Power In Spain Research Articles

Greening Electricity Production: A Success Story of Multi-Level Governance Convergence and Innovation

This paper analyzes the diffusion of wind power in Spain from the perspective of the multi-level governance features that contributed to the outcomes observed so far. Public authorities at all governance levels designed strategies that converged to reinforce each other's positive effects on potential investors and social acceptance. Next to implementing traditional policy instruments for financial support, Spanish authorities also engaged in direct capital investments in wind power, in the form of public-private partnerships, to reduce the risk perceptions of investors. Besides, regional authorities developed long-term strategies for wind power deployment to accommodate investors' plans. The convergence of these three strategies has led to a high investment interest and resulted in an exponential annual increase in the installed capacity of wind power.

On wind power integration into electrical power system: Spain vs. Denmark

Economic, social and environmental concerns demand higher efficiency and more sustainable electrical power systems. Then, power systems need to evolve from its traditional conception to future power systems. New nonconventional generators are distributed in power systems, most of them based on renewable resources, which have been developed and connected to the grid. Wind power is nowadays considered as one of this future renewable energy sources and it is more and more spread over the world. But there are a number of technical issues to be solved in order to accommodate these new units. Moreover, technical grid code requirements and regulations vary considerably from country to country. Denmark is the leader in wind power integration and development, and it is considered as a pattern to be followed. Wind power in Spain is also important. However, there are some facts between both countries that cause important differences. This paper points out some of them and suggests some strategies to be dealt with regarding wind power integration in Spain.

On the nature of power: an examination of the governing elite and institutional power in Spain, 1939–92

This article summarizes a study of the political, bureaucratic and economic elites in Spain, from the Franco regime through the democratic transition to the socialist governments of the 1990s. Data on the people holding posts in one or more of these elite groups were used to test and extend the theory of elite circulation first formulated by Vilfredo Pareto. The data confirms that Spanish elites became more open to others in the democratic period. Up to the present time, they continue to be integrated through multi‐positionality – many bureaucrats also hold political or economic posts – though to a lesser extent than in the past. Our empirical findings enable finer distinctions to be made about the different modes of elite circulation. These results show the changing nature of the networks that form when posts in different sectors become associated through multiple post‐holding. These networks are an important component of the social fabric in Spain and elsewhere and deserve further investigation.

Is Communism Returning?

Is Communism Returning? Zhelyu Zhelev In early 1990, carried away by the carnival atmosphere of the time, students and intellectuals all over Eastern Europe burned effigies and held symbolic burials of communism. I still have a souvenir of those heady days, a small can that holds “the last breath of communism.” Some of those who served as exultant pallbearers and gravediggers may be in this hall today; others, perhaps, cast their most recent votes for the parties of the ex-communists. One thing is sure: the specter whose haunting of Europe Karl Marx announced in his Communist Manifesto a century and a half ago looks less certainly laid to rest in 1995 than it did in 1990. Viewed in historical perspective, this should not be in the least surprising. By the fifth year of the French Revolution, France had had two constitutions, Louis XVI had been guillotined, the Terror had devoured such darlings of the Revolution as Danton and Robespierre, and Babeuf had begun hatching his “conspiracy of equals.” Napoleon and the Restoration lay ahead. By the fifth year of the Russian Revolution, the horrible civil war had just come to an end, war communism had failed, Lenin had announced his market-friendly New Economic Policy (NEP), and grassroots Bolsheviks had begun heatedly debating whether the NEP was or was not restoring capitalism. Stalin and the gulag lay ahead. In the context of this revolutionary chronology, the return of communism today is hardly surprising. Revolutions, even velvet ones, [End Page 4] rarely meet the expectations that they raise. Disenchantment and pessimism creep in. This is when we realize that the old regime, whose death knell we have so eagerly sounded, is still very much alive. The euphoric sense that everything has changed is followed by a numbing suspicion that nothing has changed. It is appropriate for historians and journalists to examine historical analogies in search of social and psychological explanations for the ex-communists’ return to power in Eastern Europe; politicians should be allowed no such luxury. I make this point because too many democratic leaders tend to act like political commentators, sociologists, psychologists, or cultural critics. They explain and analyze the emerging tendencies rather than trying in earnest to stem the tide. After the victory of the ex-communist left in the 1993 parliamentary elections in Poland, an observer asked the rhetorical question: “Can you imagine Franco’s adherents returning to power in Spain just four years after his death?” In the context of this question, the left-wing resurgence in Eastern Europe seems anything but reassuring. Yet the democratic process in our countries is irreversible as long as there are political forces committed to the consolidation of democracy. Competing Paradigms There are two basic models for understanding the former communists’ return to power. One is the paradigm of recommunization, upheld mainly by the party of decommunizers, which sees a conspiracy by former communists to regain control. The other is the paradigm invoked by moderates, who interpret the return of the ex-communists as a “velvet restoration” that is actually an extension of the revolution itself, or a sign of its consolidation. According to this second model, democracy is now so securely entrenched that even if the communists win an election and return to power it will not make any fundamental difference to the nature of the regime: they will not be able to put an end to free political competition or reassert totalitarian social controls. Both paradigms are political rather than intellectual, and relate directly to the specifics of different postcommunist countries. In Hungary, with its consensus in favor of democracy and markets, the paradigm of recommunization has few supporters; this is not the case in countries such as Bulgaria or Romania. The decommunizers see no revolution, but rather a simulacrum of change that has allowed the ex-communists to convert political power into economic influence and sidestep claims for retribution and justice. The credibility of this thesis has grown as former communist apparatchiki and secret-police bosses have redistributed national wealth into their own pockets by manipulating privatization, thumbing the public in the eye and creating once again a society for themselves. [End Page 5] In the...

