Foreign Policy Practice Research Articles

The concept of multi-vector politics in the system of foreign policy practices of the average country (on the example of Belarus)

The article discusses the concept of the average state and its problematic for modern political science. Based on the analysis of the concepts of the average state that have developed to date, the authors come to the conclusion about the vagueness and uncertainty of the criteria of the average state. It is concluded that the average state is not so much a set of features that characterize a particular country, as the political role that a particular state is ready to play in the international arena. At the same time, countries as different in scale as India and the Scandinavian states can claim the role of an average state. A distinctive feature of the average state is a propensity for multi-vector politics, geopolitical balancing and multilateral alliances. Using the example of Belarus, the authors show how this post-Soviet republic is trying to realize the role of an average state in the international arena. Unlike its neighbors, the Baltic states and Ukraine, which chose the model of small client states of the West, Belarus followed the path of a medium–sized state balancing between Russia, the EU, China and the states of the “far arc”, while maintaining a close alliance with Russia as a priority direction of foreign policy. The article highlights the difficulties faced by the Union State of Russia and Belarus due to the unequal vision of its participants of their roles. In conclusion, it is concluded that the former model of the Belarusian multi-vector politics in the new geopolitical conditions is exhausted, and the Union State can gain a new meaning as one of the geopolitical centers in the emerging world of “colliding civilizations”. At the same time, the role of Belarus as an average state — an equal partner of Russia can be preserved.

East Asia at the Crossroads of Cooperation and Rivalry at the Regional and International Levels: Editorial Introduction

The rise of new powers throughout the 2000s and the 2010s augurs the end of the unipolar system that has persisted since the end of the Cold War. In no region is this transition more compelling than in East Asia. Economic revitalization of this region and a steady redistribution of power related to it is a dynamic process characterized by intense changes in foreign policy strategies, practices, and orientations of China, Korea, and Japan. The proposed special issue seeks to critically assess the emerging developments of Chinas, Japans, and Koreas core international perceptions and policies. More specifically, the special issue addresses two complex and interrelated questions. Firstly, how do China, Korea, and Japan adapt to the changing international landscape? Secondly, how do China, Korea, and Japan respond to the challenges inherent to the pursuit of the enhanced international status? The contributions to this special issue aim at scrutinizing Chinas cybersovereignty and industrial policy; exploring the strengths and limitations of Koreas public diplomacy; and examining Japans contributions to regionalism. The special issue also discusses Russias relations with East Asia and its role in regional politics.

Vietnam’s growing agency in the twenty-first century

The world is witnessing a dual process of power shift from West to East and power diffusion from the major states to the lower layers of the global power structure. However, inadequate scholarly endeavour is devoted to exploring the foreign policy thinking and practices of weaker states amid these dynamics. This paper analyses the changing patterns of Vietnam’s post-Cold War worldview, its engagement with the regional security order, particularly its current threat perception and strategic response to regional challenges such as China’s rise and the South China Sea disputes. It will trace how Vietnam, previously perceived as a small to medium country, has increased its agency in the twenty first century to the extent that an emerging middle power can maneuver in a multifaceted and fluid world. It argues from the case of Vietnam that weaker states are not merely dictated by structural developments but may now have greater agency in contributing to shaping regional or world orders. Such investigation will help enrich both the existing Western-dominated and structure-oriented accounts on small and middle powers.

Analysing the EU's collective securitisation moves towards China.

This research responds to an increasing volume of scholarly literature unpacking the recent dynamics of EU foreign policy discourses and practices vis-à-vis China. Drawing on the theoretical approach of collective securitisation, this article shows that EU foreign policy towards China since the mid-2010s has witnessed increasing collective securitisation moves directed at multiple policy frames, including Asian regional security frame, economic security frame, political security frame and information and technology and cybersecurity frame. The EU’s attempts to securitise China as an existential threat across multiple issue areas have been triggered by a combination of long-term trends and specific sets of precipitating events, which contributed to galvanising the EU’s collective securitising discourses and subsequent policy initiatives. However, this research finds that the EU’s securitising moves and relevant speech acts have not resulted in a coherent audience response among the EU member states. The divergent views held by the EU’s internal audience on whether China should be perceived as an existential threat have hampered the implementation of the EU’s collective policy outputs.

