This article examines and analyzes the dilemma of power-sharing as Lebanese leaders turned to the task of consolidating state institutions and rules of governance after the Syrian withdrawal in 2005. It argues that Lebanese political groups ' difficulties in sharing power were largely attributable to the lack of external support for the regulation of conflict. This article emphasizes the relationship of internal parties and external powers to the maintenance of peace and power-sharing institutions.The Lebanese Civil War, which lasted from 1975 to 1989, marked the ultimate failure of the consociational model of democracy of Lebanon's First Republic that was established in 1943. The rationale behind the adoption of the consociational model by Lebanon's religious groups on the eve of independence was that it would serve the aims of stability and democracy in the country, and help it withstand external destabilizing political pressures. The National Pact of 1943 was a power-sharing formula that specified a division of government positions and parliamentary seats among Christian and Muslim communities on the basis of a six to five ratio, in favor of the former. The different religious groups were to be proportionally represented in the cabinet that was regarded as a power-sharing body. A veto power was present in the system concerning approval of decisions on fundamental issues by the cabinet. The veto was provided to make sure that such approval was subject to a majority vote of two-thirds. The pact also distributed power among the state's three most senior positions, so the presidency was reserved for a Maronite Christian, the premiership was reserved for a Sunni, and the Speaker of parliament was reserved for a Shi'i.1Lebanon's cultural, socioeconomic, political, and sectarian divisions made it fallible to external intervention and destabilization of the system.2 Indeed, the performance of the prewar (1943-75) consociational model was unsuccessful because a number of external and internal pressures contributed to the breakdown of the state. Externally, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the presence of the Palestine Liberation Organization on Lebanese territory, and inter-Arab rivalries weighed heavily on the fragile Lebanese political system.3 Internally, Lebanon's power-sharing system that would provide a basis for nurturing domestic stability was simultaneously a force of disin- tegration. The sectarian, consociational model did not provide equal political rights among Lebanese ethnic groups.4 The traditional elites not only refused to incorporate emerging groups into their cartels but also manipulated specific institutional arrange- ments to benefit their own position within their communities the expense of emerg- ing elites. The collapse of the system, as Rola el-Husseini describes it, was at least partially due to the inability of the entrenched elites to confront new ideological and socioeconomic challenges.5 According to Samir Makdisi, Fadia Kiwan, and Marcus Marktanner, the distribution of the benefits of the liberal economic system was highly uneven and endowed large benefits to political and business elites.6 Additionally, the defects of the prewar consociational model, as Tamirace Fakhoury Muhlbacher ar- gues, were attributed to Lebanon's confessionalism that aimed to enhance the influ- ence of the communities on the institutions of the state. The sectarian, familial, and clientelist nature of the political system led to poor institutional performance: pub- lic officials, including those of the highest rank, often dealt with issues and services that met the interests of their sects above those of the state. Rather than building democracy, the confessional system aimed to satisfy the demands and maintain the privileges of religious groups. Thus, Lebanon's consociational system in the prewar period was a double-edged sword: a power sharing agreement and an instrument of disintegration.7 These external and internal factors thwarted the stability of coalition governments and contributed to the eruption of the civil war. …