Teaching the French Popular Front

specialists on the occasion of its fiftieth anniversary (1936-86) may serve to highlight the enduring and exemplary interest of the subject for all teachers of history. France has always provided history teachers with basic topics; feudalism, absolutism, revolution and class conflict are commonly approached with reference to French example when approaching the history of European civilization. France was the laboratory where they appeared in their purest form. The use of French models is less common in teaching the twentieth century although some political scientists have found in Gaullism the model of the modem bureaucratic state par excellence, and the Mitterrand experiment has briefly rekindled interest in the possibilities of socialism in a modem industrial democracy. In all this the French Popular Front experiment of the 1930s should not be overlooked, the surprising lack of interest in it by analysts of the contemporary socialist experiment notwithstanding.' While a Popular Front policy was implemented with varying results in a wide variety of countries in Europe, Asia, and the Americas, the French Popular Front was in its own way the classic example? To be sure, a Popular Front government also came to power in Spain, but its tragic history more properly belongs to the study of the Second World War. In France alone the Popular Front became a part of the national political culture, its achievements permanently enshrined in the national psyche. It established collective bargaining, the 40-hour week, and paid vacations

Economic Policy and Public Opinion in Spain

The socialist party has come to power in Spain just as socialist orthodoxy has fallen out of fashion, at a time of widespread unemployment, and in the wake of memories of prosperity during the last years of Francoism. Drawing on data from a national sample, we examine the preferences of Spaniards with regard to economic policy and the effects of these preferences on support for the government. Economic opinions are relatively uncrystallized, although it is possible to discern a progressive-conservative split. An equally important feature of public opinion is the high level of expectations surrounding government responsibility for economic affairs. These characteristics reflect the disjuncture between economic ideology and actual practice during past decades as well as an older legacy of statist values. Despite the inchoate nature of attitudes on certain economic issues, and because of the high level of expectations regarding economic policy, perceptions of collective economic conditions-that is, sociotropic considerationstend to have a greater impact than traditional cleavages, such as religion, on support for the government.

Douglas MacArthur and Manuel Quezon: A Note on an Imperial Bond

The links by which imperial powers controlled their colonies varied over time. Ranging from the raw power of Spain with its advantages of horses and muskets to the more subtle American progressive school teachers and knowledgeable money-lenders, the connections between governors and governed existed at both the institutional and personal levels. The national wealth of a colonial power grew through the advantages of privileged trade, cheap labor, and the plantation economy; the personal wealth of the representatives of the colonial power was sometimes increased through the perquisites of office, some acknowledged, others carefully camouflaged. The document examined in the following pages is an example of one of the ways this personal wealth was quietly increased. Executive Order # 1, issued on January 3, 1942, by Manuel Quezon, president of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, conveyed $640,000 from the Philippine Treasury to the personal bank accounts of General Douglas MacArthur, commanding general of the United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE), his chief of staff, General Richard K. Sutherland, his deputy chief of staff, General Richard J. Marshall, and his personal aide, Colonel Sidney L. Huff. Although the principals involved in this exchange left no other evidence to explain this document's meaning,1 a careful search of the

The Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera: A Political Reassessment

General Primo de Rivera assumed power in Spain by means of a classic pronunciamiento on 13 September 1923. He suspended the 1876 constitution, upon which the liberal monarchy had rested for the previous fifty years, and established a seven-year dictatorship. His coup d'etat was, however, acclaimed by King Alfonso XIII, who had been exhibiting signs of impatience with the parliamentary regime which had, he believed, obstructed the material development of the country. By his adherence to rebellion against legality, the king put himself in an unconstitutional position, a position which was to be aggravated by his constant endorsement of the dictator's decrees throughout his years in power. Historians and contemporary observers have generally dismissed Primo's rule as that of a 'national Father Christmas','a Haroun-el-Rashid issuing decrees right and left with a Robin Hood sense of justice, or a sympathetic Andalusian determined to force upon a whole nation his primitive and over-simplistic political philosophy. Primo de Rivera was certainly an improviser, an amateur politician who believed fervently in his 'intuition', and a naive soldier who maintained that 'patriotism' alone could be the lever with which he would 'reconstruct' and 'regenerate' the 'decaying' Spanish state.1 A major purpose of this paper is, however, to focus attention upon those aspects of the dictatorship which constitute attempts, though hesitant, to set up a new regime; and to highlight the political consequences of Primo de Rivera's arbitrary rule, as well as of his failure to become a political architect. His measures to undermine the foundations of the monarchist liberal state unleashed processes which finally brought about both his downfall and that of the monarchy. Furthermore Primo de Rivera was responsible for the disappearance, for years

