Power In Iraq Research Articles

Between virtue and power: the persistent moral dilemma of U.S. foreign policy

In this survey of U.S. history, John Kane looks at the tensions between American virtue and power and how those tensions have influenced foreign policy. Americans have long been suspicious of power as a threat to individual liberty, Kane argues, and yet the growth of national power has been perceived as a natural byproduct of American virtue. This contradiction has posed a persistent crisis that has influenced the trajectory of American diplomacy and foreign relations for more than two hundred years. Kane examines the various challenges, including emerging Nationalism, isolationism, and burgeoning American power, which have at times challenged not only foreign policy but American national identity. The events of September 11, 2001, rekindled Americans' sense of righteousness, the author observes, but the subsequent use of power in Iraq has raised questions about the nation's virtue and, as in earlier days, cast a deep shadow over its purpose and direction.

Response to Triumph Forsaken

38 Historically Speaking November/December 2007 ality that in 1998—years before then-Governor Bush moved to Washington—a unanimous Senate and more than 90% of the House of Representatives approved the "Iraq Liberation Act" that declared: "It should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime." Indeed, every senior national security official in the Clinton administration and every senior leader of both parties declared that Saddam Hussein had WMD and had to be be stopped. The lies about "lying" continue to divide and weaken our country in a time of national crisis, just as misperceptions about "Vietnam" lead us astray. It is imperative that this record be corrected, and Moyar's book provides valuable insight and ammunition for that struggle. Robert F. Turnerhas studiedthe Vietnam Warfor more thanfortyyears, served twice as an army officer in theAmerican embassy in Saigon during the war, and has taught undergraduate andgraduate seminars on the warat the University of Virginia andthe Naval War College. He is the authororeditorof three books on the war, including Vietnamese Communism: Its Origins and Development (Hoover Institute Press, 1975) and Real Lessons of the Vietnam War: Reflections Twenty-Five Years After the Fall of Saigon (Carolina Academic Press, 2002). Response to Triumph Forsaken Michael Lind As a contribution to the debate about the Vietnam War, Mark Moyar's Triumph Forsaken is impressive in many respects. All too much of the scholarship about the Vietnam War has been a continuation in the academy of the campusbased anti-Vietnam War movement. Too many scholars have sought to portray the conflict as an inexplicable atrocity committed by the United States, rather than as one of several major proxy wars that took place during the Cold War, including the Korean War and the first Afghan War. By drawing on archival material from the communist bloc and by treating the Vietnam War in its context as part of die Cold War, Moyar lives up to the new, higher standard that must be met by contemporary historians of the Vietnam War. Despite the wealth of new information he adduces in its support, Moyar's basic argument is neither original nor persuasive. If the antiwar Left since the 1970s has interpreted the Vietnam War as a senseless mistake or a horrible crime, the consensus on the political Right, and among many in the U.S. military, has been that the Vietnam War was an easily winnable war forfeited by the U.S. because President Lyndon Johnson and civilian defense intellectuals foolishly tied the hands of General Westmoreland and other soldiers. The late Colonel Harry Summers provided the first sustained defense of this thesis in On Strategy: A CriticalAnalysis of the Vietnam War (1982). Triumph Forsaken, as the very tide indicates, is a new restatement of this old theme. According to Moyar, the Vietnam War "was not to be a foolish war fought under wise constraints, but a wise war fought under foolish constraints." The culprits responsible for the "foolish constraints" are the villains of conventional American conservative political demonology: "What would doomJohnson was neither the illness of the patient nor a faulty diagnosis but a poor choice of remedy. His refusal to order some very feasible actions in Laos and North Vietnam, the result of misplaced fears and faulty intelligence and unwarranted confidence in brainy civilians"—note the slur—"forfeited opportunities to deny the Communists the great strategic advantages that they were to enjoy for the next ten years" (416). Like Summers a generation ago, Moyar argues that if only the civilian liberals of the Kennedy and Counter/actuals are a legitimate tool ofhistorical analysis, ifusedproperly. But all of the options must he considered in detail and weighed realistically. Johnson administrations had not been so pusillanimous , then the U.S. could have prevented the communist conquest of South Vietnam by cutting off the Ho Chi Minh Trail, invading North Vietnam, or both. TheJohnson administration's self-imposed constraints on how the U.S. waged war in Vietnam reflected fear that China would intervene, as it had done in the...

