post-Cold War World Research Articles

China and Globalization: Confronting Myriad Challenges and Opportunities

China, with its rapid economic rise, holds one of the master keys to the future of globalization in the post-cold war world. This article explores how China is coping with the forces of globalization since that time, beginning with a brief description of the global discourse and politics on globalization. The article then tracks Chinese views on globalization, especially how its promises and perils are conceptualized and addressed by key pundits and decision makers. An examination follows of the complex and evolving interplay between globalization and China’s policies in terms of globalizing economy, security, and soft power. The final section sketches out a series of major challenges confronting the Chinese leaders, each of which will involve a strategic decision and sequencing regarding how to cope with globalization challenges and how to redefine the role of the state as a competent, efficient, and adaptable actor.

`To Put Oneself into the other Fellow's Place': John Herz, the Security Dilemma and the Nuclear Age

It is well known in the literature on security dilemma theorising that John Herz coined the concept in the early 1950s, with Herbert Butterfield developing a very similar concept at the same time. What is less well appreciated is that Butterfield powerfully argued in his 1951 book History and Human Relations that there was no prospect of state leaders and diplomats overcoming the dynamics of mutual suspicion and distrust that created what he had chosen to call a condition of `Hobbesian fear'. Herz parted company with Butterfield on this fundamental question, considering that two adversaries could come to appreciate that what they perceived as the other's hostile behaviour was a defensive response to their own actions. This article revisits this fundamental question that divided the pioneer theorists of the security dilemma as to whether better mutual understanding between potential rivals might be the key to mitigating fear-based hostility. The article discusses this question in relation to Herz's ideas about surviving the nuclear age, and shows how he believed that knowledge of the security dilemma was critical if the superpowers were to mitigate their security competition. Having examined how far the end of the Cold War supports Herz's position, the article concludes by showing how Herz became increasingly disillusioned that the United States was capable of acting to mitigate the security dilemma in the post-Cold War world.

A War with No Winners

It is difficult to understand what prompted Mikheil Saakashvili to transform the Russian–Georgian cold war into a hot one. The Georgian leader would have been better off rallying a diplomatic coalition to pressure Moscow. His attack, whether provoked or not, has undermined his international credibility. Now some of his allies in the United States and Europe blame him for igniting a crisis which has cost his nation dearly and lowered the threshold for Russian military intervention in Russia's ‘near abroad’. The conflict also became a diplomatic confrontation between Russia and the West. In this test of wills, none of the parties – Georgia, Russia or the West – has emerged as a winner. The post-Cold War world order, built on the assumption that Russia and the West could settle all their differences by peaceful means, has been challenged.

Enduring Logics of U.S. Foreign Aid during the Bush Administration

Since 9/11 the Bush administration has made larger pledges than ever to the cause of promoting development and fighting HN/AIDS in various corners of the globe. Foreign aid policy initiatives taken by the Republican president needed some explanations considering the GOP's longstanding dislike for foreign aid. One of the common answers was 9/11; the U.S. had to address the sources of discontent against itself by providing foreign development assistance to countries most vulnerable to terrorist infiltration. This paper argues that U.S. foreign aid during the Bush administration is not just a response to the spread of anti-American sentiments among failed and failing states but an outgrowth of foreign policy ideas that had shaped the liberal hegemon’s vision of the new world order since the end of the Cold War. Particularly continuities between the Clinton and Bush administrations are stressed in terms of foreign policy ideas. Three themes of post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy are identified here: globalization, democracy promotion, and good governance. Globalization has been routed as the facilitator of economic prosperity through the liberalization of trade and capital flows. Democracy promotion has been endorsed as a long-term solution to security instability of the post-Cold War world. Good governance has been advanced as a yardstick by which to compare countries in their willingness and capability to be part of global community. Those major tenets of U.S. foreign policy affected the policy outlook of foreign aid in a way that makes less significant the difference between the Clinton and Bush administrations than is assumed.

