While the advent of constitutional courts in the post-communist Central-Eastern Europe provoked a wide array of insightful analysis, one of the lesser known and neglected courts in the region was the Romanian Constitutional Court. Despite this scholarly gap, the Romanian Constitutional Court’s activity supplies at least for the past decade a wealth of empirical data, which could be used for further testing the paradigms provided by Constitutional Politics theory. Based on our extensive empirical research on the decisions of the court since its inception, we attempt to prove that the great extension of powers of the Romanian Constitutional Court undertaken by the Romanian legislature in 2003, failed so far to produce the outcome sought by the Legislator at the time of the enactment of the constitutional amendments. In our view, the legislative efforts of the majority are well explained by the insurance theory in constitutional politics, while the cooperation of the legislative minority in the enactment needs further explanation, which we will attempt to provide. In doing so, we hope to contribute with an empirical and comparative argument to the constitutional politics theory, and also to the more neglected empirical research in the activity of Constitutional Courts from Central Eastern Europe. We also hope to fill a scholarly gap in the knowledge of the Romanian Constitutional Court. This paper should be of interest for those interested in constitutional theory, the theory of courts, constitutional politics and theories of the democratic process.