Conflict and Cooperation in the Persian Gulf: The Interregional Order and US Policy

For decades, the regional order in the Gulf was shaped by a triangle formed by Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. If one of them gained too much weight, the other two tried to compensate. Yet the 2003 Iraq War has created an entirely new situation since the indefinite US presence has virtually transformed the triangle into a square. Yet in reality this impression is misleading because Iraq's role has actually been usurped by the United States. This has resulted in a new, artificial triangle comprised of the US, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. Strangely enough, within this new triangle, external, or at least non-Arab powers, i.e. the US and Iran, are the most powerful actors, even hinting at the emergence of a bilateral system. Nevertheless, history, tradition, and geography would suppose a renaissance of the traditional triangle. Washington would probably not object to an Iraq acting as its strategic partner in the region as imperial Iran did in the 1970s. If a circular model of the regional order in the Gulf is imagined, the center is in fact formed by a triangle of states: Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Although the balance within this triangular system is very fragile there has been a proven method of upholding it. If one of the mentioned countries gains too much weight, the other two try to compensate. This fundamental framework for the region's balance of power has not changed basically since the end of the second World War with one minor exception, that one has to add the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) - in strategic terms - to Saudi Arabia after 1981. Thus, in general, whether conflict or cooperation prevailed between certain countries was due to the actual state of the overall balance of the triangular system. By comparing the triangle's conduct in previous crises and wars with its reaction to the 2003 Iraq War, the following analysis intends to address the question of whether the latter changed this traditional system. THE TRIANGLE IN OPERATION THE TWIN PILLARS POLICY: IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA VS. IRAQ Arab nationalism, born in the era of anti-colonial struggle, often equated the monarchial system with colonial cronyism. Therefore, monarchies such as Iran and Saudi Arabia considered Arab nationalism an immediate danger. Iran had an additional handicap as a non-Arab state. The threat became imminent in 1958, when nationalist forces overthrew King Faysal II in neighboring Iraq, thus creating a precedent in the Gulf for toppling monarchies. Subsequently, Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi and the Saudi Kings Sa'ud, and especially Faysal after his seizing power in 1964, initiated a modus of frequent consultations to coordinate their regional policies. Events such as the leftist coup in South Yemen in 1967, the British declaration that they were completely retreating from the Gulf region by 1971, and the Ba'th party gaining power in Iraq in July 1968 were powerful incentives to intensify political coordination. The common interest in fighting socialist and radical-nationalist influences in the Gulf region, in ensuring a stable flow of oil and gas, and in increasing wealth through exports, united Iran and Saudi Arabia till the end of the 1970s. David Long was right when he stated that prior to the [Iranian] revolution, the primary political confrontation in the Gulf was neither Sunni-Shii nor Arab-Persian but conservative-radical.1 A strong external momentum supported the Saudi-Iranian alliance of the late 1960s. The US government - alerted by the British proclamation of withdrawal had to ensure that the expected power vacuum in the Gulf region, important both in terms of economy and strategy, would not be filled by East bloc countries and their allies. But US capabilities were stretched to the utmost in Vietnam. This caused President Richard Nixon to declare that in the future his government would look for suitable states to assume regional leadership responsibilities in close cooperation with the US. The so-called Nixon Doctrine meant nothing more than the appointment of deputies for certain strategic areas of the world. …

Fear and Loathing in Falluja

Why should it be so difficult for the United States, with its overwhelming military edge, to counter low-level conflict? An answer is suggested by the paradigmatic example of U.S. operations in Falluja in April 2004. Falluja shows that the Bush administration and its military commanders treat power as a possession or capability independent of the relationship in which it is to be exercised, whereas power in Iraq is better understood in terms of relationships. Considered in this light, Falluja clarifies several issues shaping U.S. understanding of power and offers insight into the application of conventional force against insurgents

Reaching for Power: The Shi'a in the Modern Arab World

Preface ix A Note on Transliteration xiii Prologue A Shi'i-Led Reformation 1 Chapter 1: The Burden of the Past 16 Chapter 2: Containment Politics in the Persian Gulf 42 Chapter 3: The Struggle for Power in Iraq 72 Chapter 4: The Revival of Shi'ism in Lebanon 99 Chapter 5: Between Aspirations and Reality 129 Conclusion 158 Abbreviations 165 Notes 167 Further Reading 207 Acknowledgments 211 Index 213

Iraq's Many Challenges

As she identifies the key players in local community struggles for power in Iraq and analyzes their goals, the author raises essential questions that must be answered if the United States is to "stay the course," finish the job, and prevent Iraq from becoming Lebanon on the Tigris and Euphrates.

