Post-communist Party Research Articles

Democracy with Chinese Characteristics: Historical and Political Transformations

In autocratic regimes, democracy stands as a paradoxical beacon, feared and manipulated by dictators. This study examines China’s conceptualisation of democracy post-Communist Party ascendancy, analysing key political historical milestones—the demise of the Qing dynasty, the Mao Era and subsequent leaders up to Xi Jinping today. The research sheds light on the Chinese Communist Party’s customisation of democracy, guided by the writings of its leaders, to suit China’s unique conditions. Democracy is an abstract concept, yet in China, authoritarian rule, hierarchical social structures and traditional values have helped shape interpretations and application.

Algorithmically Mediated Nostalgia through Recordings of Post-Communist Parties on TikTok and Instagram

Among numerous capabilities, social media platforms have also enabled users to remix and repurpose analog videos through their features. This remediated media is further propelled by the platforms’ algorithmic systems, thus enhancing their visibility among users who, as affective publics, can interact with it and further remediate it. This paper discusses how the nostalgic discourse takes shape on Instagram and TikTok around remediated analog videos of parties and celebrations during the 1990s in Romania and how the platform affordances and the algorithmic imaginary of the affective publics influence the nostalgic discourse. The exploratory study utilizes a mixed method – combining digital ethnography, discourse analysis, and digital humanities – the research identifies a double-folded nostalgia, which is impacted by the interplay between each platform’s specific affordances and the imagined rules and styles of the platforms, imagined by their users.

Lewica o polskiej polityce wschodniej w XXI w.

The subject of the article is the views of the Left on eastern policy. The study covered the 21st century, as it brought decomposition at the level of the international system, with regard to the quality of international relations and in the geopolitical space. New challenges emerged for Poland. These challenges resulted from the imperial policy of Russia, the strengthening of the international position of Germany and its cooperation with Russia, lowering the level of security in Central and Eastern Europe, the crisis of the European Union, and the strategic and doctrinal reorientation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In the first decade of the independent Third Republic of Poland, the main political parties and movements agreed on the implementation of two strategic goals: joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and accession to the European Union, achieved in 1999–2004. At the same time, politicians gave various answers to the issues and challenges outlined above, and disputes over the implementation of Polish foreign policy reduced its effectiveness. The Left was one of the participants in the dispute. In the Third Polish Republic, the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland and the Democratic Left Alliance (the so-called post-communist parties) were of the greatest importance among the left-wing political parties, and from 2020 the New Left. The post-communist left ruled in Poland in the years 1993–1997 and 2001–2005, and then functioned as a parliamentary, extra-parliamentary and again parliamentary opposition. In January 2020, the Democratic Left Alliance adopted the name of the New Left, which remained after the unification with the Spring party.

Segmental Volatility in Ethnically Divided Societies: (Re)assessing Party System Stability in Southeast Europe

AbstractThis article examines the role of ethnicity and ethnic parties as stabilizing factors in Southeast European party systems. It compares two ethnically divided countries in Southeast Europe: Bosnia and Herzegovina, where ethnic identities that form the political cleavage are firm, and Montenegro, where they are malleable. Theoretically, it addresses the debate between scholars who either find stability or instability in East European post-communist party systems. The article traces the role of ethnicity in the formation and development of electoral contests and compares the two cases by utilizing measures of block volatility, based on analysis of official electoral data. We argue that party systems in ethnically diverse countries are stable at the subsystems level, but unstable within them. In BiH, firm ethnic identity stabilizes the party system by limiting competition between blocks, leading to closure. Malleable ethnic identity in Montenegro opens competition to non-ethnic parties seeking to bridge ethnic divisions, leading to more instability. We find that party system dynamics in ethnically divided new democracies depend on identity rigidity and cleavage salience, in addition to levels of heterogeneity.

