environments and the application of social and political theory to evaluate and improve environmental decisionmaking. Such pragmatist contributions will:a. avoid, disintegrate, demystify, and disarm confusing metaphysical disputes,b. investigate how epistemic practices operate to resolve or, on the other hand, to amplify environmental problems,c. search for practical solutions to environmental controversies that are acceptable to all parties, andd. encourage participants in inquiry to be open to social learning and change.2. Bryan Norton's Pragmatic ProceduralismA good example of this is Bryan Norton wide-ranging account of public environmental decision-making in his recent book Sustainability: A Philosophy of Adaptive Ecosystem Management (2005). Drawing on Deweyan pragmatism, he develops a procedural framework for reaching democratic resolutions to environmental problems. Norton believes that one of the largest obstacles to resolving environmental controversies and to implementing solutions to environmental problems is that people fail to communicate. The role of the philosopher here is twofold: first, to outline and justify general procedures for inquiry and action; and second, to help the parties to disputes make their goals clear as they work toward mutually acceptable (in the ideal case, win-win) solutions.Both of these philosophical goals have Deweyan roots - in other words, Norton has contextualized Deweyan inquiry for the environmental policy arena. To this end, Norton proposes that participants in environmental problem solving pick what he calls indicators. An indicator is a measurable quantity that is tied to an environmental goal. Importantly, Norton holds that the ideological basis for the goal is not directly relevant. …

Dialectical vs. Experimental Method: Marcuse's Review of Dewey's <em>Logic: The Theory of Inquiry</em>

This introduction contextualizes and evaluates Herbert Marcuse’s the accompanying, previously untranslated review of John Dewey’s Logic: The Theory of Inquiry . Marcuse’s critique of pragmatism is indebted to Max Horkheimer’s claim that pragmatism is an example of “traditional” theory and reduces thought to mere instrument in service of external ends. Unlike Horkheimer, Marcuse concedes that Dewey, unlike the logical positivists, attempted to develop a material logic of ends. However, he concludes that the attempt was ultimately unsuccessful. I place this conclusion in the context of Marcuse’s critique of technological reason. Lastly, I defend Dewey from the charge of crude instrumentalism and delineate Marcuse’s and Dewey’s critical disagreement on science’s capacity for self- reflection.

Uniwersalizm i partykularyzm w polityce emancypacji – fałszywa alternatywa

The article deals with the issue of universalism versus particularism and its implication for minority politics. It will be argued that without the problematization of the tension between universalism and particularism the emancipatory potential of minority politics is lost and remains only a declaration. The author begins with the critique of Richard Rorty's pragmatism which disregards the particularist content in every minority politics. Later the author moves on to present Judith Butler's stance towards universalism and he concludes with Ernesto Laclau's theory of agonist democracy where the problem of universalism and particularism is, in the author's view, best taken into account when minority politics is at stake.

A Pragmatic Critique on the Limit to Communicative Reason: Beyond Exteriority to Language, Toward a Form of Life

A Pragmatic Critique on the Limit to Communicative Reason: Beyond Exteriority to Language, Toward a Form of Life

Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder: New Challenges for Definition, Diagnosis, and Treatment

The extensive literature regarding Attention-Deficit/ Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is often overwhelming, even to those most knowledgeable about this behavioral disorder. Consequently, it requires considerable effort to maintain currency about the numerous clinical and scientific advances reported with ever-greater rapidity and through diverse scientific venues. Our intention with this special issue, AttentionDeficit/Hyperactivity Disorder: Recent Findings, Practical Matters and New Conceptualizations, is to provide a pragmatic and cogent critique of how we define, evaluate, diagnose, and treat individuals with ADHD. Concerted collaborative efforts among disciplines have led to generation and testing of theoretical models, identification of etiology with improved diagnostic acumen, application of more effective and varied treatments, and utilization of newer techniques, including neurophysiological, neuroradiological, and molecular genetic advances. We emphasize these accomplishments as they pertain to ADHD. Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, it is also intended that this issue challenge its readers to recognize the inadequacy of the DSM-IV criteria on which we rely for ADHD diagnosis. Sufficient data now exist to reinforce revision of the older assumptions and models that perpetuate their application. This conclusion is reached in light of considerable scientific advances and a natural progression in the concerted efforts made across disciplines to refine our understanding of ADHD. It is our intention to emphasize these within an integrated framework that cap-