Restraining the Hegemon: North Korea, the United States and Asymmetrical Deterrence

Since the Korean War, deterrence has been the dominant theoretical framework guiding security relations in Korea. The United States and South Korea have maintained an alliance with the goal of deterring another attack from the North. Indeed, most of the literature on Korean security focuses on deterrence and U.S.-South Korean security policy. Yet, deterrence has also been a part of North Korean security planning, particularly with the end of the Cold War. In the early 1990s, North Korea saw its security situation gravely shaken as both of its traditional allies, China and Russia, distanced themselves and sought a relationship with the economically vibrant South. Not coincidently, this became a time of increased North Korean efforts to acquire a nuclear capability. During the 1990s, the North Korean economy also began its descent with the loss of trading partners and preferential deals from the Communist bloc that made it increasingly difficult to match South Korea's defense spending. As a result, North Korea assumed a defense posture that increasingly resembled that of deterrence, a task even more difficult given it needed to deter the United States in an asymmetrical relationship. Despite these circumstances, scholars have given little attention to applying deterrence theory to explain North Korean actions. This article addresses examines North Korean efforts to implement a deterrence policy in the post Cold War world. In addition, this article addresses the implications for asymmetrical deterrence as smaller states seek to deter larger powers, particularly through the development of a nuclear capability.

The EU's Test in Kosovo

It remains to be seen whether the rule of law and robust institutions can be built in Kosovo. The answer will show whether a common EU (and transatlantic) foreign policy is possible in the diffuse post–Cold War world.

Liberal Institutionalism and International Cooperation after 11 September 2001

Liberal institutionalism has traditionally emphasized the need for institutional arrangements to initiate and sustain cooperation among states. The theory regenerated much interest in the capacity and potential of international institutions, particularly the United Nations, for sustained international cooperation and peace in the post-cold war world. A good number of recent developments, particularly the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on America and the resurgent neoconservative agenda in American foreign policy to wage the endless ‘war on terror’ and to extend the zone of freedom and democracy through force, run counter to the basic premises of liberal institutionalism. This article analyzes the impact of the neoconservative foreign policy agenda on wider forms of international cooperation and argues that the unilateral US invasion of Iraq in 2003 has created an international environment of conflict and insecurity where rival and hostile states view each other with deep suspicions and prefer not to cooperate on important international peace and security issues. The prevailing international environment of insecurity has seriously undermined, the potential of international institutions, particularly the United Nations, to hold the post-September 11 world together and get states on board to cooperate on a sustained basis.

The Worst Allies, Except for All the Others: US-European relations in the age of George W. Bush

Any nuanced assessment of current transatlantic tensions requires an awareness of their historical context. An understanding of the legacy of the Cold War in particular helps to answer the following questions: (1) What are the sources of current US-European tensions? (2) Has the transatlantic connection sustained mortal damage, or can it endure? (3) What changes of attitude and of focus might help the transatlantic relationship in the future? The argument is as follows: The US–European relationship is under assault not just because of recent US military actions but also because of a longer-term shift away from a successful US Cold War grand strategy that still had much to offer the post-Cold War world. However, cause for alarm is limited, because the history of cooperation, the lack of alternative partners, and the very real nature of external threats means that neither the US nor the Europeans have any realistic alternative to cooperation with each other.

Sea Power Ashore and in the Air (review)

