post-Cold War Environment Research Articles

The Divide Over European Security

The war in Iraq continues to divide the Western democracies, nations once optimistic that the post-Cold War environment might lead to a more secure world. Even if solutions proved difficult to achieve, many hoped that these societies would share common viewpoints on threats to peace. Yet there have been contrasting security perspectives that have been highlighted by the conflict in Iraq, such as that of former European Union High Commissioner for Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, who stated in 2003 that “Europe is not at war.” One of the main cleavages is between Europe and the United States generally, with the former considering that the U.S. has increasingly been too dedicated to the unilateral use of force, views held by both elites and the general public in Europe. Even before the Bush Administration, Samuel Huntington described U.S. foreign policy as one of “world unilateralism,” with a single-minded devotion to its own interests while minimizing those of other countries. Since the Iraq war, Harold Pinter has stated, the U.S. “has become a fully-fledged, award-winning, gold-plated monster. It has effectively declared war on the world....” Many people in Western Europe have some sympathy with this view, if not its hyperbolic quality, and the war in Iraq appears to have amplified long-held convictions about the world’s sole remaining superpower. However another great cleavage is within Europe itself, mainly between those countries once dominated by the former Soviet Union and others more willing to object to U.S. security proposals. The major Central European states have long been part of the operations in Iraq, despite opposition and even outright threats by their new European Union neighbors. French President Chirac, for instance, publicly chided Poland for its quick support of the war, and as EU negotiations loomed implied that only major powers should decide questions of war and peace. Poland and the Czech Republic are presently being courted by the United States as sites for future missile defense bases, part of a system called “Son of Star Wars” by their media. As of March 2007, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Mark Pelaka was consulting with Europeans on plans to erect a partial shield against ballistic missiles launched

Vietnam´ s Membership of ASEAN: A Constructivist Interpretation

Vietnam's membership of ASEAN was driven by pragmatic reasons of economic growth, political independence and regime survival in a post Cold War environment. But in fact the learning process — which made Vietnamese decision-makers through their first-hand experiences more aware of convergent domestic and foreign policy goals between Vietnam and ASEAN — was instrumental in Vietnam's decision to seek ASEAN membership as quickly as possible. The case of Vietnam joining ASEAN then shows that the process of socialization and interactions between Vietnam and ASEAN countries helped improve the awareness of commonalities and promoted cooperative relations. And this is one of the main arguments in the constructivist approach to international cooperation based on the self-other internalization. In this connection, Vietnam joining ASEAN was also part of a broader process in which the country forged a new state identity in the post-Cold War era: Vietnam opted for ASEAN membership to overcome an identity crisis and political isolation. The ideational approach, therefore, offers an additional and more plausible explanation for Vietnam's decision to join ASEAN. Moreover, it helps explain Vietnam's continued satisfaction with and commitment to membership of ASEAN.

The Continuing Roles for U.S. Strategic Forces

The rise of hostile rogue states, new terrorist threats, and the proliferation of WMD and missile technology have all highlighted our need for an effective deterrence strategy in this post-Cold War environment. The fundamental questions of strategy we now face are to understand what and how we may be able to deter in a new strategic environment. Unfortunately, most of what we believed was true about deterrence during the Cold War is now misleading because international conditions have changed so dramatically. This conclusion does not suggest that we discard deterrence. It does, however, explain why our Cold War strategy of deterrence based on offensive nuclear forces and a mutual balance of terror must be reconsidered in toto.