A pragmatic critique of three kinds of religious naturalism

AbstractThis paper takes a critical look at a number of recent attempts to reconcile religious and scientifi c ways of thinking. Three basic programs of what I call "religious naturalism" are discussed: (1) attempts to synthesize science and religion by defending a combination of (Christian) theism and naturalism by means of the concept of emergence; (2) "demythologized" interpretations of religious statements, allegedly rendering them compatible with science (for example, in John Dewey's pragmatic naturalism or in the religious naturalism inherited from the Chicago School of liberal theology); and (3) a form of naturalism analogous to Arthur Fine's "natural ontological attitude" (NOA), debated in the philosophy of science over the past two decades. I suggest that (1) amounts to a nonreductively naturalist metaphysics, whereas (2) is a nonmetaphysical and (3) a postmetaphysical program in the philosophy of religion. It is argued, among other things, that while the concept of emergence has become increasingly relevant in the philosophy of mind and science, its place in the philosophy of religion remains obscure. Similarly, nonmetaphysical discussions of religious experiences or "the religious" à la Dewey and his followers are difficult to combine with genuinely religious views. Further, it is hard to see how postmetaphysical naturalism (NOA) could be part of a philosophically responsible program at all, because of its diffi culties in accounting for the normativity of ontological commitments. It is proposed that, instead of elaborating on these pseudo-solutions, the problem of the relation between science and religion should be subordinated to a pragmatist re-evaluation.

Formalism, Pragmatism, and the Conservative Critique of the Eleventh Amendment

This essay reviews John T. Noonan, Jr., Narrowing the Nation's Power: The Supreme Court Sides With the States (Berkeley, University of California Press 2002). Judge Noonan's monograph is a critical review, by a well-known jurist, considered conservative in most circles, of the federalism decisions of the Rehnquist Court. Part I of the essay surveys Noonan's arguments, focusing mainly on his critique of the Eleventh Amendment cases. Liberal academics have been sharply critical of those cases. Part II considers what the position of conservatives has been, or should be, on those cases, especially given that the cases largely ignore interpretative methodologies favored by conservatives in other cases. The first two parts of the essay are mainly concerned with formalist arguments. Drawing on arguments made by Noonan, the third and fourth parts engage in a more pragmatic critique of the cases. Part III considers why the Rehnquist Court has seemingly decided so many cases raising Eleventh Amendment issues, and suggests that one of the reasons is the activism of state attorneys general in aggressively litigating the cases, as parties amici curiae, in the Supreme Court. An empirical study of the states' amicus-activity in such cases is presented. Part IV revisits additional rationales for, and empirical effects of, the Eleventh Amendment cases. With regard to the former, the essay addresses whether current doctrine has some functional justifications. With regard to the latter, the essay revisits claims that gaping exceptions to the doctrine, taken together with the purported availability of state law remedies, considerably ameliorates the supposed negative effects of the doctrine on the enforcement of federal law. The essay's conclusion briefly outlines an alternative path the conservative Justices could have, and perhaps should have, taken in shaping Eleventh Amendment doctrine.

War and the Intellectuals: Bourne, Dewey, and the Fate of Pragmatism

My purpose here, apart from convincing you that John Dewey was quite possibly right about American entry into World War I, is to address the repression and mutilation of pragmatism by left-wing intellectuals in the twentieth century. These would seem to be very different purposes, but in fact they are the same. If we are to understand how pragmatism acquired its unsavory reputation among leftists everywhere, we must go back to 1917, when Randolph Bourne denounced not only Dewey's decision in favor of American entry but also pragmatism itself as the source of that decision. These almost ancient denunciations would not matter very much, except that they are repeated in every subsequent account of the American Left in World War I, and are recalled if not reiterated in every subsequent critique of pragmatism – they still determine our thinking about Dewey, about pragmatism, and about the war. Revisiting this primal scene allows us to ask why. It allows us to convert the following statement, which still serves as a left-wing credential, into a question: Dewey's support for American entry into the Great War demonstrates that pragmatism is a philosophy of acquiescence to “the existing fact,” a philosophy that must validate capitalism, accept imperialism, and repudiate socialism.

The Contingency of Solidarity: A Pragmatic Critique of Richard Rorty's Philosophy

ABSTRACTPragmatist philosopher Richard Rorty articulates a view of the human person that is deeply at odds with a central assertion of Christianity: that human persons are deeply but not finally vulnerable to the conditions of their existence, and thus not wholly contingent beings. Because key elements of a Christian view of the human person, including a sharp appreciation of human vulnerability and the concept of freedom, as well as grounds for an overriding commitment to the well-being of all human persons are at stake, the author stresses the importance of addressing Rorty's pragmatist views. The author's argument is that Rorty's presentation of solidarity as the public response to human contingency fails on pragmatic grounds and she suggests an alternative view of contingency that can account for the creation of solidarity.