Reviewed by: Sea Power Ashore and in the Air Kathleen Broome Williams Sea Power Ashore and in the Air. Edited by David Stevens and John Reeve . Canberra: Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Centre, 2007. ISBN 978-1-920831-45-5. Maps. Photographs. Notes. Index. Pp. 320. Price unavailable. Today, argues Andrew Lambert in the opening salvo of this book, "Nowhere on earth is safe from maritime power projection" (p. 30). Indeed, he continues, further clarifying the book's theme, expeditionary warfare must be our "current concern" (p. 31). In nineteen essays, including Lambert's, authors examine why this is so. In the process, they discuss more than one hundred years of naval power projection, from the blockade of Weihaiwei in the Sino-Japanese War to recent operations in East Timor, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The products of a naval history conference held in Canberra in 2005, most of the essays concern the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) or the Royal Navy – including their air arms - often as integral parts of joint or multinational forces. Predictably, Gallipoli receives considerable attention, as do World War II amphibious operations from North Africa to Okinawa, and Cold War efforts in Korea and Vietnam. Among the less familiar topics are RAN Beach Commandos in the Pacific, the role of the US Navy in the civil war in China (1945-47), submarine "virtual" warfare under the northern ice cap, sea power in peace operations, and naval contributions to the conflicts in Lebanon-Jordan (1958), Kuwait (1961), the East African Mutiny (1964), and the Somalia campaign (1992-93). For this reader, part of the refreshing appeal of the volume is the opportunity it affords to view even familiar engagements from the less familiar Australian point of view. Perhaps inevitably, this book- like most collections of essays - is of mixed quality. On the whole, though, the standard is high. The essays vary in length [End Page 586] from six pages to twenty, and some still bear the marks of compression common to conference papers. This is a handicap when it precludes context, as it does in one or two, although the best, like David Hobbs's three case histories of joint and coalition warfare, or Sarah Paine's "Weihaiwei," manage to convey the essence of the historical and theoretical setting in a few sentences. The weaknesses have little to do with sources. Whether based on primary or secondary sources, personal experience, or some combination of these, the essays are well-researched and appropriately supported. A few, however, are too narrowly focused, weak on analysis, or tentative in their conclusions. Most of the contributors are naval historians and some are retired naval officers whose writing is informed by practical experience. A fine example of this is David Farthing's humorous yet incisive firsthand account of the RAN's air mobile operations in Vietnam. In general, the contributors agree on the lessons hammered home in the book. Although blue water fleet engagements are – for now – a thing of the past, navies have never been more important because of the prevalence of expeditionary warfare and the asymmetry of 21st century conflicts. This ensures that maritime forces can increasingly influence events ashore. What John Connor calls the "wide repertoire of naval capabilities" (p. 247) suits them perfectly for the multi-role and joint nature of future operations. The authors argue convincingly that the continuing relevance of navies in the post-Cold War world will depend on the skill with which they exploit this reality. Copyright © 2008 Society for Military History

Maximising the Potential of UK Maritime Forces in Peacetime

The post-Cold War world has seen the re-emergence of the historical norm of dispute and conflict in many areas of the world. It has enabled the growth of globalisation at an unprecedented rate, cre...

Re-exploring the Foundations of World Order

Global Liberalism and Political Order: Toward a New Grand Compromise? Edited by Steven Bernstein, Louis W. Pauly Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007. 240 pp., $70.00 (ISBN-13: 978-0-7914-7045-9). In his seminal article, John Gerard Ruggie (1982) described the foundation for the emerging world order during the decades that followed World War II as “embedded liberalism”—a grand compromise between liberal international economic policy and domestic political interventionism, which was designed to protect the welfare state. Is the world as we know it today any different from those days? If the answer is yes, is there a movement toward a new compromise, and is that compromise a “grand” one? These questions are the focus of Steven Bernstein and Louis Pauly's Global Liberalism and Political Order , which seeks to understand the foundations for global political authority and the role of legitimacy in granting that authority. The book constitutes an unusually reflective, theory-based, and coherent contribution to the literature on the discontents of globalization (see, for example, Stiglitz 2002) and the alleged legitimacy crisis of global governance (Bodansky 1999; Zurn 2004). Unlike the vast majority of edited books, each contributor stays true to the central theme. The book also enables readers to revisit Ruggie's original concept and arguments in their historical setting and to revisit them in the context of a post-Cold War world characterized by accelerating globalization. Global Liberalism and Political Order is accessible and thought provoking. It gives both the student and the scholar a framework for a deeper understanding of the current dynamic world order. It may even provide valuable insights for those who want to change that order. In the first chapter, Bernstein introduces the editors' quest in clear and comprehensive terms and provides a necessary grounding discussion on the often underestimated role of legitimacy and agency in global governance. Bernstein summarizes the contributors' conclusion that “the dynamics of global legitimation may be changing.” A range of …

International Relations after the Cold War

This article, based on Adam Roberts's valedictory lecture as Montague Burton Professor of International Relations at Oxford University, reconsiders the causes and consequences of the end of the Cold War. It argues that a key to understanding these developments is acceptance of pluralism—of theories, of political systems, of cultures, of methods of analysis, and of academic disciplines. Pluralism in at least some of these senses is a recognized strength of International Relations studies in the UK. The long tradition of acceptance of a plural international system, and a plural approach to understanding it, includes figures as varied as John Stuart Mill, Maxim Litvinoff, Alastair Buchan and Hedley Bull. The end of the Cold War was the result of a plural mix of factors: both force and diplomacy; both pressure and detente; both belief and disbelief in the reformability of communism; both civil resistance in some countries and guerrilla resistance in others; both elite action and street politics; both nuclear deterrence and the ideas of some of its critics; both threat and reassurance; both nationalism in the disparate parts of the Soviet empire and supranationalism in the European Community. Paradoxically, the specialists in politics and International Relations who came closest to foreseeing the end of the Cold War were those who made few if any claims to a ‘scientific’ approach, and whose idea of forecasting was based, at the very most, on Mill's modest concept of ‘a certain order of possible progress’. Since the end of the Cold War, simplistic interpretations of how it ended have contributed to narrow understandings of international order. The spirit of imposed universalism having fed from Moscow, has flourished as never before in its other favourite haunt, Washington DC. There is a need to recognize the plurality of perspectives that endure in the post-Cold War world.