The Economy of the Alta California Mission, 1803-1821

On June 26, 1803, Father President Fermin Francisco de Lasuen died. The following day he was solemnly buried at the foot of the altar in the chapel of Mission San Carlos near his missionary companions, Juan Crespi and Junipero Serra. Lasuen and Serra, opposites in personality, had firmly planted Spain upon the soil of Alta California. The affable and yet firm Lasuen had inaugurated the golden age of the California missions. Staple crop production had reached limits undreamed of by the pioneers of Serra's day. During Lasuen's tenure as Father-President nine new missions were begun, bringing the total to eighteen. Under the firm prodding of the gentle Basque priest, older missions implemented systems of irrigation, orchards were planted and buildings were improved. Technicians were imported from New Spain who taught the secrets of their crafts to Indian neophytes. By Lasuen's death in 1803, the mission chain was well supplied with competent weavers, masons, carpenters, blacksmiths, leather workers and even ribbon-makers. Some experiments had faltered; notably hemp culture and a fur-trade monopoly. Serra, the founding pioneer, had laid the basis for the missions and Lasuen, gentle and conciliatory, had brought them to their peak of development. The years from 1803 to 1821 witnessed turmoil, revolution and bloodshed throughout Hispanic America as disgruntled Creoles took advantage of the discomfiture of the Spanish monarchy at the hands of Napoleon, and the consequent turmoil in Spain. California had no Hidalgo, Bolivar or San Martin. It was little affected by the ideology of revolution, although the revolution itself profoundly affected the area. The decline of Spain's power since the halcyon days of Charles III had little by little opened the gates to foreign intruders. The years from 1803-1821 were to see what had been a trickle become a flood. The process was given much impetus when normal trade channels were interrupted by revolution signaled by the Grito de Dolores of Father Hidalgo

Spain 1808-1939. Raymond CarrThe Origins of Military Power in Spain 1800-1854. E. Christiansen

Previous articleNext article No AccessBook ReviewsSpain 1808-1939. Raymond Carr The Origins of Military Power in Spain 1800-1854. E. Christiansen Gabriel JacksonGabriel Jackson Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Modern History Volume 40, Number 4Dec., 1968 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/240311 Views: 1Total views on this site Copyright 1968 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

The Origins of Military Power in Spain. 1800-1854

The Origins of Military Power in Spain. 1800-1854

The Origins of Military Power in Spain. 1800-1854.

The Origins of Military Power in Spain. 1800-1854.

E. Christiansen, "The Origins of Military Power in Spain, 1800-1854" (Book Review)

E. Christiansen, "The Origins of Military Power in Spain, 1800-1854" (Book Review)

The Origins of Military Power in Spain, 1800–1854. By <italic>E. Christiansen</italic>. [Oxford Historical Monographs.] (New York: Oxford University Press. 1967. Pp. x, 193. $6.10)

The Origins of Military Power in Spain, 1800–1854. By E. Christiansen. [Oxford Historical Monographs.] (New York: Oxford University Press. 1967. Pp. x, 193. $6.10) The Origins of Military Power in Spain, 1800–1854. By Christiansen E.. [Oxford Historical Monographs.] (New York: Oxford University Press. 1967. Pp. x, 193. $6.10.) Stanley G. Payne Stanley G. Payne University of California, Los Angeles Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The American Historical Review, Volume 73, Issue 2, December 1967, Pages 501–502, https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/73.2.501-a Published: 01 December 1967

The Origins of Military Power in Spain, 1800-1854

The Origins of Military Power in Spain, 1800-1854

The Orinoco River and Angostura, Venezuela, in the Summer of 1819: The Narrative of a Maryland Naval Chaplain

The distinction between privateering and piracy was blurring badly by the spring of 1819. The Spanish American revolutionaries, like their Anglo-American counterparts of four decades earlier, lacked a naval force able to challenge Spain's power while it was still en route to her vast American domains. Consequently it was only a question of time before the struggling republics hit upon the happy expedient of issuing letters of marque that authorized independent captains to war against Spain in their cause and under their auspices.

Melchor de Macanaz and the foundations of Bourbon power in Spain

Melchor de Macanaz and the foundations of Bourbon power in Spain

Freedom and Catholic Power in Spain and Portugal. An American Interpretation

Freedom and Catholic Power in Spain and Portugal. An American Interpretation

Freedom and Catholic Power in Spain and Portugal: An American Interpretation

Freedom and Catholic Power in Spain and Portugal: An American Interpretation

Freedom and Catholic Power in Spain and Portugal: An American Interpretation. By Paul Blanshard. Boston: Beacon Press, 1962. 300 pp. $3.95

Journal Article Freedom and Catholic Power in Spain and Portugal: An American Interpretation. By Paul Blanshard. Boston: Beacon Press, 1962. 300 pp. $3.95 Get access McElhannon Joe McElhannon Joe Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of Church and State, Volume 4, Issue 2, November 1962, Pages 227–229, https://doi.org/10.1093/jcs/4.2.227 Published: 01 November 1962