The Greek sovereign debt crisis has raised some important issues, not only with regard to the effectiveness of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as an optimal currency area, but also as to whether or not a member state should exit the euro zone in the face of unsustainable debt problems, given the fact that the EMU lacks a fiscal union. Concerning Greece’s potential exit from the euro zone, the majority of the literature is confined to analyzing spillover effects to other member states and the endangerment of the euro’s stability, rather than highlighting the unsustainability of extreme balance-sheet effects upon a devaluation of the drachma. This paper explores what effects a euro exit would have on Greece’s economy and examines whether the exchange rate risk of devaluation would lead to a greater debt trap, causing irreversible harm to the economy. This paper analyzes devaluations after crises in certain emerging market economies (EMEs), namely South Korea, Russia, and Argentina. Despite differences in economic backgrounds and enforced policies, these countries experienced V-shaped recoveries, sustaining positive and relatively constant economic growth throughout the decade following the devaluation of their currencies. In this paper, Greece is considered an EME as well, and is therefore very comparable to the above examples. The Greek case exhibits many similarities to the situation in Argentina, in which internal devaluation was pursued ineffectively for four years, resulting in disorderly default and devaluation and the resumption of growth within the following year, thus underlining the plausibility of the argument. Despite numerous complications, a euro exit could have been beneficial for Greece under certain conditions because of the instant effects on competitiveness following an all-level currency devaluation, as opposed to the asymmetric internal devaluation strategy that is currently being pursued.