Remote warfare as “security of being”: reading security force assistance as an ontological security routine

ABSTRACT This article analyses remote warfare from an ontological security perspective, arguing that remote warfare needs to be understood as a response to states’ internal self-identity needs. We develop this claim by analysing an emerging aspect of remote warfare: Security Force Assistance (SFA). SFA is aimed at building up the security forces of partners, sharing best practice, assisting in security sector reform, fostering collaboration, and overall contributing to conflict resolution. Focusing on the UK, we show how and why ontological security needs are a driving force behind the UK’s SFA program. We outline the UK’s specific autobiographical narrative, which we call a “global engagement identity,” explore the crises that induced ontological insecurity, and show how the UK’s SFA program can be read as a routinised foreign policy practice aimed at taming uncertainty and reinforcing ontological security. This paper makes three contributions. First, it analyses remote warfare through an ontological security framework, thereby moving the focus from “security-as-survival” to “security-of-being.” Second, it highlights the importance of SFA as a remote warfare tool. Third, it shows the centrality of ontological security in understanding UK defence policy.

Forging strategic partnership in the Indo–Pacific region: Vietnam’s diplomatic direction

ABSTRACT Vietnam used to be isolated from the international community but has now become the Southeast Asian country with the most strategic partnerships with other Indo-Pacific countries. In Vietnam, over the past decade, ‘strategic partnership’ has also become a popular concept in the country’s foreign policy and media. However, the current literature does not yet include significant study on Vietnam’s new foreign policy practice. This article attempts to fill the gap by examining Vietnam’s use of ‘strategic partnership’, how Vietnam defines the term and how its partnerships operate in practice. By examining case studies of three strategic partnerships between Vietnam and India, Japan, and the Philippines, this article argues that the way Vietnam views strategic partnership shares quite a few common features with existing studies’ definitions. It also concludes that the country has rapidly forged strategic partnerships in the Indo-Pacific more than any other Southeast Asian country because of both external factors and internal demands. Despite limitations, SP is a valuable political and diplomatic tool for Vietnam.

US Strategy in a Changing World Order: Challenges for Russia.

The article covers the impact of changing global economic and political order on the attitudes and narratives of US elites and decision-makers upon America’s global leadership, its forms and practicies. The author shows how the economic, political, and ideological prerequisites for changing the position of the United States in the world affect the foreign policy ideology and practice of Democratic and Republican administrations, as well as Washington’s approaches to the development and implementation of a national security strategy. Particular attention is paid to the approaches of the US government to relations with China and Russia. The key trends in American policy towards Russia during the administrations of B. Obama, D. Trump, and the first months of the presidency of J. Biden are examined.

The Past as a Benchmark in Defining Turkey’s Status Politics

This article deals with Turkey’s status politics since the 2000s, by employing an aspirational constructivist approach that links social psychology with social constructivism in international relations. It focuses on the temporal side of status, stemming from historical identity construction in Turkish foreign policy (TFP) rhetoric and practices under the rule of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) since 2002. Turkey’s status politics is motivated by its past legacies rather than by a peer-to-peer comparison. Therefore, different variances and practices of identity politics in TFP offer valuable insights into its status-seeking practices. The article offers five images of the past that define various role sets and status claims for Turkey.

Science Diplomacy in Ecuador: Political Discourse and Practices Between 2007 and 2017.