Perplexed by Turkey (Review article)

US-Turkish relations appeared in fair shape at the beginning of 2003. True, there had been hard bargaining over the terms of Turkey's participation in America's campaign to dislodge Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq, but the US alliance was generally regarded as the lynchpin of Turkish foreign policy. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the leader of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), had gone to Washington immediately after his election victory in November 2002 in order to enlist US support for his country's bid to obtain from the European Union an immediate date for the commencement of membership negotiations. The roots of AKP in political Islam did not seem to bother the US administration, which, on the contrary, hoped that the emergence of a moderate Islamic government in Turkey would encourage democrats in other Muslim countries. Although Erdogan was the leader of the ruling party, but not yet of the government, as he had been prevented from standing for parliament on account of a conviction for incitement to religious hatred, he was received by President George Bush, who came to the conclusion that Turkey would co-operate in his designs for the Middle East. For his part, Bush urged Brussels once again to deal sympathetically with Turkey's bid for EU membership. The fact that the EU nevertheless disappointed Turkey, and was in turn disappointed when Ankara failed to deliver agreement on a plan, concocted jointly by the UN secretariat and the EU, for the settlement of the Cyprus dispute appeared to force Turkey deeper than ever into the embrace of its powerful American friend. At first, the new Turkish government seemed to confirm this impression. On 6 February 2003 the Turkish parliament allowed the US military to upgrade air bases and harbours in Turkey for a possible attack from Turkish soil against the regime of Saddam Hussein. A resolution to this effect had been presented by the government headed by Abdullah Gill, deputy leader of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). AKP could deploy a maximum of 364 votes in the 550-seat parliament. However it was not clear how many would support the government resolution, since the party executive had allowed its members a free vote. In the event the resolution was passed by 308 votes to 193 with nine abstentions. President Bush

Inverse Engagement: Lessons from US-Iraq Relations, 1982-1990

February 2003 marked the 12th anniversary of the liberation of Kuwait by the United States and its global allies and their near-total victory over the military forces of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in Operation Desert Storm. However, much to the surprise of members of the first Bush Administration, academic scholars, military analysts, media pundits, foreign policy experts, and the average layman, Saddam Hussein remained in power in Iraq and continued to successfully defy the international community. Regardless of the military success of the US war with Iraq prosecuted by the second Bush Administration in 2003, Saddam's longevity should in itself serve as a significant warning to policymakers that something may be amiss in the formulation and execution of US foreign policy. In this article I reexamine the fundamental intellectual assumptions of what is known as engagement, the foreign policy doctrine that guided US behavior toward Iraq in the decade preceding Saddam's invasion of Kuwait. Despite the whol esale failure of engagement in Iraq before 1990, the fundamental assumptions that guided US engagement policies have remained largely unexamined. This failure to acknowledge historic mistakes raises the disturbing possibility that similar failures of engagement may occur in Washington's strategic relationships with other problematic international actors and rogue states. Engagement in Practice: US Relations with Iraq, 1982-1990 Engagement serves as a core policy doctrine of US national security strategy in the 21st century. (1) In practice, implementing engagement relies heavily on the manipulation of economic incentives, primarily in the areas of trade and finance, to influence the behavior of other states. Engagement uses economic interdependence, or mutual dependence, to create ties that bind states together. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye suggest that economic interdependence should be understood in terms of the power to influence, or the effects on each state of their trade linkages. Indeed, as many scholars have indicated, states have long recognized the truth that power generally flows from asymmetrical (or imbalanced) interdependence. (2) In keeping with this tradition, Keohane and Nye stress that when planning an effective diplomatic strategy, It is asymmetries in dependence that are most likely to provide sources of influence for actors in their dealings with one another. Less dependent actors can often use the interdepend ent relationship as a source of power in bargaining over an issue and perhaps to affect other issues. (3) At its core, economic statecraft is founded on the principle of asymmetrical power. In 1979 political turmoil in the Middle East forever changed the regional strategic landscape. In January of that year a groundswell of Islamist protesters drove the Shah of Iran from the Persian throne, in December the Soviet Union launched its ruinous war in Afghanistan, and in September 1980 Iraq invaded Iran. Thus, the Middle East stage was radically changed as the Reagan Administration entered the White House. In the minds of Ronald Reagan's foreign policy team, US national interests in the oil-rich Persian Gulf now faced two significant new threats: communist expansionism by direct military means from the Soviet Union and the spread of anti-US Islamic fundamentalism from Iran. With these two factors in mind, Iraq's sponsorship of international terrorism was seen as a lesser of evils, and therefore Baghdad was perceived as a potential partner that could serve US strategic interests in the region. In March 1982, the US government officially began engaging Saddam Hussein by removing Iraq from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. The official reason was to recognize Iraq's improved record, (4) a claim that a Defense Department official later rebutted in stating, No one had any doubts about [the Iraqis'] continued involvement in terrorism.... The real reason was to help them succeed in the war against Iran. …