Paying for appeasement: On the moderating role of public subsidies in East Central European party politics

Focusing on the relationship between the access of political parties to direct public funding and electoral support for anti-political-establishment (e.g. populist, extremist) parties (APEp), this article tries to fill an important gap in the literature. Whereas previous contributions, mostly focused on the United States or established democracies in Western Europe, have presented contradictory findings, our study of 19 new democracies in East Central Europe clearly shows that the absence of state subsidies for political parties boosts support for those with an anti-political-establishment character. More importantly, and taking into account the minimum legal payout threshold that grants parties access to public subsidies, our results show that the more restrictive the regulations and the greater the difficulties faced by parties in obtaining state help, the higher the support for APEp. Our findings have obvious implications for the development of post-Communist party systems and the future of legislative (party funding) reform in the region.

Prime ministers and party governments in Central and Eastern Europe

ABSTRACT This article is the introduction to a special issue on Prime Ministers (PMs) and party governments in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). It argues that the political survival of PMs in post-communist democracies depends on their interrelationships with other actors in three different arenas. The first arena encompasses the linkages between PMs and their parties. In this respect, being a party leader is a major power resource for PMs to retain their office even under critical circumstances. At the heart of the second arena is the PMs’ relationship to other parliamentary parties. In this regard, the high fragmentation and fluidity of many post-communist party systems pose enormous challenges for PMs to secure constant parliamentary support. In the third arena, PMs are confronted with state presidents. Relatively strong CEE presidents, especially in semi-presidential systems, may use their constitutional powers to interfere in the political domain of PMs and thus jeopardise the stability of party governments. For each of these interrelationships, the article provides systematic evidence for eleven CEE democracies from 1990 to 2019 and situates the findings of the volume’s contributions within a broader comparative perspective.

Spoiler effects in proportional representation systems: evidence from eight Polish parliamentary elections, 1991–2015

I consider a model of multiple winner elections with several types of spoilers. In single-office elections, a “classic” spoiler turns a winner into a non-winner and a non-winner into a winner. Such spoilers rarely appear in multi-office elections. In such elections, spoilers include a “Kingmaker”, who turns a non-winner into a winner; a “Kingslayer”, who turns a winner into a non-winner; a “Valuegobbler”, who subtracts from some competitor more seats than it receives; and “Selfspoilers”, who may be hurt by competing separately rather than creating an electoral coalition. Various strategic spoilers, such as fake parties, are possible as well. I look for spoilers in eight Polish parliamentary elections that have taken place since the fall of communism in 1989. In two elections, the consequences of spoilers were massive. In 1993, multiple spoilers on the right helped the two post-communist parties return to power, slow down decommunization and create strong institutional obstacles to further democratization. In 2015, a spoiler manufactured a majority for the largest party (PiS) and, as a consequence, enabled PiS quickly to implement radical reforms. In other elections, spoilers had smaller, but noticeable consequences. The results suggest that parliamentary elections using PR party-list systems are vulnerable to spoiler problems that may cause significant political effects.

Institutionalization and De-institutionalization in Post-communist Party Systems

This article is part of the special cluster titled Parties and Democratic Linkage in Post-Communist Europe, guest edited by Lori Thorlakson, and will be published in the August 2018 issue of EEPS In an article written in 1995 titled “What Is Different about Postcommunist Party Systems?” Peter Mair applied the method that he called “ ex adverso extrapolation.” He matched his knowledge of the process of consolidation of party systems in the West with what was known at that time about Eastern European history, society, and the emerging post-communist party politics. Considering factors such as the existence of fluid social structures, the weakness of civil society, or the destabilizing impact of the so-called triple transition, his article predicted long-term instability for the region. In the present article, we evaluate the validity of Mair’s predictions, thereby also contributing to a lively debate in the current literature about the scale and nature of East–West differences and about the trajectories of the two regions. Going beyond the identification of cross-regional similarities and differences, we also differentiate between individual party systems, establish subgroups, and describe changes across time. Using four major dimensions (i.e., party system closure, party-level stability, electoral volatility, and fragmentation), the article finds that Mair’s predictions were largely, though not in every detail, right. Ironically, however, we also find that changes in the West tend to match over time the trajectory of the East.