Into the Black: JPL and the American Space Program, 1976–2004 (review)

Reviewed by: Into the Black: JPL and the American Space Program, 1976–2004 Yasushi Sato (bio) Into the Black: JPL and the American Space Program, 1976–2004. By Peter J. Westwick . New Haven: University Press, 2006. Pp. xviii+392. $40. Into the Black is a sequel to Clayton R. Koppes's JPL and the American Space Program: A History of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (1982), which covers the history of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory up to 1976. Like its predecessor, Peter Westwick's book is an institutional history examining JPL's roles and achievements, its management and culture, and its organizational strategies and external relations. JPL is a national laboratory, carrying out NASA's programs and managed by the California Institute of Technology (Caltech). As Koppes has [End Page 893] shown, the triangular institutional relationship among JPL, NASA, and Caltech has shaped the character of JPL ever since it withdrew from army missile projects and started developing deep-space robotic spacecraft for NASA in 1959. Westwick argues that the triangle tilted toward Caltech in the 1970s and 1980s, as JPL increased its autonomy from NASA by diversifying its work into energy research and military projects. Then in the 1990s, most non-NASA work phased out, and the triangle tilted back toward NASA. In Westwick's account, diversification is a key parameter in understanding JPL's institutional evolution. Westwick's analysis of JPL's involvement in military work is suggestive. In the late 1970s, JPL began developing defense systems as well as pursuing research on war-gaming and combat simulation, in the face of opposition from many Caltech professors. This was a response to NASA's declining budget, and JPL could avoid drastic cutbacks that other NASA centers suffered. Westwick argues that military funding spurred development of new technologies, which then flowed into civilian programs. Civilian engineering also fed into military programs, so the two became almost integrated with each other. More important, Westwick points out that JPL's acquisition of military technologies and management models drove a shift in the 1990s toward the "faster, better, cheaper" approach, which paralleled that of NASA as a whole. The book is divided into three parts: first, from 1976 to 1982, when a young, aggressive director Bruce Murray responded to a shrinking NASA budget by political lobbying and diversification; then, from 1982 to 1991, when a more restrained, pragmatic director Lew Allen renewed JPL's connection to the military while also improving its relationships with NASA; finally, from 1991 to 2001, when director Ed Stone, embracing new management theories, sought to reorient JPL's culture to adapt to the faster, better, cheaper approach in the post–cold war environment. Westwick believes that each director strongly influenced the culture of JPL. In the epilogue he briefly examines JPL under current director Charles Elachi. Westwick often discusses JPL's culture, which is quite natural for an institutional history. He regards JPL's strength in systems engineering and its emphasis on collective rather than individual achievements as aspects of its culture. It is true that project managers such as Robert Parks, Jack James, and John Casani rigorously enforced a systems engineering regime. But did the laboratory as a whole really turn to systems engineering? As Westwick notes in summarizing Koppes's book, during the 1960s JPL's engineers had a strong inclination toward individualism and a loose, academic style of operation. Had initiatives by a relatively small number of engineers really eradicated such institutional tradition by the mid-1970s? To what extent was JPL's culture stable and pervasive? Such questions could have been dealt with more carefully. Be that as it may, Into the Black solidly covers the history of JPL from [End Page 894] 1976 to 2004. There are adequate accounts of the technologies the laboratory developed and the projects it carried out, including Voyager, Mars Pathfinder, and Cassini, as well as other major and minor efforts. It describes the lab's changing demography, relations with the local community, and public perceptions of its achievements. It identifies complex tensions between human and robotic exploration, between JPL and the aerospace industry, between scientists and technologists, and within the scientific community. Not only that, it offers overall...