The decade 2007–2017 was a period in which the Republic of Ecuador experienced a series of economic, social, cultural, and political transformations. This research focused on science, technology, and innovation (STI) changes with implications for Ecuador's foreign policy. One of the core components incorporated was Ecuador's engagement with foreign governments and various regional and global actors to further scientific and technological advances. These far-reaching collaborations aimed to reduce gaps the country experienced in science and research. Moreover, to incorporate Ecuador into worldwide initiatives to tackle cross-border issues, such as climate change and environmental sustainability. These measures included academic and scientific mobility through an extensive scholarship program, the Prometeo Fellowship Program, the Yasuni ITT Initiative, the creation of emblematic research universities, and certain guidelines released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility of Ecuador related to these policies. This article reports on qualitative research in which President Rafael Vicente Correa Delgado's political discourse was analyzed, along with key STI policies promoted in his administrations. The objective of this study was to establish different implications from the Science Diplomacy perspective (SD); particularly, reflecting on the consistency between the political rhetoric and the policy implementation. Evidence suggests that the political discourse materialized into concrete STI policies that could partially explain positive transformations in various aspects of the STI context in Ecuador. Institutional strengthening, international mobility (inward and outward), increased scientific output, and foreign policy practices involving SD which can be traced in the studied period. SD strategies could have been more effective and lasting if they were not discontinued upon Correa's departure from the Presidency.

Populism, nationalism and revisionist foreign policy

Abstract Over the past decade, we have seen the rise of populist nationalist heads of state across a number of important electoral democracies—all of whom have made some version of the promise to make their countries ‘great again’. However, scholars are divided over whether these leaders' sometimes bombastic rhetoric has consistent or predictable effects on state foreign policy. This article introduces a framework for mapping the effects of populism and nationalism in foreign policy. In doing so, it draws on Essex School discourse analysis and sociological frame analysis to argue that representational crises at the sub-state level increase the popular resonance of ‘sovereigntist frames’ that diagnose the causes of perceived gaps in representation of the ‘authentic’ sovereign community at the international level and enjoin chief executives to resolve these gaps through revisionist foreign policy practices. The ethno-nationalist master frame prescribes policies and practices of lateral revisionism (conflict with neighbours or rival states), the populist frame prescribes systemic revisionism (conflict with allies and the international ‘establishment’), while the ethno-populist frame prescribes omni-revisionism (conflict with both). The article illustrates the effects of these disparate sovereigntist movements across three paired case-studies drawn from Europe, Latin America and the United States. It concludes that nationalism has greater destructive effects for the international system when combined with populism, demonstrating the importance of distinguishing nationalism and populism conceptually in order to isolate their separate and combined effects on foreign policy.

(Re)producing the ‘history problem’: memory, identity and the Japan-South Korea trade dispute

Japan-South Korea relations have consistently been presented by International Relations scholars as a puzzle that confounds mainstream rationalist theories, which struggle to explain the consistent acrimony associated with the so-called ‘history problem’. While many scholars have, therefore, adopted conventional constructivist approaches to incorporate history into their analyses, such literature often neglects the processes of (re)construction of this social reality, thereby implicitly treating these negative sentiments as essentialised elements of Korean and Japanese culture/identity which cause certain foreign policies. Using the recent Japan-South Korea trade dispute as a case study, this article instead draws on critical constructivist/poststructuralist theory and discourse analytical methods to examine how the ‘history problem’ is produced and reproduced. It argues that dominant discourses of remembering in South Korea, which represent Japan as an unrepentant colonial aggressor, and of forgetting in Japan, which represent South Korea as emotional and irrational for dwelling on the past, act to (re)produce identities that clash in their attitudes to difficult history. While such foreign policy practices (re)produce dominant national identities, these identities also shape the bounds of which foreign policies are legitimate or imaginable. This mutually constitutive relationship between identity and foreign policy continually reproduces the ‘history problem’ in Japan-South Korea relations.