Does Partisanship Hurt Electoral Accountability? Individual-Level and Aggregate-Level Comparisons of Western and Postcommunist Democracies

While the negative effect of partisanship on electoral accountability has been assumed in established Western democracies, its empirical test has been rare, especially for postcommunist democracies whose democratization processes are so distinct that their partisanship might deliver different political impacts from their Western counterparts. Through individual- and aggregate-level regressions, I find that partisanship, in general, does hurt electoral accountability at both levels. From a comparative perspective, the individual-level tests reveal that such a negative effect of partisanship has been more salient among the postcommunist voters with fewer electoral resources to rely on than among the Western voters whose abilities to hold the government accountable are stronger. At the aggregate level, however, this tendency becomes reversed as any increase in partisanship beyond its current relatively high level may induce the over-institutionalization of the Western party systems restricting electoral accountability, while it could rather help to stabilize the postcommunist party systems making it easier for voters to discern which political group is accountable for policy outcomes.

Parties between thresholds: State subsidies and party behaviour in post-communist democracies

Much has been written about what makes political parties form, persist, change and die. One factor often brought into this discussion is the availability of resources in general and of state financing of political parties in particular. However, an empirical link at the aggregate level is difficult to establish because of various issues of conceptualization, operationalization and measurement. Working at the party level and taking into consideration that state funding provides important resources that make running in elections and achieving a party’s electoral target more likely, this article provides empirical support for the claim that parties who (anticipate to be or) are being funded by the state have a higher chance of forming and surviving in an independent format in the party system. Based on a comparison of 14 post-communist party systems, the main conclusion of the article is that the survival rate for such parties exceeds the survival rate for the non-publicly funded ones in almost all cases. A second, novel and more particular, finding is that parties who find themselves outside parliament, but above the payout threshold, display higher survival rates than parties who are below it.

Poland’s Palikot Movement

Although post-communist party systems have shown signs of stabilisation in recent years, they are still susceptible to the emergence of new parties. Sikk (2012) and Sikk and Hanley (2014) have suggested that many of these challengers owe their success to a distinct winning formula, appealing to the public primarily on the basis of their ‘newness’ and antiestablishment credentials. However, to draw conclusions about the relative importance of newness in explaining the successes of these parties, it is necessary to understand the nature of their support among the electorate. Few empirical demand-side analyses of party support in the region explicitly address the newness thesis. This paper analyses support for Poland’s Palikot Movement, a party which rose to prominence in 2011 and for whom newness constituted a significant aspect of its electoral appeal. It shows that while the Palikot Movement attracted voters who disliked the other parties, support for the party was more clearly attributable to its distinct ideological profile rather than its claim to represent those dissatisfied with the actions of the political establishment.

Political Activism: Post-communist Challenges and Opportunities in East Central Europe

Contrary to standard narratives on the declining function of parties in fostering political participation, this article argues that far from abandoning the cause of participation, post-communist political parties diversified the understanding of the party as a mobilizing agency by adapting their internal organizations. On the basis of a mid-range number of cases (e.g. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia) the study identified different patterns of evolution within a complex interaction effect between participation and organizational development. The peculiarity of the parties’ organization and functions has shaped political participation both as an opportunity structure (legitimizing the political system and increasing citizens’ involvement in politics) and as a democratic challenge (increasing the pro-pensity of parties towards populism, ‘seasonal’ membership, corruption and clientelism).

Ethnic Minority Policies as an Ethnic Cleavage Dimension Within Post-Communist Party Systems: Case Studies of Vojvodina Hungarians and Estonian Russians

Ethnic Minority Policies as an Ethnic Cleavage Dimension Within Post-Communist Party Systems: Case Studies of Vojvodina Hungarians and Estonian Russians

Post-Communist Democracies and Party Organization. By Margit Tavits. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 295p. $90.00 cloth. $32.99 paper.

Post-Communist Democracies and Party Organization. By Margit Tavits. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 295p. $90.00 cloth. $32.99 paper.