A How-To Handbook for Hegemons

Have you ever eaten dinner at a Japanese restaurant but on the way home secretly been tempted to grab a burger at a fast food drive-through? No matter how delicious the sushi was, sometimes one is left yearning for... a little something more. That is precisely the feeling one has after reading Jakub Grygiel's generally excellent Great Powers and Geopolitical Change. Despite its short length (only 177 pages, not counting the 49 pages of Notes), Grygiel has aggressive ambitions for this little book. In it, he aspires to do nothing less than (i) review the historical development of geopolitics, (ii) argue for its current relevance to the study and practice of international statecraft, (iii) present three relevant case studies, and (iv) posit some strategic lessons for future United States decision makers. Grygiel succeeds in much of this, and as such Great Powers and Geopolitical Change is a must-read for anyone interested in international relations in general and geopolitics in particular. Nonetheless, partly due to the book's brevity, the reader is still left with a vague hunger for a little more: a little more depth in the policy analysis, a little more breadth in the theoretical scope. At its simplest, geopolitics is the study of the role that geographic factors (very broadly defined) play in the behavior of nations. By the beginning of the twentieth century, geopolitics had formed one of the basic foundations of the traditional realist school of international relations and every self-respecting political scholar was expected to acquire a firm knowledge of geography. In the interwar years, however, German geopoliticians highjacked the field to justify the Nazi regime's policies of military aggression and genocide. As a result, the field of geopolitics fell into a long period of intellectual disdain, reviled by academe for its intellectual and moral ambiguity. But with the fall of the Soviet Union, scholarly interest in geopolitics has enjoyed a substantial revival. The neoconservative clique within the Bush Administration has shown itself to be particularly enamored with the role that geographic factors can play in strategically dominating the post-Cold War environment (Ikenberry 2002). Celebrating this renaissance of interest, Great Powers and Geopolitical Change begins with a history of geopolitics' rollercoaster ride as an academic approach to international relations. Grygiel argues convincingly that the austere econometric models favored by the current generation of number crunching political scientists shortchange our understanding of state behavior. His portrayal of geopolitics is decidedly mainstream, ignoring the full flower of the approach that is so well illustrated in, for instance, The Geopolitics Reader by Gear6id Tuathail, Simon Dalby, and Paul Routledge (1998). Nevertheless, the first chapter of Great Powers and Geopolitical Change is a superbly succinct essay that shows the enduring relevance of geopolitics. International relations instructors should consider it as an introductory reading on the subject for both undergraduate and graduate students. Grygiel's second chapter sets out the central thesis of the book: the fairly obvious admonition that states, especially those with imperial ambitions, must

The Pendulum Swings toward a Rising Sun

[ 188 ] asia policy The Pendulum Swings toward a Rising Sun T.J. Pempel In the late 1980s, when Japan’s economic boom hit its high point of “irrational exuberance,” the West seemed able to find plausible any tale concoctedbyanycharlatanwhohadspenttwoweeksinJapan.Foragluttonous and gullible West, alleged links between samurai swordsmanship and justin -time management seemed no less improbable than analysis of jujitsu as a guarantee that the “land of the rising sun” would dominate the 21st century. The popping of Japan’s economic bubble soon displaced that of triumphalist champagne corks. Global insouciance ushered in a wave of “Japan passing” that was combined with a love-hate fascination with a rapidly growing China that might be a new source of economic dynamism—or a perfidious military threat. Thesetwobooks,eachbyaforemostauthorityonJapan,markanewswing of the pendulum. Gone, each argues, is the Japan of the Yoshida Doctrine premised as it was on high economic growth and passivity in global affairs. “Checkbook diplomacy” and “free rides” on defense have been replaced by a Japanese foreign policy that is conspicuously more robust, more militaryfocused , and more nationalistic. Neither Kenneth Pyle nor Richard Samuels gives credibility to those who dismiss Japan and its foreign policies as irrational, passive, or lacking in strategic thought. Instead, these two authors present rich and compatible, though unique, portraits of Japanese strategic history, demonstrating the overarching rationality behind Japan’s shifting policies. Pyle, as the historian, devotes roughly two-thirds of his analysis to Japan’s policies during the Meiji period, the liberal 1920s, World War II, and the early postwar period, showing how Japanese elites adapted to changing external environments in the pragmatic pursuit of national wealth and power. Today, he argues, Japan is in the midst of yet the latest adaptation, this time to the new post–Cold War environment, where, particularly in East Asia, the challenges from a nuclear North Korea and a “rising China” provide the stimulus behind a resurgent Japan. Samuels’ sensitivity to historical roots plays out in his analysis of ongoing coalitional dances among domestic political competitors whom T.J. Pempel is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, where from 2001 to 2006 he also served as Director of the Institute of East Asian Studies. The author of twelve books and over 100 scholarly articles, he is currently at work on a manuscript on U.S. foreign policy toward Asia. He can be reached at . [ 189 ] book review roundtable • japan rising & securing japan he sees as the key shapers of Japanese foreign policy. Samuels shows how new ideological configurations are today combining to produce what I have elsewhere called the “regime shift” that underpins Japan’s new grand strategy. While Pyle italicizes the underlying rationality of eventual Japanese security choices, Samuels teases out precisely how competing Japanese elites put forward alternatives that can offer equal, though dramatically different, claims to rationality. What shapes Japan’s choices, Samuels contends, are changing norms and identities and their power in the country’s ongoing policy discourse. In his words, “collectively held understandings of social life and national aspiration are not bequeathed by history but [are] forged and reforged in the crucible of political debate” (p. 187). As a consequence, Samuels places emphasis on how political entrepreneurs are now using these understandings to sell their own preferences for a post-Yoshida “Goldilocks consensus” that gets things “just right.” To even the most jaded Japan watcher, each book offers page after page of insightful nuggets on specific facets of Japanese power and strategy, including the enhanced influence of a new generation of Japanese politicians born after World War II. A major focus in both books is the U.S.-Japan relationship. There Pyle is more sanguine than Samuels. Pyle sees the alliance—albeit in a more symmetrical reconfiguration than at present—as the pillar for a stable Asian region and the pivot for a trilateral relationship among Japan, China, and the United States. Samuels, in contrast, underscores the open debate about the alliance now going on in Japan, noting that there are those who see the United States as posing “as great a threat to Japan as any hostile neighbor” (p. 151). Moreover, though neither says it so bluntly...