The Ever-Studied Isle

[First paragraph]Cuba Transnational. Damián J. Fern ández (ed.). Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2005. xvii + 216 pp. (Cloth US$ 65.00)Cuba’s Aborted Reform: Socioeconomic Effects, International Comparisons, and Transition Policies. Carme lo Mesa-Lago & Jorge F. Pére z-Lópe z. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2005. xx + 223 pp. (Cloth US$ 59.95)Cuba, the United States, and the Post-Cold War World: The International Dimensions of the Washington-Havana Relationship. Moris Morley & Chris McGillion (eds.). Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2005. xi + 286 pp. (Cloth US$ 65.00)There are perhaps few countries other than France for which the ratio of academic word per population is higher than Cuba. Notwithstanding its symbolic significance over the past fifty years, it is important to remember that we are talking of a small island of something over ten million souls exporting sand and sugar. Even the Cuban diaspora has benefited from this arguably undeserved notoriety, and hardly a week goes by without yet another exile memoir. Over the past two weeks (this is being written in mid-August 2006), the attentionmeter once again jumped as Fidel’s illness and the temporary (?) transfer of power was documented by the global media. Given all this attention, new books on Cuba face a daunting challenge: to say something new about a place that has been much studied, but which, in many ways, has remained the same for the past half century. Is there something we don’t yet know?

Bill Clinton’s “new partnership” anecdote

This essay explores the composition of United States post-Cold War foreign policy rhetoric under President Bill Clinton. We contend that Bill Clinton offered a coherent and comprehensive foreign policy narrative for the direction of U.S. foreign policy discourse in the post-Cold War world. Specifically, we analyze the “new partnership” narrative that Clinton articulated in his 1998 trip to Africa as a representative anecdote for the larger body of his foreign policy discourse. This “new partnership” narrative was structured by three narrative themes: (1) America’s role as world leader; (2) reconstituting the threat environment; (3) democracy promotion as the strategy for American foreign policy. These three themes can be found throughout Clinton’s foreign policy rhetoric and serve as the basis for a foreign policy narrative used by Clinton, and perhaps, future administrations.

Korea in the Post-Cold War World : Macro Views and Micro Cases

냉전종식 기념일이 다가오고 있고 학자들은 이미 탈냉전 시대의 국제관계를 형성했던 중요한 이론적 전망에 대해 합의하고 있다. 사실주의, 자유주의, 구조주의의 중요 이론에 대한 학파는 각각 미어샤이머(Mearsheimer), 후쿠야마(Fukuyama), 헌팅턴(Huntington) 같은 학자들의 업적에 의해 대표된다. 본 논문은 탈냉전 시대의 미시적 인론적 전망에 대해 살펴 보고 그것을 동북아시아와 남?북한의 미시적 경우에 적용하였다. 또, 이론을 보완하기 위해 경험주의에 입각한 증거가 종종 사용되었다. 그러나 거기에도 남?북한과 중국, 일본, 미국의 미래관계를 추론하기 위해 이론이 동북 아시아의 안전 상황에 적용되고 있다. 잠재적인 발견을 지원하는 그 증거는 일화와 인상적인 것 둘 다를 포함하고 있다. 그러나, 이것은 위에서 언급한 나라들 사이에서 일어날 수 있는 가능한 미래의 시나리오를 이해하려는 첫 단계이다. 덧붙여, 미래의 연구를 위한 제안이 주어질 것이다.

