Power-sharing Arrangements Research Articles

Lebanon’s Endemic Power-Sharing Dilemmas and their Manifestation in the Beirut Blast

Abstract This article examines how Lebanon’s power-sharing arrangements, embedded within the politics of sectarianism, entrench “recurring dilemmas” that undermine political change, reform, and accountability. The three dilemmas uncovered in this article include the propensity of Lebanon’s power-sharing system to political deadlock, its institutionalization of impunity, as well as its veritable disconnect from grassroots demands. This article focuses on the case of the Beirut blast and demonstrates how the tragedy represents a microcosm of the convergence of these power-sharing dilemmas. The analysis highlights the limitations of Lebanon’s power-sharing system. It suggests that as long as the current sectarian power-sharing system remains in place, the system’s endemic dilemmas will continue to manifest and preclude meaningful reform, effective policy making and justice.

The Conditionality of Political Short‐Termism: A Review of Empirical and Experimental Studies

Political short-termism prioritizes short-term net policy benefits over long-term benefits and thus can hinder policy investments that impose short-term costs to society to address long-term policy challenges. This literature review explores when political short-termism can be driven and mitigated in a democratic system by reviewing empirical and experimental studies and identifying the various factors that can influence policy investments: elections, economic conditions, power-sharing arrangements, partisanship, the presence of compensation schemes, and media coverage among politicians; discounts of future policy benefits, policy trade-offs, political ideology, and socioeconomic and demographic factors among voters; and compliance costs, power-sharing arrangements, compensations, and long-term political signaling from governments among special interest groups. Finally, I discuss the findings and provide suggestions for future research.

Public Support for Power Grabs after Civil Conflict

Power-sharing is a recognized strategy for reaching durable settlements among rivals. However, power-sharing arrangements are often violated when one side grabs power. We examine public perceptions of power-sharing versus power-grabbing in the context of local policing in Mosul, Iraq. In a survey experiment, we investigate if ­individuals believe that security in Mosul, in the aftermath of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) occupation, is enhanced or reduced under power-sharing versus power-grabbing treatments, which vary the authority held by distinct factions of the counter-ISIS coalition. The public is more likely to support power-grabbing than power-sharing in matters of policing and security. In the case of power-grabbing, there are also important moderating effects of conflict-related victimization. Unlike nonvictims who favor ingroup power-grabbing to enhance local ­sectarian control, victims place a premium on stability, welcoming even external, out-group control over power-sharing among groups who might be at odds. Our results underscore the challenges of institutionalizing power-sharing mechanisms for peacebuilding after conflict.

Unravelling the constitutional settlement: devolution, democracy and patronage in eastern Sri Lanka

ABSTRACT Like other conflict-torn societies, Sri Lankans have long sought to build peace through constitutional re-design with devolution of power and minority protections. However, the preoccupation with legal norms and institutions runs counter to the widely-held conviction that politicians routinely transgress norms and twist institutions. It is thus imperative to study the lived political realities of power-sharing arrangements, rather than their intended design. The 1987 Thirteenth Amendment devolved state power to the provinces to assuage Tamil separatism. The limited academic work that exists on the Provincial Council system outlines its shortcomings and failures, but there is little scholarship of the councils as a political arena in their own right. This article discusses the politics around the Eastern Provincial Council, especially the brief but unique period between 2015 and 2017 when it was run by Tamil and Muslim parties. More specifically, the empirical material pivots on three Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim Ministers in the Eastern Province and two lower-ranking Muslim politicians. The Provincial Council has very different meaning, legitimacy and utility to these diverse political figures. I argue that we must consider these diverse ethno-nationalist manifestations of provincial politics to understand what the Provincial Council system entails in Sri Lanka.

Semi-consociationalism in Burundi

ABSTRACT This article reclassifies the power-sharing arrangement in Burundi and argues that it is a semi-consociational system rather than a full-consociation. The authors discuss the characteristics of semi-consociational democracy and show how the current political system in Burundi falls under this classification. This is an article that challenges the mainstream argument that power sharing in Burundi has failed; the article instead identifies the semi-consociational arrangement that relies on presidential hegemony in executive and security matters as the source of failure. In addition, there has been institutionalisation of the policy whereby the CNDD party is equated with the government – referred to as CNDDification – to the extent that the political system has become a regime under the full control of the party. The article concludes with recommended steps to restore more effective power sharing in Burundi.