Bilateral relations with the republic of /North/ Macedonia as an element of Bulgarian regional policy after 1989

The article begins with a re-evaluation of the often neglected importance of 1989 developments in Skopje that inaugurated the subsequent transition of Yugoslav Macedonia leading to its transformation into an independent republic. The text argues that the outcome of the often overlooked congress of the League of Communists of Macedonia in late November 1989 dismantled a small break out of the pan-European Berlin Wall that autumn. After 1989 Bulgaria maintained a policy aimed at limiting and the non-proliferation of the conflict from the dissolving Yugoslav federation and contributed to the stabilization of the former Yugoslav and wider region. One of the most sensitive aspects of Sofia’s regional policy was that towards Skopje. The article offers evidence and argues that Bulgaria’s approach since 1989 went through different phases but nonetheless was based on three key constant principles: first, support for the independence and for the statehood of the new Republic of Macedonia; second, the countering and dismantling of Macedonianism (in its ‘Yugoslav’ and ‘antiquated’ versions alike) both as a provocative construct of history and as Skopje’s foreign policy practice; third, seeking of solutions within the wider EU and NATO framework and support for the Republic of /North/ Macedonia’s integration into NATO and EU structures.

The People’s Republic of China and the Development of Contemporary International Law: Review and Prospects

The development of Chinese international jurisprudence over the past 70 years can be divided into three stages: fledging; recovery and development; and flourishing. During the period, Chinese international lawyers have made great contributions to the development of international law through, inter alia, the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, recognition and succession, the peaceful settlement of international disputes, the Belt and Road Initiative, the Shared Future for Mankind, and so forth. However, participation in international legislation and international judicial activities needs to be further improved, because the theoretical ground for China’s foreign policy and diplomatic practice is still insufficient and academic works with global influence are not enough yet. The development of Chinese international law follows such trends: more valuable interpretation and application of international law; the theoretical innovation of international law; and the improvement of China’s discourse power. These are important missions for Chinese international lawyers.

Leaping Jaguar, Crouching Tiger: Comparing the Strategic Culture of Brazil and India

Based on the premise that each country has a particular way of interpreting and reacting to international events, the study of strategic culture provides an important analytical tool for understanding and explaining how countries see the world and what drives their foreign policy practices and preferences. Considering that the rise of emerging powers has the potential to affect the balance of power in the international system, this article examines and compares the strategic culture of two of the most important emerging countries in the world, Brazil and India. While apparently exhibiting completely different patterns of strategic thinking, which have led them to pursue different approaches to reach their objectives, these two states share a belief that they are predestined to “greatness,” to play a more significant role in their regional contexts, and to become major stakeholders in global affairs. As the largest countries in their respective regions, Brazil and India can help to shape the future of Latin America and South Asia. Their international behaviour can not only condition the foreign, security and domestic policies and strategies of their neighbours but also impact the ambitions of extra-regional powers with a stake in those regions. Analyzing the strategic culture of these two countries can therefore help policymakers and scholars to understand the rationale for their perceptions and ambitions, what influences and drives their foreign and security policies, how they see the world and why they behave the way they do.

Soft power is not so soft: is a reconciliation between China’s core interests and foreign policy practices possible?

ABSTRACT China’s improved diplomatic relations with Asian countries have been characterised by positive engagement with regional organisations. However, cross-nation opinion surveys show that China’s approval in the region has declined significantly since2013. Why does this gap exist, and what can China do to close it? More importantly, how can Beijing effectively align its policy objectives with its soft-power tools to gain more support among its Asian neighbours?This article argues that reconciliation between China’s core interests and its soft power discourse is possible and desirable, as China’s self-restraint, assuring, and leadership practices are crucial sources of China’s policy practices. First, it claims that China’s soft power discourse matters greatly, as a rising country needs to express its good intentions to others in avoiding an anti-China alliance. Secondly, it proposes a feasible framework to reconcile China’s core interests and its soft power policy, in which Beijing could be firm in its official stances and flexible in its execution.It offers an in-depth analysis of three case studies: China’s North Korea policy, its handling in the South China Sea disputes, and its governance in Hong Kong. Finally, it concludes with substantive implications for East Asian politics.

The Architecture of Paradiplomacy Regime in Indonesia: A Content Analysis

Paradiplomacy as a policy and practice of foreign policy by local governments have been carried out by the Indonesian government. But the practice of paradiplomacy shows a gap between local governments, as there are local governments that are so intensive but, on the other hand, some are passive. This article explains the architecture of paradiplomacy in the constitutional dimension through tracking the message structure in a number of regulations with content analysis methods. The advance of content analysis in the constitutional dimension will be able to provide comprehensive analysis on the architecture of Indonesia's paradiplomacy and its implications for achieving national interests. This article finds that Indonesia's paradiplomacy architecture is still very administrative, procedural, and technical, which results in inability to accelerate paradiplomacy by local governments in Indonesia to progressively attain local and national interests.