The Betrayal of Pragmatism?: Rorty's Quarrel with James

For the past several decades, Richard Rorty has sought to reinvigorate pragmatism as a viable alternative to analytic philosophy and various postmodernisms. His project insists on the contemporary relevance of his pragmatist predecessors. In Consequences of Pragmatism, for example, he boldly observes that "James and Dewey were not only waiting at the end of the dialectical road which analytic philosophy traveled, but are waiting at the end of the road which . . . Foucault and Deleuze are currently traveling." He argues that while "James and Nietzsche make parallel criticisms of nineteenth century thought," James's perspective is preferable, since it avoids the "metaphysical" entanglements that have hampered Heidegger and Derrida. 1 Aside from such eulogizing, however, for many years William James did not receive any detailed consideration from Rorty. Thus, it is remarkable to encounter an extended critique of James's pragmatism in Rorty's recent essay, "Religious Faith, Intellectual Responsibility and Romance." Here Rorty focuses on James's approach to metaphysics, the very aspect of James's thinking that he had previously praised. The essay culminates in a stinging accusation that James, in "The Will to Believe," had "betrayed his own pragmatism." 2

Plain reservations: Amish and Mennonite views of media and computers

Ethical objections to the use of mass media and the internet help explain why the Plain People of North America avoid new communication technologies. Each subgroup of plain folk-including Amish, Mennonites, and Brethren adopt differing amounts of new technology, and the use variesfrom region to region or even,from community to community. Old media such as the radio and telephone and newer media such as television and the internet introduce diferent and unwelcome moral values into plain communities, although the telephone is often a borderline case. The ethical systems of the Old Order groups provide a unique and pragmatic critique of the widespread acceptance of mass media and the internet in the larger social world.

Clinical pragmatism: bridging theory and practice.

This response to Lynn Jansen's critique of clinical pragmatism concentrates on two themes: (1) contrasting approaches to moral epistemology and (2) the connection between theory and practice in clinical ethics. Particular attention is paid to the status of principles and the role of consensus, with some closing speculations on how Dewey might view the current state of bioethics.

Russell's Marginalia in His Copy of James's <i>Principles of Psychology</i>

R ussell's relationship to William James is most often discussed in reference either to Russell's critique of pragmatism or his rejec,: tion and subsequent acceptance ofneutral monism. However, he had an earlier influential encounter with James's work when he read The Principles ofPsychology in September 1894. Russell's reaction very favourable but is often unacknowledged. Though he never withdrew his criticisms of James's pragmatism, nor his objections to James's manner ~f doing philosophy, he did exempt The Principles ofPsychology from them. In an article written for The Nation on James's death, Russell·said that James was at his best where he had concrete facts to deal with, and he went on to single out the Psychology for special praise. It was, he said, far the most delightful and readable book on the subject.l Russell's interest in the Psychology is demonstrated by the great number of marginalia in his copy.2 There are 450, all in pencil, in a count

Durkheim and Pragmatism: An Old Twist on a Contemporary Debate

Durkheim's lectures on pragmatism, given in 1913–14, constitute both a significant critique of pragmatism and a clarification of Durkheim's own position. Unfortunately, these lectures have received little attention, most of it critical. When they have been taken seriously, the analysis tends to focus on their historical context and not on the details of Durkheim's actual argument. This is partly because the tendency to interpret Durkheim's theory of knowledge in idealist terms makes a nonsense of his criticisms of pragmatism. It is also due to a lack of serious appraisal of the lectures as a series of arguments in their own right.

CLASSICAL AMERICAN PRAGMATISM: THE OTHER NATURALISM

AbstractThis essay compares and contrasts pragmatic naturalism with the more well known position of epistemological naturalism on several pivotal issues, in the process offering a pragmatic critique of the latter. It highlights their common rejection of both foundationalism and a priori methods and their positive claims that: what needs examination is not our concept of knowledge but knowledge itself; knowledge must be understood as tied to the world and as a natural phenomenon to be examined in its natural setting; the epistemic endeavor involves unifying its three traditional projects of giving an account of what knowledge is, explaining how knowledge is possible, and providing useful epistemic advice, thus involving normative considerations; and the method of gaining knowledge in general is continuous with the method of science. Yet, there are very great divergences between the two naturalisms concerning the answers offered, and these are explored and evaluated in the development of the essay.

The end of the world as we know it: Popular music's cultural mobility

Abstract Popular music has moved to the centre of economic life, suggesting a shift in the political economy of advanced societies. The transition has been marked by a concomitant shift in the centrality of popular music in social life, assisted by new technologies. More importantly, the changes have been brought about by the reorganization of record company ownership and activity since the 1980s. This paper suggests that cultural studies could apply aspects of the research and analysis methods developed in institutional economics, to a study of the relationship between cultural and economic formations. Institutional economics, especially as proposed by Thorstein Veblen, provides a pragmatic critique for cultural industries in an era of globalization and rising corporate power. In this paper I have used institutional economics to illustrate how the shift in the organization of popular music has taken place within the corporate economy. The use of popular music as a feature of the corporate economy has inv...

The Promise of Pragmatism: Modernism and the Crisis of Knowledge and Authority

For much of the 20th century, pragmatism has held the dominant point of view in American politics, law, education and social thought in general. After suffering a brief eclipse in the post-World War II period, pragmatism has experienced a revival, especially in literary theory and such areas as poststructuralism and deconstruction. In this critique of pragmatism and neopragmatism, the author traces the attempts of thinkers from William James to Richard Rorty to find a response to the crisis of modernism. He analyzes the limitations of pragmatism from a historical perspective and asks whether America's one original contribution to the world of philosophy has actually fulfilled its promise.