1 Thanks are due to Adam Arico, Matt Bedke, Mike Bruno, Jerry Gaus, Kate Johnson, Josh Knobe, David Schmidtz, Daniel Silvermint, Jen Zamzow, and an anonymous referee for this journal. 2 Samuel Scheffler says that “none of the most prominent contemporary versions of philosophical liberalism assigns a significant role to desert at the level of fundamental principle.” Samuel Scheffler, “Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes, and Liberalism in Philosophy and Politics.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 21, no. 4 (1992): 299-323, 301. See, for example John Rawls, A Theory of Justice. Revised ed. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1999, 89; “The Basic Structure as Subject.” American Philosophical Quarterly 14, (1977): 159-65, 162; Ronald Dworkin, “Why Bakke Has No Case.” New York Review of Books, November 10, 1977; Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979; Brian Barry, Political Argument. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965; Robert Goodin, “Negating Positive Desert Claims.” Political Theory 13, no. 4 (1985): 575-598. 3 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971, 104. 4 Eric Rakowski, Equal Justice. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991, 112. 5 Serena Olsaretti, Liberty, Desert, and the Market. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, 28. 6 Peter Vallentyne, “Brute Luck Equality and Desert.” In Desert and Justice, edited by Serena Olsaretti, 169– 185. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, 175.