Global Energy Security and Its Geopolitical Impediments—The Case of the Caspian Region

AbstractThis article discusses the global geopolitics of energy security in the post-Cold War environment. Energy companies headquartered in western countries have long history of accessing energy resources beyond borders through invasion of the host by their home state, followed by domination and the creation of property rights to explore and sell oil. Conquest and domination, respectively voluntary exchange are the survival strategies of human groups in the global system. The article differentiates between demand-induced scarcity, supply-induced scarcity, structural scarcity, and the creation and transfer of property rights. Together, the behaviors referred to by these concepts create a field of social forces that cross state borders and involve state and non-state actors. Monopolizing control over energy resources by the Anglo-Saxon maritime powers was one of the causes of both world wars. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US has been creating a land-based extension of its post-World War II defense perimeter. It runs from Romania, via Central Eurasia, to Israel, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Overland transport increasingly connects economies and energy supplies on the Central European and Pacific sides of the Eurasian continent. The US, therefore, has decided to bring under its military umbrella the energy-carrying region between industrializing China and India, recovering Russia and unifying Europe. China's policy to secure its energy supply by direct contracting with the home state and legal owner of the stock, brings it into confrontation with the US. The latter consumes one-quarter of the energy assumed to be present in the Greater Middle East. In recent decades, the Chinese economy has been growing at a rate substantially above the worldwide growth rate, which implies that China's share in the world economy is increasing over time. Accordingly, China is becoming more dependent on imports, especially energy. The US domestic oil production peaked in 1970-71. Thus, the US has no spare capacity to provide its allies in Europe and East Asia in case of an interruption of supply. The conquest of Iraq by the US and its allies, and the transfer of the management of the oil sector from the state to a US tax-paying private company opens a new era of violent interstate competition for access to and control of fossil energy sources.

