Territorial consolidation after rebel victory: when does civil war recur?

Abstract

ABSTRACT Rebel victors of civil war face existential threats both internally and externally. In consolidating territorial control, how do rebel victors respond to domestic armed challengers? Do such decisions determine civil war recurrence? This paper argues that rebel victors can manage domestic risk and consolidate state power by either repressing or coopting challengers. Cooption strategies can range from the less inclusive, such as unilateral changes to the constitution and elite power-sharing arrangements, to the more inclusive, such as signing peace agreements and negotiated constitutional reform. While repression and non-inclusive cooption strategies increase chances of civil recurrence, consensus-based strategies of state consolidation, such as negotiated constitutional reform, reduce repeat civil wars. Evidence is found for our argument in newly configured data on cases of rebel victory since the end of the Cold War (1989–2015).