Digital Diaspora and National Image Building: A New Perspective on Chinese Diaspora Study in the Age of China's Rise

is on the rise. A rising power has traditionally been thought of as a revisionist power by the status quo powers and neighbouring countries. There are still some disputes within the global community of China scholars about the speed and extent of China's rise. Most scholars' attention has focused on the question of whether an authoritarian and nationalistic China would adhere to international norms, and fully integrate itself into the existing global system. Therefore, Beijing must make efforts to establish a favourable national image (i.e., as a peaceful and responsible great power) in order to create a friendly international environment for its ascendancy. Moreover, compared to the rise of other powerful nations in history, China's current ascension has been complicated by a new but unpredictable factor that of the continuously growing Chinese diaspora, which consists of 38 million ethnic Chinese living outside of Greater China. In the post-Cold War world, the increased importance of national image building as part of foreign policy, and the formulation of new concepts such as transnationalism, the global information age and international broadcasting power have suggested alternative perspectives from which to approach diaspora studies. There is no consensus among the global community of China scholars on an apt description of the ethnic Chinese who live outside of Greater China, a region which is composed, of Mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau. The older term of Huaqiao refers to those Chinese who have been living outside of Greater China for many years, but still retain their Chinese citizenship. Obviously, this term is not strongly associated with new Chinese immigrants and foreign-born ethnic Chinese. Another term, that of overseas Chinese, refers to Chinese sojourners, Chinese subjects or nationals temporarily residing abroad, but excludes those who have become

A nova agenda internacional de segurança põe a democracia brasileira em risco?

Agenda Internacional de Segurança mudou após o fim da Guerra Fria. Surgiram novas ameaças, frequentemente domésticas, que vão de encontro às tradicionais teorias de segurança. Este artigo analisa documentos oficiais produzidos por atores nacionais e internacionais. É possível concluir que existem incentivos políticos e jurídicos para a participação de militares em atividades policiais. Essa participação, contudo, pode apresentar riscos para a democracia.

The “Middle Power” Concept in Australian Foreign Policy

During the early 1990s, the Hawke and Keating Labor governments promoted Australia's diplomatic credentials as an activist and independent middle power. Labor claimed that by acting as a middle power Australia was constructing a novel diplomatic response to the challenges of the post‐Cold War world. But a closer reading of the official foreign policy record since 1945 reveals that previous conservative governments have also taken a similar view of Australia's place and position on the international stage. This essay traces the historical evolution of the middle power concept in Australian foreign policy and concludes with an assessment of the Howard government's more recent reluctance to use this label and its implications for Australia's future middle power credentials. Although its use has waxed and waned in official policy discourse and it is more commonly associated with Labor governments, the middle power concept itself and the general diplomatic style it conveys have been one of the most durable and consistent elements of Australia's diplomatic practice.

America's Global Role after Bush

The next American president's foreign policy will be conducted in the face of two main challenges. One is the legacy of George W. Bush: Iraq in particular, and a substantially weakened US strategic...

NATO's new mission: projecting stability in a post-Cold War world

Reports of NATO's death have been greatly exaggerated. Characterizations of NATO as a relic of the past do not square with the fact that the Alliance is busier today than at any time in its history. As Europe has become more unified and more democratic, NATO has assumed new layers of significance in the global security environment. In a post-September 11 world, the old 1990s debate about what is in area and what is out of area is a luxury that the Alliance can no longer afford. Decisions made at the 2004 Istanbul summit aimed at enhancing NATO's partnerships with the states of Central Asia and extending the partnership concept to the Greater Middle East reflect the Alliance's new, more global presence as do new military missions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sudan. Moore argues that a careful analysis of NATO's new, more global focus suggests that it's not the nature of NATO's mission that has changed, but rather its scope. NATO is approaching its new out of area missions with the political tools developed after the Soviet threat faded in the early 1990s when the Allies agreed that, rather than merely defend an old order, they would now create a new one grounded in liberal democratic values, including individual liberty and the rule of law. Indeed, the mission of projecting stability eastward was understood to be inextricable from the promotion of these values. This new mission required that NATO devote greater attention to its political dimension. In fact, as the United States turned to promoting democracy around the world in the wake of September 11, it ultimately sought to enlist NATO in its mission of extending democracy beyond Europe to Central Asia and the Middle East. As Moore demonstrates in her attempt to provide a full and comprehensive understanding of the new NATO, while divisions within the Alliance persist as to just how global NATO should be, the post-September 11 security environment ensures that NATO's survival depends upon its willingness to project security beyond Europe. That mission will be as much political as it is military.