The United Nations Organization and Global Power Politics: The Antagonism between Power and Law and the Future of World Order

The dilemma faced by the United Nations Organization at the beginning of the 21st century lies in its inability to reconcile the structural realities of power politics in a unipolar world with the requirements of the international rule of law. The paper ana- lyses the normative contradictions in the UN Charter that result from the antagonism between power and law and reviews the prospects for a fundamental reform of the United Nations Organization that would guarantee its survival under the radically different circumstances of the post-Cold War environment. In that regard, the paper emphasizes the need for a new paradigm of international organization that will do away with the idea of special privileges accorded to the great powers of 1945, and emphasizes the need for a better regional balance in the decision- making processes at the United Nations.

The Soviet Union and Communist China, 1945-1950: The Arduous Road to the Alliance (review)

Reviewed by: The Soviet Union and Communist China, 1945-1950: The Arduous Road to the Alliance Michael Sheng (bio) Dieter Heinzig. The Soviet Union and Communist China, 1945-1950: The Arduous Road to the Alliance. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2004. xix, 531 pp. Hardcover $99.95, ISBN 7656-0785-9. When the Sino-Soviet border war erupted in 1969 and Richard Nixon's visit to Beijing followed in 1972, the Western world was almost in shock. In the academic world, what emerged in the aftershock was a fundamental change of climate; the "revisionist" interpretation of the "lost chance in China" overwhelmed the "lost China" thesis of the heyday of the Cold War in the 1950s and 1960s. The Democrats of the Truman administration recognized the impossibility of massive intervention in China to stop the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) march in 1948-1949, while hoping that the "nationalistic" Mao would be a Tito in the East. The "hands off" China policy ensued. Compounded by the Soviet acquisition of the atomic bomb, the CCP's victory in late 1949 and the Sino-Soviet military-alliance treaty in early 1950 not only made the "wise men" in Washington appear to be [End Page 365] quite unwise but also provided ammunition for the Republican opposition. The attack on the Truman China policy became ferocious with the outbreak of the Korean War, a war that turned out to be the first that the Americans would not win. The finger-pointing on Capitol Hill was reflected in the academic world, with the publication of books with titles such as How the Far East Was Lost: American Policy and the Creation of Communist China.1 The Sino-Soviet conflict started to simmer before the end of the 1950s, culminating in the border clash at the end of the 1960s. Trying to find a way out of the Vietnam fiasco, the Nixon administration played the China card to take the advantage of the feud between the two communist giants. Mao's ping-pong diplomacy not only opened China to the world but also forecast a revisionist wave in the academy, and books then flooded the shelves with such titles as "Lost Chance in China."2 The revisionist school perceived the Chinese Communists as nationalists, progressives, or agrarian reformists—anything but communists, whose "political program is simple democracy. This is much more American than Russian in form and spirit."3 Thus, the conclusion arose that Washington under both Democratic and Republican administrations had lost the chance to win over the CCP by blindly supporting the Guomindang (the GMD/KMT, or Nationalist Party) during the Chinese civil war, and then by fighting needless wars in Korea and Vietnam. This revisionist school of thought was not seriously challenged until the 1990s, when a considerable amount of new historical evidence came to light in the post-Cold War environment. Based on what "we now know"—to borrow from the title of John Gaddis' book—some scholars, many of them émigrés such as Chen Jian and this reviewer, revisited the events leading to the founding of the Beijing government in 1949, concluding that the "lost chance in China" was nothing but a myth.4 The new post-Cold War literature has found that a shared ideology and a common distrust of the KMT and its backer, the United States, brought Mao and Stalin closer, although they conspired to mislead the Americans to believe that the Chinese Communists were "margarine communists" and that Moscow had nothing to do with them. In reality, Mao reported every major decision to Stalin in advance, and Stalin's advice was always closely heeded, which saved the CCP from Mao's often reckless impulses in many crucial instances. But what is new in the new literature is its emphasis on the role of ideology in the equation of foreign relations; a policy maker's perception of national interest is never "objective." After stating the history-in-a-nutshell in a necessarily simplistic manner, where does this current book stand? At first glance, it is undoubtedly one of the most comprehensively researched scholarly works to date, with eighty-five pages of meticulously documented notes. The most important...