Protracted Conflicts in Afghanistan and Chechnya: American Perspectives on Russian Experience

Since the early 1980s, American scholarly and analytical literature has discussed the effectiveness of Soviet, and subsequently Russian, management of low-intensity conflicts. Though both the Soviet and Russian experience has been examined from many perspectives, including the military, economic, social and political, the American academic community does not tend to deem such an approach relevant and useful in terms of understanding US foreign policy. This disjoint is even harder to understand given the fact that the American military faced the same problems in Afghanistan and Iraq as the Soviet army experienced in Afghanistan (1979–1989), and Russian forces experienced during the First Chechen War (1994–1996). The greatest perplexity for American authors was the ability of Soviet and Russian leaders to recreate a power hierarchy on the ground while relying on their former adversaries – the Afghan Mujahideen and Chechen separatists. According to American intellectual discourse, reliance on a former enemy cannot be considered, by definition, during post-conflict state-building. Since the condition of the Russian conflict settlement model was pragmatism that is opposite to normative approach of the American policies in conflicts, this experience was not in demand in American foreign policy practice. The number of works by American scholars that include the comparison between the Soviet/Russian and the US campaigns is significantly smaller than the number of papers focusing on Soviet and Russian conduct, let alone their experience of nation-building. The aim of this study is to analyse American academic discourse about the Soviet/Russian experience of conducting low intensity conflicts. In the first part, the authors analyse the key mistakes of the Russian leadership during the campaigns, according to the estimates given by American researchers; the second part examines Russian strategy and its conflict settlement drawing comparison with the American experience. The authors conclude that US adaptation on the basis of Russian experiences in Afghanistan and Chechnya has proved impossible due to normative imperatives dominating American academic papers and policies. These imperatives bind the conflict resolution with the level of sophistication of a given country’s institutions. Perhaps, the vice versa claim could have grounds, yet it exceeds the limits of this study.

Israel’s Periphery Doctrine Prospects for Defining and Studying a Foreign Policy Practice

Israel’s Periphery Doctrine Prospects for Defining and Studying a Foreign Policy Practice

«Soft Power»: Specificities of Domestic Understanding

The concept of «soft power» has long been the subject of domestic social, political and scientific discourses. At the same time, the current specificity of the Russian understanding of “soft power” as “comprehensive toolkit” for achieving country’s foreign policy objectives without the use of armed violence leads to attempts to define its structure, measure its effectiveness and further optimization. Such an approach has a number of consequences. Firstly, it impoverish the scientific discussion, secondly, it leads to an inefficient building of a communication system with the foreign policy environment. An instrumental approach that prevailed in the domestic political science and foreign policy practice deflect the attention and the resources to create channels and forms of communication to the detriment of its content. The key problem, according to the author, is the content of communication channels, the use of historical memory, as the main resource of “soft power”. An appeal to a common historical past makes it difficult to communicate in the Post-Soviet space, especially during the creation by the Post-Soviet community their national versions of the “long” history and it causes the alarm among political elites in Post-Soviet space.

Lilliput Effect Revisited: Small States and EU Foreign Policy

The role of small member states in EU foreign policy is increasingly being challenged, especially in view of the reforms being proposed to make the EU more effective as an international actor. These reforms, if adopted, will require the small Central and Eastern European member states, such as Bulgaria, to rethink their old foreign-policy strategies and practices. Instead of band-wagoning and balancing conflicting interests, these small member states will have to learn to be more proactive, to build their reputations and to form alliances if they want to continue to have any influence on EU foreign policy. These issues are discussed in the light of the EU sanctions adopted against Russia in the aftermath of the Ukrainian–Russian conflict of 2014.