Constricted rights and imagined identities: Peace and accountability processes and constitution-making in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Abstract This article takes an interdisciplinary law-in-context approach to examine the nature of constitutionalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We argue that while the new constitution was necessary for implementing the postwar democratic transition and rebuilding processes, its fixed ethno-religious collective political identities achieved between 1992 and 1995 by forceful means have further reinforced ethno-territorial divisions in a multicultural society. As a consequence,the individual and state accountability for mass atrocities and genocide before the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia and theInternational Court of Justice have become secondary to the postwar power-sharing arrangement, thus perpetuating inter-ethnic tensions. The dominant focus on a social order that reasserts citizenship and constitutional rights based on ethnic identities has created an enduring deadlock for the Bosnian transition. This article reimagines a citizen-based constitution generated by political participation for those in and outside of Bosnia and Herzegovina that safeguards the principles of non-discrimination and equal civil, political, socio-economic, and cultural rights, and encourages citizens’ education and democratic participation to shape the future of democracy.

Are consociations bad for women? Assessing the effectiveness of gender quotas in Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia

ABSTRACT To overcome ethno-national segregation, conflict resolution practitioners have promoted consociational power-sharing. After power-sharing arrangements were instituted, to address women’s under-representation in parliaments legislated gender quotas were also introduced. Gender quotas have been adopted in many post-conflict settings, but their effects remain understudied. In this article, by combining consociationalism and gender quotas theory, and applying a feminist institutionalist analytical approach, we examine the disparate effectiveness of gender quotas in two consociations: Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia. We pair the two countries to evaluate why gender quotas have produced different outcomes and demonstrate that formal and informal institutions matter for quota effectiveness.

Challenges of Ethnic Party Adaptation in Power-Sharing Systems: Evidence from Malaysia

In authoritarian systems, ethnic power-sharing arrangements include important ethnic groups in government and decision-making while putting restraints on political competition. However, under conditions of democratization, we might expect power-sharing arrangements to fragment as political parties seize opportunities to expand their base and appeal across ethnic lines. This article draws from the case of Malaysia, where multiethnic coalitions built around ethnic parties ruled for 61 years but where increasing electoral competitiveness has destabilized coalition politics. I focus on the Democratic Action Party (DAP), one of the country's most successful parties, which has sought to build a more multiethnic support base. I show that its attempts have been stymied by enduring norms of ethnically informed coalition building and efforts to protect existing ethnic bases by both rivals and allies. The findings shed light on the barriers to ethnic party adaptation and on why power-sharing practices remain so enduring, even in more fluid and democratic political environments.

Adversarial Power-Sharing and “Forced Marriages”: Governing Coalitions in Lebanon and Yemen

Abstract How do power-sharing governing coalitions work in the context of politicized identities and external pressures? And how do they emerge, develop, and disintegrate when governing parties share power in the context of colliding agendas? Working on the premise that coalition governments may be messy constellations of power, rather than rational avenues for deliberation, this article explores the politics of coalitions in the Middle East as a case of adversarial power-sharing, or what we frame as ‘forced marriages.’ We focus on Yemen and Lebanon, two polities that have developed power-sharing arrangements in conflict-laden environments, albeit under different circumstances and logics of state-building. We argue that while both countries are different on a wide range of variables, they have broader lessons to convey on the ways coalition governments perform and the policy consequences they yield. Throughout both countries’ political history, coalition governance patterns have led to political fragmentation and policy gridlock. However, the puzzle is that notwithstanding antagonistic policy agendas and despite popular disaffection with ruling arrangements, coalition governments have kept re-emerging. This requires an incisive look into the relational and complex dynamics that sustain their logic.

Territorial consolidation after rebel victory: when does civil war recur?

ABSTRACT Rebel victors of civil war face existential threats both internally and externally. In consolidating territorial control, how do rebel victors respond to domestic armed challengers? Do such decisions determine civil war recurrence? This paper argues that rebel victors can manage domestic risk and consolidate state power by either repressing or coopting challengers. Cooption strategies can range from the less inclusive, such as unilateral changes to the constitution and elite power-sharing arrangements, to the more inclusive, such as signing peace agreements and negotiated constitutional reform. While repression and non-inclusive cooption strategies increase chances of civil recurrence, consensus-based strategies of state consolidation, such as negotiated constitutional reform, reduce repeat civil wars. Evidence is found for our argument in newly configured data on cases of rebel victory since the end of the Cold War (1989–2015).