Chinese Foreign Policy in Transition

Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, and particularly after the opening brought about by economic reforms roughly thirty years thereafter, China has become an influential player in regional and global affairs. Increasingly, both American and European policymakers examine Chinese foreign policy as a flexible, pragmatic, and significant element in world affairs. This has accelerated in the middle of the new first decade of this century, as business firms and political officials have developed interests in the sources, processes, and significance of China's reemergence as a global force. This volume examines how, in conjunction with rapid economic growth and profound social transformation, China's foreign policy is experiencing significant transition.The purpose of this truly deep and probing collection is to deepen Western understanding of the sources, substance, and significance of Chinese foreign policy--with a focus on the post Cold War environment. Contributors include academic specialists, area researchers, and distinguished journalists, all with firsthand experience in the field of China studies. The volume is divided into four parts: (1) theory and culture; (2) perspective and identity; (3) bilateral relationships; and (4) retrospective and prospective essays on Chinese policy concerns. The volume is sensitive to changes in national leadership and Communist Party structure as well as continuity and change in foreign policy. As Lowell Dittmer of the University of California notes in his Foreword, precisely because it is so difficult to do well, the analysis of foreign policy is often conducted rather tritely.Thus it is a real pleasure to find assembled here a treasure trove of some of the finest work by some of the field's most penetrating minds. This is fortunate, for at the core of this volume is one of the biggest and most portentous questions to confront the world at the outset of the twenty-first century. That

The Need for Influence Theory and Actor-Specific BehavioralModels of Adversaries

This article discusses problems of employing deterrence and coercive diplomacy in intra-state conflicts, drawing on those aspects of experience with these strategies during the Cold War relevant for dealing with intra-state conflicts, and adding some reflections on problems of employing these strategies in the post-Cold War environment. The special characteristics of intra-state conflicts, identified in this analysis, call attention to the need for several types of indirect deterrence and coercive diplomacy. Emphasis is placed on including deterrence and coercive diplomacy within a broader influence framework that considers the utility and sometimes the necessity for coupling these strategies with positive initiatives. This article outlines a basic requirement for effective use of these strategies, namely the need to replace the simplistic assumption that adversaries are “rational, unitary” actors with more specific “actor-specific behavioral models” essential for understanding and attempting to influence different adversaries.

Survival Strategies in an Era of Government Downsizing: Evidence from the Ogden Air Logistics Center

Abstract Due to the post-cold war environment, beginning in the late 1980s U.S. military missions shifted from the ability to support a full-scale war scenario against Warsaw pact nations to the ability to support regional conflicts. This new environment left the U.S. military with significant excess maintenance capacity. The Defense Business Operations Fund (DBOF was renamed working capital fund in 1995) was initiated by the Department of Defense to provide incentives for military services to embrace market-like efficiencies. This study examines the efficiency and effectiveness of a major United States Air Force aircraft repair depot, the Ogden Air Logistics Center. Efficiency and effectiveness data are collected and compared for the six-year period surrounding adoption of marketlike business practices. The results indicate dramatic efficiency improvements as profitability and efficiency of asset use increase sharply in the three years after adoption of the DBOF initiatives. The data also suggest that ma...

Strategic Innovation and the Administrative Heritage of East Asian Family Business Groups

Using the case of Chinese Family Business Groups (FBGs) in East Asia, this paper examines the relationship between the strategic behaviour exhibited by an organisational form and it's administrative heritage. To do so, we trace the origins of the strategic behaviour that scholars commonly attribute to FBGs to the environmental conditions prevailing during their emergence in the turbulent post-Colonial era of East Asia. We explain how fundamental changes brought about by shifts in the post-Cold war environment of East Asia have confronted FBGs with new opportunities and organising imperatives which their administrative heritages have left them ill-equipped to deal with. In concluding, we explain how the lack of fit between a dominant organisational form and contemporaneous environmental conditions may have significant implications for the organisations themselves and the economies whose landscapes they dominate.