Women's resistance to the radical right: lessons from post-Communist Hungary

ABSTRACTMen dominate the electorates of populist radical-right political parties across Europe. That is a matter of empirical fact. Why women resist such parties remains subject to debate. One approach suggests that there is a fundamental mismatch between the ideological profile of populist radical parties and the values and priorities held by most women. Another theory highlights men's concentration in the blue-collar occupations most threatened by socio-economic modernization. Women's over-representation in service jobs is thought to insulate them from the sense of economic vulnerability that animates male enthusiasm for the far right. Other approaches emphasize factors that render conservative women unavailable to populist right-wing parties, despite a degree of ideological affinity. Montgomery draws on electorate survey data to explain the gender gap in voting for post-Communist Hungary's extreme-right anti-Roma party, Jobbik. She discusses key East-West differences and several unique features of Hungarian party political development, but her emphasis is on the interaction among key variables identified in the general literature. Findings therefore contribute to broad debates about what drives (or may inhibit) the growth and governing power of populist radical-right parties.

Analyzing the Dynamics of Post-Communist Party Systems

he literature on the development of party systems in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe has basically revolved around four topics, three of which are represented in this issue, and maybe there is a fifth topic emerging soon, evolving out of the fourth. The first topic is whether mechanisms of accountability are at all involving politicians’ delivery of collective and large-scale club goods to large citizen constituencies, or what is commonly referred to as “programmatic politics” and “responsible partisan government.” The answer to this question has to be at least partially in the affirmative to make reading the articles assembled in this EEPS issue worth while. I assume here with the authors of this volume that this is correct, although the agenda of studying alternatives or complements to programmatic partisan appeals—such as clientelistic, targeted, narrow material inducements, a symbolic politics of charismatic leadership, or also purely descriptive identity politics—is very much alive. So I will set this general topic aside.

Stranická patronáž a její vztah ke korupci a klientelismu: teoretický koncept a nástin uplatnění v postkomunistickém prostředí

This article examines the patterns of party patronage in both communist and post-communist regimes in Central Eastern Europe. Firstly, the text outlines the theoretical concept of patronage and explains in more detail the linkage between patronage and other related phenomena – i.e. corruption and clientelism. This part focuses on both the differences and similarities between them. In the second part, the article sketches out the principles of the working of patterns of patronage (so-called nomenclature) in communist regimes. In the last part, the paper discusses changes in the patterns of party patronage after the fall of communism and provides an explanation for the varying practices of patronage among post-communist parties, stressing the institutional legacy of the past. The paper thus generally aims to provide theoretical background for further research on party patronage in post-communist countries and also in more specific (i.e. local or regional) contexts

Engineering party competition in a new democracy: post-communist party regulation in Romania

The article examines the evolution of party regulation in Romania and identifies a progressive shift from the early 1990s promotion scope of party legislation towards a multi-layered prescriptive and rather restrictive legislation. The dynamics identified fit the party cartelisation idea, although with significant amendments. The mid 90s and the 2000s changes were not primarily geared towards controlling access to public funding for party politics; beyond the rhetoric pleading in favour of a simpler democracy, the various amendments testify parties' interest to limit access to privileged state contracts and patronage positions.

Post-Communist Democracies and Party Organization. By Margit Tavits. (Cambridge University Press, 2013.)

<i>Post-Communist Democracies and Party Organization</i>. By Margit Tavits. (Cambridge University Press, 2013.)

A model of strategic preemption: Why do post-communists hurt hemselves?

Why do political actors pass legislation that seemingly hurts them? Lustration laws limit access to public office of the ancien regime's collaborators and hurt members of post-communist parties in East-Central Europe. So why has lustration in Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria been passed when post-communist parties held parliamentary majorities? Why did the postcommunist party in Romania switch from no-lustration to pro-lustration after the 1992 elections? We explain this phenomenon by electoral timing and rules of procedure in legislatures. Specifically, we develop an agenda-setter model with a finite number of parties, imperfect information, and multiple potential medians. Our main argument can be summarized as follows: Suppose that the Postcommunists do not introduce any lustration bill and then lose proposal power in elections. If Anti-communists come to power, they are sure to introduce a harsher bill, and the median of the legislature may prefer such a bill to a no-bill status quo. Post-communists can prevent such a scenario by implementing a mild bill themselves. If they manage to appease the new parliamentary median, they will block a harsher bill that would be implemented after they lose power. Additional results show how electoral perspectives and uncertainty affect and modify this typical scenario. We test our model with an exhaustive analysis of all cases from East- Central Europe that meet our assumptions that a Postcommunist party is in power and no lustration bill is already in force.