Caring is sharing: Why independent commissions in post-conflict societies have power-sharing arrangements

The inclusion of conflict parties in independent commissions through power-sharing has been found to reduce the reoccurrence of conflict. Yet, the theoretical and empirical literature explaining why independent commissions include power-sharing is very limited. Previous publications have focused on in-depth case studies that explain how power-sharing prevents conflict recurrence in specific post-conflict societies but do not provide a general argument or widescale testing beyond individual case studies. This article provides a new systematic, general theoretical argument and novel empirical testing that explains why there is power-sharing on some commissions but not others. We argue that conflict parties adopt power-sharing provisions in independent commissions because doing so allows them to overcome significant credible commitments problems that are inherent to the ending of intrastate conflict. Using a new and comprehensive dataset, Independent Commissions in Post-Conflict Societies, which includes information on 580 commissions (1990–2016), this article applies a combination of decision trees and regression analysis to test our hypotheses. The findings indicate that power-sharing is adopted where credible commitment problems are acute and show that commissions working on political or security issues and those with monitoring or verification roles, or that work on the implementation of peace agreements, are more likely to include power-sharing arrangements.

Power-Sharing Models for Postwar Syria: Consociational vs. Centripetal Options

This article explores potential power-sharing models for post-conflict Syria. It surveys the literature on the need for power-sharing as a conflict management tool for deeply divided societies and explores its suitability for Syria. Two particular power-sharing models are explored: the consociational and centripetal. Both arrangements are examined through a comparative research that assesses the success and failures of the Lebanese and Iraqi power-sharing experiences. The findings suggest that reform toward post-conflict reconstruction requires a multi-step political agreement that may be initiated in an agreement toward a transitional consociational power-sharing arrangement followed by the gradual attainment of centripetal-based power structure.

Community policing in areas of limited statehood: The case of Lebanon

ABSTRACT This article explores the impact of community policing on democratic policing in conflict-affected areas of limited statehood with divisive politics by way of a case study of Lebanon from 2008 to 2016. It argues that community policing leads to unequal empowerment and that it reflects and reproduces the existing politics of the context in which it is applied rather than promoting democratic changes, as the proponents of community policing usually claim. Specifically, the analysis of two cases of community policing in Lebanon shows that it reflects policing aimed against perceived threats to the country’s consociational power-sharing arrangement and the sectarian balance on which it is based, namely Palestinian and Syrian refugees as outsiders who do not fit into consociational categories. The community policing projects in the Palestinian Nahr al-Bared camp and the urban Ras Beirut area of Beirut represent different contexts within Lebanon and so also show variation in the state’s intent behind, and approach to, community policing. Still, the similarity in outcome in both cases, policing of ‘outsiders’ as threats to the consociational order, suggests that community policing exhibits flaws independently of where, how, and why it is being applied.

COVID-19 And Rule By Decree – A Case Study Of The NCT of Delhi

ABSTRACT The article attempts a quantitative as well as a qualitative analysis of the National Capital Territory (“NCT”) of Delhi’s legislative productivity in the year 2020. The Legislative Assembly of Delhi produced only one piece of substantive legislation throughout the year, sitting for one of its fewest number of sessions. However, the business of the Government continued to run apace through several subordinate legislations. While most of these pertained to routine matters of day-to-day administration, two primary regulations embodied the entirety of the State’s pandemic response on the back of a colonial-era skeleton legislation. The article discusses the constitutional questions of concern raised by such promulgation of subordinate legislations, while acknowledging the backdrop of the emergency nature of the pandemic and the unique power-sharing arrangement in the Constitution of India regarding the National Capital Territory of Delhi.

Resource allocation in power-sharing arrangements – evidence from Lebanon

Power-sharing arrangements allocate not only political power but also economic resources from valuable state functions among powerful elites. Two broad hypotheses emerge from the existing literature regarding how elites allocate such resources: elites either distribute the control over valuable institutions or share the rents they generate. This article investigates which mechanism prevails by focusing on a major source of such resources: public procurement of large infrastructure projects. We analyse an original data set of infrastructure procurement contracts in Lebanon and investigate which politically connected firms receive larger contracts than non-connected firms. We find that firms receive inflated contracts only when they are connected to elites with a ‘seat at the table’ at the board of the implementing agency, rather than the wider set of powerful political elites. We argue that resource distribution depends on elites’ access to important institutional functions, rather than other conceivable mechanisms of resource sharing. By penetrating key positions with loyal personnel, elites serve as brokers in collusive networks, or cartels, that succeed in undermining a process as complex as infrastructure procurement.