Japan´s Post‑Cold War Security Policy: Bringing Back the Normal State

Introduction Japan's security role in both regional and international affairs has experienced a marked shift from that which it used to play during the COLD WAR. During the Cold War, Japan adopted an isolationist regional strategy of one-country pacifism. This strategy rested on two pillars: first, Japan pursued economic diplomacy while avoiding any political role in international security affairs; and second, Japan entrusted its stake in regional security to the United States. (1) However, Japanese passivity towards security affairs came under scrutiny at the onset of the post-Cold War era. The resultant vulnerability of the East Asian security environment, characterized by a possible drawdown of U.S. military forces and the uncertainty posed by the rise of China, prompted Japanese policy-makers to call for a reassessment of Japan's strategy of one-country pacifism. This reassessment introduced a greater political dimension in Japan's security policy. The key event that led to a shift in Japanese security policy was Tokyo's embarrassing experience during the Persian Gulf War of 1991. Despite Japan's huge financial contribution to the war effort, its reluctance to dispatch non-combat personnel to the Gulf exposed it to criticism from both the West and the Arab states. (2) The Gulf War experience was a significant event for Japan, for two reasons. First, it challenged Japan to think beyond the defence of its territory and participate in defining new rules to govern the international security environment in the post-Cold War period. (3) Secondly, the Persian Gulf War demonstrated to Japan that military power still shapes international relations to a significant degree in the post-Cold War era, and that Japan was ill-equipped to deal with military crises. (4) Following the Gulf War, the security dimension in Japanese foreign policy gained prominence. In response to the emergence of new external threats, Japan adjusted its security policy to allow for greater participation in the international security environment. It did so in particular ways. First, in 1992, Tokyo enacted the International Peace Co-operation Law, which allowed Japan to play a more active security role through greater participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO). The passing of this Law led to the successful deployment of 1,800 Japanese troops to Cambodia as part of a UN-sponsored peacekeeping force in 1992. (5) Secondly, Tokyo reformulated the National Defence Programme Outline (NDPO) in 1995 -- the first time since 1976. That reformulation emphasized Japan taking a greater role in UNPKOs, and the Self-Defence Force (SDF) addressing low-intensity threats such as terrorism. (6) Thirdly, in 1996, the Japanese Government agreed to enter into talks with the United States to revital ize the U.S.-Japan alliance to make it more relevant to the postCold War environment. In the new U.S.-Japan Joint Security Declaration, both countries outlined an agenda for a greater role for Japan in expanded defence co-operation, including defence planning, research and development, missile defence, and diplomacy towards China. (7) In explaining Japan's enhanced security role in regional affairs, this article employs the concept of a state. In the conceptualization of a normal state, the omission of Japan comes as no surprise to many Japan observers. This is due to the stark imbalance in Japan's involvement in the economic versus security spheres globally since the post-war years. While it has reached the position of being the second largest economy in the world, Japan has deliberately avoided taking any major political initiative in international affairs. This imbalance in Japan's behaviour is supported and perpetuated by internal controls, such as the Peace Constitution, social and legal norms that restrict the role of its military, the limitation of defence expenditures to one per cent of the gross national product (GNP), and Japan's adherence to the three non-nuclear principles. …

Faith, Hope, Neoliberalism: Mapping Economies of Violence on the Margins of Europe