The Causes and Timing of Iraq's Wars: a Power Cycle Assessment

The application of power cycle theory to Iraq's war decisions reveals the dynamics of an increasingly competitive Middle East system. Iraq's power share rose sharply from 1975 to an abrupt inflection by 1980, just after Iran's inflected decline, an explosive mix that provided the context for Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Iran. Although Iraq gained slowly in relative power during the war with Iran, by 1987 Iraq had entered a period of decline relative to its Gulf rivals that continued through its invasion of Kuwait. The relative power winners, at Iraq's expense, were Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. That Iraq was in relative decline before invading Kuwait reconciles the seeming contradiction of Iraq as both an expansive potential hegemon and a desperate war-exhausted economy.

The Changing Pattern of Politcal Power in Iraq, 1958-1971

The Changing Pattern of Politcal Power in Iraq, 1958-1971

Impressions of the United Arab Republic

T HE United Arab Republic came into existence in February I958. When I visited it a year later I had little idea of the relations between its components, Egypt and Syria, and I imagine that many of you are still in that position. I propose therefore to begin by looking at the factors which brought the union about and by outlining the nature of the constitutional link between the two member states. As an independent country Syria, in I956 and I957, was in a very weak position both strategically and economically. On the south she had never been on any terms with her neighbour, Israel, save those of war or of armed and hostile coexistence. On the north, her relations with Turkey were not good either. Syria had always bitterly resented Turkish action twenty years earlier when the latter had used the French and British desire for an alliance as a means of depriving her of the province of Alexandretta, at a moment when her position under a French Mandate made it impossible for her to resist. In I957 the Syrian acceptance of Communist arms put a further strain on Syrian-Turkish relations; and Turkish forces were actually massed on the frontier, ostensibly to carry out manoeuvres. On the east, her neighbour Iraq was indeed an Arab State. But, as Syria suspected at the time and as was subsequently proved by the Baghdad trials, the Government in power in Iraq had in I956 made definite plans to send in her army and forcibly incorporate Syria into the Iraq monarchy, on the pretext of anticipating a Communist couip. Economically, the moment was equally unfavourable. Syrian economy is dependent on agriculture. Failure of the seasonal rains had put an end to the remarkable post-war development of cultivation in the north; and the ensuing slump, worsened by the initial difficulties of the transition to economic aid from the Communist countries, had brought the rapid growth of the chief cities, and particularly of Damascus, to a sudden stop. In these circumstances it was natural that Syria should look for some bettersituated state with which she could enter into such close relations as would ensure whole-hearted support in case of need. These may be considered negative reasons; but there was also a positive motive. Syria was the birthplace of the idea of Arab unity; it was from Syria that the idea had passed to Egypt. The Syrian Constitution of I950 declared, in so many words, that 'the Syrian people are part of the Arab nation'. Egypt had since become the principal champion of Arab