An efficient energy-management strategy for a DC microgrid powered by a photovoltaic/fuel cell/battery/supercapacitor

Abstract The outcome of this paper is to suggest an efficient energy-management strategy (EMS) for a direct-current (DC) microgrid (MG). The typical MG is composed of two renewable energy sources [photovoltaic (PV) systems and fuel cells (FCs)] and two energy-storage elements (lithium-ion battery and supercapacitor). An EMS was proposed to ensure optimal bus voltage with a power-sharing arrangement between the load and the sources. As a result, in the suggested DC MG, non-linear flatness control theory was used instead of the traditional proportional-integral control approach. The suggested EMS is intended to supply high power quality to the load under varying load conditions with fluctuating solar irradiation while considering the FC status. To validate and prove the effectiveness of the proposed EMS, a MATLAB® environment was used. In addition, the output power of the PV system was maximized using the particle swarm optimization algorithm as a maximum power point tracking (MPPT) technique to track the MPP of the 3000-W PV system under different irradiance conditions. The results show that the suggested EMS delivers a stable and smooth DC bus voltage with minimum overshoot value (0.1%) and improved ripple content (0.1%). As a result, the performance of the DC MG was enhanced by employing the flatness control theory, which provides higher power quality by stabilizing the bus voltage.

Presidents, Ministers and Governors: Ethnic Quotas and the Evolution of Power-Sharing at Critical Junctures in Burundi

Building on an original dataset, this paper explores the evolution of the consociational power- sharing at critical junctures in Burundi. Covering almost two decades of power-sharing practice (2001–2020), this paper analyzes the allocation of high salience ministerial portfolios and of provincial governor positions along ethnic lines. The paper shows how quotas matter and how a changing political context affects the real life implementation of Burundi’s negotiated power-sharing arrangements. We argue that dominant political actors take advantage of loopholes in the design of power-sharing institutions in order to enhance their access to important political positions.

When Can Dictators Go It Alone? Personalization and Oversight in Authoritarian Regimes

Why are some autocrats able to personalize power within their regimes while others are not? Past studies have focused on the balance of power between the autocrat and his or her supporting coalition of peer or subordinate elites, but we find that often the crucial relationship is between the autocrat and the “old guard”—retired leaders, party elders, and other elites of the outgoing generation. Using an original data set of authoritarian leadership transitions, we argue that when members of the old guard retain oversight capacity over their incoming successor, he or she is less likely to overturn power-sharing arrangements and consolidate individual power. We illustrate this argument with a case study of three leadership transitions in China between 1989 and 2012. This study’s findings advance our understanding of elite politics and intergenerational conflict in authoritarian regimes.

Transformational Leadership and Conflict Management in Zanzibar

Zanzibar has had a turbulent political history for more than half a century, from the time of nationalist struggles in the 1950s. The major bone of contestation has revolved around the politics of identity with its resultant long-standing political conflict. In November 2009, the then President of Zanzibar, Amani Abeid Karume from Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), and the Civic United Front (CUF) Secretary-General, Seif Shariff Hamad met and declared their commitment in public to end the long-standing political conflict between the two main political parties on the islands. This article seeks to explain the process of reconciliation in Zanzibar with specific reference to the role of leadership in transformational change. The study was conducted between March 2015 and February 2017, involving two main data collection methods: in-depth interviews and documentary reviews. Interviews were conducted with politicians, government functionaries, academics, journalists, and leaders of civil society organizations. The study found that the only substantive achievements that were realized in the short run were power-sharing under the Government of National Unity (GNU) and some changes in attitudes among some of the key political actors, which, to a certain degree, amounted to a discourse switch from a hostile political attitude based on zero-sum politics to the recognition of the need for cooperation across party lines. The uniqueness of the power-sharing arrangement in Zanzibar was that the system was entrenched in the constitution. The constitution was negotiated and established before the election. The theory of transformational change suggests that transformational leaders tend to have a strong personal attachment to their missions. Their absence in the course of implementation may sometimes negatively impact the transformation process, even in the context where the mission has been translated within the legal and constitutional framework. The case of Zanzibar indicates a pressing need for deepening the power-sharing deal so that it becomes people-centered rather than a mere elite project entrenched in partisan politics.

Solving Collective Action Problems under Separated and Shared Powers: The Benefits of Consolidating Executive Budgetary Powers, 1895–1940

The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 consolidated executive budgetary powers within the presidency and Congress. I evaluate how the Act reforms altered the nature of executive budgetary influence, using an original historical database from fiscal years 1895 to 1940. I show that these reforms were not only consistent with both political branches’ objective to empower presidents to rein in profligate executive budget proposals under the decentralized budgetary system but also afforded presidents greater budgetary influence when seeking higher funding levels relative to Congress. This mutually beneficial power-sharing arrangement between the president and Congress stands in contrast with existing accounts that these reforms favored one branch at the expense of the other. Finally, I offer evidence that this arrangement was made possible by solving collective action problems within the executive branch that reduced the capacity of seasoned agency heads to shape budgetary outcomes during the postreform era.