This paper explores the manner in which the east of Europe has been theorized in the post cold war environment, and the implications for our understanding of the relationship between east and west. It argues that hegemonic discourses of neoliberalism lend a quality of inevitability to the integration of east into west, which in turn leads to a singular conception of Europe at the end of a trajectory of development. The paper argues that the relationship of western Europe to eastern Europe is more fruitfully explored through the conceptual framework of a center to its margins, which allows for a broader range of analysis on the issues — conceptual and implementational — at stake in transition processes, and which will allow for a theoretical exploration of where power is located and exercised. Because eastern Europe is understood in scholarly and policy communities as politically and geographically European, the study of postcommunist transition in Europe falls outside the purview of a development studies community that is increasingly focused on the emerging north/south divide. In a scholarly environment where the East/West divide no longer constitutes a salient focus of study, there is a need for the development of a framework that will provide a richer understanding of the reconstituted relationships being formed in Europe in the post-cold war environment. This paper argues that the social, economic, and political impact of disciplinary neoliberalism in eastern Europe can benefit from an analysis that takes into consideration the Eurocentric, disciplinary power that lies at the core of the transition process. Toward this end, it is necessary to query the discursive foundations of what constitutes the ‘properly European’ in order to develop a framework for a more fruitful course of analysis with respect to the relationship between Europe and its fluctuating eastern margins.

Deterrence, Defenses, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control

This paper suggests a framework for thinking about the subjects of deterrence, nuclear weapons, defenses and arms control and outlines the major issues and how they interrelate. In the post-Cold War environment, new connections among them and vastly different circumstances around them will change how the United States formulates its security.

Principles of global security

From the earliest human records, warfare has been both an organizing focus and a prime source of political motivation. Countless battles have been fought in the course of colonizing the planet, and the experience has created a legacy of military confrontation that many people consider immutable. Since preparations for war and the occasional conduct of it have been central preoccupations for virtually all the major states throughout time, it is widely assumed that the pattern is rooted in human nature and will endure indefinitely. But contemporary civilization is undergoing a monumental transformation affecting its most basic features. The combined effects of information technology, population dynamics, and the globalization of economic activity are altering some of the critical operating conditions of human societies and appear to be inducing a new pattern of interaction. Correspondingly, fundamental changes in the practice of war-or what is now more politely called international security-can be expected to follow. Principles of Global Security anticipates the major implications of this massive transformation for security policy. John D. Steinbruner, one of the nation's leading specialists on defense issues, identifies formative problems and organizing principles relating to the predictable issues of security. He examines in sequence how the configuration of nuclear and conventional forces might be affected, how the problems of communal violence and dangers of technical proliferation might be managed, and how security relationships among the major states might be altered. One of the fundamental implications of globalization in a post-cold war environment is a shift in security policy from deterrence to reassurance, from active confrontation to cooperative engagement. Without an opponent to justify preparation for large-scale traditional missions, nations must establish safer and less volatile patterns of deployment. Maintaining global security in the twenty-first century calls for a reconfiguration of basic relationships among historical opponents, as well as revisions in military practices. This visionary work will stimulate productive thinking among policymakers seeking to reshape the legacies of the cold war with a new conceptualization of international security.

The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States

This comparative analysis of the foreign policies of European Union member states includes comprehensive coverage of the post-Maastricht period and the three newest members of the EU. In the only comparative study of its kind since 1976, the book analyzes the dual impact of the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union, and the post-Cold War environment on the foreign policy processes of the EU’s member states. The book argues for a new approach to the foreign policy analysis of EU states that recognizes the fundamental changes that membership brings after the Cold War, but also acknowledges the diverse role of policies which states seek to retain or advance as being “special.”

Can Japan Craft an International Nuclear Disarmament Policy?

Research Article| July 01 2000 Can Japan Craft an International Nuclear Disarmament Policy? Anthony DiFilippo Anthony DiFilippo Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Asian Survey (2000) 40 (4): 571–598. https://doi.org/10.2307/3021183 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Anthony DiFilippo; Can Japan Craft an International Nuclear Disarmament Policy?. Asian Survey 1 July 2000; 40 (4): 571–598. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/3021183 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAsian Survey Search This content is only available via PDF. Copyright 2000 The Regents of the University of California Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

The Turkish‐Israeli rapprochement in the post‐Cold War era

(2000). The Turkish‐Israeli rapprochement in the post‐Cold War era. Middle Eastern Studies: Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 172-191.